In general, this isn't the best idea. If you force all your traffic through Tor you increase the chances that you're going to have an opsec fail. Loads of stuff talks to loads of other stuff in the background all the time. Checking your email or refreshing your social media feed or whatever.
When you use TAILS, only applications that are aware of Tor will be using Tor and other applications just go nowhere.
Tor Browser is a great example for explaining the separation between application layer and network layer anonymity. The tor client gives you network layer anonymity while Tor Browser gives you scrubbing of cookies and anti-fingerprinting. Using another browser, or other applications in general that do not try to provide application layer anonymity, with Tor wouldn't protect against all the application layer attacks and so you end up with less (or no) protection.
I see where you're coming from but neither tor-browser, tails or a portal is going to protect users that don't rtfm. If you use the tor-browser you still want to avoid checking email or starting services over that same channel that will leak your identity. this are basic tor guidelines and the documentation even warns users of this.
the typical users for a portal are people with prior training of opsec (yes you need to train opsec all the time because it's not just the tools but your whole workflow that's gonna trip you up) and a real use-case.
I assume if you use this you won't make such rookie mistakes like having services running that will leak identity. It's perfect for journalists, activists or anyone else that already uses hardware based compartmentalization. This is an additional layer - not a silver bullet. I really assume a portal user already knows what things to isolate, which processes may run, what part of their work (during an operation) needs to be airgap'ed and hence shouldn't go through a portal ...
it says UNLESS YOU KNOW WHAT YOU ARE DOING! ¶ ... as an engineer I think I do know what I'm doing and would have thought most readers of this site are at least interested in peaking under the hood. Anyway this warning explicitly excludes those who do.
but yes please don't use that without opsec training, because simply using some tool and assuming you're safe will sooner or later spoil your day.
Just a thought,IC and Law Enforcement control a large number of Tor nodes.
Even if Tor has no deanonymization risks,the fact that you use Tor makes you a bright red target -- by Feds and Local cops! (In US). Unless you use bridges(and even then) your ISP and Law enforcement will have you (or the subscriber of the ISP connection) listed as a Tor user. Think of it as driving on the road,you can drive a "pimped up" cadillac bouncing it all over the street -- and you have the right to do so -- but you will get pulled over and searched a lot,and hopefully all your encounters with LE will be harmless but it might not be so.
Just because they leave you alone,don't assume it's because they are not monitoring you.
Then you accept the risk associated with it. For people who need anonymity,I'd say a TLS vpn which isn't publicly listed as such would be ideal imo. My opinion is that anonymity isn't absolute and if you care about your use of anonymozing services to remain unknown as much as you want the resources you access with them to remain a secrect then the protocol should blend in with normal traffic.
Consider a place like n korea,if they see someone connectig to a Tor node,that person is screwed even if he only watched cat videos with it. Or maybe even in the US,imagine a court case where your innocent usage of Tor is used to into question the legitimacy of your private activities.
can't tell that from the outside... and if you're looking for people who are trying to hide illegal activity you actually care about prosecuting, I'd bet there's a higher overlap with the tor users than non-tor users. Even if there isn't the cops probably think so...
then why use tor in the first place, if you got nothing to hide?
logs may incriminate you even your own country protects you. think e.g. panama-leaks or other stuff that an activist or journalist might come across in your research ... also can you trust your own law enforcement not to be corrupt? how about if you know things connected to organized crime, ... in that case if you're based in the same jurisdiction as the mobster and e.g. you stole a couple of gig worth of incriminating material would you go to the police? it's pretty clear that you wouldn't want any logs.
I live in a country where the highest ranking politicians are fully in the hands of the mob. here a speeding ticket can be solved with a small "tip". Word of advise: don't ever trust the state to protect you. Also don't ever talk to cops no matter where in the world you're living (even less so if you're not guilty! this is first advise every lawyer will give you too).
We all know Private Browsing is for porn, but everyone goes along with the illusion that it's for buying presents for your SO. You might well have something to hide, but putting a banner over your fireplace saying "Incriminating evidence goes here" is still a bit silly.
It's not that I have nothing to hide. I close the door before I use the toilet. This tool specifically promotes hiding crimes. Mix questionable ethics with no updates in six years and it's likely to taste off and stale.
insinuating criminal content and questionable ethics, or conjecturing he is a nation state actor, when you seem to be utterly unfamiliar with his work isn't fair tbh
Tor-over-Tor is less secure than Tor by itself, because the circuits are not aware of each other and it is possible to reuse your first connections entry as your second connections exit.
i.e. A->-B->C, then the second connection becomes D->-E->A. This would allow A to de-anonymize you.
I’m interested in doing something similar, but just routing all my home network traffic through an Algo VPN server I spun up on DigitalOcean (except Netflix and Amazon video).
I know there are tutorials online for setting this up against an OpenVPN server, but I haven’t found any for Algo that allow exceptions for some destination IPs (Netflix, etc.).
When you use TAILS, only applications that are aware of Tor will be using Tor and other applications just go nowhere.
Tor Browser is a great example for explaining the separation between application layer and network layer anonymity. The tor client gives you network layer anonymity while Tor Browser gives you scrubbing of cookies and anti-fingerprinting. Using another browser, or other applications in general that do not try to provide application layer anonymity, with Tor wouldn't protect against all the application layer attacks and so you end up with less (or no) protection.