> Putting this girl in prison and a jumpsuit is ridiculous.
Should they have put her on house arrest in a hotel room? She doesn't deserve special privileges. A huge swath of the US population would be adamantly against her being treated special.
Do you know that mixed race marriage did not gain majority support in the USA until 1995? Sometimes it is right to not give a fuck about what "a huge swath of the US population thinks".
And in this case, it's not about "special priviledges", it's about the ridiculousness of this process being applied to anyone in her circumstances.
My ancestors (going back to the 1400s) were the living embodiment of "the mutt mindset", only rooted in northern Europe. Someone who didn't want to fight in the Hugenot wars ran off to England, and the fucking began...
How do you know their peers, teachers, and bosses aren’t autistic too? Autistic people can’t be peers, teachers, and bosses? Autistic people can be assholes too. Maybe that’s what it really is: some people are just assholes.
> not a single chinese have a single thought about going war with the US
Odd. Then who in China feels the need to outcompete US military technology? Why is China developing missiles like DF-27 that are difficult to counter and take out aircraft carriers? Who is coming up with these ideas and for what purposes?
This misconception is common among US official/think tanks especially related to DOD because the way Chinese government operated is so counter-intuitive from US perspective (probably many other governments). It's actually same as how China makes economics policy: First assess the "inevitable" future, than make a plan to better adapt to that future (e.g. Battery, EV, Solar...actually a lot more examples before those). This means China is constantly making policies considered "ineffective" because in many cases they don't have a clear goal (build the capbility for the sake of the build). On contrast US sets a clear goal first and build the capbility accordingly, which means you build the capbility for a purpose.
For some reason people can't translate the same process when talking about military capbility. The current assessment from China probably is some version of "China will be regard as superpower. to be regarded as a credible superpower, credible superpower level army is required". While most US officials think China builds this military power for a concrete goal (why spend money if you don't plan to use it?).
This misconception at least has been communicated by some US intellectuals many times though I think it's not very effective under current geopolitical climate.
I think China is building military capability because they think they need it. We don’t know why. If you think about the game theoretic aspects of this, then it makes sense for the US to preemptively mass forces nearby even if they believe China’s ambitions are peaceful. You can’t just assume that because your opponent is telling you that. And vice-versa if you’re China and you see the US massing forces.
The fact that Chinese fishing ships invade other territorial waters to steal fish and damage habitat and the fact that the premier wants to bring Taiwan back suggests a will to be the aggressor.
China didn’t increase defense budget accordingly and for now still sticking to the same gdp percentage (around 1.5%) so the spiral hasn’t started yet (surprisingly).
Also China is always aggressive to DPP which isn’t something new and US government well understood the reason and used to assure China they will deter DPP’s independence agenda (if you’re familiar with that history. also https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/taiwan-china-true-sour...). Unfortunately there isn’t much political room now in US for that kind of assurance.
that's the refelection you'll have if your neighbor is a psycho whose first thought every morning is to decide whether he should go around to shoot something, especially after the psycho neighbor has shooted to many ones already
You understand of course that you can replace psycho in your sentence with either party and it just describes the others beliefs.
There are living citizens of both countries that have shot at each other in a hot war. It’s not unreasonable in that case yo think it will happen again.
The only way the US will not respond militarily is if Taiwan chooses unification. By all accounts, Taiwan will not choose that. The US military has not been strategically shifting to the Indo-Pacific for more than 10 years now for no reason.
If China acted quickly in disabling American military assets in the region, it is conceivably possible that Taiwanese people could be demoralized and surrender to the PRC before America has a chance to muster more forces to the region. Even if this definitely wouldn't be possible, it's still possible that the PRC thinks otherwise and will try it, as Japan once did.
The counter to this is that it might make more sense for China to _not_ attack the United States with the anticipation that they sit it out. China attacking US forces/ naval bases makes it much harder for a president to sit back and say not our problem/ focus on economic sanctions.
Imagine if Russia started the invasion of Ukraine by bombing polish railways, so that the Ukrainians would not be able to get supplies/resources from the EU. I would think that the EU/Nato response to that would be much more severe than what happened in reality.
While Guam might be considered different, as most Americans cannot place it on a map and it is on the other side of the world, seeing caskets of all the US troops dying makes it pretty hard to politically shrug off as not our problem.
