> about the safety of their fleet operating in coastal areas
> i.e. the US can't reasonably sanction China.
Please correct me if I'm wrong, but I assume you're linking these ideas together.
From a military standpoint, at least today, the US can use its blue water navy to patrol and shut down shipments of resources going in to China pretty well. You don't need to get near the Chinese coast to do that. The US also has no interest in any sort of land warfare in China, so ultimately the strategy is containment. That's why the US (and Biden announced this again today) would absolutely go to war with China over Taiwan, because for China to take Taiwan is to break out of this containment zone and basically eliminate most of the effectiveness of the US Navy in the Pacific as it would relate to China, and undoubtedly end the US as global hegemon.
I think people assume that the US Navy has to be close to China in order to do damage and therefore naval ships are screwed because China will launch missles. While I do think the US Navy would conduct operations and quickly learn what exact capabilities the Chinese have, I don't think their effectiveness is limited to near-shore operations. Frankly, the US can shut down all maritime trade for China and now all of a sudden the Chinese are trying to ship in food and goods and energy products (oil and coal) via road, which I don't think is currently feasible.
But I also don't think China is foolish enough to actually try and invade Taiwan, because that would be like Ukraine, except with the US actively fighting. Some suggest China may try and launch a limited nuclear strike on a location like Guam, but I think that's very dangerous because the US would no doubt retaliate on mainland Chinese military assets and it either ends right then and there with both sides calling a truce (and China not invading Taiwan) or it would continue to escalate into a limited nuclear exchange, which would be catastrophic. China doesn't and won't have the military strength to take over Taiwan unless it's willing to take insane losses, like Russia is now (but worse) in Ukraine.
* I also have a pet conspiracy theory that the war in Iraq was launched to warm up the US military and give it practice with combined arms tactics against an enemy that can fight back, but not too hard.
> (oil and coal) via road, which I don't think is currently feasible
They'll be able to ship oil via rail and pipes from Western Siberia and the Russian Far East pretty soon, which, granted, is not as cheap as sea transport but is good enough. I think they have enough coal available inside China's borders.
I still cannot understand what the US strategists think when they're throwing the Russians (and their huge mineral resources) directly into China's hands. On this Kissinger is of course right, i.e. he mentioned recently that back in the day the US was careful not to diplomatically "fight" against both China and the USSR/Russia at the same time, for good reason.
> They'll be able to ship oil via rail and pipes from Western Siberia and the Russian Far East pretty soon
Not even close to that. Transsiberian railways are already operating at full capacity, mostly due to re-routed coal exports. Both rail and pipes will take a decade to build to re-route supplies to China from sea to land.
You overestimate how long it would take to build a pipeline from China to Russia in wartime with no regard to cost.
The transsiberian railway isn't operating anywhere near the capacity of the rail itself, it just doesn't have enough rolling stock. The recent upgrades weren't to increase maximum capacity, they were to increase capacity at cost by increasing maximum train length and maximum speed. Nothing prevented there to simply be more trains, it's just less economical. In wartime this matters little.
> I still cannot understand what the US strategists think when they're throwing the Russians
US and NATO and the West gave Russia all the opportunity it needed to integrate and they refused.
Also the resources don’t matter much. Ok so China buys them cheaply from Russia, and then the US buys them cheaply from other producers, and China keeps making products. What’s the issue?
Russia does not want to "integrate" (i.e. adopt Western "values" for the benefit of those Western countries), Putin has said that out in the open back in Munich, in 2007, I thought this global hegemonic thing that the US has had been left out somewhere in Iraq or/and Afghanistan.
> and then the US buys them cheaply from other producers, and China keeps making products. What’s the issue?
Afaik the US doesn't produce as much, it's China that does. In case of a future proxy war between China and the US cutting access to mineral resources might have been one of the main tactics adopted by the US. It's easier to do that when China brings in its resources via marine transport (it's a well established fact that the US dominates the planetary oceans), way harder to do that if said transport of resources is carried out "inside" a huge landmass like Eurasia.
> Russia does not want to "integrate" (i.e. adopt Western "values" for the benefit of those Western countries), Putin has said that out in the open back in Munich, in 2007,
Then I guess I'm confused about your comment:
> I still cannot understand what the US strategists think when they're throwing the Russians (and their huge mineral resources) directly into China's hands.
