> I'm not sure what understanding of "reparations" excludes those things? Both from a pure legal perspective and from a transitional justice perspective, monetary restitution is just one possible aspect of reparation.
Another comment in this thread says that giving money to the Namibian government was wrong because it was not going in the hand of those who suffered the consequence of the genocide which seems to indicate that for reparations to be considered "valid" it must be addressed directly to the wronged people. I don't see how a museum in Germany is going to repair the degradation of the descendant of the Namibian people who where massacred.
But anyway, let's assume that all these things could be considered reparations.
> To stretch the company/settlement analogy a little, I personally think it's rather clear that offering an out-of-court settlement rather than facing civil judgment is still cowardly/insulting (with an added helping of weaselling) if it comes from the successors of the company execs/staff that committed the wrong rather than the actual perpetrators.
But all the actual perpetrators (the killers or those who gave them orders) are dead. Justice in the case of dead perpetrators is moot. What remain is civil actions against the company itself. But as far as I know, there are no judicial framework to trial countries for "historical" acts. If this was the case, it would open many questions. What are the "historical" acts that can be brought to that court? Another commenter was talking about the invasion of eastern Europe by the Golden Horde ; should it be a candidate of a trial? Of course not but it means that there are some criteria that will be hard to get an agreement on.
Anyway, my beef with this is that the goalpost is not defined. And probably some people have qualms taking extensive (and expansive) steps to a moving goalpost.
Another comment in this thread says that giving money to the Namibian government was wrong because it was not going in the hand of those who suffered the consequence of the genocide which seems to indicate that for reparations to be considered "valid" it must be addressed directly to the wronged people. I don't see how a museum in Germany is going to repair the degradation of the descendant of the Namibian people who where massacred.
But anyway, let's assume that all these things could be considered reparations.
> To stretch the company/settlement analogy a little, I personally think it's rather clear that offering an out-of-court settlement rather than facing civil judgment is still cowardly/insulting (with an added helping of weaselling) if it comes from the successors of the company execs/staff that committed the wrong rather than the actual perpetrators.
But all the actual perpetrators (the killers or those who gave them orders) are dead. Justice in the case of dead perpetrators is moot. What remain is civil actions against the company itself. But as far as I know, there are no judicial framework to trial countries for "historical" acts. If this was the case, it would open many questions. What are the "historical" acts that can be brought to that court? Another commenter was talking about the invasion of eastern Europe by the Golden Horde ; should it be a candidate of a trial? Of course not but it means that there are some criteria that will be hard to get an agreement on.
Anyway, my beef with this is that the goalpost is not defined. And probably some people have qualms taking extensive (and expansive) steps to a moving goalpost.