The actual content of the report does not support the conclusion in the headline and description. The entire extent of the supposed "plan" is the obvious suggestion, in passing, that finding people who leak sensitive information would deter others from leaking sensitive information.
So what's the story here? That U.S. military intelligence knew, in March 2008, that Wikileaks was posting classified information that presumably had inside sources, and that this might be threat to OPSEC/INFOSEC, and that shockingly someone who works in "cyber counterintelligence assessment", wrote a report about it. Utterly mundane.
I agree except the utterly mundane. It's mildly interesting to see how the government does threat analysis.
The wikileaks summary on the first page implies that the government actually tried to carry out a contingency plan to get rid of wikileaks (and that it "appears the plan was ineffective"), which is beyond silly. Surely wikileaks of all organizations would understand that these sorts of _analysis_ documents, enumerating even the mildest threats and then pinpointing potential weaknesses and then basically trying to get permission to investigate further (probably unsuccessfully but who knows) are a dime a dozen (not implying you should ever pay for one if offered).
The word "planned" in the phrase "planned to destroy..." has a very different meaning in the context of government contingency planning than common usage suggests. In most contexts a plan to do xyz implies a course of action the organization intends to take. The US government, at least, generates layers and layers of "plans" that it never intends to act on, or knows that the probability that they'll need to be acted on are very remote. For the most part then the actual dispatch of some combination of plans are left up to non military elected officials.
So what's the story here? That U.S. military intelligence knew, in March 2008, that Wikileaks was posting classified information that presumably had inside sources, and that this might be threat to OPSEC/INFOSEC, and that shockingly someone who works in "cyber counterintelligence assessment", wrote a report about it. Utterly mundane.