It seems you understand yea? Russia doesn't want themselves or their minerals in the hands of the West.
> I thought this global hegemonic thing that the US has had been left out somewhere in Iraq or/and Afghanistan.
No, it's just continued to evolve. Moving out of Afghanistan for example left a mess in the backyard of Iran, Pakistan, and China. Iraq so far has been a flawed, but growing in success endeavor.
> Afaik the US doesn't produce as much, it's China that does.
Sure, but that's not a lack of ability.
> In case of a future proxy war between China and the US cutting access to mineral resources might have been one of the main tactics adopted by the US. It's easier to do that when China brings in its resources via marine transport (it's a well established fact that the US dominates the planetary oceans), way harder to do that if said transport of resources is carried out "inside" a huge landmass like Eurasia.
I think there'd be a direct war. But I'm not sure you're disagreeing with me? The point I made was that the US Navy dominates the oceans and would block marine transport to China. In order for China to pivot into a defensive mode here it would have to spend a lot of noticeable money on infrastructure development for a future war that may or may not occur depending on its own actions. If China preemptively launched an attack and didn't build out this infrastructure, then it would be blockaded. If it did build out this infrastructure but didn't attack then it spent a lot of money for no good reason. Certainly the option is to try and build these networks in case of launching an attack, but that would happen regardless of US action.
Not being on the US side does not immediately correlate with being on China’s side, or, more exactly, it shouldn’t mean that. What Russia said it wants, several times, is a multi-polar world, so (for example), a world with the US vs Russia vs China (again, just as an example). The US is doing its best to make this into a world of US vs China+Russia thing.
That’s also the thing, blockading something by sea only makes sense if you blockade something of real value, so to speak. Right now that would work against China because they bring many valuable things by sea, a big part of that being mineral resources (iron from Australia, I guess copper from South America, oil from the Persian Gulf). If China can bring that stuff by land instead of by sea (so from Siberia/Russia instead of Australia and Chile) then a maritime blockade will have almost no discernible effect.
And lastly, I think money is not an issue for countries like China in this type of situations/scenarios, as in they’re not doing a cost/benefits analysis based on financial reasons, so to speak, they’ll be thinking along the lines of “does spending all this money make us just a little more ready against a war with US, no matter how unlikely?”, and if the answer is “yes” I think they’ll go for it, they’ll put that way above the financial well-being of the Chinese population (who will bear the costs for this). At the limit, that’s how a country like North Korea has been functioning since its inception, that’s how the former USSR was functioning at the height of the arms races against the West in the ‘70s and ‘80s, that’s how the West itself functioned for short periods of time in the past (during WW2, for example). That’s why when I see so many analyses (and I’m not targeting your comment, I’m thinking mostly about the Western media) that focus first and foremost on the economic thing in this type of scenarios I strongly believe that they fail to see the true nature of this confrontation.
> Not being on the US side does not immediately correlate with being on China’s side, or, more exactly, it shouldn’t mean that. What Russia said it wants, several times, is a multi-polar world, so (for example), a world with the US vs Russia vs China (again, just as an example).
Sure, but that means then that Russia also doesn't want to sell resources to the west, because wanting this "multi-polar world" means exactly that. Also, why in the hell would it be a multi-polar world where Russia is a prominent player? Because they have nuclear weapons? Not convincing. In a multi-polar world it would be something more akin to the US, China, Brasil, the EU, India, etc. - Russia would just be a minor player with not much economic or (now that we know) military clout.
> The US is doing its best to make this into a world of US vs China+Russia thing.
I don't see how you can argue this in good faith when you have Xi Jingping and Vladimir Putin meeting and talking about their "unlimited friendship". Maybe, just maybe, China and Russia made it a China + Russia thing because they thought that they could gang up and bully Europe and that the US and NATO were weak.
> That’s also the thing, blockading something by sea only makes sense if you blockade something of real value, so to speak. Right now that would work against China because they bring many valuable things by sea, a big part of that being mineral resources (iron from Australia, I guess copper from South America, oil from the Persian Gulf). If China can bring that stuff by land instead of by sea (so from Siberia/Russia instead of Australia and Chile) then a maritime blockade will have almost no discernible effect.
