
US pulls out of Trans-Pacific Partnership - PirateDave
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/01/trump-withdraws-us-from-trans-pacific-partnership/
======
sctb
Previous discussion:
[https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13452983](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13452983)

------
danso
TPP felt to me one of the issues that really defined the Trump campaign and
the voters it appealed to. I think Clinton eventually [0] took a public stance
against the TPP, but ignoring the public's perception of her relation to the
truth, she clearly did not prioritize the dismantling of TPP in the way that
Trump did. In fact, it's really hard to imagine her undoing President Obama's
work were she in office.

If someone believes international free trade is the cause of the gutting of
American manufacturing and by proxy, local/regional economies, it's hard to
argue that Clinton presented little more than nominal lip service to the
cause, at least compared to the way that Trump and Sanders made it a core
priority of their campaign and stump speeches.

[0] [http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trade-
tpp-20160926...](http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trade-
tpp-20160926-snap-story.html)

~~~
degenerate
This Podesta email isn't one of the DKIM-signed ones, but it shows that
Clinton was ultimately going to support TPP regardless of what she was saying:

[https://wikileaks.org/podesta-
emails/emailid/6616](https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/emailid/6616)

(note the email is from 2015)

As for Trump, he's done 2 of the "Seven actions to protect American workers"
he promised for the first 100 days in office (PDF):

[https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/_landings/contract/O-TRU-102...](https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/_landings/contract/O-TRU-102316-Contractv02.pdf)

~~~
stephancoral
>As for Trump, he's done 2 of the "Seven actions to protect American workers"
he promised for the first 100 days in office (PDF)

Pretty easy to hit milestones when the goals are low. "Announce intent" and
"Stop bill that was never going to pass congress" aren't exactly adroit acts
of statesmanship.

~~~
kafkaesq
_" Announce intent" and "Stop bill that was never going to pass congress"
aren't exactly adroit acts of statesmanship._

OTOH "making a clear, simple statement about something that hits a raw nerve
with tens of millions of working-class Americans -- but which Hillary won't
touch with a ten-foot pole until way too late" matters a hell of a lot. And
has a lot to do with how this man came to get as far as he has, so far.

------
jwtadvice
Interestingly at today's White House Press Briefing, a reporter asked the
Press Secretary whether the Trump Administration thought that it could
surround/contain China with bilateral trade agreements the way that the TPP
had intended to do on a multilateral basis.

China has a couple of free trade deals in the region. It has a multilateral
effort (RCEP) which is somewhat stalled and primarily pursued bilateral trade
agreements.

This may put American and China toe-to-toe in reaching agreements with Asian
Pacific states. There’s a question about the quality of the trade deals that
can be reached, if the target nations are clever enough to play Beijing and
Washington off against one another.

The Trump Administration has suggested that bilateral agreements are better
because they don’t devolve into “least common denominator” the way
multilateral deals do; and that they also allow the deals to be quickly
withdrawn from or renegotiated to account for new realities.

~~~
hackuser
Here's the real story every time you read about the comparison between
multilateral and bilateral international agreements (speaking very generally):

* Powerful nations want bilateral agreements, because it's the strong negotiating with the weak. Imagine the U.S. negotiating a trade deal with Nicaragua: The U.S. position is overwhelmingly strong; they could walk away and cancel all trade with Nicaragua; the U.S. would hardly notice and Nicaragua's economy would be devastated. (EDIT: I'll add that this is true of the powerful everywhere; e.g., large businesses don't want to negotiate with government or Congress (law and regulation) or a class in court (a class action), they want to deal with individual consumers one by one.)

* Supporters of an international rules-based, law-based order, and of a democratic and rights-based order want broad multilateral agreements. Then the weak nations can band together and resist the powerful; it gives them self-determination, the foundation of democracy; it creates rule of law rather than rule of the powerful. Also, instead of an exceptionally complex system of individual agreements between each pair of countries, it creates one standard - much more like a law. Imagine a global business trying to parse the individual trade deals between every pair of countries from its supply chain to its retail customers - an incredibly, needlessly complex level of regulation compared to one international standard. Imagine if the 50 U.S. states only had bilateral trade deals with each other - that would be 1,225 deals, endless red tape for a national business (and there are many more countries than U.S. states). A major reason the U.S. is so wealthy is that it's the largest single, unified economy; that's what the EU hopes to equal.

