I was responding to the above comment saying that it's a conjecture that consciousness is subjective. I'm saying it's a definition not a conjecture.
That fact makes objective investigation very hard. If I don't know whether a person is a p-zombie, I cannot know whether any objective events cause his consciousness. And if it's my consciousness we're talking about, I cannot be there to investigate the objective causes of it.
I believe the conjecture lies in the claim that there is no objective element to it. The fact that objective investigation is difficult does not make the case. BTW, your specific arguments for it being hard seem to me to border on solipsism.
Well, it's related to solipsism in that (a) if solipsism is true, then any objective explanation is illusory, and (b) it is impossible (not just hard) to know whether solipsism is true. Or instead of solipsism, you could substitute a simulation hypothesis.
This is what differentiates consciousness from all other phenomena. Gravity may or may not "really" exist; all I seek to explain is why objects appear to attract. On the other hand, consciousness certainly exists (you can test this out by trying to doubt it, in which case you'll have a conscious experience of doubt), and the only phenomena I can explain it with are objective and thus may themselves not really exist.
Your use of "may" in the last sentence indicates that it does not refute naaskings claim that collyw's assertion that "There is no objective element to [consciousness]" is conjecture.
We can also note that your argument that "consciousness certainly exists" (which actually only applies to my consciousness) does not validate any particular belief about it.
Quantum physics tells me cars don't really exist, they're just one more aggregate of matter really no different than any other aggregate.
But when you say "consciousness exists", you mean something different than when you say "cars exist". We both know cars don't really exist, fundamentally, but if you believe in irreducible subjectivity then you believe that consciousness fundamentally exists in the same way that quarks and fields exist.
So I do walk around and claim to be conscious just like I walk around and talk about the drive to work every morning, but I always know in the back of my mind that these are merely convenient labels, not things that actually exist. They are merely shorthands for a very complicated description of objective reality.
I'm afraid we are talking past each other. I do not know that quarks (or physical reality itself) exist; I merely infer it. Consciousness, on the other hand, is that very property by which I experience inference (among myriad other things). I do not have to (indeed, cannot) infer it.
Does it seem to you that anything at all is happening (e.g., that there seems to be a world around you, or that you seem to be having a thought)? Perhaps you're mistaken and it doesn't "really" seem, but only seems to seem. Nonetheless, it is that very seeming that I'm calling consciousness.
If I may ask: do you have significant experience with meditation? I suspect this conversation becomes easier when both parties have spent considerable time in the space between thoughts.
I have no idea why you think consciousness is needed for inference. We have plenty of algorithms that do it, and Solomonoff induction is the model to which all implementations aspire (like Turing machines are for computers).
Requiring experience to acquire knowledge is a completely unnecessary assumption. Only sensory perception and an automaton are needed to generate thoughts, at which point we can simply ask, how do we know we are not exactly such an automaton?
It is not that I think consciousness is required for inference, but that my own process of inference takes place in/via what I'm calling consciousness, and I'm guessing (but cannot be sure that) the same is happening for you.
This is why I ask: does it seem to you that anything at all is happening? Your answer cannot tell me whether you are conscious (or a p-zombie who is lying), but it may help you see what I'm getting at. If you ask me to be more precise (about "seem" or "happening"), I cannot. I can only trust that you are able to understand me.
If it does seem that something is happening, that is consciousness. If you answer that it's an illusion, and it may not really seem, but only seem to seem, that's still good enough.
So I can't tell you "how" I can be certain that something seems to be happening, and I cannot prove it to anybody else, but it certainly does seem.
But seeming to seem is not the same as seeming, so you can't hold both to be true simultaneously. This whole thread had been about whether seeming actually happens at all. For instance, I've consistently stated that experience doesn't really exist, that it's an illusion, and so p-zombies can't exist. As I said earlier, I acknowledge I have "consciousness", but this doesn't necessarily entail the same set of properteies you expect. I am totally behind the idea that consciousness is an informational property, but that hasn't been the impression I've gotten from your posts.