Transport via land is more expensive than by sea. China would have to build out this infrastructure at great cost, and you're assuming that they could obtain sufficient resources. Not sure that they can.
> That’s why when I see so many analyses (and I’m not targeting your comment, I’m thinking mostly about the Western media) that focus first and foremost on the economic thing in this type of scenarios I strongly believe that they fail to see the true nature of this confrontation.
I certainly agree and I think that's why so many (not myself) were surprised by Russia invading Ukraine. On the other hand, though, if China didn't care about economic interests so to speak, then they would have also launched an attack on Taiwan or otherwise did something when Russia attacked Ukraine. I think the CCP is more mercantile, even if they are nationalist, than Russia is. China has also had opportunities to do things like continue to trade with Russia, and there are many instances of Chinese suppliers abandoning Russia out of fear of being the recipient of US and EU sanctions. So I agree with you certainly with Russia, but I think it would then be a mistake to apply the same calculation to China.
You've sort of missed my point here: the point isn't a direct military engagement with China, and the Millenium challenge war game wasn't about a direct engagement with a major power - it was about an invasion of a regional state like Iran.
So the whole issue is that the US getting embroiled in a fight with someone for reasons has the issue that they're unlikely to be in a full-scale war footing, but rather they'll be fighting a single state with lots of neighboring friendlies, civilian traffic, and since they're not directly fighting China, no one's going to be able to stop the Chinese if they choose to screw around from backing whoever the opponent is.
Basically: exactly the scenario Russia finds themselves in with Ukraine.
Unlike the Ukrainians, the Chinese antiship missiles have very long legs. As in, 5000km+. They are 30 years apart technologically, if not more.
In theory, the DF-ZF could hit a target 10,000km away, but I don't think that's operational yet.
The best bet for the USN to blockade would be with submarines. A blockade with surface vessels is going to be exceedingly difficult.
Also, China has enough oil stockpiles (around a year) to be able to switch their oil to overland transportation, not via roads but via pipes. Meanwhile, coal wouldn't be transported by ship but by rail, which is expensive but not that bad.
A problem with very long range ASMs is targeting: how do you make sure the target is still within the field of view of your seeker when the missile gets to the target area, and how do you make sure it's actually the target? This is a major reason why TASM was retired.
It's not very complicated. The target is very large and slow, while the missile is very fast. I've done the math a few years ago, but with consumer-level optics you could easily search a 40km diameter area for a 300m sized optics in seconds from a distance of 300km.
Beyond that, you can use datalinks with a satellite (carriers are visible all the way from geostationary orbit), as well as two different types of targeting sensors on the missile, presumably optics+radar (which the Chinese seem to be doing), and obtain a very robust targeting solution.
The TASM was retired because it's really just a worse Harpoon in everything except payload. It wasn't worth putting too much work into it. It's also 10x slower than a DF-26, and speed helps a lot with targeting. Also, the TASM was pretty easy to shoot down since it was big, slow, and not very maneuvrable.
Currently PRC can still hit US basing in SK or JP and trigger US art5 tier security umbrella forcing them to fight within 1st island chain and range of strong PRC A2AD. Unless US choose to forgo commitment and obligations which is self defeating.
There's also PRC signalling developements of their prompt global strike program, using ICMBs to hit any target around the world = sinking US naval assets in port. Keep in mind every USN capital asset has to dock for maintainence eventually and current fleets are sustained by less than a handful of TAEO ships that enables more than a few days of continuous operation, which will make even distant blockade unviable. Sealift command / auxiliary force has ~30 fast support/oiler/ammunition ships total for all of USN. Reality is short/medium term PRC rocketry developments has potential destroy not just blue water naval projection but also extends inland to other strategic targets (i.e. strategic bombers) that make entire CONUS vunerable to deter attacks on mainland PRC targets. Ultimate goal is mutual conventional vunerability, which arguably already exists with cyberwarfare - US can blocade PRC, but no telling if PRC cyberwarfare can disrupt comparable % of US industrial production. IMO Blockade advocates US can starve PRC with impunity without realizing CONUS has become existentially vunerable in a other domains. Like stop PRC food/fuel imports and don't be surprised if energy grids start breaking down or DRMed agri equipement stops functioning during harvest season.
