The problem with DRM like Intel's is that you have to trust Intel. And the DRM is meant to protect other people's code running on consumer machines. The pitch here is that you can run your own custom DRM, that only you control.
To use CAs as an analogy. Intel, and most chip manufactures, when they describe DRM, they mean generalized consumer DRM, so basically how your browser or OS comes with a list of CAs pre-installed. The DRM pitch here is the ability to write your own DRM, e.g. like having your own internal CA.
This has a use case. DRM can be useful for things like governments and companies. While dangerous from a civil liberty perspective on consumer hardware, it's perfectly reasonable for an organization to want a DRM solution that they control entirely. As an example such a solution could prevent the IT guy (re: Snowden) from stealing your files.
In this case I'd call it InfoSec features, not DRM. They can be conflated because both can rely on encryption, but they have different purposes, or I'd say premises.
InfoSec is the goal, and DRM is the process by which the goal is reached. DRM refers to digital data that some people can't copy, or view, etc. often at a hardware level. That's a tool in doing InfoSec.
To use CAs as an analogy. Intel, and most chip manufactures, when they describe DRM, they mean generalized consumer DRM, so basically how your browser or OS comes with a list of CAs pre-installed. The DRM pitch here is the ability to write your own DRM, e.g. like having your own internal CA.
This has a use case. DRM can be useful for things like governments and companies. While dangerous from a civil liberty perspective on consumer hardware, it's perfectly reasonable for an organization to want a DRM solution that they control entirely. As an example such a solution could prevent the IT guy (re: Snowden) from stealing your files.