So, the original author's point was that the discount rate thing applies differently than you're applying it.
They're not choosing less satisfaction now rather than more satisfaction later. They see things as hopeless (too many bee stings), throw their hands in the air and say screw it. A 0% chance of a high-paying job in the distant future discounts to 0 utility at present for any discount rate.
Karelis isn't talking about discount rates at all.
He is claiming the poor have a flat utility function with a kink at zero. I.e., the ability to cure 1 bee sting (out of 5) now is worth nothing to them, only the ability to be bee sting free holds utility.
I think to understand the point I'm trying to make, we could re-examine your previous statement: "Am I foolish and not obeying the laws of economics for buying video games, which have an expected payoff of $0?"
If the laws of economics predict that you shouldn't buy that video game, then you're not foolish -- they are.
People's behavior changes radically when you give them experimental situations that involve gaining or losing money -- they're way more risk averse with losing 100$ then they are with changing their odds of winning 100$. This isn't baked into the assumptions that economics makes, and neither are a million other wrinkles of human behavior.
"What economists say" isn't the be-all and end-all, it's just another prism to be used.
They're not choosing less satisfaction now rather than more satisfaction later. They see things as hopeless (too many bee stings), throw their hands in the air and say screw it. A 0% chance of a high-paying job in the distant future discounts to 0 utility at present for any discount rate.