Hacker Newsnew | past | comments | ask | show | jobs | submit | rhodey's commentslogin

Hi! thanks for the feedback!

I think you are right. I thought "Call" would clearly get the idea of voice across at least, but it can be confused with function call, or simply to invoke.

I dont have the ability to change the title but if someone else wants to:

"Video and Voice Call an AI from Signal"

Else maybe I will submit it again in a few days.

Thanks


the pull-stream module and its ecosystem is relevant here

the idea is basically just use functions. no classes and very little statefulness

https://www.npmjs.com/package/pull-stream


Attestation always involves a "document" or a "quote" (two names for basically a byte buffer) and a signature from someone. Intel SGX & TDX => signature from intel. AMD SEV => signature from amd. AWS Nitro Enclaves => signature from aws.

Clients who want to talk to a service which has attestation send a nonce, and get back a doc with the nonce in it, and the clients have somewhere in them a hard coded certificate from Intel, AMD, AWS and they check that the doc has a good sig.


Yes, though I see the term abused often enough that it's not enough for me to believe it's sound just from the use of the term attestation. Nowadays "attestation" is simply slang for "validate we can trust [something]". I didn't see any mechanism described in the article to validate that the weights actually being used are the same as the weights that were hashed.

In a real attestation scheme you would do something like have the attesting device generate a hardware-backed key to be used for communications to and from it, to ensure it is not possible to use an attestation of one device to authenticate any other device or a man-in-the-middle. Usually for these devices you can verify the integrity of the hardware-backed key as well. Of course all of this is moot though if you can trick an authorized device into signing or encrypting/decrypting anything attacker-provided, which is where many systems fail.


In my opinion this is very well written

Two comments so far suggesting otherwise and I guess idk what their deal is

Attestation is taking off


I wanted to try the demo so I found the link

> Write me 10 sentences about your favorite Subway sandwich

Click button

Instant! It was so fast I started laughing. This kind of speed will really, really change things


At my time of reading it is not at all clear to me how the "sandbox network proxy" knows what value to inject in place of the string "proxy-managed"

> Prerequisites > An Anthropic API key in an env variable

I am willing to accept that the steps in the tutorial may work... but if it does work it seems like there has to be some implicit knowledge about common Anthropic API key env var names or something like this

I wanna say for something which is 100% a security product I prefer explicit versus implicit / magically


Yeah, we are on it. In the current version, things are hardcoded and implicit (we are also in experimental preview), but soon it will be configurable and explicit.


good catch, it's naturally `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, but I could have been more specific.


I own 2 framework 13 laptops at this time and repairability aside I am also just happy to support a new PC hardware co.


Always fun to read about HFT. If anyone wants to learn about the Order Book data structure you can find it in JS here:

https://github.com/rhodey/limit-order-book

https://www.npmjs.com/package/limit-order-book


I am glad for this feature

If I have anyone's attention there is something related I would like to see

Please add a small thing which users can look for on the public: repo/actions page

This small thing should let users know the action was run by github like is default and not run on a custom / private action runner

The private action runner feature makes sense but many projects tell users to look to the github action history to trust that tests A, B, C passed. If the github action ran on a private action runner then you really cannot trust that what is in e.g. run.yml actually ran

The attestation feature can be used to prove that an action was run by github and not by private / custom but users need to install the github cli to validate attestations and this is a heavy ask when I think an addition icon on repo/actions page or a diff icon color will do better


I am seeing some docs now that suggest

> runs-on: [self-hosted, ...]

Must be added to run.yml to use custom / private action runners

I did not find these docs last time I looked and so my feature request may be already fulfilled

If anyone wants to chime in to say that `runs-on` can be relied on or not I would be grateful


Amazon Nitro Enclaves not effected

IMO Amazon is the obvious choice for TEE because they make billions selling isolated compute

If you built a product on Intel or AMD and need to pivot do take a look at AWS Nitro Enclaves

I built up a small stack for Nitro: https://lock.host/ has all the links

MIT everything, dev-first focus

AWS will tell you to use AWS KMS to manage enclave keys

AWS KMS is ok if you are ok with AWS root account being able to get to keys

If you want to lock your TEE keys so even root cannot access I have something i the works for this

Write to: hello@lock.host if you want to discuss


Nitro Enclaves also require you to trust Amazon. No thanks, I'll take the hardware based solution.


why wouldn't it be effected?


Because AWS does not sell the Nitro TEE hardware

And so there is no case where you find a Nitro TEE online and the owner is not AWS

And it is practically impossible to break into AWS and perform this attack

The trust model of TEE is always: you trust the manufacturer

Intel and AMD broke this because now they say: you also trust where the TEE is installed

AWS = you trust the manufacturer = full story


Guidelines | FAQ | Lists | API | Security | Legal | Apply to YC | Contact

Search: