Multiple computers belonging to congressmen/their aides have been reported accessed or stolen (https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/533162-merkley-says-capi...). Someone posted a picture of Nancy Pelosi's email client, stole mail and left a threatening note in her office. Other private chambers were vandalized (https://twitter.com/SenJeffMerkley/status/134703950452849868...). Can anyone really confirm that there were zero foreign agents among the thousands of rioters who accessed the building? Let's not pretend what happened was normal.
The vandalized office you linked is... weird. Judging by the dirt on the carpet a sizeable horde stampeded through the office, some of them stayed long enough to put cigarettes out on a picture frame or something, and yet the destruction seems pretty limited.
Using the term, insurrection, to describe what happened yesterday is belligerently misrepresenting what happened. If the protests over the last year were mostly peaceful, then Jan 6 really was the most peaceful of them all. I was there, we had more then enough people to mount a serious insurrection. From what I could see, the members of the protest were used by some anarchist group to commit a BNE. Most, IE, 99.9% of the protestors were not involved in the BNE, and a significant portion of the protestors were fighting back against the anarchists.
The media is not telling the truth about what happened.
They delayed and tried to overturn a constitutionally necessary process of democracy with their violent intimidation. What is that of you have a better word for it than terrorism and insurrection.
What happened meets the dictionary definition of an insurrection completely. It did not appear to be an armed insurrection or an attempted coup, would be difficult to file under terrorism, and sedition will be very challenging to prove, but "insurrection" is definitely the correct term to describe what happened.
"Terrorism: the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims."
I dunno man, the attackers had flashbangs, zip ties, molotovs... If the building had to be evacuated, then I'd say it counts as intimidation. It was certainly in pursuit of political aims.
I wasn't there, but the images I've seen don't seem to demonstrate much violence and very little intimidation on the part of the insurrectionists. I see a lot images of people wandering around inside the building taking selfies and acting like tourists (albiet often poorly-behaved ones going places they shouldn't). In hindsight the evacuation was probably overkill but I acknowledge it was probably the best reaction to a clear and present danger.
Like I say, it would be difficult to file under terrorism. You're welcome to try.
The people showed up with molotovs, flashbangs, and zipties. That's intent to intimidate, even if the residents managed to get evacuated before we could prove that they weren't just comfort props from people who were merely cosplaying as terrorists.
Here's a copy/paste legal definition where I removed a lot of extraneous examples:
> Under federal law, the activity or attempted actions which could fall under terrorism charges include:
> government official kidnapping;
> arson or bombing property;
> use of explosives;
> attacking a federal facility;
> conspiracy to murder, kidnap, or maim;
> take a hostage;
> bombing public places;
I mean, they brought molotovs and bombs. And zipties. I'd say an attempt was made.
Then of course there's the fact that one of them murdered a cop by bashing his head with a fire extinguisher.
There are lots of things to be concerned about besides classified information - such as emails and personal files of congress members and staffers - but even further it's not just what you can get off of the computer, it's what you can put on it.
Ignoring the potential for harvesting credentials and then abusing reused creds, the ability to send emails from a congressional email account is a disaster in and of itself. Imagine if someone sent out an email from Nancy Pelosi's email account validating Q Anon theories for example. Good luck ever walking that back.
> But those computers did not have access to classified information.
Got a source for that? You really think a sitting Senator's laptop has zero useful data for a foreign government, or even the opposition party? Heck his browser history or synced texts could have enough blackmail material.
Useful data != Secret/TS data. If there is any Secret/TS data on these systems, there's already been a security breach and yesterday wasn't special. Unclassified systems are often assumed unsafe/breached to begin with.
I don't disagree, however... human beings can be lazy, short-sighted or take short-cuts. I wouldn't put it past someone to keep something where it shouldn't be, intentionally or by accident.
I don’t think you understand how difficult it would be to get classified information on your unclassified laptop and there isn’t a chance in hell you could do it by accident
You write an email that references something you read in a classified briefing?
Nancy Pelosi is part of the Gang of Eight - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gang_of_Eight_(intelligence) which is briefed on National Security matters by the Executive Branch (this is top secret, special forces operations style stuff).
That's actually how a lot of real-world classified data leak incidents happen. Either someone records a classified fact/detail on an unclassified system through carelessness or lack of caution, or compiles a set of facts that are (in aggregate) classified but individually unclassified.
The latter can be particularly pernicious as it's hard to know the aggregate classification. I may be able to say in separate contexts "The XF-42 is capable of exceeding 1200 nautical miles per hour" and "The XF-42 is capable of flying in excess of 60k feet" but placing the two facts together can actually be classified (in practice, usually more than two details).
This seems nonsensical -- why are the sum of the parts more classified than the individual?
If I put together a long list of facts about the XF-42, it's classified, but if I separate each item onto a different page and tell someone else how to recompile the information (eg page numbers), it's fine?