>except with the US actively fighting
Historically and fundementally, PRC taking TW has always been an exercise in overcoming US military. The point when PRC chooses to take TW, it would be when PLA has eroded ability for US to intervene by which time defeating US military intervention is as significant a political victory. Current PRC military modernization and aquisitions isn't built with confronting TW in mind, but US military and assumed US intervention. Frankly if US can be deterred or defeated then taking TW would be easy simply because it opens many other options like blockade, quarantine, siege etc. Then it will be a question of whether US is foolish enough to defend TW and risk losing her global hegemony or safe face and allow it to be an domestic Chinese civil war matter.
> Currently PRC can still hit US basing in SK or JP and trigger US art5 tier security umbrella forcing them to fight within 1st island chain and range of strong PRC A2AD.
But this is self-defeating for a few reasons:
1. The forces in South Korea and Japan are already there, and now you've guaranteed a war with whoever you just attacked and the US.
2. Attacking these forces doesn't result in territorial gains so now you're just lobbying missiles at countries which can lob them back.
3. An attack on South Korea or Japan will undoubtedly result in a severe backlash globally for China, regardless of whether or not they only attacked US bases (which will surely kill civilians anyway).
> There's also PRC signalling developements of their prompt global strike program, using ICMBs to hit any target around the world = sinking US naval assets in port
Which they won't do, because the US can't tell if these ICBMs are nuclear weapons nor where exactly they are going. So this will almost guarantee a nuclear response, which is probably not desirable for China.
> Keep in mind ...
First, US intelligence will see movement of Chinese forces, activation of units, missiles being prepared, etc, and then the ships can just leave port and/or move out of range. Outside of these hypersonic missiles, others can be shot down or avoided. Similarly to Russia's idiotic invasion of Ukraine, the US and allies will see Chinese activities coming well before they have any good position to attack.
> Reality is short/medium term PRC rocketry developments has potential destroy not just blue water naval projection but also extends inland to other strategic targets (i.e. strategic bombers) that make entire CONUS vunerable to deter attacks on mainland PRC targets.
This doesn't make sense for a few reasons. First, Chinese rockets can't destroy US blue water naval assets in the general way you are speaking. Second, the US forces in places like Guam would not just leave the strategic bombers sitting around. China could launch a surprise attack and hit targets, but that results in a response against Chinese forces, and the US can reposition forces away from these bases to locations such as Australia or Hawaii.
> IMO Blockade advocates US can starve PRC with impunity without realizing CONUS has become existentially vunerable in a other domains.
Third, an attack on the continental United States would probably result in a some really crazy stuff that I don't think China is interested in aggravating.
> Like stop PRC food/fuel imports and don't be surprised if energy grids start breaking down or DRMed agri equipement stops functioning during harvest season. Ultimate goal is mutual conventional vunerability, which arguably already exists with cyberwarfare - US can blocade PRC, but no telling if PRC cyberwarfare can disrupt comparable % of US industrial production.
Eh it can be hacked. Nothing to worry about there. Also cyber warfare really treads the line between conventional and escalatory. If China shuts down US power plants, the US will respond in kind or may further escalate.
> every USN capital asset has to dock for maintainence
Yes but this is usually preventive maintenance, and they don't dock at the same time. These ships dock in a rotational program so that the US maintains a consistent "coverage" based on strategic interests. That's why there are so many ships. Also since most of this maintenance tends to be retrofits and such, these ships can be redeployed quickly in an emergency.
> Historically and fundementally, PRC taking TW has always been an exercise in overcoming US military.
Agreed, however the US has shored up allies in the region because of China's aggressive international policies which have scared smaller countries into allying with the US.
> The point when PRC chooses to take TW, it would be when PLA has eroded ability for US to intervene by which time defeating US military intervention is as significant a political victory. Current PRC military modernization and aquisitions isn't built with confronting TW in mind, but US military and assumed US intervention. Frankly if US can be deterred or defeated then taking TW would be easy simply because it opens many other options like blockade, quarantine, siege etc. Then it will be a question of whether US is foolish enough to defend TW and risk losing her global hegemony or safe face and allow it to be an domestic Chinese civil war matter.