The game theoretic problem with this scenario (and thus why a Pacific escalation scenario is so dangerous) is that China has essentially all of its forces in the area around China, whereas the US and its treaty allies have their forces scattered around the world. Thus even if the US has a bigger military most of it won't be in theater on day 1 of a conflict, leading China to have every incentive to move as fast as possible and present a fait accompli to the West. If they choose to just do nothing to the US and hope America sits it out, it just gives the US time to redress this force imbalance in the region by moving in assets from around the world. That leads China to be strongly incentivized to strike US forces on day 1, in much the same way the IJN was incentivized to strike early and strike hard 85 years ago.
A naval invasion of Taiwan would be among the largest military operations in history, requiring immense preparation both to produce the necessary equipment and to move it into position, to say nothing of moving and training all the participating forces. In the era of satellite surveillance, the US would know months if not years in advance. They would almost certainly preposition forces in proximity both as a deterrent and as a potential response force. There's no comparing today's circumstances to a time when a carrier strike group could sneak up and launch a surprise attack on a US base.
Chinese naval assets, most particularly their large transports and landing craft, would be extremely vulnerable to antiship missiles. They're building those anyway, which suggests they have some sort of plan to use them after the antiship missile threat has been eliminated in the region. The most plausible way to accomplish that is to paralyze the American response by having Taiwan capitulate very fast, before the invasion actually takes place. Starting and finishing the war with the rapid destruction of key American military bases and surface assets (almost certainly using missiles, not a "sneaky carrier group") could shock Taiwan into a rapid capitulation, which in turn could neutralize (politically) the American fast attack subs that could otherwise decimate the vulnerable invasion fleet (which they are building, regardless of how little sense it makes to us.)
> They're building those anyway, which suggests they have some sort of plan to use them after the antiship missile threat has been eliminated in the region. The most plausible way to accomplish that is to paralyze the American response by having Taiwan capitulate very fast, before the invasion actually takes place.
There are a lot of very dumb assumptions baked into this. First, building something vulnerable to antiship missiles does not mean the plan is to use them under circumstances where anti-ship missiles aren't a threat. War necessarily involves casualties, and it is a perfectly rational strategy to endure some level of attrition. Next, wiping out american bases in close proximity does not eliminate the antimissile threat. Taiwan would be the ones firing anti-ship missiles, and after American forces are attacked they would have a nigh unlimited supply. Third, shocking Taiwan into a rapid capitulation is not a realistic strategy. Taiwan is a nearly unassailable fortress - with sufficient time and resources it could concievably be overwhelmed but the optimal strategy for Taiwan is to draw out the conflict as long as possible. Finally, if America is attacked, Taiwan's capitulation doesn't end the war. We have in the past fought to liberate allies who were capitulated by our enemies even when we ourselves were not attacked (see Kuwait in 1991), attack the US and the war goal changes to preventing an attack from every happening again.
Again, the reason you know they are building the invasion fleet is because we can see it from space. This isn't even something limited to the worlds' most elite intelligence agencies, anyone with a few hundred bucks can buy sattelite images of chinese shipyards. Before China is in a position to launch an invasion the US attack subs will already be in the strait of taiwan, there will be three carrier groups on permanent assignment to the pacific, and Taiwan will be sitting on top of an arsenal that could sink thousands of transport ships. America doesn't have to wait for war to break out to put these defenses in place. A chinese missile barage is not some new threat, every base in the region has been preparing for this scenario for decades now, and they still have several more years to make further preparations. Would America take losses if China launched a strike? Of course. Would we be caught with our pants down and have our military capability completely wiped out, unable to recover before the war was over? Not a chance.
The thing is that an amphibious invasion will likely not be the first move in the war. China will almost certainly strike hard to try and neuter US air and seapower close to the First Island Chain, and then impose a blockade to starve Taiwan into submission. The war would then center around the US and its allies trying to penetrate China's A2AD complex and keep food and supplies coming to Taiwan, while China builds up an invasion fleet after extensive use of airpower against Taiwanese ground installations that could threaten a beachhead.
Yeah taking some of the Ryukyus to build airbases and host anti ship missile forces would probably be an early objective to support the blockade. Depending on how bad the US is hit in the initial stages it wouldn’t even be out of the question to see an amphibious operation against Okinawa.
China would basically need to invade Japan to cut off Taiwan, ensuring that the USA and Japan are involved very early, so that makes an up front amphibious operation more likely.
I don't think you are getting the idea. ANY military operation of this scale, be it a massive blockade, an invasion, a coordinated strike on multiple US bases, they all are impossible to hide. Such large scale conventional strikes are exactly what these forces and the systems that support them are designed to deal with. There isn't going to be a point where China has knocked out the ability of Taiwan and its allies to defend the island and give China the opportunity to prepare for a minimally contested invasion. On day one they are going to be fighting a well prepared force that knew the attack was coming.
