> People like to extend trends into the indefinite future, but macroeconomics is superstition at best. The stagnation of Japan caught just about everyone by surprise.
Japan stagnated after reaching approximate parity with the US in GDP/capita. China only has to reach one quarter the productivity of the United States in order to surpass the US in nominal GDP. If China reaches half the productivity of the US, its economy will be twice as large as that of the US. These are relatively low bars.
> Given this level of uncertainty, it seems reasonable that some powerful Americans might not want the US to go gentle into that good night.
I wouldn't call it "reasonable," but I might call it "predictable." A policy of trying to sabotage China's economic development would put the US and China on a definite collision course, and I don't want to see what the world looks like after that. The most concerning aspect of this is the apparent widespread support for this course of action among both Democrats and Republicans. A lot of people don't know what they're careening into.
Japan stagnated after reaching approximate parity with the US in GDP/capita. China only has to reach one quarter the productivity of the United States in order to surpass the US in nominal GDP. If China reaches half the productivity of the US, its economy will be twice as large as that of the US. These are relatively low bars.
> Given this level of uncertainty, it seems reasonable that some powerful Americans might not want the US to go gentle into that good night.
I wouldn't call it "reasonable," but I might call it "predictable." A policy of trying to sabotage China's economic development would put the US and China on a definite collision course, and I don't want to see what the world looks like after that. The most concerning aspect of this is the apparent widespread support for this course of action among both Democrats and Republicans. A lot of people don't know what they're careening into.