For example, in the South China Sea, China says they want bilateral
negotiations with each country - they oppose the current U.S.-led
international order and want negotiations they can dominate. The U.S. and
China's neighbors want a multilateral deal; they want to continue the rule of
international law and the U.S.-led order, and want to negotiate from a
position of strength.

My guess in this case is that it's a reflection of the fact that Trump, the
Republicans, and their big business constituents prefer rule of the powerful.

~~~
jwtadvice
Thank you! Very keen.

To add to this comment, there’s more nuance when speaking less generally:

* In cases where there is competition between powerful nations, weaker nations can and do gain advantage by playing the interests of one country off of one another. For instance, during the Cold War the United States and Soviet Union would engage in trade, weapons, and security deals. States caught in the middle understood that both empires were competing with one another to either expand their network outward or prevent the other from doing so (America often included “and you may not trade with the Soviet Union” as an aspect of its bilateral negotiations) would try to internalize the security/strategic value that the empires sought - rather than the pure quid-pro-quo of markets.

* The United States effort with both NAFTA and the TPP were to contain Russia and China, respectively, by building a coalition of countries with trade that excludes each specific United States adversary. This strategically weaponizes the second point above: coalitions of nations together banded together against a more powerful economic force. Similarly, the Chinese RCEP agreement bands together trade centered around the Chinese economy, and excludes the United States. Indeed, the Soviet Union was, as a security/power concept, an idea that a trade network on the Eurasian Supercontinent would be able to outperform and outcompete other continental sized trade networks (the United States), which led the United States to disrupt the trade framework with proxy war, etc.

* Similar episodes are common throughout history: Nasser’s Egypt had tried, unsuccessfully, to create a Republic of Arab nations in the Middle East, so that they could collectively bargain and negotiate with external powers such as Europe and the United States. This was considered a security threat to these powers, because the West much preferred strong-on-weak bilateral agreements, protectorates and mandates.

From the security side of the coin, great nations including China, Russia (now
the Eurasian Union), and the United States strategically try to build
coalitions of small nations against their powerful adversaries in an attempt
to disrupt their ability to successfully compete.

The Trump Administration decision to abandon this represents an idea that the
United States will be able to “out-deal” regional competitors (primarily China
but also Japan, South Korea) on a one-for-one basis. My guess is that the
diplomacy will get very nasty - even if its all in the back room.

~~~
hackuser
Thanks; that's a great addition to the discussion. One important nit:

> The United States effort with both NAFTA and the TPP were to contain Russia
> and China, respectively, by building a coalition of countries with trade
> that excludes each specific United States adversary

As I understand it (I'm no expert in the field), U.S. policy in regard to
China is that its rise to superpower status is inevitable, and the U.S.'s
strategy is to get China to join a rules-based (i.e., law-based) international
order - preferably the existing one - rather than create an anarchic great
power competition that often results in terrible wars. On a political level,
TPP was designed as a step in that direction; it wasn't intended to exclude
China but to compel them to join a rules-based trade regime for the Pacific -
i.e., either play by the rules or be excluded from trade. The goal was that
they would join.

~~~
jwtadvice
> As I understand it (I'm no expert in the field), U.S. policy in regard to
> China is that its rise to superpower status is inevitable

Interesting. My understanding is quite the opposite: that the U.S. policy in
regard to China is that its rise to superpower status is in question.

China is 25 years or more from being on par with the United States in terms of
military projection in its own region (much less power projection in distant
lands and seas). China has legitimate issues with all of its territories that
have strategic resources: its water is in Tibet, its minerals and oil is in
its Uyghur region. The United States today has China surrounded by the "first
island chain." China's economy is robust, but has inherent weaknesses that
could cause it to fracture as it tries to jump the 'middle income gap'. Indeed
out of several dozens of states that have attempted jumping the gap, only a
couple have succeeded. Ongoing sovereignty disputes in Hong Kong and Taiwan
keep the Chinese mainland divided and focused in on its own territory. Japan
today could match Chinese military might, and with the right trajectories
could maintain an upper hand in the future. America has tried to block Chinese
multilateral/international banking efforts (AIIB, ADB, etc) and it's admission
into the Special Economic Basket of currencies at the IMF. Today the United
States (well, under the prior administration...) is trying to prevent full
membership of China inside the WTO, and it's membership isn't guaranteed.
India forms a natural check on Chinese regional power as its population is
larger than China and its economy is growing at even faster rates. Russia
(which shares a huge and important border with China) and America both eye
China and it's ambitions and could individually or together align to snuff
Chinese expansion where they to find a good justification. China's
international investments are questionable, as much of them are in countries
with poor histories of solvency (this is a strategic bet on the part of
China). It's One Belt One Road infrastructure project is vulnerable to
stability issues in Central Asia (of which there is a long history). The
people's party in China also (rightly) fears regime change operations in their
country - this remains a real possibility. China has a burgeoning nuclear
power (DPRK) on its border, a nation in dispute with a long time American
military protectorate.

The United States has a lot of issues it can make with China, from internation
trade, currency practices, South China Sea settlement, Taiwan and recognition
of independence, Japanese security (look at their reform of National Security
legislation), Indian bolstering, Korean Unification, Russia's far east,
Central Asian proxies, etc.

The United States is hoping that, with containment pressure on all of China's
strategic bets that it won't be able to realize its ambitions to greatness -
and will fizzle. This is a practiced playbook: it's how the United States
prevented the Soviet Union from realizing super power parity. Curiously, the
timeline originally predicted by strategic thinkers for the Soviet Union for
parity was also "25 years."

Including China into the "rules-based international order" isn't code for "we
want a nation as powerful as our own to also rule the international order."
The United States Grand Stategy toward China - indeed toward any and every
potential adversary - is to prevent their rise by raising obstacles and costs
to its succession.

