With the exploits published as-is, you'll only get root inside the container: there's no explicit namespace break, and calling setuid() in a container just gives you root in the container.
However, it can be used to modify files that are passed into the container (e.g. Docker run -v), or files that are shared with other containers (e.g. other Docker containers sharing the same layers). kube-proxy with Kubernetes happens to share a trusted binary with containers by default, which is how it can be exploited: https://github.com/Percivalll/Copy-Fail-CVE-2026-31431-Kuber...
You don't need any setuid binaries. You could just as easily use the vulnerability to add a job to crontab(5) that causes the cron daemon to run whatever you want as root.
I’ve spent dozens of hours reading about the conflict on social media. I don’t think I’ve seen a single western account, outside of schizophrenic conspiracy theorist anons, saying that Iran is some paradise that can do no wrong.
No, and even if we could, it would require a migration of approaching the same difficulty of a migration to PQ, at which point why not just migrate to PQ
The entire point is that you can escalate to root
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