
Taboo Your Words (2008) - simonbrown
http://lesswrong.com/lw/nu/taboo_your_words/
======
JackFr
Very similar to if-by-whiskey [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/If-by-
whiskey](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/If-by-whiskey)

 _If when you say whiskey you mean the devil 's brew, the poison scourge, the
bloody monster, that defiles innocence, dethrones reason, destroys the home,
creates misery and poverty, yea, literally takes the bread from the mouths of
little children; if you mean the evil drink that topples the Christian man and
woman from the pinnacle of righteous, gracious living into the bottomless pit
of degradation, and despair, and shame and helplessness, and hopelessness,
then certainly I am against it._

 _But, if when you say whiskey you mean the oil of conversation, the
philosophic wine, the ale that is consumed when good fellows get together,
that puts a song in their hearts and laughter on their lips, and the warm glow
of contentment in their eyes; if you mean Christmas cheer; if you mean the
stimulating drink that puts the spring in the old gentleman 's step on a
frosty, crispy morning; if you mean the drink which enables a man to magnify
his joy, and his happiness, and to forget, if only for a little while, life's
great tragedies, and heartaches, and sorrows; if you mean that drink, the sale
of which pours into our treasuries untold millions of dollars, which are used
to provide tender care for our little crippled children, our blind, our deaf,
our dumb, our pitiful aged and infirm; to build highways and hospitals and
schools, then certainly I am for it._

~~~
eruditely
Honestly even if this manipulative speak I still love reading this every time.

Disclaimer: obviously manipulative speak is generally bad if not always

~~~
vinceguidry
That wasn't a manipulative or fallacious speech at all. It was in fact deeply
insightful, calling attention to the war of characterization being played out
in the public sphere. Do people think the speaker honestly intended to pull
the wool over people's eyes by agreeing with both sides of the issue?

The first if-by-whiskey is an over-the-top satire of whiskey-haters. The
second was a rousing call for reason. It's brilliant wordplay whose intentions
would have been clear to the audience.

~~~
vinceguidry
kungfuton, you appear to be hell-banned.

------
B-Con
One of my personal rules for communication is that high-level language is a
killer. Whenever conflict or confusion arises, high-level words need to be
abandoned in favor of precision if the communication is to go anywhere. This
is very similar to the article's examples of replacing a word with it's
definition.

I believe that high-level language is the root of many philosophical/political
disagreements because people simply use different definitions. When
disagreeing parties avoid high-level labels (like "justice", "bad", "fair",
and a plethora of others) and instead say exactly what they mean they can much
more quickly realize exactly what they disagree and agree on. Arguments over
high-level concepts _rarely go anywhere useful_ because there's no substance
to argue over.

> The illusion of unity across religions can be dispelled by making the term
> "God" taboo, and asking them to say what it is they believe in; or making
> the word "faith" taboo, and asking them why they believe it.

This is very true, and I can't believe some religions that people think are
the same. They happen to use the same words, like "God", "heaven", etc, but
the concepts are completely different and incredibly incompatible.

High-level language is very useful for quick communication. But it's horribly
misleading and is a complete road-block to communication when people have
different definitions or ideas in mind. This seems really obvious, but it's
sad how much religious, philosophical, and political discussions only center
around high-level language.

~~~
jarrett
> This is very true, and I can't believe some religions that people think are
> the same. They happen to use the same words, like "God", "heaven", etc, but
> the concepts are completely different and incredibly incompatible.

What's more, the definitions of the religions themselves are so slippery, we
can barely begin to compare religions. For example, suppose we take the
author's advice and try to dereference the term "afterlife" in a comparison of
Christianity and Islam.

Our first step would thus be to ask: What happens to an individual's
consciousness after death, according to each of the two religions? But here
our inquiry goes right to pieces, because we won't be able to agree on how to
define the set of beliefs constituting each religion.

Is Christianity defined as the set of beliefs expressed in the Bible? And
likewise for Islam and the Koran? But if so, then what about adherents of
those religions who are not fundamentalists? Are we to ignore people who call
themselves Christians and Muslims, yet believe that only some, or perhaps
none, of the scripture is literally true?

But if we define Christianity and Islam so as not to exclude those people--
which seems like the intellectually honest choice--how can we possibly agree
on a set of beliefs that constitutes each religion?

Perhaps we could administer a scientific poll of self-identified Christians
and Muslims, asking them to agree or disagree with various theological
propositions. Those propositions which are supported by a majority of self-
identified adherents become part of our definitions, and the rest do not.

That may allow us to continue with our project of comparing afterlife beliefs,
but it still seems incorrect somehow. Now we've greatly oversimplified the
actual beliefs of Christians and Muslims worldwide. By establishing an
arbitrary threshold (>50% belief), we've painted over a lot of distinctions
that matter to real-world adherents. Equally badly, the arbitrariness of the
threshold makes our definitions suspect. Had we chosen a different threshold,
we'd probably have arrived at radically different definitions, suggesting that
our definition has little authority.

