I don't think The Intercept has much responsibility here at all. In my opinion, in their role as receivers of leaked information, they should verify the information provided to them and decide if it should be released to the public. Sure, they shouldn't reveal their source and The Intercept met that requirement by insuring that they themselves did not know the leaker's identity.
Anyone who is thinking about leaking anything classified only needs to spend thirty seconds typing "Snowden" into Google to find out what happens when the federal government identifies the leaker. They then decide if it's worth the risk and how much time they will spend on covering their tracks. In this case (if true) it sounds like Reality Winner decided that they simply couldn't cover up their leaking and threw in the towel.
Much has been made of the watermarks on laser printers, we've known about those for a long time. Not everyone is aware but it's the sort of thing you can find out about if you put in time to do the research. After doing my own research, it doesn't seem like these watermarks really came into play; the NSA simply looked up everyone who had accessed the document and inspected their workstations for clues.
> the NSA simply looked up everyone who had accessed the document and inspected their workstations for clues.
The FBI doesn't mention the watermark in their affidavits, but they do mention that The Intercept gave away that the document had been printed and mailed from Augusta, GA. That allowed them to quickly zero in on Winner. The only "clue" on her workstation was that she had e-mailed The Intercept asking for a podcast transcript months before. In other words, she knew The Intercept existed.
The Intercept burned her.
I'm not doubting that the NSA would have figured out the source eventually, yellow dots or not, but I think it's a fair criticism to say the Intercept did not have to publish a picture of the document in full, instead of transcribing the contents.
I disagree, if the Intercept values leaking things the public deserves to know (their whole raison d'être), they need to do better.
Bear in mind, The Intercept is likely more aware of anti-leaker strategies than most of the people they are hoping will leak them data. If they're going to encourage the act, they should do everything possible to help their sources protect themselves, and do diligence on anonymizing everything they get even further.
No, Journalists need to ensure the confidentiality of their source by all means. Simply releasing the info would consitute negligence. They have a duty to protect those who risk their life or freedom for the public good
There's no evidence that it was The Intercept's actions that caused her to be found. I agree that they should be more careful (they should _always_ be more careful), but there are many ways the source could have been found independent of the newspaper. Regardless, the government has many incentives to claim that it was The Intercept's deficient opsec that caused them to find the leaker.
There really isn't much you can reasonably conclude about this. Is the government lying? Is The Intercept incompetent? The only thing you should remember is that if you are going to leak documents you need to do as much as possible while they are still in your control to hide your involvement. Once you send them off, your fate is in the hands of others.
For NSA documents classified "top secret" they don't just watermark when printing, they watermark the text. How do they do this?
For NSA documents classified "top secret" they don't just watermark when printed they watermark the text. How?
They can also sprinkle typos:
For NSA documents clasified "top secret" they don't just watermark when printing, they watermark the text. How do they do this?
Another option: They'll include meaningless "extra" information after the text such as a glossary or word definitions or even just something that looks like background info copied from Wikipedia.
Of course, it all depends on how the document was obtained. The systems that modify texts in this way aren't used everywhere.
Yes it certainly is. The Intercept should have taken such precautions, but it's not very smart to assume that they always will take those precautions. If you want to be safe as the leaker, you'll have to either do that sort of thing yourself or communicate with The Intercept to make sure they will. Point is that you cannot really control how much caution third parties will take with your documents.
But like I said, the government has every incentive to make us question The Intercept's competence in these matters even though there are many ways the government could have found the leakers. Leakers _should_ be worried about these sorts of things, but we as the general populace should realize that this is perfect opportunity to make The Intercept look bad and to deter future leaks.
I'm not really sure what argument is failing. I'm certainly blaming the leaker for using bad opsec (sent emails to The Intercept using a work computer). I'm also certainly blaming The Intercept for using bad opsec. I'm also pointing out that the government has every incentive to act like it was The Intercept's bad opsec that allowed them to find the leaker even if they, for example, found who it was by just looking at access logs for the document.