You can strike US air and seapower close to the first island chain, but the airpower will be replenished in hours and the seapower in days. Blockades require a massive naval advantage, otherwise the attacking navy can concentrate its forces and defeat the blockading navy in detail. That's before we just consider the anti-ship missile threat which would make operating near an unfriendly Taiwan extremely costly even with no naval opposition. Taiwan already has supplies to last for months in the event of a blockade, and would certainly stockpile more on the eve of a major conflict. That's going to be a lot of attrition.
The major reason China is concerned about the first island chain is because it is actually quite vulnerable to the gaps in the chain being closed off and itself blockaded. The islands of the chain have much more direct access to the pacific, meaning they are much more resistant to blockade. The US and its allies can shut off the lifeblood of China's economy and industrial power without sailing anywhere near Chinese defenses. Either China will have to sail out to dislodge them on their terms, or the Chinese people will have to endure a long period of high attrition and economic hardship with little demonstrable gain. That's not to say it would be impossible for China to win, but they're going to have to go up against an extremely powerful military alliance that has a lot of positional advantage in a protracted war and win a fair fight.
Rushing Taiwan, despite being a bad idea, is probably the best strategy they could have. Its odds of success are low, for the reasons already discussed, but if they are the right combination of clever and lucky they might be able to exploit some unrecognized weakness. If they can get control of the island, a lot of things flip in their favor. The island's natural resistance to invasion would make them nigh impossible to dislodge (for comparison during WW2, the US judged an attack on Formosa to be impossible despite the Japanese only having about 170,000 troops there and the local population being hostile to Japan). Access to the pacific would make it more difficult to effectively blockade China; they still could, but it would take more resources and more would slip through. Finally, having won something, the Chinese people would be more tolerant of the war's costs. I think this is a losing gamble, and believe the Chinese invasion ships are best used as bargaining chips for negotiation (as in 'we'll sink $10 billion worth of ships to avoid tariffs which would cost us $100 billion'), but perhaps someone high up in the Chinese leadership has a different opinion.
> Thus even if the US has a bigger military most of it won't be in theater on day 1 of a conflict, leading China to have every incentive to move as fast as possible and present a fait accompli to the West.
I disagree. I've think we've seen and will continue to see China acting slowly on this, because their primarily incentivized to not attack. This, on three fronts:
- China is not looking for a vassal state. It's looking for national reunification. War is a terrible way to incorporate people into your nation. Effective perhaps, but very much a last resort.
- Time isn't on Taiwan side— TSMC is losing is edge. The technological gap between TSMC and Chinese silicon companies is shortening with each year that passes by, and this is meaningful not only because TSMC is 25% of Taiwan's GDP [1], but also because it's the most strategic export they have geopolitically. World leaders care more about any disruption to the supply of cutting-edge chips than they care about the name of the island on a map. This is specially true for the USA, and the reason why they want TSMC to manufacture in Arizona.
- Time is very much on China's side. In the past couple of decades China has consistently become more competitive with the USA in most strategic aspects, and bettered it's strategic standing overall. If your chances of winning are increasing every year, you don't want to attack today; you want to wait until you think your chances of winning have peaked.
If anything, I'd argue the USA is in a tough spot. If a war is going to happen, it would be in the USA's interest that it happens soon, albeit after they can secure advanced-chip production outside of Taiwan.
A very quick war against American forces in the region followed by Taiwanese capitulation could leave the Taiwanese public largely untouched by the war, which would serve the CCP's goal of national reunification. This hinges on the US dropping out of the war and licking their wounds after Taiwan gives up on the first or second day, rather than continuing the war even though the Taiwanese government has now 'consented' to the invasion. China's perception of the social circumstance of America is therefore, arguably, the most important consideration for the timing of this war. The best time to do this is when Americans are demoralized and doubting their own righteousness in world affairs, doubting the competence and merit of their military leadership, with their own problems to worry about at home, with isolationist-inclined leaders.
> The best time to do this is when Americans are demoralized and doubting their own righteousness in world affairs, doubting the competence and merit of their military leadership, with their own problems to worry about at home, with isolationist-inclined leaders.
I personally disagree with this read for two reasons:
1. I think this underestimates the USA's capacity to sway public opinion. Especially if it's helping on a war of defense (vs a war of attack) the USA government could IMO very much ease opposition. We saw this when Russia invaded Ukraine; a quick media and public response in support, various angles explaining why the USA/NATO should be involved (from fear to righteousness), Russophobia/Putin-phobia, etc. To this day, the main argument against the support of Ukraine I see widely and in public discourse isn't so much "is it the right thing to do", but rather just about the cost.