I think China really screwed up and has no chance of reunifying now. Taiwan is going to continue to buy arms and the past decade or so of being lulled to sleep by what was a peaceful Chinese rise to power was shaken by poor diplomacy, backing Russia diplomatically (though not in practice), and seizing Hong Kong. It'll just cost too many lives, which is why it won't happen. The question is whether or not China decides that it thinks the US is weak (similar to Russia's miscalculation regarding Ukraine) and how badly the war escalates. Frankly, the best path forward for all parties is probably the status quo as China can saber-rattle over Taiwan but not actually fight. A war is very difficult to control. Anything can happen.
Honestly the easiest and simplest way out of this is for China to just leave Taiwan alone. But egos and such will just drag us all into a stupid war that solves nothing for anyone. I would say the easiest and simplest way is for Taiwan to just be part of China again, but if the people don't want that then it's not as easy as it is for China to leave Taiwan alone.
IMO American hubris to assume PRC would leave US basing alone, especially in region. In event of PRC blockade (war), it's all fair game and JP/SKR much more vunerable to external dependencies and in terms of industrial base and resources, PRC sheer size can survive attrition better vs SKR and JP. Attacking these forces result in US entering first island chain, which is better than the alternative of trying to break blockade where US is strongest. Ultimate PRC stretch goal goal is to eradicate US east asian security architecture, so there's more reason to hit these bases than not. Either US comes to rescue of allies in region where they are weakest or they lose credibility.
>Which they won't do
More likely they will, it's spelled out in doctrine in latest PRC Science of Military Strategy. Again it's US hubris to assume only US can strike PRC mainland targets with impunity. Keep in mind US short/medium range strike platforms are all nuclear capable, but no one thinks PRC will retaliate with nukes to US tomahawks. Assured second strike exists because no one will trigger hairstring immedidate retaliation if they know adversary capable of conventional strikes. Hence PRC work on hypersonics, because realistically it's the only conventional platform that can hit CONUS, while simultaneous building up nuclear forces and maintaining No First Use to setup posture for conventional CONUS strikes. I think we're in for serious shits if US planners assume only they can strike PRC mainland and expect no retaliation.
>US intelligence will see movement of Chinese forces
Hypothetical PRC PGS can preempt strike with ICBMs (again doctrine for long time, though less likely) without any pre-position or visible signalling. Roll out TEL from tunnel and any target around globe can be hit within an hour. Even if discovered immediately it would take longer for ships pull out of port. Also most of US ships especially support aren't nuclear, which means they need continuous replenishment tail which are extremely vunerable. Hence point about taking out fast combat support ships (which exist in single digits) basically cripples all of USN. Escorts of CSG underway can't sail for long and become stationary single use VLS platforms assuming they can make it in theatre at all.
>This doesn't make sense for a few reasons
...
> attack on the continental United States
It makes perfect sense for PGS use case, that's the entire rational behind PGS for US as well. There's no survivable shelter (except maybe bombers / SSNs) for strategic assets because every platform needs to stay still at some point for maintanence. Again the goal is to establish mutual conventional vunerability to deter US by making attacking mainland PRC as risky as attacking CONUS. It only doesn't make sense from US exceptionalism lens that no country in the world would dare to hit CONUS. That's historically true due to technologic limitations that prevented accurate (non nuclear) fires against Fortress America that's geographically isolated. But assumption will not hold when PRC (and eventually others) acquires accurate PGS capabilities.
> don't dock at the same time
No but they all dock eventually and will be therefore subject to attrition and become single use assets that can't sustain power projection. It's logical extension of PLA systems destruction warfare that targets AWACs and other critical subelements that would cripple US warfighting capability. The caveate being that PRC can bunker away enough survivable ICBMs for the weeks/months US ships can stay out at sea, and that's assuming kill chain for hitting moving ships at sea is dud.
> cyber
PRC will anticpate US retaliation, but functionally it enables PRC to dish proportional damage. Again, it's about mutual vunerability. The broader point being that we are in era of conventional MAD in other domains. Having a massive blue water navy isn't going to save US society from existential damage unlike in analogue era. US always had conventional capablities to hurt PRC and others with CONUS impunity, but they maybe deterred if PRC can hit US conventionally or via cyber as well.
