So, in one important vein, I would disagree, but I'm not sure how well it applies to this scenario -- if you are building a system based on deniable encryption, one example that totally falls apart if one party can prove that they have (forced) zero-keying I imagine would be in deniability, especially if part of the zero keying depends on unpredictability of the keyspace of more than one actor.
AKA, if the deniability of your protocol depends on the random keyspace of more than one actor, a vector that allows some actor to compress the space of permitted keys could allow an inference of more-likely potentially valid keys vs invalid keys, thus disproving or at least weakening the deniability of the protocol.
As for the malicious peer problem -- the malicious peer is the very model of state-sanctioned surveillance. I think it would be an exercise in willful blindness at the least to pretend that does not exist.
Deniable encryption refers to the ability hide encrypted data without an adversary being able to detect that there is encrypted data present. It generally refers to file system encryption. I'm not sure how it would even apply in a case where key exchange is used. Either way though, the attack still doesn't get anything. If someone is participating the key exchange, then they get access to the resulting key. They can publicize this key to do at least as much damage as zero-keying.
> As for the malicious peer problem -- the malicious peer is the very model of state-sanctioned surveillance.
I'm really not sure what you mean by this. Some peers might be malicious, but this attack gains them nothing. This is true whether the peer is a state actor, or an 11 year old. Please try to have a basic understanding of what you are talking about before you accuse other people of engaging in willful blindness.
AKA, if the deniability of your protocol depends on the random keyspace of more than one actor, a vector that allows some actor to compress the space of permitted keys could allow an inference of more-likely potentially valid keys vs invalid keys, thus disproving or at least weakening the deniability of the protocol.
As for the malicious peer problem -- the malicious peer is the very model of state-sanctioned surveillance. I think it would be an exercise in willful blindness at the least to pretend that does not exist.