I’m not a fan of Many Worlds. Communication or even detection of the split universes is impossible, which means it is impossible to measure. And science requires measurement to confirm our theories. Which means the MWI is equivalent to a simpler interpretation that doesn’t require split universes.
If something moves far enough away from us that it exits our observable universe, should we assume it still exists, or that physics has a special collapse rule that makes it stop existing at that point? Just like the split universes, it's impossible to directly measure the existence of objects outside of our observable universe.
> MWI is equivalent to a simpler interpretation that doesn’t require split universes.
That simpler interpretation is also equivalent to a simpler implementation that doesn’t require apparently-arbitrary resolutions of quantum probabilities (MWI). It’s essentially a question of where you hide the “weird”.
It seems likely to me that they’re both wrong, and the in-principle-untestability of all this points to our mental machinery just failing to map intuitive concepts onto this space, but I’m totally agnostic to this. I do find MWI more conceptually appealing.
