Same or better uptime might not be granted, but I've been hosting my instance for quite a bit of time now, and the only downtime I've had were due to my ISP.
I'm using vaultwarden too (bitwarden_rs when I first deployed it), and have absolutely no complains whatsoever.
Also, after your device synced with the server at least once, you can still access and export all your passwords, even if the server is down. This is the main selling point for me : even in a disaster scenario, your passwords are "naturally" replicated.
Mine is exposed behind a reverse proxy, with a subdomain != Bitwarden, and a wildcard certificate. Never seen anything weird in the logs since (before, I had a named certificate including subdomain, and I was seeing regular pokes from unknown IPs, so better be on the safe side)
Again, the main bitwarden instance is a huge target. Mine is just a small instance with less than 10 users, which will probably never encounter a targeted attack.
> Also, after your device synced with the server at least once, you can still access and export all your passwords, even if the server is down. This is the main selling point for me : even in a disaster scenario, your passwords are "naturally" replicated.
Watch out for the browser extension clients though - they're prone to session expiry and insisting you relogin which is a problem if the remote server is down or gone.
I know people who were in that case. Not a fine, the taxes are just updated, and from now on they have to pay for the pool.
As for the dataset, while I don't know for certain in this particular case, we have a rather accurate database of constructions in France, that could have been used (it's publicly accessible, actually that's what OpenStreetMaps used for the building footprints here), and include pools. We also have "BDOrtho", a public database of aerial photography.
In my experience, the annoyances list in ublock orogin (and possibly others), which is disabled by default, drastically reduces the amount of such pop-ups. The only remaining ones are unfortunately among the worst, which is to be expected since they went through the trouble to setup anti-adblock measures ...
I used LastPass for a while too, but I then switched to KeePass, using syncthings to have a single db. At first that was great, but after a few save mistakes, and a slight change in need, I've switched to a hosted bitwarden (using vaultwarden).
I've not had a single issue with it since, it's fully compatible with the official bitwarden app (which works rather well), and is much easier to use when other people in your household also need to manage their passwords.
Point of note : the android app syncs the database locally, and can be accessed/used/exported even offline, which is very, very reassuring in case of server/network failure
I used this tool a few month ago, as a way to quickly profile some slow running functions in one of my notebooks. The color is mapped to the cumulative run time of the line.
I switched to /e/ rather recently, and it also just happen that I am in the process of switching banks, which means I currently have two banking apps on my phone.
Both are rather strict on having a clean, non rooted, non modified phone. Currently, they both work without any caveats, but I had to install magisk, add them to magisk hide, and use the magisk renaming feature to have them work.
I recently had a bank detect Magisk Hide. Since on principle, I don't think it's their business what I do with my phone, especially once added Magisk Hide, I went into my branch, told them just that and asked for everything in cash to move to a different bank. These are the same banks that only have SMS for 2FA and it's required.
Also, after your device synced with the server at least once, you can still access and export all your passwords, even if the server is down. This is the main selling point for me : even in a disaster scenario, your passwords are "naturally" replicated.
Mine is exposed behind a reverse proxy, with a subdomain != Bitwarden, and a wildcard certificate. Never seen anything weird in the logs since (before, I had a named certificate including subdomain, and I was seeing regular pokes from unknown IPs, so better be on the safe side)
Again, the main bitwarden instance is a huge target. Mine is just a small instance with less than 10 users, which will probably never encounter a targeted attack.