>Basically, separate law enforcement and social work. And enforce strict data souvereignity.
This is how things used to be in decades past. The police did police things and social workers did social work things and there was no way in hell the police were reading the social workers notes without a warrant and even then there's a chance that would still be protected.
> The problem is that police are being involved in the job of social workers.
Isn't the whole point of this that they can't be expected to be social workers?
> For example, a police officer may be called to respond to someone’s disruptive but non-criminal behaviour time and again. Under the Hub model, the officer can bring the person’s situation to the Hub—which may include staff from child welfare, addictions, or housing assistance agencies—and ask if other agencies can intervene.
The idea is that calling the police may be a blunt instrument, but maybe they can get the right instrument in place. I'm not dismissing the concerns with such information sharing, just seems like the point is to get the right people for the right circumstance.
- Police had write-only access to the database.
- Police had no involvement in interventions.
- Anyone was able to fill out a form and get their data purged.
- Everyone in the database could easily discover it.
Basically, separate law enforcement and social work. And enforce strict data souvereignity.
The next problem is that it blurs the line between 'client' and 'suspect'.