> On Apple platforms or on Windows, you could look at the crash logs captured by the operating system’s built-in crash reporter, but on Linux that’s typically all you had to go on.
On modern linux distros, simply typing `coredumpctl debug` puts you right into gdb with the core dump loaded. If debuginfod is set up (not sure what the defaults look like there across distros), it will even automatically download debug symbols for all libraries loaded at the time of the crash.
Forced open source for everyone but them. They retain copyright and will continue to sell proprietary adaptions, while forbidding everyone else to do the same.
Yosys and nextpnr have been production-ready for years, they handle your average hobbyist FPGA project just fine (and 1-2 orders of magnitude faster than the vendor tools).
> Open source tooling is very primitive and not usable
Maybe you're working off old information, but the FOSS tooling (ghdl, yosys, nextpnr) is completely sufficient for hobbyists. If you're doing huge, high-speed designs on expensive FPGAs, sure, use the vendor tools, but for your average iCE40/ECP5-scale design, FOSS is the way to go.
Sufficient, sure. But in terms of usability it's like giving someone sed and grep and saying "this is sufficient for writing a novel".
Maybe in time they'll move on from the "here's a bunch of random poorly documented tools, you only have to do all of the integration work!" stage, but they aren't there yet.
If you rely only on TPM for key storage, yes, the disk is unlocked automatically and any sufficiently broken userspace application you can get your hands on will let you access it. You can still combine TPM+passphrase/PIN though, at the cost of having to enter it at boot.
With properly functioning secure boot and no bugs in the entire software stack, it doesn't matter if the disk is decrypted automatically, since you can't access the system without OS-level authentication. If you tried to replace system files to let you get in anyway, the secure boot measurements would no longer match up and the decryption fails entirely.
Then again, an attacker can read the decryption key from RAM (freeze and remove the modules, then dump the memory on another system) and decrypt the disk offline.
So, data on a stolen laptop which has an unprotected TPM (no PIN to boot) can be considered compromised.
I use a very long and inconvenient password for LUKS, and a simpler one for login and root. My lock screen is more a convenience in a trusted environment and not security. The TPM only solution sounds like it would require my very long password every time I leave my desk to get coffee.
Relying on no bugs in the entire software stack makes the attack surface quite large.
If a laptop is stolen the thief can wait sufficiently long for some vulnerability to be discovered somewhere in the stack. With LUKS only the LUKS encryption has to be good and full disk encryption protects the data.
> You mention cost, but what is even the benefit of encryption that's unlocked by just booting?
Ideally, your login screen is secure and allows no bypasses into a shell or similar, so you cannot really access any files on the hard drive.
And if you modify some system files or boot another operating system to get around this, you are required to know the disk encryption password to get to them.
That definitely exists, but AFAIK it requires special equipment to get the signal across transformers. Not much of a problem in urban environments, but e.g. in low-density areas in the US, where every house has its own transformer, it might be a problem.
There's also Brandweer Lunteren, which had to shut down for a while recently but seems to be sanctioned now. Not much traffic footage there though, being a pretty small town in the Netherlands.
> I'm not a fan of the fact that ÖBB couchette compartments don't have locks on their doors
The ones I know have both a turning lock that can be opened from the outside by the conductor or anyone else with a wrench (so more of a protection against someone mistakenly stumbling into your compartment in the middle of the night), as well as a deadbolt that can't be opened from the outside without ripping it apart.
I'm guessing this is what happened to me. I was robbed overnight in a sleeper car, which I assumed was safe because there were literally 3 locks on the door. This seems to be a pretty common occurrence
lol. lmao