I can't imagine a scenario where this model makes sense -- ignoring absurdities like classifying basic facts (sky is blue) and words (help) due to cascading classification.
It seems to me the rule should be that of poisoning -- any information in a document with classification X poisons the rest of the document to the same classification; or rather, a document classification is the maximum of its children
My example probably wasn't the best as too much is already given away. It's more like this:
- We have a manned aircraft
- We have an aircraft that can travel above 60k feet
- We have an aircraft that can sustain or exceed Mach 8 (EDIT: strike this part as it connects two facts already: "at that altitude")
- We have an aircraft called the XF-42
- We have an aircraft based in Middle-Of-Nowhere, AZ
- We have 10 operational aircraft of some specific type
Any one (EDIT: or all) of those details may be unclassified, but as you start pairing them up classified information can be derived from it. Note that in this, somewhat better, example only one item identifies the aircraft (rather than my initial example in which both items identified it).
Publicly it may be known that an XF-42 exists, even where it's based, and that there are only 10. Publicly it may be known that an aircraft exists which is manned, travels above 60k feet and over Mach 8. But the two sets of data may not be joined in public because that would give more information than desired (in particular, that there are only 10 indicates a limit on the capability of the mystery superfast and high altitude aircraft).
EDIT: Regarding some of your other comments.
If I spread the information out and tell you how to reconstitute it so you can make a cohesive whole, I've just obfuscated the classified information which is the same as leaking it straight up.
Regarding "poisoning", this is how it's done. If you have a document with TS data, the document is TS even if it's a single line item surrounded by unclassified data.
Fact A and Fact B are unclassified for the XF-42. But combining Fact A and Fact B implies Fact C, which is classified. Separating each item on a different page wouldn't make the whole thing unclassified. It'd make the entire report classified. One of the facts, if not both of them, would likely be controlled information, even if unclassified, in order to reduce the likelyhood of Fact C leaking.
Example: the XF-42 has a jammer builtin. The output of the jammer is classified. But the amount of power available from the generator is unclassified, as is the percentage of power used by the jammer. Individually, either of those facts doesn't help, but together they tell you how much power the jammer has, which can help our adversaries figure out how much power they need to burn through the jamming.
That said, if any fact is classified, that by itself will make the document it's in at least that classification.
EDIT: to use your poisoning example. If it's a poison, it makes the entire thing poisoned. But there are binary poisons. Two things together make a poison, even if neither alone is (very) poisonous.
I’ve never seen exactly what they are talking about but what they may be getting at is actually information compartmentalization - group A can know fact A and group B can know fact B but neither group can know AB. Some higher up official can know AB but must keep those facts separated in documentation because they may share portions with the groups. Having said that - both A and B are classified. You can’t have unclassified compartmentalized info.
Just wondering as I have no special knowledge, but suppose I am a senator and I receive a number of classified briefings on a particular issue.
Could I use Outlook to take some notes on my thoughts on that issue? Say as a draft e-mail? I don't think there would be anything technical to stop me, and it's not going to set off any automatic exfiltration flags.
But those notes could very well need to be classified. Does everyone in the Capitol with access to classified material have the necessary skills and incentives not to make notes about them on their personal computer?
If you are receiving a classified briefing you cannot be on a machine that has internet access - the briefing would be in a secured area with no personal devices and the only machines in that area are airgapped (and they are airgapped forever, no switching back and forth).
You could of course write stuff down afterwards in an unsecure place but that is day 1 essential huge fucking deal no no. You don’t even discuss classified info outside a secure area, not in your public office not in the outback not ever. That doesn’t mean people don’t do it but when they do and it is found out it is a really big deal. Accidents do happen and there are protocols in place to deal with them when they occur. 99.9% of these leaks are extremely mundane low tier classification and are due to document misclassification etc. Sometimes the name of a project is classified and is leaked by reference etc but when it comes to actual important stuff people are quite competent at keeping that in secure areas.
Though of course all those rules are subject to Trump's Law: "When you are a star they let you do it".
A random member of the military or the administration would go to jail for a long time, a senator especially from the same party as the president would get away with it with impunity.
>Does everyone in the Capitol with access to classified material have the necessary skills and incentives not to make notes about them on their personal computer?
Access to classified information comes with training on properly handing classified information.
Mishandling classified information is a crime if you have a security clearance
I know a lot of people who worked for members of Congress and a few who do now. Computers sitting on desks in regular Congressional offices do not have access to classified materials. Most members of Congress or their staff do not have access to classified material at all.
There is a lot of private information on those computers, though, and the biggest risks there are the use of that info to harass staff and/or manipulation of it to feed conspiracy theories (see: Pizzagate).
Blackmail material is extremely unlikely since these are all government computers and everyone who works there knows they are subject to oversight.
