Okay, turn the hypothetical around. Let’s say you (generic “you”) had an insurance policy that covered you for loss caused by insect and vermin infestations, and the insurance company refused to pay after a spider infestation. Would you stoically accept the insurance company’s position? Maybe you would wouldn’t even file a claim in the first place, to demonstrate a commitment to scientifically precise language in insurance policies.
Perhaps. I suspect many of us would reasonably argue, in such a situation, that the category of loss described in the policy is obvious to a reasonable observer, and if, say, an ant infestation is valid grounds for a claim, a spider infestation should be too.
I’m no great fan of the insurance industry, but putting that aside for a moment, it does seem that in terms of the contract language, a sensible conclusion was reached here.
Actually, I've been bitten (if you'll pardon the pun) by this, not in the case of insurance, but in the case of contract law. I and my lawyers knew the definitions in question, and were content that we had an understanding, only to discover later, during a dispute, that the technical meanings of various terms and definitions were being overturned in favour of "common understanding."
Fortunately a significant amount of negotiation meant that we ended up with a revised agreement we were all happy with ... that would be unlikely if an insurance company is involved.
My point was never the inaccuracy of including spiders as insects, my point was intended to be that the terms in your legal documents may not carry the meanings you expect. I guess that point is lost now.
And to answer your question, I would include "spiders" as "vermin" in circumstances such as this."
Perhaps. I suspect many of us would reasonably argue, in such a situation, that the category of loss described in the policy is obvious to a reasonable observer, and if, say, an ant infestation is valid grounds for a claim, a spider infestation should be too.
I’m no great fan of the insurance industry, but putting that aside for a moment, it does seem that in terms of the contract language, a sensible conclusion was reached here.