2. I think the USA can very much wage a war in spite of strong popular opposition too. We've seen this during the invasion of Iraq and the middle east. Most damningly perhaps we saw this during the Vietnam War. The war lasted 20 years, from 1955 to 1975, in spite of huge protests especially starting in the mid-sixties.
> A very quick war against American forces in the region followed by Taiwanese capitulation could leave the Taiwanese public largely untouched by the war [...]. This hinges on the US dropping out of the war and licking their wounds after Taiwan gives up on the first or second day, rather than continuing the war even though the Taiwanese government has now 'consented' to the invasion.
This personally sounds like a bad wager for China. They're betting a lot on "the best case". Would Taiwan quickly capitulate? Would the USA drop out of the war quickly too? Would the general population actually be largely untouched? How hurtful would it be to China if Taiwan and the USA don't act this way, or if the war on the ground actually causes major damage? Since IMO China is not in a hurry, I think it'd be smarter to simply wait; for it's own power to grow, for Taiwan's to diminish, and for the USA to lose interest and/or the capacity to fight in this possible war.
10 years doesn't sound too short a time for me haha. I'll avoid guessing time frames here, but if I had to make a prediction, I'd say it's quite possible we see reunification without an international war happening here at all.
I wouldn't be surprised if the response to an invasion of Taiwan looked very similar to the response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
The world did nothing for about a week and it seemed as though leaders were willing to sit on their hands for a week to see if it ended quickly. When it didn't they moved from vague, hand wavy statements to economic sanctions.
If China tries to invade we very well could see a weak, hollow political response from world leaders unless China falters and is stopped initially.
Ukraine was (and is) a very small economy literally right up against russia that had long been in Russia's sphere of influence if not under its direct control. Ukraine's fall would have had little meaningful impact on western powers other than losing some face in countering Russian aggression. Specifically to avoid losing that face, western leaders made it very clear from the get go that they would not step in to defend Ukraine, specifically so that they could conserve their strength in case they needed it against China. The universal assumption was that Russia, which was believed to have one of the most capable armies in the world would steamroll the Ukrainians and the country would fall in days if not hours. Only when the Russian advance stalled and it became clear that Ukraine with moderate support could hold out did the west start providing that support, and only after Ukraine made some impressive gains that demonstrated it could not only hold out but potentially drive the russians back did the west start sending serious aid.
Conversely, Taiwan is extremely integrated into the global economy and is a key part of America's pacific power. We have been backing Taiwan for decades. Taiwan is an island, and one with very few appropriate landing sites, making its invasion extremely technically challenging for any power, even one with a strong navy. China, despite its recent shipbuilding spree, still lacks naval and amphibious combat experience, and it does not have anywhere near the fleet size necessary to fully leverage its army's main strengths. We are all freshly aware of lessons learned from Ukraine's invasion: that the strength on paper of countries like Russia and China do not correspond to force projection capability, that providing substantial aid early on is critical, and that modern military equipment is not so powerful as to collapse an otherwise functional country in hours. The amount of aid Taiwan needs is less, and the willingness to give it is greater. Only a major shift in US behavior would cause it to not support Taiwan.
Trump is now in charge of the US and admires Xi and his dictatorship. He’ll find an excuse not to intervene or even better will pay peacemaker and trumpet how his intervention saved millions of lives and stopped a war by capitulating to China and refusing Taiwan aid. As he is doing in Ukraine.
Since Trump is in I’d expect invasion later this year or next. After invasion the people of Taiwan won’t be choosing anything.
I get that it is easy to say that Trump admires dictators, he is such great friends with them, they have compromising information on him and he will allow them to do whatever they want, however, he was president before and during that time China did not invade Taiwan. Also during that time; Russia did not invade Ukraine.
They did take Hong Kong during that time. It would've been pretty easy to point out that they were violating their agreements there, but he kept his mouth shut so they would sign his trade agreement. It's pretty clear who is wearing the pants in that relationship.
It is a fact that he admires dictators, not sure why you feel the need to reframe it as ‘easy to say’?
He has been useful to Putin already (‘This is genius.’ Putin declares a big portion of the Ukraine — of Ukraine — Putin declares it as independent. Oh, that’s wonderful,” ) and will be again by pausing the disastrous invasion and refusing Ukraine aid. I can see him being similarly useful to Xi for similar reasons.
China was not ready last decade they have been clearly preparing the last few years and now is the time to do so.
People who take UAP seriously still will speculate, especially since drones can relay audio from controllers to talk to ATC as if they were onboard. People on the internet speculate about things that are a lot more clear than this case.
