
Project Habbakuk: Britain's attempt to build an ice warship - epaga
https://edition.cnn.com/style/article/project-habbakuk-ice-aircraft-carrier/index.html
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matt_morgan
Funnest quote from the article: "Britain now needed ice, so it turned to
Canada for help."

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larrydag
Technically it was Pykrete used for the construction method. It is a an ice
conglomerate with pulp or some other solid debris substance.

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pykrete](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pykrete)

Mythbusters did a show on Pykrete that was fascinating. Man, do i miss that
show.

[https://mythresults.com/alaska-special-2](https://mythresults.com/alaska-
special-2)

~~~
epaga
To convince Churchill of Pykrete's qualities, Mountbatten put a block of
Pykrete into Churchill's bath (while he was in it, according to the Wikipedia
article):

What happened next was explained several years after the war by Lord
Mountbatten in a widely-quoted after-dinner speech. "I was sent to Chequers to
see the Prime Minister and was told he was in his bath. I said, 'Good, that's
exactly where I want him to be.' I nipped up the stairs and called out to him,
'I have a block of a new material which I would like to put in your bath.'
After that, he suggested that I should take it to the Quebec Conference." The
demonstration in Churchill's steaming bath had been most dramatic. After the
outer film of ice on the small pykrete cube had melted, the freshly exposed
wood pulp kept the remainder of the block from thawing.

— Pyke, the Unknown Genius, [8] Lampe, David

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NeedMoreTea
Interesting, I hadn't known remnants survived in the lake.

It draws 2 of 3 wrong reasons why it didn't go ahead though.

Not at all Iceland, that was long before, but leasing the Azores airbases in
43 made the biggest difference to the Atlantic Gap (U boat alley as this
article calls it). The Atlantic Gap was _massive[1]._ Iceland offered its use
to the US in 41 after the British invasion in 1940 following the German
occupation of Denmark (Iceland was then Danish). Operation Fork if you want
that rabbit hole[2]. :)

Centimetric radar made a big difference - thanks to the well known cavity
magnetron story, but Bomber Command was pushing for priority, and there were
modifications needed for it to work on the flying boats (ASV IIIC). So for
Coastal Command initially on Wellington and Liberator only, with Coastal not
coming on stream as soon as Bomber Command. Don't think it took too long to
get to the boats though.

For the British side of the Atlantic, VLR (Very long range) Liberators were
already available, and had been some time, but in limited numbers. They were
distributed between the three Commands that wanted them (Bomber, Coastal and
Transport). VLR Liberators were compromised from a fighting point of view
(removed some or all turrets, armour and bomb bay space for the extra fuel
tanks). Catalinas, Wellingtons and especially Sunderlands did more action
against subs, despite more limited range. Sunderlands managed to increase
range by about 40% with additional and temporary tanks - albeit pushing the
III to its absolute limit. I think they managed to get about 2,600m from a III
in the end, including the unofficial drop tanks, but that was brutal on
engines. The V solved that with heavily uprated engines. Catalinas had very
little space for extra fuel without compromising already limited armament.

Don't know much about anti sub operations the US side. Obviously they'd be far
more Liberator, and probably Catalina heavy. :)

Back to Habbakuk. The scale made it faintly absurd, even though technically
viable. The amount of steel and engineering needed was equivalent to a couple,
perhaps more, conventional carriers.

See Wikipedia's list of how it ended:
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Habakkuk#End_of_projec...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Habakkuk#End_of_project)

[1] 1941 Atlantic Gap: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mid-
Atlantic_gap#/media/File:T...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mid-
Atlantic_gap#/media/File:The_battle_of_the_Atlantic_1941_map.svg)

[2]
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion_of_Iceland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion_of_Iceland)

~~~
ethbro
I found this a great read:
[https://www.amazon.com/gp/aw/d/1591145244/](https://www.amazon.com/gp/aw/d/1591145244/)

So much so I'm seriously considering reading the full version.

The biggest revelation was just how close the shipping battle was circa-1942.
Without timely technical and tactical advances, it's likely Britain would have
been choked off and had to reach some kind of peace agreement. The civilian
supply situation was literally within months of being that dire.

~~~
smacktoward
_" The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat
peril."_

\-- Winston Churchill, 1949

~~~
ethbro
It's funny how much popular perception of the war, mine included, is still
distorted by wartime secrecy. Even after the war ended.

Some things (e.g. Dresden) are now more fully detailed.

But others (e.g. just how effective the Atlantic submarine campaign was, how
weak the US Pacific fleet was pre-Midway) never seemed to have been revised
post-war.

~~~
NeedMoreTea
Thanks for the book recommend!

The Battle of the Atlantic was, for Britain, quite simply the most important
theatre of the entire war, and yet is one of the least known beyond "convoys"
today. 12 hour Sunderland and days long naval patrols weren't suitable for
sexy movies, though there were a couple of b&w. It gave repeated opportunities
to lose. From initial US reluctance to form convoys at all, despite British
preference until loss rates convinced, through the Air Ministry neglect of
Coastal Command both pre-war and early war. Always second place to Bomber and
Fighter Commands yet the Ministry were determined to retain control during
Admiralty efforts to coordinate activity with the Navy. Thankfully the
Admiralty won out, or we would have lost.

The U Boat "happy times" could so easily have lost the war, and remarkably
fast. Bridging the gap with "stupid" ideas like the improvised merchant
carriers that carried a few obsolete, but remarkably effective Swordfish
stringbags kept things going until mid-late war when convoys had a decent
chance of escorts. The tech and boffins going into the Atlantic war are mainly
invisible, just as important, but make a bomb bounce for a PR only dam raid
and everyone and their dog knows those forever.

Bomber Harris (Bomber Command crews preferred to call him Butcher when
avoiding profanity), had more the ear of the politicians. Churchill was
supposedly not convinced by Harris' controversial, and often ludicrous,
promises to win the war by air alone yet they got the men and aircraft that
implied they did. Obviously with Dresden and other actions, Harris and Bomber
Command is _far_ better known and re-examined today. I've never been entirely
convinced by Churchill and war cabinet's supposed reluctance to accept bombing
given how well supported they were.

Approximately no one at all knows, writes books about or builds monuments to
RAF Coastal Command or Western Approaches Command[1] (the Naval fleet and
associated Admiralty group HQ in Liverpool) that _actually did_ repeatedly
stop us losing the war. There should be a Sunderland in the BBMF next to the
Spitfires and Hurricane, not a bloody Lanc. Some revision and re-evaluation is
probably long overdue.

One relative in Bomber Command, two in Coastal. I think my bias is showing. :)

[1] [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commander-in-
Chief%2C_Western_...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commander-in-
Chief%2C_Western_Approaches)

