A valid question, and not one that in my opinion (even though I am a theist) that has an argument that is both clear and compelling (look up various Ontological arguments to see the gamut).
I think it is enough to say the following things:
1. The universe clearly exists, but it is also clear that it doesn't have to exist (i.e. the universe is contingent)
2. Therefore, there must be some thing that exists, and exists of necessity, to explain the existence of the universe
3. The existence of necessary truths such as logic and mathematics are not sufficient to explain the existence of the universe, so therefore there must be something else, which could act as both the sufficient and necessary cause of the universe.
We can call this thing God, but by that we don't commit ourselves to any particular religion. At most that gets us the God of deism.
> We can call this thing God, but by that we don't commit ourselves to any particular religion. At most that gets us the God of deism.
Not so. The deist God is more of a Cartesian/Paleyian watchmaker, not the God of the philosophers classically understood. The God of the philosophers is very much in line with the Judeo-Christian God (not everything can be inferred through unaided reason, but much of it can). And God as "I am" ("ehyeh asher ehyeh") is precisely not a thing ipsum esse subsistens, or that who's essence it is to exist, and by which all things are. However, it precedes things and in doing so puts a stop to the infinite regress of having to appeal to still further things to explain the existence of things (which cannot work because we aren't trying to a chain of causes but the cause of their existence in the here and now).
Response to mythrwy:
If existence were a property, then it would follow that things precede their own existence, which it absurd. And as I've written above, things cannot account for their own existence, thus you must posit existence as distinct from the things that are by virtue of it. You must appeal to a causal non-thing to account for things and thus depend on that cause for their own being in the here and now.
> Not so. The deist God is more of a Cartesian/Paleyian watchmaker, not the God of the philosophers classically understood. The God of the philosophers is very much in line with the Judeo-Christian God (not everything can be inferred through unaided reason, but much of it can). And God as "I am" ("ehyeh asher ehyeh") is precisely not a thing ipsum esse subsistens, or that who's essence it is to exist, and by which all things are. However, it precedes things and in doing so puts a stop to the infinite regress of having to appeal to still further things to explain the existence of things (which cannot work because we aren't trying to a chain of causes but the cause of their existence in the here and now).
I'm not sure I follow the distinction you are making. In any case, my point is that this ontological train of reasoning does not get us all the way to specific religious commitments, although we might argue that some religions are more compatible with this line of reasoning than others.
If nothing can account for its own existence, how then do we come to the concept of God?
If every existence must have a preceding cause, and the thread were followed long enough, ultimately there could be no prime cause unless cause were cyclical, a loop so to speak.
In the case it's not cyclical but linear at some point "cause" ceases to exist and existence is an intrinsic property of the object, ("the thing without cause"). Why then should we suppose that point is some abstract level above the manifest universe? In other words, if we accept "God" (i.e objects can be without cause) then we have accepted that there need not necessarily be a proceeding cause to existence and the universe is as good a starting place as any.
Doesn't point 2 (something exists of necessity) negate point 1 (clear it doesn't have to exist)?
On point 3 I fail to see logical need for external cause. Existence could simply be an intrensic property of the universe.
Besides it just shuffles the "cause" issue up a level. If God can exist "just because he does and always has and is without external cause" so can a universe.
> Doesn't point 2 (something exists of necessity) negate point 1 (clear it doesn't have to exist)?
they are talking about different things. The universe is contingent, but something other than the universe (that is not contingent) is required to explain the existence of the universe.
> On point 3 I fail to see logical need for external cause. Existence could simply be an intrensic property of the universe.
Could the universe have been in a different configuration than it is? More matter, less matter, no matter, etc.? There is no contradiction in those configurations, therefore we must admit that they are possible. That means that the universe needn't be (as it is, or at all). If something could be different than the way it is, then rationally we must suppose there is an explanation for the way it is.
> Besides it just shuffles the "cause" issue up a level. If God can exist "just because he does and always has and is without external cause" so can a universe.
"God" at this point is just a placeholder to the solution of the problem of infinite regress. The universe is not a suitable stopping point for reasons stated above.
I'm not sure that conventional human mathematics lacking the ability to explain something indicates another abstract level of complexity above what we call "the universe".
Also I don't know that infinite regress is necessarily a problem. Cycles most immediately come to mind, aka "loop quantum gravity".
But really I think think both the concept of God and the universe are a perceptual and a definition problem.
Because of our state of being, we can't speak nor understand much outside of the parameters we know. Which leads us to define ideas in ways that probably aren't very accurate and leads to misunderstanding and miscommunication.
That being said, I see no reason to abstract things more than needed.
I won't say I'm necessarily "atheist" because that presupposes I'd understand and could define what it is I don't believe in. By this same reasoning I most certainly am not a theist either.
"Prime cause" just appears a very fallacious argument to me, I guess that's the point. No offense intended.
> I'm not sure that conventional human mathematics lacking the ability to explain something indicates another abstract level of complexity above what we call "the universe".
I just bring up mathematics as an example of something that philosophers have typically categorized as "necessary truth". For example, 1 + 1 = 2 is necessarily true (there is no possible world in which it is not true) and as such requires no additional explanation as to why it's true (aside from just defining terms).
The fact that the earth is populated with living organisms is a contingent fact. That is, it is possible that there be no living organisms on the earth (or, in philosophical parlance, "there are possible worlds in which the earth is not populated with living organisms"). It seems perfectly logical to conclude that if there are living organisms on the earth, but there need not be, then therefore there must be some explanation as to why it is so. Indeed, one might say that the entire enterprise of science is predicated upon the notion that contingent facts have causal explanations.
So when it comes to the question of "why does anything exist at all, rather than nothing?", I think it's fair to question whether we can know the reason, but it likewise seems inescapable that there must be a reason.
> Also I don't know that infinite regress is necessarily a problem. Cycles most immediately come to mind, aka "loop quantum gravity".
Well, I can say that it doesn't look like the universe is headed in some kind of loop (because of accelerated expansion) but that (at best) answers the physical question whether we are in a cycle, not the metaphysical question of why there must be a prime cause. I admit I don't have a good answer for that, but I will certainly think on it. I also don't know enough about loop quantum gravity know how that relates (though I trust it does).
> That being said, I see no reason to abstract things more than needed.
As the saying goes "a theory should be as simple as possible, but no simpler". In this case, I would say that a "prime cause" is the simplest theory available. To posit that the universe exists without cause is too simple, and alternative theories (such as the multiverse theory) are more complex.
> "Prime cause" just appears a very fallacious argument to me, I guess that's the point. No offense intended.
No offense taken! It's always great to hear what parts of my thinking other people find unconvincing. I like knowing how other people think about these kinds of issues.
I think it is enough to say the following things:
1. The universe clearly exists, but it is also clear that it doesn't have to exist (i.e. the universe is contingent)
2. Therefore, there must be some thing that exists, and exists of necessity, to explain the existence of the universe
3. The existence of necessary truths such as logic and mathematics are not sufficient to explain the existence of the universe, so therefore there must be something else, which could act as both the sufficient and necessary cause of the universe.
We can call this thing God, but by that we don't commit ourselves to any particular religion. At most that gets us the God of deism.