But seeming to seem is a form of seeming. And the only form of illusion I know of requires seeming: things seem one way but are actually another.
I simply do not understand what it means to doubt or deny that it seems like something is happening (though it's perfectly clear to me what it means to doubt that something is actually happening). When I see (and even accept) a proof of it, will I say "well it sure seems like something is happening, but I'm wrong, so it doesn't really seem like anything is happening?"
Perhaps my imagination is limited. I thank you for trying!
> But seeming to seem is a form of seeming. And the only form of illusion I know of requires seeming: things seem one way but are actually another.
When direct perception implies a false conclusion, that's an illusion. What else could "seems" actually mean?
So now we're down to the meaning of the word "perception". I hope you also agree that there's no need to imbue some subjective subtext into this word, so where else can subjectivity hide?
Let's take another look at the statement that introduced that phrase: "Consciousness is entirely subjective. There is no objective element to it." This is typical of a certain sort of internet comment, the incomplete argument. Here, the first sentence is presented as if a self-evident truth, and the second as if it inarguably follows from the first, but collyw omitted to state what he meant by "entirely subjective" and "objective element", let alone present any argument for his two assertions. Despite that, my impression is that collw is trying to suggest (perhaps without committing to an argument that could be challenged) that the claimed total subjectivity of consciousness excludes it from having any objective aspect. This, of course, is the form of qualia-based arguments for dualism / against strong AI, where the specific objective aspect they allegedly rule out is that consciousness could arise from physical processes. My only point here is that the argument "subjective implies not objective" is not axiomatic, and anyone advancing that argument has an obligation to justify the mutual exclusion, for whatever specific definition of 'subjective' and 'objective' they are using (they also, of course, have to justify that their definitions of subjective and objective are accurate characterizations of the specific things they are talking about.)
I am not sure that your second question accurately represents naasking's views, but I will say that while things like mood changes and drugs raise questions as to how well I know even my own consciousness, I don't really question that there is something there (I will get to the 'really' bit presently.) That self-knowledge on my part does not, however, extend to your consciousness (or anyone else's.) It has belatedly occurred to me that you are trying to draw a line between everyone's consciousness, as being something that you say certainly exists, and everything else, that might not "really" exist. If so, then you cannot do it: any argument that distinguishes knowledge of the external world from your self-knowledge of your own consciousness puts other people's consciousness on a par with the rest of the external world. As far as I can tell, that makes the position indistinguishable from solipsism. My take on solipsism is that you cannot prove or disprove it: it stands as a demonstration of the limits of reason, and for all practical purposes, you have to take the methodological assumption that it is false simply in order for the conversation to continue - anything we conclude is, at best, only true up to solipsism (or up to being in a simulation, which I think we both agree is, for all practical purposes, equivalent to solipsism in this regard.) This, by the way, is why I included 'really' in "I don't really question that there is something there."
I recognize your point about solipsism. I am not certain (except for practical purposes) about anyone else's consciousness.
Perhaps it would help if I describe what seem to be phases of belief about consciousness (or perhaps it will merely sound presumptuous and not help at all...). One way this progression can happen is through meditation, which I see as the process of consciousness becoming increasingly aware of itself.
1. I can doubt my own consciousness. How do I know I'm not an automaton? This seems to be naasking's position. From past experience, I trust that it's not merely rhetorical. There is genuine uncertainty about any consciousness, and proofs of its nonexistence can be satisfying.
2. "Oh, THAT!" It is no longer meaningful to doubt my own consciousness. I may be wrong about its details, but the sheer fact of experience is indeed a fact and not an assumption. Attempting to doubt my own consciousness is nonsensical, because I recognize that (my) doubt occurs in consciousness.
3. Various features of conscious experience are exposed as illusory. I've never actually experienced the passage of time; it is always now, and a present memory and anticipation only suggest something called "time." I've never actually experienced a self; it used to seem that monktastic was recognizing consciousness, but now it's clear that consciousness is recognizing monktastic (monktastic is, after all, a conglomeration of memories, bodily textures and sights, etc.; whereas consciousness is that which experiences those). These are not merely intellectual understandings.
