>Right, but it does mean you won't be forced to do things the wrong way because it makes Apple money.
I don't understand this point. What's wrong with downloading binaries from a trusted distributor (Apple)?. If you agree that just because it's FOSS doesn't mean it's secure, then downloading binaries is as "right" as you are going to get when it comes to mobile app distribution. It's no different than downloading binaries from apt.
>This means keeping copies of keys unencrypted (or encrypted with a key on the same device which is effectively the same) on the device.
No. The whole point of the Secure Enclave means the keys never leaves the hardware - they never touch the main memory and the keys can never be read out of the chip. You are never "a few exploits away" from getting the keys because there is no mechanism to read the keys at all. This also prevents attacks on the device itself - you cannot brute force an iPhone without the Secure Enclave locking you out. I'm not certain (and I really doubt) the PinePhone is resistant to physical attacks.
>Sure but you can't even guess at which messenger I use. Attacking me means taking expensive professional time and focusing it on one person.
The article is about journalists who were targeted by a state sponsored cyber security firm. This is a moot point, not to mention security by obscurity doesn't work.
>The FOSS OS approach where knowledgeable people protect those who aren't knowledgeable (without restricting their rights) is a significantly more advanced social structure.
Except that, in practice, this is no different (and arguably worse) than just trusting Apple. It turns out knowledgeable people do not work for free, most other knowledgeable people don't read the code or recompile sources, and FOSS maintainers aren't always properly equipped to ship secured software. Heartbleed is poster child for this.
I'm not saying that it's impossible for there to be secure FOSS code, but that it's incredibly difficult to ship secure code at all in any situation. For the non-technical person it's far easier to trust platform that is hardened from the outset (like the iPhone) that has a well-funded security team (like Apple) and is recommended by other security professionals.
I don't understand this point. What's wrong with downloading binaries from a trusted distributor (Apple)?. If you agree that just because it's FOSS doesn't mean it's secure, then downloading binaries is as "right" as you are going to get when it comes to mobile app distribution. It's no different than downloading binaries from apt.
>This means keeping copies of keys unencrypted (or encrypted with a key on the same device which is effectively the same) on the device.
No. The whole point of the Secure Enclave means the keys never leaves the hardware - they never touch the main memory and the keys can never be read out of the chip. You are never "a few exploits away" from getting the keys because there is no mechanism to read the keys at all. This also prevents attacks on the device itself - you cannot brute force an iPhone without the Secure Enclave locking you out. I'm not certain (and I really doubt) the PinePhone is resistant to physical attacks.
>Sure but you can't even guess at which messenger I use. Attacking me means taking expensive professional time and focusing it on one person.
The article is about journalists who were targeted by a state sponsored cyber security firm. This is a moot point, not to mention security by obscurity doesn't work.
>The FOSS OS approach where knowledgeable people protect those who aren't knowledgeable (without restricting their rights) is a significantly more advanced social structure.
Except that, in practice, this is no different (and arguably worse) than just trusting Apple. It turns out knowledgeable people do not work for free, most other knowledgeable people don't read the code or recompile sources, and FOSS maintainers aren't always properly equipped to ship secured software. Heartbleed is poster child for this.
I'm not saying that it's impossible for there to be secure FOSS code, but that it's incredibly difficult to ship secure code at all in any situation. For the non-technical person it's far easier to trust platform that is hardened from the outset (like the iPhone) that has a well-funded security team (like Apple) and is recommended by other security professionals.