~~~
hackuser
Great talking with you, by the way.

Our understandings are different, of course, and it's great to learn another
perspective. I agree with much of what you say, I just think it weighs less
heavily. But a few concrete points:

1) A minor point: China's massive and questionable investments in poor
countries are not grants, but loans (at least, based on what I've read). They
may be creating leverage over those countries via debt, similar to what the
West had at least until massive debt forgiveness.

2) 25 years is a larger number than what I understand. Depending on how it's
measured, China's economy already is ~75% of the U.S.'s size and growing much
more quickly (though with many serious risks, as you point out). Also, they
don't need complete parity, just the prospect of parity - that will be enough
to intimidate neighbors. Finally, China currently can focus all their
resources on one region; the U.S.'s are distributed globally - one reason
Obama hoped to withdraw from some situations.

3) My understanding was that the Cold War 'containment' strategy was not based
on the assumption that the USSR would reach parity, but that their Communist
economic system was fatally flawed, would inevitably collapse, and all the
West had to do was wait and keep the USSR contained. At the time, some did
claim that the USSR would or even did catch up - IIRC (a hazy memory of the
histories I read) Kissinger thought so and so did the CIA at some point(s).
But mainly we tried to pressure them into failing; that's the popular wisdom
for why Reagan engaged in an arms buildup and 'Star Wars' missile defense.
Regardless, based on hazy memory of numbers from the 1970s that I saw a year
ago, the USSR and Warsaw Pact grew to around 50% of NATOs economic strength.

> The United States Grand Strategy

From what I've read many times from foreign policy insiders, such a thing
doesn't exist. The foreign policy institutions are so massive and complex,
from Dept of State to Dept of Defense to the National Security Advisor and
staff, to all the large subcomponents of each, to Congress, to all the career
bureaucrats that outlast any President, that getting them all moving in the
same direction is impossible. Also, those people are disappointingly and
shockingly focused on the day-to-day; few have time for grand strategy. As one
person observed,

 _If, as F. Scott Fitzgerald said, '[t]he test of a first-rate intelligence is
the ability to hold two opposing ideas in mind at the same time and still
retain the ability to function,' then the government is a genius._

I think you would enjoy the whole article:

