Because they don't have to, yet. It's an "if", and it's a big "if".
IMO, the US should publicly commit to a solid order for a very large number of the weapon systems Taiwan and Ukraine would likely need in an extended double conflict. We saw in COVID (with things like tests) that "we need a billion of X, but we'll dribble out the order in much smaller quantities" tends to make industry leery of evaporating demand after making big capital investments.
Indeed. Americans often seem to keep re-telling themselves the narratives of WW2. "America builds lots of cheap, effective equipment faster than our opponents." Except today, we build huge, complex, expensive equipment much slower than others.
China would completely swamp our manufacturing. However, they only have a small stockpile of the raw goods needed to keep up their current manufacturing levels. Even for something as basic as steel, which China's overwhelming dominance in is widely known...they are very limited by foreign imports of iron (75% of their domestic consumption of iron is provided by Australia). If China had to stop imports from Western nations, its war material production capacity would probably drop by about 75% after its 30-90 day stockpile of raw materials was used up.
How much America's production suffer without good from China? Probably fairly catastrophic as well, but more especially in the long run as industrial parts break and need replacement. The resultant domestic shortages and inflation here would quickly ruin our populations appetite for any major trade war over a small foreign island.
> they are very limited by foreign imports of iron (75% of their domestic consumption of iron is provided by Australia). If China had to stop imports from Western nations, its war material production capacity would probably drop by about 75% after its 30-90 day stockpile of raw materials was used up.
That’s a fair point, but US geopolitical decisions have incentivized an extremely close relationship between China and Russia, which has the third-largest iron ore reserves globally and is one of the largest producers of many other raw materials as well.
Yes and no. For example, production of Soviet-compatible ammunition is restored in some NATO countries. However, production rate is not high enough to have parity with RF. IMHO, Ukraine should capture Russian stocks in Transnistria to match RF stocks. Taiwan has no such option. Moreover, Taiwan sea routes can be easily interrupted with sea mines. If the war will start this year, then it's too late to bump up weapon production.
The Ukraine war has demonstrated you don’t need parity in shells. A dozen or two HIMARS turned the tide against hundreds of artillery pieces; mobility, range, and accuracy mattered more than being able to send hundreds of shells in a general direction.
While we’re comparing Ukraine and Taiwan, Taiwan has significant defensive advantages; tougher terrain, no land border, and they’ve been fortifying for decades. Even river crossings in Ukraine are fraught with peril, let alone an ocean strait.
IMO, the US should publicly commit to a solid order for a very large number of the weapon systems Taiwan and Ukraine would likely need in an extended double conflict. We saw in COVID (with things like tests) that "we need a billion of X, but we'll dribble out the order in much smaller quantities" tends to make industry leery of evaporating demand after making big capital investments.