As for the whistleblower, I'm very skeptical of her — to be a tech PM against encryption, and somehow linking e2e encryption to making the platform less safe, is dubious at best. Removing misinformation and calls to violence on the Facebook platform doesn't need to include monitoring private messages.
The idea that she's been a PM at large tech companies for 15 years and doesn't understand that Facebook monitoring messages will mean China can monitor those messages is almost too suspicious to believe.
How do these two align?
Why would FB sending messages that are sent encrypted (not e2e) and stored on US servers allow China to read messages?
If you allege hacking then why wouldn’t they be able to hack the devices?
Re misinformation: why would misinformation not simply happen in e2e group chats like it is already happening in e.g. Brazil or India? What’s the difference between posting to a group of friends on Facebook vs sharing a group message to those friends?
I do think messages should be encrypted but the trade off isn’t as straightforward as you make it sound.
> Why would FB sending messages that are sent encrypted (not e2e) and stored on US servers allow China to read messages?
Not parent, but I think the idea is that if BigCo does business in CountryA , then CountryA's government invariably forces BigCo to spy on their users who are residents.
Obviously compromising the user's device is a workaround open to governments but hard to achieve in bulk.
FB does not do business in China. This is rather a risk for Apple given they store keys in the cloud and do business there fwiw.
I agree it’s a risk for almost all other countries.
I think you're missing the context of what this is about:
> Strangely, the example she gave suggested that Facebook needs to have looser encryption in order to somehow protect Uyghurs in China from government attempts to implant spyware onto their phones. [1]
And Facebook responded, sticking up for e2e encryption:
> A Facebook spokesperson responded to The Telegraph with what we all should realize at this point is the responsible approach to encryption: "The reason we believe in end-to-end encryption is precisely so that we can keep people safe, including from foreign interference and surveillance as well as hackers and criminals." There is no such thing as encryption back doors that only the "right" people can access. If they exist, they can eventually be found or accessed by others. [1]
> If someone is going to Congress and lobbying against end-to-end encryption of private communications, how are they an ally?
Because they're also lobbying for other things you care about. And those things are more likely to be passed into law than the E2E encryption pieces.
Taking a puritanical view on an issue is a high-risk high-reward gambit. Nine out of ten times, it ejects you from the room. One out of ten times, you will organize sufficiently to make it a wedge issue (e.g. the NRA on guns, NIMBYs, et cetera).
There's a gambler's fallacy at work here, though. Our Fourth Amendment right to encrypted private communications is so important that if we lose it (or give it up), any future wins in areas like corporate transparency, monopoly regulation, and net neutrality won't ultimately matter. We won't have the freedom needed to benefit from them.
To the extent Haugen disagrees, she's not on "our side."
The plain text reads, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."
It's not reasonable to outlaw the tools needed to exercise a fundamental right. Not OK for the 1st, not OK for the 2nd, and not OK for the 4th. Encryption was already an old technology at the time of the Constitution's authorship. If they had wanted to regulate or outlaw it, they were free to say so. They didn't.
Depending on how terrible the bad ideas are that they're pushing, they may not be an ally at all in fact. A multi-purpose trojan horse may be more accurate.
In this case, promoting the abolition of end to end encryption is quite heinous. She's providing the authoritarians a potent argument that isn't yet well established in the public mind (we have to be able to see all of your data so we can keep you safe from the Chinese trying to see all of your data).
The Facebook leaker is explicitly arguing against this though. She cites Facebook’s push for end-to-end encryption of private messages as a problem.