Maybe this is a stupid question, but what's the point of an application that's intended to make your system more secure but actually makes it less secure? Do the firejail maintainers not realise? Or do they not agree that it's insecure? Or what? I can't reconcile these CVEs with anyone ever wanting to use firejail ever.
I think the assumption is that the user, outside the jail, is already trusted. (You're running this on your personal laptop, etc.) Therefore it "doesn't matter" if they can abuse firejail to get root, they already have that ability. (Not an endorsement.)
I see, so the system gains strength against untrusted code (Zoom client, Javascript in the browser, etc.) at the cost of losing strength against the local user. If so then the benefit is really balanced on a knife edge! If the sandboxing is not implemented, or fails, then the untrusted code can run with root privileges!
For typical single user with DE it's not that much tipped-once you can write to real $HOME you easily go to have root through replacing sudo password dialog or similar. Most desktop-targeted distributions drift towards the console user having a lot of privileges already (but not directly root access).
