> That's just like all those bug bounty programs including some phrase disallowing automated tools. Even for active participants of the platform that's completely unrealistic and introduces unnecessary uncertainty.
I was a report triager on HackerOne for over a year. There is a good reason for that clause, and I would definitely recommend any program that didn't already have it (which is only programs new to bug bounties) to adopt it.
What's disallowed is filing a report consisting of the output of an automated tool. Look at Uber's scope statement ( https://hackerone.com/uber ):
> Out-of-Scope
>> Negligible security impact
>>> Vulnerabilities as reported by automated tools without additional analysis as to how they're an issue
>>> Reports from automated web vulnerability scanners (Acunetix, Vega, etc.) that have not been validated
This prevents a denial-of-service attack on Uber's bug bounty team. It's very, very common for someone to run an automated tool against one of your domains, copy the output into a HackerOne report, and walk away. In nearly all cases, that output is a scary-looking false positive. It doesn't make sense to investigate reports like this, because they are almost always spurious -- so they are placed out of scope. If you file a report consisting solely of automated output, your report will be closed without investigation per the company's policy. The only problem being addressed by the clause is that reports like this are a waste of our valuable time.
Automated tools themselves are not disallowed. (How would we know?) The requirement is that you investigate the bug yourself, and provide a writeup that indicates that you did so and substantiated that there really was a security issue.
> If you're not a paid external security researcher, of course you click on at least one report to confirm that the vulnerability is actually working and has meaningful impact. Plus, they're still working with curious humans here, not OWASP top 10 scanners.
I have a lot more sympathy for you here. I have personally seen the same company pay out thousands of dollars more for the same security issue just because one of the reports alleged a bigger potential problem. (In this case, "you might be able to write to the database" as opposed to "you can read from the database".) This makes it hard for me to recommend "stop as soon as you know an issue is present", even though that is definitely the preferred policy of the companies.
First off, I have to admit to a bit of snark when writing that up yesterday tbh and completely forgot about folks reporting some Nessus output etc. I'm absolutely with you when it comes to that type of automated tool and reporting, thanks for separating that.
The Uber one is actually a great example of wording I can appreciate. I was thinking of one like Verizon Media's ( https://hackerone.com/verizonmedia ).
> Do not use automated scanners/tools - these tools include payloads that could trigger state changes or damage production systems and/or data.
Unlike Uber's that's just a blanket statement and while I'm sure nobody wants to use it in that way (I actually like H1 acting as proxies for that alone, they surely mean something very similar to the example you posted), it's unrealistic and could make pretty much any attack ineligible.
All that being said, at least the change to H1s own policy let's people know where they draw the line. Maybe I should change my mind, not every program has to be relevant to everybody at the end of the day.
I was a report triager on HackerOne for over a year. There is a good reason for that clause, and I would definitely recommend any program that didn't already have it (which is only programs new to bug bounties) to adopt it.
What's disallowed is filing a report consisting of the output of an automated tool. Look at Uber's scope statement ( https://hackerone.com/uber ):
> Out-of-Scope
>> Negligible security impact
>>> Vulnerabilities as reported by automated tools without additional analysis as to how they're an issue
>>> Reports from automated web vulnerability scanners (Acunetix, Vega, etc.) that have not been validated
This prevents a denial-of-service attack on Uber's bug bounty team. It's very, very common for someone to run an automated tool against one of your domains, copy the output into a HackerOne report, and walk away. In nearly all cases, that output is a scary-looking false positive. It doesn't make sense to investigate reports like this, because they are almost always spurious -- so they are placed out of scope. If you file a report consisting solely of automated output, your report will be closed without investigation per the company's policy. The only problem being addressed by the clause is that reports like this are a waste of our valuable time.
Automated tools themselves are not disallowed. (How would we know?) The requirement is that you investigate the bug yourself, and provide a writeup that indicates that you did so and substantiated that there really was a security issue.
> If you're not a paid external security researcher, of course you click on at least one report to confirm that the vulnerability is actually working and has meaningful impact. Plus, they're still working with curious humans here, not OWASP top 10 scanners.
I have a lot more sympathy for you here. I have personally seen the same company pay out thousands of dollars more for the same security issue just because one of the reports alleged a bigger potential problem. (In this case, "you might be able to write to the database" as opposed to "you can read from the database".) This makes it hard for me to recommend "stop as soon as you know an issue is present", even though that is definitely the preferred policy of the companies.