> US has shored up allies
US tried/trying to, but so far there hasn't been any meaningful movement in region except words. Certainly nothing substantial like IRBMs or AGILE basing that makes US assets survivable and that's among US allies. Surprisingly no one wants to be PRC missile sinks for US. Everyone else is neutral / hedging. The crowning achievement is AUKUS that establishes new US capabilities all the way out in west AU which is farcry from initial US blob hopes of having IRBMs in every ASEAN country. Alas no taker because PRC aggressive diplomacy works. Regardless, doesn't change the fundemental changing force balance - trend is PRC will simply have more forces in theatre than US + co can hope to aggregate over time.
> no chance of reunifying now
Not peaceful no, but that's inevitable nature of demographic/cultural shift between different political systems. Status quo preferrable but TW/US stirring up status quo or at least reverting it to less stable arrangement (PRC is one content with 92 consensus charade). As for taking TW, if US deterred, PRC can simply turn the island into Yemen/Palestine and drag out capitulation without single boots on ground. No amount of porcupining can prevent that. I think UKR/RU and past US excursions has shown massive loss of life quickly tolerable. At end of day, it's an ongoing civil war with US playing offshore spoiler for last 70 years with no simple ending except force. It's not preferrable, but it's what's left if TW/US doesn't play ball.
> IMO American hubris to assume PRC would leave US basing alone, especially in region.
It's based on "what probably makes sense" and how escalatory a war becomes. Various scenarios suggest that an intense Chinese strike against American assets may be enough. On the other hand scenarios suggest that such an intense strike would provoke an intense, escalatory backlash. All of a sudden we have a legit war between China, the United States, Japan, Korea, and Australia. Certainly China has the capability to strike some number of US + Allies assets in various countries, but you have to prepare to do that which will be noticed (not to mention just spies in general who can report such things), in which case the US can relocate many assets before or during an actual attack.
> US east asian security architecture, so there's more reason to hit these bases than not.
IF your goal is a large scale, potentially nuclear war versus the US + Allies, then yes you'd attack these bases and try to force the US to withdraw. But it's a very risky gamble, especially since attacking bases in countries like Japan and South Korea will be very problematic internationally.
> Hypothetical PRC PGS can preempt strike with ICBMs
> PRC will retaliate with nukes to US tomahawks.
I already explained why this doesn't make any sense. Also, a tomahawk cruise missile isn't the same thing as an ICBM.
If you're assuming that China thinks it makes sense to go into a full-scale war against the United States I just disagree. Also these posts turn into a lot of "well they'll just do this" as if adversaries can't react or haven't thought of the same scenario that us armchair generals are talking about.
> Status quo preferrable but TW/US stirring up status quo
Well, now let's not pretend that there is one "bad" side here and one "good" side here.
> At end of day, it's an ongoing civil war with US playing offshore spoiler for last 70 years with no simple ending except force. It's not preferrable, but it's what's left if TW/US doesn't play ball.
Well you can just stop having a civil war. Especially when Taiwanese companies operate and employe people in China, for example. The only way it's a continued "civil war" is because the CCP needs something to rattle sabers at. It's like "the War on Terror". Ultimately, China would be way better off without the CCP, America could use some reconfiguration and getting out of some of these alliances too.
It's not about PRC wanting full-scale war, but PRC wanting to deterring full-scale war via mutual vunerability. PRC would like nothing better for to intervene on TW without US intervention. Comment chainw as in response to your original comment that US can blockade PRC and somehow not escalate to full-scale war when blockade is already act of war and it makes perfect sense to escalate to redirect fight within PRC favour. Just consider US has full command of SKR military in times of war, notion that PRC would allow herself to be blockaded assymetrically and not retaliate on such US threats in region during war is not sensible. As for international sentiments, I dont think PRC cares about opinions of those who looks unkindly to PRC hitting legitimate US military targets during war. For repositioning assets, in post PRC PGS world, all that does is buy some time. Replenishment fleet needed to sustain fleet beyond days for high tempo operations, once they're docked and gone USN is left with some CVNs with limited sorties that has to outrun her empty fuel escorts for anything productive. Or ships becomes relegated to CONUS litoral use due to systematic logistic disruption.
>tomahawk cruise missile isn't the same thing as an ICBM.
Cruise missiles are nuclear capable platforms, as are even gravity bombs from long ranger bombers. The distinction is nuclear vs conventional capable and calculations will converge when ICBMs have viable conventional tip heads that will force strategic thinkersto treat new capability and integrate threat model accordingly. ICBMs simply seen differently _so far_ since ICBMs have been exclusively nuclear. And on balance cruise missiles are perhaps MORE destablizing than ICBMs because they're harder to detect and can be stealthed.