Yes, but there were only six who printed it to begin with. I'm inclined to agree that the Intercept shouldn't have shared that information with the contractor, but it's not at all clear that the leaker wouldn't have been found anyway.
How does the FBI know it was printed? Because the Intercept told them. It could have been screenshots from a phone. It could have been downloaded from some hack. The number of people that viewed a document is going to be a superset of the number of people that viewed and printed a document. And if they're worried someone could access the report outside of their controls, then the set gets even larger. The Intercept only needed to disclose some content and the intelligence report number to get confirmation. Instead, they gave away how they got the report (printed), narrowing it to a set of six, and then they gave away the postmark, narrowing to a set of one. The Intercept burned their source.
That article contains the following "evidence" claiming this is how the leaker was unmasked:
> Armed with this evidence, the NSA was able to quickly determine who had printed the document by checking audit logs.
So no I see exactly _zero_ evidence in that article that this was the method used. If you have any other article that has such evidence, I'm all ears.
Of course you're correct that The Intercept should have taken more care in this matter, but that doesn't mean that this was the reason why the leaker was found. The leaker should also have been a bit less amateur (e.g. not communicating with The Intercept on a _work_ computer).
Do you think the NSA wouldn't have checked access logs and the emails if not for the scan? The difference isn't between getting caught vs. not, it's between getting caught in days vs weeks.
But also caught with irrefutable proof. The printer and job time can be tracked back to her precisely. With that in hand, there is absolutely no doubt that leak came from her (she intentionally shared), or through her (she printed, but someone else shared, with or without her knowledge).
In a situation like this, you as the leaker have a lot more to lose than whoever you're leaking to.
In that situation, I'm sorry, but the responsibility for protecting your identity is on you. Anonymize the data. Do not leak something that only you would have access to. etc, etc.
Because unless you're leaking to Infowars, you have to expect that a legitimate journalist will present your data to the organization from which you leaked it to, and request comment.
Snoweden did everything right, and it still wasn't good enough.
> Snowden did everything right, and it still wasn't good enough.
But Snowden's whole strategy was to be a public figure. He fled the country and had a documentary filmmaker record the handover of the documents. It looks like Winning was hoping to remain private and had no idea what she was doing.
We don't really know, it might have been good enough.
> Snowden's identity was made public by The Guardian at his request on June 9, 2013.[97] He explained: "I have no intention of hiding who I am because I know I have done nothing wrong."[20] He added that by revealing his identity he hoped to protect his colleagues from being subjected to a hunt to determine who had been responsible for the leaks.
I think everyone would agree with that. The question then becomes: did The Intercept not follow best practices here? Once again, there is no evidence and any "yes" answer relies on trusting the NSA/DOJ.
They did not. They told a government contractor that the document had been printed and mailed from Augusta, GA, who then reported it to the government. That's what got her, microdots or not.
You can read the search warrant at https://www.buzzfeed.com/stevenperlberg/a-federal-government..., which is more complete than the arrest warrant. Just read paragraphs 12-19, which cover the relevant probable cause. If the FBI don't know how it leaked (printed) and from where (Winner's home town), the case becomes extremely difficult. Instead, they had so much that she just confessed when they showed up.
She signed up for an email subscription from her personal gmail, on her work computer.
That would certainly have been enough to raise her superiors' hackles when discovered, but the result would have been her getting fired, not indicted.
The bottom line is having a personal subscription to the Intercept was not ever going to be enough to build a case against her. You repeating that claim is victim blaming, and more importantly, wrong.
Exactaly right. You should assume, especially in an environment like the NSA, that your internet browsing and email correspondence is being monitored and certain hosts and suspicious DNS will trigger something.
I've worked at far less security concerned companies that monitored all network traffic going and out and logged it and continually were looking not only for internal nefarious behavior but for possibly viruses, worms, etc.
A scheme that would be less effective if not for The Intercept's demonstrably deficient opsec in protecting its source in this affair.