Not looking for agreement. I think there is an empirical, mathematical case to be made for this 'specialness' of the mind that is beyond what computation and randomness can give us.
Another way to state this is in terms of the halting problem. Halting oracles are possible and detectable. Halting oracles can authenticate the Gödel sentences for all finite, consistent formal systems.
Looking at the logical induction page, I'm not sure it offers anything beyond Solomonoff. If they have a computable method, then it will be deficient compared to Solomonoff induction. Leonid Levin published something called randomness conservation in 1984, which implies computers cannot learn math, or any other consistent logic, beyond what they are initially fed with. So, given an initial set of consistent axioms, a computer cannot come up with anything new and consistent.
Anyways, bottom line of what I'm saying is halting oracles are possible and empirically detectable. We should entertain the possibility that the human mind is a halting oracle, and set about researching that idea. We are making no progress with our assumption the mind is computational.
Solomonoff induction can make eventually good predictions about any computable environment, but:
While Solomonoff induction is limit computable, it isn’t computable, while logical induction is.
Logical induction can reach conclusions about what a system using a computable approximation to solomonoff induction would conclude. Actually, it can also assign probabilities to what full solomonoff induction would conclude.
Solomonoff induction cannot accurately model a world which contains agents who use solomonoff induction. Logical induction plays nicely with self reference.
Importantly, with some naive ways of attempting to do probabilistic induction on mathematical statements, if you give the system different facts in an adversarial order, you can cause it to alternate between being highly convinced that something is true, and that it is false. Logical induction solves this problem.
I don’t think solomonoff induction can be straightforwardly applied to this task. Solomonoff induction predicts what inputs it will receive, but this isn’t, I think, immediately well suited for assigning credence to mathematical statements.
I’m not sure how a halting oracle could be empirically detected?
Well, I guess if one believed that “this is like a halting oracle except only for the first 3^^3 Turing machines” and the like we’re substantially less likely than “this is a halting oracle in general”, which I guess seems reasonable.
Ok, I guess I can see that, sorta.
Not sure what practical tests you have in mind though.
Everything is a bitstring, and Solomonoff is optimal for predicting bitstrings. Probabilistic induction, if it is computable, cannot do better than that.
Halting oracles require fewer program bits to generate longer bitstrings, so they make compressible bitstrings more likely than Turing machines. Applying bayesian reasoning, the existence of compressible bitstrings implies the existence of halting oracles. Or, even simpler, given the fact Turing machines might not halt, but halting oracles can always halt, the mere existence of bitstrings implies the existence of halting oracles.
Solomonoff induction is optimal for, given an initial portion of a computable bitstring, predicting the rest of (or the next portion of) the bitstring.
Logical induction (my apologies for referring to “probabilistic induction”; I was speaking unclearly when I did so. What I meant to communicate by that phrase was “if you attempt to do Bayesian updating on math statements in a naive ‘just apply Bayes’ rule’ way”, as an example of something that doesn’t work) on the other hand, will assign probabilities to different statements, which it updates over time, and these different probabilities aren’t for mutually exclusive events, unlike with solomonoff induction.
Now, I don’t mean that if you had an oracle for solomonoff induction, that you couldn’t make a program using that oracle to produce something much more powerful than logical induction.
And I’m also certainly not saying that the algorithm found for logical induction is the fastest one for the problem it solves. If it was (at least, if it was for small amounts of time? Perhaps it could be asymptotically optimal for large amounts of time), I think it would be strong evidence that the human mind is special with respect to estimating the plausibility of mathematical statements! (The algorithm is very slow).
But, I do think that it is quite probably better at that task than straightforward applications of computable approximations of solomonoff induction.
(Like computable approximations to solomonoff induction, logical induction also goes through an enumeration of all possible programs and eventually tries each one of them.)
By the way, this thread is getting to the point where I have to click your specific reply in order to get to the reply link; do you want to move this to email or discord or something? Totally fine if you want to keep it here of course, just wanted to offer the option.
Also, I need to read up on the thing you mentioned on randomness conservation. Sounds interesting. Sorry for not having gotten to that yet.
I’m confused by what you mean by “implies the existence of halting oracles”. Do you just mean as abstract objects? (in which case, yes, I completely agree that halting oracles exist as abstract objects. There is a fact of the matter as to whether any particular Turing machine halts, and so there is a function from Turing machines to whether the input Turing machine halts on an empty tape. Similarly for halting oracles for Turing machines which themselves have a lower halting oracle.)
Or do you mean that they exist or might exist as physically implemented (err, not sure “physically” is exactly the word I mean. Like, if human souls are the only things in/“in” the universe that can solve the halting problem, I don’t think I’d call that “physically implemented”, but I don’t mean to exclude this option) things?
I’m currently skeptical of the latter, but that is approximately the question we are discussing, so maybe I’m wrong.
Are you saying that, you think it plausible that humans can (in a sense) compress strings in ways that Turing machines cannot, (or that a Turing machine with access to a human / to humans, can compress strings better than a Turing machine can alone), and that, if true, that would be evidence for humans containing/having-access-to halting oracles?
If that is what you mean (and my apologies if I’ve misunderstood you), I do agree that this would be evidence for that, yes (though I’m, of course, less convinced that access to humans as an oracle would allow a TM to compress strings better.).
[fifth letter of toboggan]mail btw: Madaco dot madaco
Edit: have started to read the Leonid Levin paper “randomness conservation inequalities” now. Quite interesting so far.
Another way to state this is in terms of the halting problem. Halting oracles are possible and detectable. Halting oracles can authenticate the Gödel sentences for all finite, consistent formal systems.
Looking at the logical induction page, I'm not sure it offers anything beyond Solomonoff. If they have a computable method, then it will be deficient compared to Solomonoff induction. Leonid Levin published something called randomness conservation in 1984, which implies computers cannot learn math, or any other consistent logic, beyond what they are initially fed with. So, given an initial set of consistent axioms, a computer cannot come up with anything new and consistent.
Anyways, bottom line of what I'm saying is halting oracles are possible and empirically detectable. We should entertain the possibility that the human mind is a halting oracle, and set about researching that idea. We are making no progress with our assumption the mind is computational.