Hacker News new | past | comments | ask | show | jobs | submit login

I'm a little surprised we haven't seen governments try offering identity-based encryption as a way to head off encryption that's harder for them to wire-tap.

For the unfamiliar, with identity-based encryption, the recipient's public key is a function of the key authority's public key and some "identity", such as a national ID number or email address. Their private key is a one-way function of their identity and the key authority's private key. So, the recipient needs to ask the key authority one time to generate their private key for them, but there's only one public key to distribute. For the whole system, the sender can calculate the recipient's public key. The private key isn't even necessarily calculated before the sender has sent their message! It's very convenient and flexible!

Of course, the downside is that the private key is deterministic and can always be re-generated by the key authority, so it's fundamentally vulnerable to attack by the key authority. Also, some of the underlying math is less well studied than standard ECDHE/DHE/RSA, so we're less confident about vulnerabilities lurking just under the surface.




Join us for AI Startup School this June 16-17 in San Francisco!

Guidelines | FAQ | Lists | API | Security | Legal | Apply to YC | Contact

Search: