> That the single faulty sensor which didn't affect anything on the previous planes could mean the difference between the life and death was specifically not reported by Boeing.
We're not talking about a faulty sensor, we're talking about an uncontrolled dive. The airline is not at fault for not connecting the two, but that only means they had information of an uncontrolled dive from an unknown cause, and still flew the plane.
> How it is responsible to certify the plane without properly analyzing the MCAS implementation? (...) And how it is responsible to claim "everything is OK everywhere" after the two crashes?
It's not, but that's whataboutism. Boeing's neglect doesn't excuse the FAA, and the FAA's neglect doesn't excuse the airline.
We're not talking about a faulty sensor, we're talking about an uncontrolled dive. The airline is not at fault for not connecting the two, but that only means they had information of an uncontrolled dive from an unknown cause, and still flew the plane.
> How it is responsible to certify the plane without properly analyzing the MCAS implementation? (...) And how it is responsible to claim "everything is OK everywhere" after the two crashes?
It's not, but that's whataboutism. Boeing's neglect doesn't excuse the FAA, and the FAA's neglect doesn't excuse the airline.