If you think a recording of ATC saying 'keep an eye out for that plane coming in to land' is going to end speculation then you have no understanding of how people behave on social media. For some reason people are upset about me pointing out the reality that this will generate lots of conspiracy theories. I invite you to consider this example of a prominent public figure engaging in exactly the sort of speculation I described.
Yes, I research and write on extremists and have become depressingly familiar with conspiratorial narrative formation in real time, as well having read a huge number of research papers into social media dynamics. I used to spend a lot of time and effort debunking CTs but frankly it seems increasingly pointless to do so nowadays.
Your first sentence, being startled to learn about remote-controlled flying, gives the impression that you're one of those conspiracy theory hobbyists (a term I'm conjuring for idjits who speculate conspiracies when anything happens)...
Well that's on me for formatting the comment poorly. But my point is that there will be a lot of CTs about this motivated by political considerations, and this recent and relevant data point will be widely cited as evidence.
Examples I've noticed so far are the idea that it was an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the defense secretary, and that some 'plant' from the Biden administration deliberated engineered the crash because they were angry about the administration's policy on DEI.
The only colloquial usage I've seen is that it is someone who has the ability to demand that others perform a public display of obedience to them. Like every time I've seen somebody unironically refer to themself as an "alpha," it's always had that underlying connotation of "Respect Me!" And every time I've seen someone mocking somebody else for being an "alpha," it's because, well, that respect was clearly undeserved.
> Like every time I've seen somebody unironically refer to themself as an "your leader," it's always had that underlying connotation of "Respect Me!" And every time I've seen someone mocking somebody else for being an "my leader," it's because, well, that respect was clearly undeserved.
I think same sentiment persists when alpha->”your leader” replacement is made.
Right but the term here is used to categorize human/animal hierarchies/behavior in an objective context. No one is here projecting their alphaness onto others. Clearly.
I mean DraftKings is currently successful, and while I think Lucid makes fantastic cars and I want ChargePoint to succeed, they may not be dead but their stock is well below the $10 SPAC price and they're far from profitable.
We're stuck with a math problem. If you admit purely based on test scores then black and latino applicants would be significantly underrepresented and non-Jewish white applicants would be slightly underrepresented. If you address these problems by insisting on a full balancing then you're going to have to reduce Asian and Jewish admittance. But increasing black and latino admittance at the expense of non-Jewish white admittance when the latter group was already underrepresented is not only the same kind of quota system but not even satisfying the goal of proportionate representation -- and that's the one that seems to be happening. So what do you want to do?
Arguably, the problem of underrepresentation became already unsustainable during Affirmative Action by the classification of African immigrants as black. Because the latter displace African-Americans who do worse in test scores than Africans.
Addressing the underlying barriers preventing blacks/latinos from getting into elite universities, rather than trying to fix the symptoms by instituting illiberal policies like reverse discrimination.
Then you need people to stop getting mad at universities when admission based on test scores causes those groups to be underrepresented. They're not the ones who can fix the test scores and nothing is going to fix them before the next round of applications.
break us colleges into tiers based on academic rigor. assuming you met XXXX standardized test score you are automatically sorted into one of the appropriate schools at random on your 18th birthday.
Iraq was never about 9/11. The error of Iraq happened because the US followed one HUMINT source Saddam was developing WMD. Considering bin Laden was in Pakistan, it would presumably require a multi-source confirmation.
The invasion of Iraq was sold in part by manufacturing a connection to 9/11. This is confirmed by public opinion [1]:
> In the months leading up to the war, sizable majorities of Americans believed ... that Iraq was closely tied to terrorism – and even that Hussein himself had a role in the 9/11 attacks.
Believing one source is simply looking for justification for what you were going to do anyway. There was plenty of evidence to the contrary, not th eleast of which was the UNSCOM inspections.
Also, it's just plain illogical for Saddam to have WMDs. Let's say he has WMDs. If the US invades, would he use them? Probably not because it wouldn't change the outcome and it would invite further retaliation. So if he's not going to use them, why not give them up to save his regime?
This isn't historical 20/20 hindsight either. These discussions were being had prior to the invasion.
It is insincere pandering to claim to relate to legitimate struggles of an ethnic group by acting like you are part of that group, when in reality you grew up completely separate from that group and aren’t even the same ethnicity.
I think the confusing part is when people act like they are offended by this when really they wouldn’t care if not for being opposed to the person politically. So it’s like insincere mimicry of offense at insincere mimicry.
Should they have put her on house arrest in a hotel room? She doesn't deserve special privileges. A huge swath of the US population would be adamantly against her being treated special.
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