Given what's been disclosed so far it seems an exploit using rowhammer techniques would be unlikely to work with ECC RAM. Consumer systems will be screwed unless a tolerable microcode update is released.
I don't think this issue is related to rowhammer. I think people have been speculating about rowhammer because it's a famous hardware bug, but none of the details of page table isolation seem to align with a rowhammer-based attack.
Oh, are you thinking the KASLR bypass is actually the main problem, because it allows targeted rowhammer? I'm not sure if that's really true, since a KASLR bypass would give you a virtual address, and rowhammer would care more about physical addresses.
But in any case, the KASLR bypass is not the main vulnerability here. KASLR is widely seen as too leaky to be really useful. Linux would not rush out a >5% performance hit just to fix one of the many leaks.
I was under the impression that rowhammer could work because ECC ram can't correct for a high number of errors. Specifically "However, even such modules cannot correct multi-bit disturbance errors" from http://users.ece.cmu.edu/~yoonguk/papers/kim-isca14.pdf.
With such a crude mechanism the odds are pretty slim that you can create all the right multi-bit flips in one go without hitting an intermediate state that triggers an ECC fault. Research theorizing and actual practice aren't always the same.
