Slight correction, they turned off the stab trim and tried to manually re-trim the plane, but the aerodynamic loading on the stabilizer was so great that they couldn't turn the trim wheel by hand. So, sadly, they re-engaged the stab trim and began to use the switches to trim up, but the MCAS came back 5 seconds later, trimmed down again, and flew them into the ground.
>As we have now learned, switching to the manual control is useless when the aircraft is in this condition (high speed, stab down, elevator up).
That wasn't the position the Lion Air flight was in.
I don't think there is much debate that the Lion Air flight was recoverable since the pilots on the previous flight recovered from the same issue:
>As the Lion Air crew fought to control their diving Boeing Co. 737 Max 8, they got help from an unexpected source: an off-duty pilot who happened to be riding in the cockpit.
>That extra pilot, who was seated in the cockpit jumpseat, correctly diagnosed the problem and told the crew how to disable a malfunctioning flight-control system and save the plane, according to two people familiar with Indonesia’s investigation.
>The next day, under command of a different crew facing what investigators said was an identical malfunction, the jetliner crashed into the Java Sea killing all 189 aboard.
It was recoverable in a similar situation. That does not mean it was recoverable in both situations.
Any incident like this is a chain of events (which in this case started back with the original design decisions). Many links in that chain aren't obvious, and no two chains are identical. Just because the chain was broken in one case doesn't mean it was reasonable to expect it to be broken in all of them.
>It was recoverable in a similar situation. That does not mean it was recoverable in both situations.
Similarly, because it was unrecoverable in one situation [based solely on speculation at this point] doesn't mean it was unrecoverable in another.
>Any incident like this is a chain of events (which in this case started back with the original design decisions). Many links in that chain aren't obvious, and no two chains are identical. Just because the chain was broken in one case doesn't mean it was reasonable to expect it to be broken in all of them.
I'll note here that you have at best addressed one of my three points. To add color:
>Airline mechanics tried four times to fix related issues on the plane starting Oct. 26, according to the Indonesia preliminary report.
Do you think that's ok?
>However, the pilots on the harrowing Oct. 28 flight [the flight before the crash] from Bali to Jakarta didn’t mention key issues with the flight after they landed, according to the report.
The original comment you were replying to referenced Boeing's smear of the pilots, not Lion Air the company. The pilots would have no knowledge of the first two items on your list (the ones I did not address, as they weren't relevant to the comment you were replying to).
You're absolutely correct that Lion Air might have had the opportunity to prevent Boeing's design failure from bringing down this plane (this time). That still leaves the biggest share of the blame squarely in Boeing's lap.
>The original comment you were replying to referenced Boeing's smear of the pilots, not Lion Air the company.
I responded to:
>the Lion Air crash (they were busy smearing the airline an the pilots instead)
Which clearly references Lion Air the company.
>You're absolutely correct that Lion Air might have had the opportunity to prevent Boeing's design failure from bringing down this plane (this time). That still leaves the biggest share of the blame squarely in Boeing's lap.
Blame is not a competition and having a more at fault party doesn't excuse your failures. Lion Air failed badly and the pilots didn't take an obvious step to correct their issue. They merit the blame they are getting.
Ah, yep, I misread that (can I blame the typo...? ;) )
My point is that is that it is appropriate to call out Boeing for their attempt at deflecting blame. The pilots apparently did not take an action that _may_ have saved the plane (we now know it may not have). That doesn't change the fact that the issue they failed to correct was a faulty design in the first place, and would have resulted in a crash at some point.
>My point is that is that it is appropriate to call out Boeing for their attempt at deflecting blame.
Sure, but that doesn't mean going the other way and deflecting blame from Lion Air and the pilots.
>The pilots apparently did not take an action that _may_ have saved the plane (we now know it may not have).
Disabling electric trim would have absolutely saved the Lion Air flight just like it did when the same issue cropped up on the previous flight. Some speculated (which appears to be incorrect) that the Ethiopian Air flight was in a situation that they couldn't recover from, but the Lion Air flight was not in that situation.
The Lion Air pilots identified that the trim was incorrect and reset it at least 20 times. It's fair to fault them for not coming to the conclusion that the electric trim system was malfunctioning and that they should disable it.
The Ethiopian pilots turned off the electric trim control, only to have to turn it back on again.