On: How Apple is paving the way to a ‘cloud dictatorship’ in China

[sneak]

In theory you control who is added to an iMessage too, but Apple’s closed source software is what does the controlling. Enter a government wiretap, and boom.

[willstrafach → sneak]

I am not sure why closed-source code would be relevant here. The opaque aspect in this case would be the server handling it, not the device.

[sneak → willstrafach]

iMessage is end to end encrypted.

[willstrafach → sneak]

Correct.

I was addressing the "closed source software" aspect, because some level is trust is required in the server for key distribution regardless of source availability.

[tony101 → sneak]

Yes, but the key server (operated by Apple) is free to add additional keys to your account that others will use to encrypt messages to you.

[sneak → tony101]

Yes. In the iCloud Keychain model, the key client (written by Apple, “operated” without review by you) is free to add additional keys to your account that you will use to encrypt messages to you.