[http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/05/how-the-u-s-saw-
syrias-w...](http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/05/how-the-u-s-saw-syrias-war/)

~~~
jwtadvice
Absolutely. Shared respect.

1) Yes agreed here. The investments/loans aren't gifts. They are expected back
- with interest - and there is real risk that insolvency and default will
stall the investments. This gives China leverage, it develops regions that
create the possibility of alternative trade routes and supply chains from the
US system, and ultimately China expects their investments not only to produce
growth but also pay back into the Bank of China.

2) The 25 year forecast is for regional military parity. Economic parity is on
a similar timeline, but I don't know offhand what the most recent projections
are. If you look at the strategic literature, many analysts (even journalists)
focus on China's ascention in 2040-2050: 25-35 years. (25 years is the smaller
number of the projections.) You will have difficulty finding analysts
discussing Chinese ascension in 2030 or 2020. I would be interested, of
course, in any such literature.

3) "their Communist economic system was fatally flawed, would inevitably
collapse, and all the West had to do was wait" \- this was Cold War
propaganda, which reinforced the message that "The USSR is the wrong trade
network to be in" ("Our trade network is the one to be in ;)"). The strategic
thinkings from the National Security core of the United States was focused on
economic warfare of all kinds that would put pressure on the USSR to collapse.
The USSR had attempted to organize strategic resources across nations. When
these states were flipped, either by "accidents to their leadership", economic
pressure from the US trade network, diplomatic pressure, or internal
instability, the USSR needed to reallocate and adjust its system. Twenty five
years of unconventional warfare intended to cut the Soviet Union from
strategic resources in key areas (Middle East and Central Asia), raise its
costs with proxy wars and arms races, containment strategies that limited its
options for economic flexibility, and pressure on China to pry the Soviet
Union apart from the inside ultimately thwarted the attempt to foment the
Eurasian free trade network. The Security State in America was _not_ resting
on their laurels, waiting for the USSR to "just collapse". The actions of the
United States were meant to put as much pressure toward insolvency and
inflexibility in the Union as possible.

> From what I've read many times from foreign policy insiders, such a thing
> doesn't exist. The foreign policy institutions are so massive and complex,
> from Dept of State to Dept of Defense to the National Security Advisor and
> staff, to all the large subcomponents of each, to Congress, to all the
> career bureaucrats that outlast any President, that getting them all moving
> in the same direction is impossible.

No, the US has Grand Stategies. You can download, for example, the once-leaked
copy of the Bush Administration era "Wolfowitz Doctrine".

Now the interagency process of getting a giant organization like the United
States government and private sector to act together in coordinated concert?
That's another problem entirely, and something that -rightfully- foreign (and
domestic) policy insiders complain about. The difficulty of administering a
giant bureaucracy is not the same as there being no Grand Strategy: indeed you
can find declassified documents, leaked copies (as mentioned), strategic
advice for modernization of Grand Strategy and the like.

Thanks, I'll read this later! FP is... okay. It's just so full of childish
references ("pee"-otus), quips and nationalist gilding it's hard to read some
times. Though some of their authors are very nice when the editing isn't heavy
handed and there's not much competition on the subject (incredibly).

~~~
hackuser
Are you professionally connected to this field? I'm just someone who reads as
much of the best sources I can (about international relations, not just
China).

I agree about FP; I don't read it regularly but I'll follow a link there. I'd
love to know what you do read. I've actually found a lot of quality sources
over the years (depending on how you define it); I can send you a spreadsheet
listing most of them if it interests you. I'm always interested in finding
more and better sources.

Here's one of my favorite hidden gems:

* The Lowy Interpreter

[https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-
interpreter](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter)

The Lowy Institute is Australia's leading foreign policy think tank, as far as
I can tell. They provide expert insight and often a much different perspective
than U.S. and European peers, both about the issues we know and also about
which issues are important. And it's relatively well written.

~~~
jwtadvice
Yes. I would love to see your spreadsheet.

Some sources that may interest you: The Federation of American Scientists
(fas.org), the Strategic Studies Institute
(strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil), OpenCourseWare
(ocw.mit.edu/courses/political-science/), the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (csis.org).

Reddit /r/geopolitics maintains a wiki with a list of open source references
that you may find interesting:
[https://www.reddit.com/r/geopolitics/wiki/index](https://www.reddit.com/r/geopolitics/wiki/index)

There's too many things to recommend: foreign news outlets, official press
briefings, leaked documents, academic and military history, think tanks and
their analysis.

Basic advice: read everything and don't believe any of it.

~~~
hackuser
Thanks for the tips. Where do I send the spreadsheet?

Also, if you know a forum with valuable, intelligent, somewhat sophisticated
discussion of international relations (i.e., non-partisan, non-ideological,
non-Internet-style ranting and hyperbole), I would love to know about it.

> read everything and don't believe any of it.

