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> Peter Singer, argues for moral consideration of animals on utilitarian grounds. There are Kantians who do the same.

I don't agree with either. In my view, the kinds of arguments they make are not even valid kinds of arguments.

> believe in moral reletavism or moral objectivism

I'm neither of those things, nor do I think they are valid positions.

I realize that it's a bit unfair for me to just say that and leave it there, but I can only spend so much time discussing this on HN.

> We're not talking about rights, we're talking about moral consideration.

OK. I wouldn't modify the substance of what I've said even if I accept that. (Though I don't actually agree with this way of separating out the problem space).

On the citations of Singer/various Kantians/etc.:

It's not my intention to talk past you, it's just that if you say "well, $BIGTEXT has a good argument!", that's not really the kind of thing we can discuss efficiently here. I can make very simple and direct arguments for my views without pointing to some $BIGTEXT.

There is nothing wrong with pointing to $BIGTEXT. In fact, somebody might say "Aha! Now I know I need to go read $BIGTEXT."

It's just that we can't really "go there" efficiently on HN. It's better if you can make simple and direct arguments, so that people can actually grapple with them.

But I know that is not always possible (and this time, I'll grant you, probably isn't, if your views happen to agree with some of the people you've cited).




Forgive me for being direct, but I only wanted to respond to the idea that there are no arguments, or rather, to point out the existence of the arguments if you don't know about them. I didn't want to make any claim as to the validity of the arguments beyond the fact that I think they're convincing, and in general, a large portion of professional philosophers consider them to be too. That doesn't mean they are correct of course (in part or entirely), only that they have some serious weight in the development of moral philosophy.

I find it pretty easy to accept some of the arguments within a certain framework, even if I don't subscribe to the framework itself. For instance, I might think that God may have or not have certain qualities or attributes, according to a theological framework, even though I am an atheist, and the question of God is not at all relevant to me. I operate the same way about many moral questions.

On the other hand, I also realize I should spend some time backing up and at least thinking about my alternatives, even if they are 'null' alternatives where I believe the burden of proof is on someone else. With regard to moral nihilism and the burden of proof, for instance, the moral skeptic may need to explain why moral intuitions are not a good starting point (or dismiss the role of intuition entirely, but she still needs an argument). A moral non-cognitivist needs to get around the embedding problem, for instance too.




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