Although it isn't yet clear how much the brakes did actually brake, it is known they would never be enough.
So the cable was a critical component and initial findings suggest it wasn't being verified as rigourously, thoroughly and often as it perhaps should have.
No that's not what it says. Brakes were not enough "in the current configuration" in other words they were not applied fully. The investigation will focus on why brakes were not applying full breaking force.
In railway jargon "brake configuration" refers to "how much are you braking" but you seem to have interpreted "braking configuration" as "the number and type of brakes that are currently installed in the vehicle"
The evidence indicates that the air brake and the manual brake were quickly applied
by the brakeman of cab #1, but that in the current configuration, the brakes do not have sufficient capacity to stop the cabins in motion without their empty masses being mutually balanced by the connecting cable. There-
fore, the existing brakes does not constitute a redundant system in case of a failure in the connecting cable.
So the braking system is insufficient to stop after a broken cable.
There's more than a wheel brake system. There's a mechanism to clamp against the track slot from both top and bottom. See Fig. 2, right. Apparently it wasn't enough.
Funiculars are a problem because they're too steep for railroad wheel brakes, too heavy for elevator braking systems, and rare enough that there are not good standards for them. Angels Flight in LA has had two major accidents, one in 2001 and one in 2013.[1][2] Different causes. The 2001 accident was due to bad design - only one cable, no track brakes, and a system where each car had its own winding drum. The spline connecting the drums failed. The 2013 accident, after a total redesign and replacement of the hauling system, was due to bad maintenance.
So bad that it involved a stick being used to hold down an override switch.
Elevator rail brakes are often jam brakes - once they're triggered, a wedge is jammed between brake and rail such that motion forces it into tighter contact. Stops with jam brakes are rather drastic. San Francisco cable cars have a jam brake for emergencies. That's the red lever, which drives a wedge into the slot. When used, there are usually passenger injuries and the wedge will be welded to the track by frictional heating.[3] So that's for serious emergencies only.
It's my understanding that this particular funicular system uses eight shoe brakes, where rubber pads basically clamp a metal track (from above and below) causing friction.
Hearing some local experts, they often mention that this is physically not enough to stop a 14 ton vehicle (plus passengers) going downhill when the slope is as high as 18%. So basically even if in perfectly working condition, the bake pads or wheels would just slide down the tracks as there's not enough friction for the resulting force.
Maybe something like a rack and pinion railway or some other kind of drastic metal locking mechanism are the only realistic way to prevent catastrophic events when the cable breaks/detaches, considering the masses and slopes involved here?
While I personally lean towards your interpretation, the language is ambiguous - perhaps intentionally so - and it is premature to read too much into it in either direction. We’ll just have to wait.
> In railway jargon "brake configuration" refers to "how much are you braking"
I've never heard that terminology in a European rail context, you'll need to provide a citation.
In EU regs, "braking configuration" literally means the mechanical configuration of braking; how much braking force the inertial, hydraulic or pneumatic braking circuits can apply in total.
> In railway jargon "brake configuration" refers to "how much are you braking"
I presume the quote in English is translated from the original Portuguese. I would hope it was carefully translated but I wouldn't personally bet on that.
No entanto, e independentemente disso, as evidências indicam que o freio pneumático e também o freio manual foram rapidamente aplicados pelo guarda-freio da cabina n.® 1, mas que na configuração existente os freios não têm a capacidade suficiente para imobilizar as cabinas em movimento sem estas terem as suas massas em vazio mutuamente equilibradas através do cabo de ligação. Desta forma, não constitui um sistema redundante à falha dessa ligação.
The suggested hodgepodge of over-engineering and mindless indirections in the fine article are far from “doing things right”, though. Stop chasing magic bullets and consider the actual current requirements, while being relatively flexible about them (this will mean something different in each case). Everything else is just a waste of effort and will come back and bite in the long run.
You have complex enough logic to warrant a language, you should use a real language. You'll have more support, less obscure issues, a solid standard library and whatever else you want, because it's a REAL language.
If the argument is "someone in my team uses recursion to write the YAML files, so I'll disallow it", then the issue is not with the language, it's with the team.
What I have found on my career is that many Ops people sell themselves short and hesitate to dive into learning and fully using an actual language. I've yet to understand why, but I've seen it multiple times.
They then end up using pseudo-languages in configuration files to avoid this small step towards using an actual language, and then complain about how awful those pseudo-languages are.
> You have complex enough logic to warrant a language, you should use a real language.
Not sure what you mean. Dhall is a real language:
Dhall is not a Turing-complete programming language,
which is why Dhall’s type system can provide safety
guarantees on par with non-programmable configuration
file formats. Specifically, Dhall is a “total”
functional programming language, which means that:
You can always type-check an expression in a finite
amount of time
If an expression type-checks then evaluating that
expression always succeeds in a finite amount of time
Generally what happens is that:
- Everyone is able to prove a transaction's correctness;
- There's no way for a third party to track the contents of a transaction adversarialy;
- there are ways for first and second parties to prove them if they so wish.
I tell them that it’s important to me to talk to them, but it’s not the most important thing I’m doing right now. A call requires my immediate attention. An email requires, and will get, my attention.
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