Unfortunately, I lack the time to read even the good stuff. My RSS feed is up
to 500+ items per day and I try to be picky about what is included.

~~~
jwtadvice
How do you feel about base64 encoding it and putting it on something like
pastebin?

If you want to keep the link secret, here's a public key you can encrypt the
link to:

\-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAs+Zefow5vk22331dfQD/
VB/l8CbDNx+fo3r4MUGuOSVBnq2U2mEE0Q91oGSeSluuq7OHRuaZ0O3fKi793+ne
LH41NNH8Yn9Dn6dyvyxyM2+mXa7g6pxhb2fjhUl2Sp8DhcaxKlpHSGY0B9sJGu7H
oBiFzO3wd/GO0mI0wdW+/7SpqaidjrLiyA2Lftdo3IrVqHCQL0CqbmFC1xK3kAKE
xIgWTA07HG3AyJpyUp1tRNP70czWn6Pl9pIufjalgZPjeNNej+R6q7WKLfH8gBZR
lWEtsQnag53fyjrn2LySAbXrdRNTXoGecAliONSV6atmiqr1pa6iH6xfPFH+ebON vwIDAQAB
\-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

Or, if all of that is too complicated how do you feel about
[https://filetea.me/](https://filetea.me/)?

~~~
hackuser
I'll figure something out and post here. It won't be until tomorrow or the
next day before I have time.

~~~
jwtadvice
No problem. Looking forward. :)

~~~
hackuser
Here it is. Beware there is no UI here; it's just a bunch of data in a table.
The first sheet is a guide.

[https://filetea.me/n3wYtvASptWSLuUxURLHFMhtw](https://filetea.me/n3wYtvASptWSLuUxURLHFMhtw)

I wish there was something like it for the publications I haven't read, which
makes me think that maybe (a very few) others might find use for what I've
done. If you have an idea of how to reach them or utilize it, I'd appreciate
it. Please don't share it yourself.

I hadn't used FileTea before; it's perfect for many uses. Does the shared file
expire at some point?

EDIT: I should add that it omits some sources that I subscribed to before I
started the spreadsheet, including the leading think tanks (Brookings, CSIS,
Rand, etc.), the Financial Times ... that's all I can think of off the top of
my head.

~~~
jwtadvice
It's my understanding that it doesn't store a file, it just sychronizes a
transfer. You have to trust that this is the case, but you can look at the
source code that it's based on (on Github).

So I think we both need to be online at the same time for it to work...

The documentation states: "FileTea does not store any file in the server. It
just synchronizes and bridges an upload from the seeder with a download to the
leacher."

~~~
hackuser
I encoded it in base64 and pasted it at the following link. See my comment
above regarding the file's contents.

[http://pastebin.com/dPZ3Z0x6](http://pastebin.com/dPZ3Z0x6)

I used my email client as a quick way to encode it and posted the whole MIME
part, in case that's somehow useful. The link will expire in a day.

I wonder how Filetea works. Their server does act as intermediary but
apparently doesn't cache the file; still, my computer was online with the
Filetea tab showing the file still open (but in the background). They refer to
leecher and seeder so at least they are inspired by P2P file sharing networks.

This should be easier. Technically, there's no reason typical end-users
couldn't anonymously and easily share files on a one-to-one basis. Maybe there
is an easier way; I just hardly ever have to do it.

~~~
jwtadvice
Acknowledgement that I've received the file.

I'm very impressed by the level of effort that has gone into curating this
information.

I will get back to you (I'll find you on HN) after digesting this information.

------
crag
The TPP was about something other then money and trade. It was about soft
power. It was about containing China. It was about influence.

By cancelling it, Trump has handed 1/3 of the worlds GDP to China. Because I
suspect China will step in and seal the deal.

I know Trump railed about the TPP. But I'm sad no one stood up to defend it.
Clinton just flipped flopped. I suppose it's easier for the average American
to understand "China is taking you job away" (and that's not the whole truth
anyway) then to explain the nuances of soft power.

With TPP gone. We now really only have one form of leverage over China. The
military. And I damn glad I'm retired from the Army.

~~~
sn41
I think it is not just about China. If you look at the unholy nexus of TPP,
TISA and TTIP, the major economies excluded are Brazil, India, China, Russia
and South Africa.

As an Indian, I feel frustrated that the world doesn't think that the economic
advancement of India and South Africa are undesirable. Seriously?

~~~
sremani
As an Indian I understand why India is undesirable perfectly. India is not a
cohesive economy or textbook nation-state, it is a multi-national nation and
that makes New Delhi weak and states moving in what ever direction they want
to go. As usual there is broadly speaking coastal vs hinterland divide in
India. This makes India hard to govern and bring a uniform economic or
governing policy, added to that a million mutinies big and small across the
country make it not desirable country in certain ways.

Maoism and militant trade unionism in the structured economic sector living in
parallel with bonded labor and child exploitation in unstructured economy
makes it a world of contradictions.

------
evolve2k
One of the TPP sections that concerned me the most was where corporations
could sue nations for passing legislation that detrimentally affected their
business (think countries passing environmental restrictions on companies). My
concern was greatest that US companies would do this to other nations, like
Australia where I am.

I'm assuming now that US companies won't be able to do this, but is the TPP
still binding between the rest of the ratified countries?

