This subthread, not the article, is about a proposal that the State use its power and funds to directly build housing, and, were it to choose to do so, it could alter the power of subordinate jurisdictions to impede that in any way it chose. So, current local administratively imposed costs are not, legitimately, part of the building cost the state would necessarily face in such a hypothetical, only actual construction costs or federally-imposed administrative costs.
Hypothetically, the state can dissolve any city with a simple majority vote in the legislature, clearing the decks of any irritating "lead agencies" with bothersome CEQA conclusions. But realistically, the state has only ever dissolved one entity involuntarily.
Short of dissolution the state cannot simply ignore local agencies, as we see with UC vs. Berkeley.
> Short of dissolution the state cannot simply ignore local agencies
No, short of dissolution, it can also adopt any restriction on or state immunity from local authority it wants. (There are some resrictions that might take a ballot measure rather than just the legislature, but since the hypothetical didn’t limit the methods by which the proposed program would be adopted, that is immaterial.)
> UC vs. Berkeley.
UC, while established by the State, is not coextensive with it and does not independently exercise the full powers of the State.
I appreciate both your willingness to follow the replies, and your openness to practical solution that so few seem to consider. This isn't a federal system where the cities have real powers. All the power in our state lies with the state, but the state government so seldom exercises it.