>let's not pretend that there is one "bad" side here and one "good"
There's sides pursuing their interests but one side's interest is drifting from the stable 92 consensus. It's not about moralizing, it's just what it is with nature of DDP idpol populism.
>well you can just stop having a civil war
No you can't. Civil war that end in potential loss of territory, especially one that could be strategically exploited by adversaries doesn't end until all the blood that can be spent has been. Doesn't matter what TW companies does during current detente, if TW and PRC gov can't settle politically then war will resume eventually. It will continue until formal armstice to legally declare the end is signed, like US civil war not War of Terror. It's how wars actually terminate. TBH any successor PRC gov that's not CCP will still pursue TW reunification and regional hegemony. It's baked into PRC mythos by this point.
> that US can blockade PRC and somehow not escalate to full-scale war
Which is only possible by starting a war... by doing something like, idk, invading Taiwan??
> cruise missiles are nuclear capable platforms, as are even gravity bombs from long ranger bombers.
It's not nuclear capability that is the issue, so I'm not sure why you keep bringing that up. The issue with ICBMs come down to range - if a country launched an ICBM you have minutes before it lands somewhere. You don't know where, and you can't intercept it, and you don't know what the payload is. So if a country launched an ICBM you would assume it's a nuclear weapon and launch your ICBMs toward strategic targets located from the launch source.
A cruise missile can be equipped with nuclear capabilities, but the range is limited (~1,000 miles or less), otherwise it would be an ICBM. Use of cruise missiles so far has been strictly conventional, and if the CCP is under the assumption that invading Taiwan would result in the US and allies using cruise missiles which may or may not be nuclear tipped and then their response would be to use nuclear weapons, well, that's kind of their own problem isn't it? The clear answer here is to not really try and find out. Conversely you can just argue that we don't know what the CCP has equipped their missiles with, ergo we would use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack just in case. The whole scenario is really stupid. If the US and allies used nuclear cruise missiles, China could just use nuclear weapons in response.
> There's sides pursuing their interests but one side's interest is drifting from the stable 92 consensus.
I don't think that's clear in any way. Hong Kong is an example.
> No you can't... It's baked into PRC mythos by this point.
Well then war it'll be. There's no other alternative here. Maybe the US should launch a nuclear first strike just in case. I mean afterall you have suggested that China would attack the US mainland in the event of an attempt at invading Taiwan. Might as well get it over with, right?
> i.e. the US can't reasonably sanction China.
Please correct me if I'm wrong, but I assume you're linking these ideas together.
From a military standpoint, at least today, the US can use its blue water navy to patrol and shut down shipments of resources going in to China pretty well. You don't need to get near the Chinese coast to do that. The US also has no interest in any sort of land warfare in China, so ultimately the strategy is containment. That's why the US (and Biden announced this again today) would absolutely go to war with China over Taiwan, because for China to take Taiwan is to break out of this containment zone and basically eliminate most of the effectiveness of the US Navy in the Pacific as it would relate to China, and undoubtedly end the US as global hegemon.
I think people assume that the US Navy has to be close to China in order to do damage and therefore naval ships are screwed because China will launch missles. While I do think the US Navy would conduct operations and quickly learn what exact capabilities the Chinese have, I don't think their effectiveness is limited to near-shore operations. Frankly, the US can shut down all maritime trade for China and now all of a sudden the Chinese are trying to ship in food and goods and energy products (oil and coal) via road, which I don't think is currently feasible.
But I also don't think China is foolish enough to actually try and invade Taiwan, because that would be like Ukraine, except with the US actively fighting. Some suggest China may try and launch a limited nuclear strike on a location like Guam, but I think that's very dangerous because the US would no doubt retaliate on mainland Chinese military assets and it either ends right then and there with both sides calling a truce (and China not invading Taiwan) or it would continue to escalate into a limited nuclear exchange, which would be catastrophic. China doesn't and won't have the military strength to take over Taiwan unless it's willing to take insane losses, like Russia is now (but worse) in Ukraine.
* I also have a pet conspiracy theory that the war in Iraq was launched to warm up the US military and give it practice with combined arms tactics against an enemy that can fight back, but not too hard.