~~~
euyyn
> think countries passing environmental restrictions on companies

I don't think that was ever true about TPP to start with.

~~~
evolve2k
I could well be wrong, but my understanding was that it was an issue.

This for example:

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-
set...](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-settlement-
language-in-the-trans-pacific-
partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html?utm_term=.d3a016106fe8)

~~~
euyyn
The Senator says: "ISDS would allow foreign companies to challenge U.S. laws."
But my understanding is it can't be used to challenge any law whatsoever.
Could be wrong (although the latter makes sense, while the former doesn't).

------
paulofmandown
I'm not that into the TPP from what I've read of it, but doesn't bailing on it
just open the door for China to take the leadership role and dictate commerce
norms for those still involved?

~~~
bbctol
Probably. The question is whether or not the US can still negotiate a better
trade deal on our terms, but China will definitely seize this chance to
propose their own less-drama version for other Pacific countries.

~~~
rbanffy
The results of Trump's actions WRT TPP are a couple years down the road. By
dismantling the TPP now he reaps the political benefits, leaving the negatives
for later. This allows him to expand on his agenda.

------
pnathan
This was a key policy bit of the Trump stumping. Agree or disagree; this is
(or should be) an expected outcome of Trump's win.

 _disclaimer_ : I have no stance on the TPP, deferring to experts who have the
time and expertise to correctly evaluate it.

~~~
eumoria
This happened quicker than I expected, though, although I'm completely
ignorant of deadlines of things so maybe this expedience was required.

------
cyborgx7
Kill TTIP next please. The politicians here won't do it for some reason,
ignoring the overwhelming opposition from the public.

~~~
hackerboos
TTIP is not likely to be ratified from the European side [1].

[1] -
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transatlantic_Trade_and_Invest...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transatlantic_Trade_and_Investment_Partnership#Ratification)

------
zuzuleinen
Can someone explain me why is this a good/bad thing? I'm unfamiliar with the
consequences.

~~~
lisper
Whether you think it's a good or bad thing depends on your point of view. The
TPP is very complicated, and it was negotiated behind closed doors. Some
people didn't like it simply because of that. They believe that policy should
be made in the open, not in the shadows.

There were two main things that the TPP did that caused a lot of controversy:
it streamlined trade between signatories, which is great if you're a business
owner or a consumer (because it drives down the cost of goods and labor) or a
worker in a country with high unemployment and low wages (I'm talking
Bangladesh here, not the U.S.). It's not so great if you're a worker in a
country with high wages like the U.S. because free trade tends to drive wages
towards being more uniform, so if you're in a high-wage country you can expect
your wages to go down, or to lose your job altogether.

The second controversial provision was stronger enforcement of intellectual
property laws, often allowing corporations to take unilateral measures against
alleged infringers that bypassed local laws. The allegation was that this
provision effectively turned multinational corporations into de-facto
governments, thus undermining democracy.

These are the main reasons the TPP was very unpopular in the U.S.

The argument in favor of the TPP was that the status quo has a lot of problems
that need fixing (which is true) and that the TPP, flawed as the process and
the result may have been, was our best shot at fixing them (which may also
have been true).

~~~
elastic_church
It is constitutional to join treaties that otherwise undermine the
constitution, the nation's autonomy, sovereignty in general.

Negotiating any treaty behind closed doors, let alone seeing encroachments on
discretionary rights like intellectual property in the various leaks, should
be met with skepticism and determent.

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elastic_church
annnnnd its gone!

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woofyman
Political theater. TPP wasn't ratified and wasn't likely to pass congress.

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danso
I think dismissing it as "political theater" simplifies the cause and effect,
and the legislative process. Congress was controlled by Republicans in Obama's
last term, but the popular belief was that not only would Clinton win in a
dominating fashion, but the effects of her dominance would propagate
downballot and win the Senate for Democrats, and at least make the House much
closer. If that had happened, TPP would seem pretty likely to pass Congress in
some form or other. At the very least, there would be more negotiations.
Negotiations began back in 2008; Congressional reluctance was unlikely to kill
TPP. Trump outright abandoning the plan _will_ kill it more decisively.

