>pensions don't really make sense though, because they create adverse incentives all around. first, for the pensioner, who transfers future risk to the pension, and by extension to the company, its customers, employees, and shareholders. and second, it's a big pot of money just sitting there begging the greedy to tirelessly and surreptitiously work to siphon off just a tiny spigot of it. and those are just the two most obvious ones.
well if a pension doesn't make sense because it's a big pot of money attractive to greedy criminals then all sorts of big pots of money don't really make sense though, so in that case I don't think that argument really works.
>for the pensioner, who transfers future risk to the pension
this is probably me being silly but how is the pensioner transferring future risk?
actually yes, most big pots of money become poorly allocated (from graft, ossification, or whatever), whether via government, market, or some other mechanism. under uncertainty (which, in the real world, is always), we're better off having 10 relatively decoupled, medium-sized pots over 1 large, more easily corruptible pot, in all ways that matter to a society and economy (not so much to politics, the quest for power, though).
the pensioner has no idea how long they'll live, so the amount of money to save for retirement is uncertain, as is the returns on investment to meet that need. this future risk is transferred to others, as the pensioner does nothing to mitigate them, the company through its pension plan does. risk transference is a key ingredient of adverse incentives (e.g., principal-agent problems).
well if a pension doesn't make sense because it's a big pot of money attractive to greedy criminals then all sorts of big pots of money don't really make sense though, so in that case I don't think that argument really works.
>for the pensioner, who transfers future risk to the pension
this is probably me being silly but how is the pensioner transferring future risk?