> Obviously because they can control when it is done as well as how the results are distributed, or not distributed.
Let's apply some Occam's Razor here.
I am led to believe they know that these machines are harmful and therefore they are carefully orchestrating all testing of these devices by, among others, all of the following parties: "U.S. Army Public Health Command, the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL)".
That's all done to prevent some sort of mass lawsuit, which might cost the United States some money.
The simpler explanation is that TSA rules are simply really strict, because that's just how TSA rules are.
The rules don't have to make sense. There's a whole lot about the TSA and its procedures that doesn't make sense.
> We do not know if this figure is the total generation output, or only the total amount put to the target & receiving sensors.
I'm content with the description given that these machines "cannot produce" more than that. You can do your own research on the matter.
> 3) even if we assume .005millirem/scan, at the rate of two/minute, that's 1000 minutes to get a chest x-ray, or 16 hours, basically two work days. In LESS THAN ONE MONTH, they are over the yearly dose.
...assuming no shielding whatsoever. You would hope that after two months without shielding on the device, someone might notice. Even then, such exposure would be well below the occupational limit for radiation workers (5000 millirem):
>>I am led to believe they know that these machines are harmful and therefore they are carefully orchestrating...
That's not even close to the simplest explanation. Far simpler is that they are careless, clueless, and paranoid, and don't want anyone finding out something bad on their watch. Or they just don't want to allow anyone to get concerned.
>> The rules don't have to make sense.
Unless we're living in a Kafka or Vonnegut book, they are supposed to have actual reasons and make sense.
Calling out one particular type of measuring device, which happens to measure the one plausible type of hazard in that workplace, yeah, that's suspicious.
>> .assuming no shielding whatsoever.
Does not assume no shielding whatsoever, only a plausible hotspot or focus. The point is that the potential dosing is in the range of values that could cause a hazard, and even at 10% of that value, would be overdosing within a year. It is not like it is totally off the scale (as are many of the public's fears).
>> You would hope that after two months without shielding on the device, someone might notice.
Yes, you would hope that. However, if you've ever read reports on industrial issues, you'll find that far worse and more noticeable hazards go unnoticed/unfixed for YEARS at a time before they get around to killing someone. And this sort of low-level radiation is particularly pernicious, as it is completely unnoticeable until after it is too late.
The simple solution is, assuming that these machines are largely safe (which I generally expect), is to say "you can buy dosimeters on your own dime and wear them if you like, just keep them out of sight in your pocket while on duty. If anyone gets any unexpectedly high readings, we'll investigate, but remember since you haven't got a chain of custody around the meter, it'll be only the beginning of an investigation, not immediate acceptance of your results."
Ye, it may turn out to be bit more work, but it shows you're on the side of worker safety, and on the road to getting things fixed. Mostly, it'll quell any fear and likely cause no one to wear one.
With the rules as it is, I'd be damn sure to sneak dosimeters into my clothes while working there.
Let's apply some Occam's Razor here.
I am led to believe they know that these machines are harmful and therefore they are carefully orchestrating all testing of these devices by, among others, all of the following parties: "U.S. Army Public Health Command, the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL)".
That's all done to prevent some sort of mass lawsuit, which might cost the United States some money.
The simpler explanation is that TSA rules are simply really strict, because that's just how TSA rules are.
https://www.quora.com/Are-TSA-screeners-permitted-to-wear-ra...
The rules don't have to make sense. There's a whole lot about the TSA and its procedures that doesn't make sense.
> We do not know if this figure is the total generation output, or only the total amount put to the target & receiving sensors.
I'm content with the description given that these machines "cannot produce" more than that. You can do your own research on the matter.
> 3) even if we assume .005millirem/scan, at the rate of two/minute, that's 1000 minutes to get a chest x-ray, or 16 hours, basically two work days. In LESS THAN ONE MONTH, they are over the yearly dose.
...assuming no shielding whatsoever. You would hope that after two months without shielding on the device, someone might notice. Even then, such exposure would be well below the occupational limit for radiation workers (5000 millirem):
https://ehs.stanford.edu/manual/radiation-protection-guidanc...
> This does NOT look at the luggage scanners, either for carry-ons or for checked luggage, which likely have much higher outputs.
Fair enough, but you picked an article that was specifically concerned with those backscatter devices.