4. ...
It's remarkably hard to have conversations across these sorts of boundaries. Perhaps naasking is right, and what I am calling a progression is actually a regression. I'll leave that for each to decide for him/herself.
All I mean to say is that in (3), it is not satisfying to objectify consciousness. Yes, we may identify (seemingly) flawless correlations between objective phenomena and consciousness, but they do not constitute any sort of "explanation" for consciousness.
Perhaps all I am really saying is this: we both recognize that any objective explanation of consciousness is only true "up to solipsism / simulation," but for me, that asterisk is a showstopper and not just a curiosity that we can punt on. Not that we should stop exploring these things (and taking them seriously for practical purposes) -- any more than we should stop painting or dancing.
> Yes, we may identify (seemingly) flawless correlations between objective phenomena and consciousness, but they do not constitute any sort of "explanation" for consciousness.
They may perhaps show that our previous expectations for an "explanation" were nonsensical. Compare this debate over consciousness against the history of vitalism. The same progression of ideas posed to justify some special ontological category for life, but where are all the vitalists now? In retrospect, do their arguments seem at all reasonable? How do they compare to present arguments about consciousness? In retrospect, will future people find these perspectives just as wrong?
No, I think that's quite backward. The only reason you (not "we" as a species) believe in something called "time" is because you think you've experienced it. You may protest and say "no, here's a picture of yesterday," but that picture does not prove anything [1]. Your belief requires a series of (perfectly reasonable) inferences which could nonetheless be wrong. But most of all, it depends on the compelling feeling you have that time is passing. And that is an illusion. You may have a faint sense of what I mean by those words, but without inspecting your experience very precisely, it will probably remain no more than a curiosity.
Time, space, matter, objective reality: these are all inferences that rely on your not paying close enough attention to a remarkable sleight of hand your consciousness is pulling on you. Once you manage to do this, it indeed becomes nonsensical to look for "explanations" of consciousness in terms of the very things it abstracted into seeming existence.
Positions like Last Thursdayism, solipsism, brains in vats and other skeptical arguments were already addressed by Moore over a century ago. A rational belief is only justified by considering the ontological commitments it requires of us.
So while I can't refute Last Thursdayism, given it's ontological commitments, it has such a low probability on the scale of possible explanations for reality that I need not concern myself with it (see Solomonoff Induction for justifying this logical ordering of hypotheses).
As for the "feeling" of time passing being some kind of ontological test, I honestly don't know what you think this proves. This "feeling" is just the competition between signals from your perceptions and signals from your memory of your perceptions. Such a comparison is trivially present in any feedback circuit, which entails that something time-like does indeed exist.
> It is not satisfying to objectify consciousness. Yes, we may identify (seemingly) flawless correlations between objective phenomena and consciousness, but they do not constitute any sort of "explanation" for consciousness.
If you are truly seeking enlightenment, rather than satisfaction, you probably should avoid a priori positions that rule out a whole class of possible answers from consideration.
I am not ruling them out. But it is only possible to prove such answers "up to solipsism" (or simulation, or similar metaphysics). Beyond that is a leap of faith. All I am saying is that my practice has decreased my willingness to make that leap. Perhaps it is not so dissimilar to how your practice (whatever it is) makes you unwilling to doubt your own consciousness -- something that you would be hard-pressed to justify to (the apparently many) consciousness deniers.
Taking a few steps back in the conversation, the reason it seems so silly to doubt that there's an objective basis for consciousness is that we've found an objective basis to basically everything else we've bothered to investigate. I claim that this is a false analogy. Though I'm apparently not good at communicating why, it amounts basically to this: you can be certain of your own consciousness, but of nothing else. Your consciousness and everything else are not on equal metaphysical footing.
That fact makes objective investigation very hard. If I don't know whether a person is a p-zombie, I cannot know whether any objective events cause his consciousness. And if it's my consciousness we're talking about, I cannot be there to investigate the objective causes of it.