That's the spirit of the current system, and it mostly works. The 2008 crisis was crazy because nobody anticipated the magnitude of moral hazard between insurers <=> (banks <=> rating agencies <=> pension funds) <=> mortgage lenders <=> homebuyers. Homebuyers thought they were in great financial shape because lenders kept pushing them easier loans, lenders were writing mortgages with their eyes closed because the banks buying the mortgages were making so much money packaging them into MBSes and selling them to pension funds, the pension funds were enjoying great returns on these products rated AAA by rating agencies asleep at the wheel, and meanwhile the banks offloaded their MBS risk by purchasing CDSes from insurers who were blindly making lots of money selling them. The whole thing was a self-reinforcing feedback loop that burst violently.
I definitely blame the banks for being overly creative in coming up with perverse, complicated multi-party incentive structures that are hard to regulate while lobbying for deregulation. But at the same time, the mortgage lenders, insurers and rating agencies deserve some blame for being negligent at their jobs.
I definitely blame the banks for being overly creative in coming up with perverse, complicated multi-party incentive structures that are hard to regulate while lobbying for deregulation. But at the same time, the mortgage lenders, insurers and rating agencies deserve some blame for being negligent at their jobs.