Boeing cannot say anything suggesting that this pilot was right, and that his warnings should have been heeded, without simultaneously admitting that it was wrong in saying that such training was not necessary.
There's another issue raised here: what sort of training was available? By withholding the existence of MCAS, did Boeing create a situation where there were no simulators with the capability to train pilots in handling an MCAS failure?
It seems like Boeing never considered the possibility of an MCAS failure beyond some footnotes in the manual.
It smells like a classic case of under-engineering. In a properly engineered system someone would have asked "What if an AoA sensor fails during flight?" and forced the MCAS to be redesigned. This question would have been asked about every single part of the system before it was deemed ready for production.
Yes. Clearly, there was some failure in systems engineering. And one must look at this very carefully and find out what went wrong such that many good diligent highly qualified people screwed up so royally.
But unreflective ill-informed hostile accusations sometimes seen here (“lies”, “care only about profits”, etc.) is certainly neither appropriate nor helpful in avoiding a repeat of the problem.
There's another issue raised here: what sort of training was available? By withholding the existence of MCAS, did Boeing create a situation where there were no simulators with the capability to train pilots in handling an MCAS failure?