Thus the problem of comparing religions seems intractable.

~~~
cgore
It isn't intractable but it can be quite complicated. This is true of theology
in specific and philosophy in general. It isn't ever going to be an easy top-
down hierarchy.

As for "defining Christianity", this is a problem that is actually addressed
in most churches, and their answer can range from as restricted to "just their
church" to as open as "anything vaguely resembling trinitarianism".

As a specific example, I go to an ELCA Lutheran Church, and they are a lot
more on the open side of things. [http://elca.org/en/Faith/Ecumenical-and-
Inter-Religious-Rela...](http://elca.org/en/Faith/Ecumenical-and-Inter-
Religious-Relations/Full-Communion)

~~~
derleth
> "anything vaguely resembling trinitarianism".

So they exclude Jehovah's Witnesses, then. Not really all-inclusive.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jehovah%27s_Witnesses](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jehovah%27s_Witnesses)

~~~
cgore
Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, Oneness Pentacostals, various others. Being all-
inclusive isn't the point, nor should it be.

If you want my personal definition of "Christian", it's this:

1\. There is a god.

2\. I'm not it, and neither are you.

3\. Jesus is.

4\. Therefore, Jesus is the boss.

After that, all the rest just sort of flows out of it. It is amazing how many
doctrinal issues either instantly disappear or don't even matter anymore. You
don't end up with all sorts or absurd "how many angels can fit on the head of
a pin?" questions to argue about endlessly, with one camp saying 144,000 and
another saying 144,000,000. Instead you get real questions, like "what does
God want of me?"

It would be like having a major disagreement within a company over if the shoe
size of the CEO is 12 or 13. The CEO doesn't care if you know his shoe size,
he cares if you do your job or not.

~~~
derleth
> Therefore, Jesus is the boss.

Meh. My boss can't tell me how to live my life. My boss's authority ends
precisely where I'm no longer doing what they're paying me to do.

My point is that, even in your simplified theology, there is still a lot of
room for debates. And, in religion, debates turn into bloody warfare, because
this is peace and love we're talking about, and peace and love really matter.

~~~
cgore
"And, in religion, debates turn into bloody warfare, ..."

Seriously?

You sure do know how to keep discussion polite.

~~~
derleth
The Albigensians would like a word with you.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albigensian_Crusade](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albigensian_Crusade)

------
scythe
The very rigid picture of language described here and used in this and many
other lesswrong essays might be compared to early Wittgenstein ( _Tractatus_
), to be contrasted with later Wittgenstein ( _Philosophical Investigations_
), alongside Derrida and a litany of less famous philosophers.

Of course, the reason Wittgenstein ultimately rejected this picture, as in
rejected describing the meaning of words by formal definition, is that it
doesn't accurately describe the way language is used in practice, and leads us
to misunderstand situations.

"Does a tree falling in the forest make a sound?"

Albert: "no" => "Berkeleyan idealism makes sense"

Barry: "yes => "I refute it thus!" _kicks rock_

Of course, the question of course, is do we really want to understand the
situation, or beleaguer Albert and Barry until they stop bothering us? The
_argumentum ad nauseum_ on lesswrong, by now an encyclopedia-sized blog, hints
toward the latter. And there are plenty of bare, wrong assertions:

>Most philosophers would advise Albert and Barry to try to define exactly what
they mean by "free will", on which topic they will certainly be able to
discourse at great length.

"Most philosophers" probably wouldn't, unless you're at a conference of the
Vienna circle. Philosophy admits a great many ways of approaching these
questions.

If a tree is in a forest and nobody can ever hear or see it, is it really a
"tree"? Is it in a "forest"? And can it really "fall"? After all, all of the
trees and forests and falling we refer to in natural language (this is an
empirical claim) are ultimately derived from (this is actually a propter hoc
fallacy, but that's inevitable) our real experiences of trees and forests, in
which falling makes a sound (this is not a definition, but a description).
This is a sort of lame analysis, but at least I'm not trying to dodge the
question.

~~~
TylerJay
> Of course, the reason Wittgenstein ultimately rejected this picture, as in
> rejected describing the meaning of words by formal definition, is that it
> doesn't accurately describe the way language is used in practice, and leads
> us to misunderstand situations.

I don't think the author is really trying to give a "formal definition" of the
meaning of words. The point he is trying to make is that while people may
claim to disagree about a high level sentence like "when a tree falls and
nobody is around to hear it, does it still makes a sound?", they actually
don't expect there to be any real difference in the physical state of the
world after the tree falls.

If you taboo the word "sound", then the question becomes either "when a tree
falls and nobody is around to hear it, are there still vibrations in the air?"
or "when a tree falls and nobody is around to hear it, is there still an
auditory experience for anyone?" If two people were to disagree on either of
THESE statements, then they actually have an important difference in their
models of the world.

The idea is that words are just convenient ways of referring to a collection
of objects that are similar in some ways. Words used in everyday conversation
generally do not have strict definitions. They just refer to a cluster of
things. This post helps explain that idea:

[http://lesswrong.com/lw/nl/the_cluster_structure_of_thingspa...](http://lesswrong.com/lw/nl/the_cluster_structure_of_thingspace/)

~~~
denom
How are arguments structured? Which words are meaningless? Who is in a
position of authority to determine which words need tabooing?

The author's unfortunate choice of the word "Taboo" to describe this procedure
of clarifying meaning reflects an implied ideological stance. He takes the
role of a curator, the vanguard of the "rationalist virtue of empiricism".
It's much like Richard Dawkins and others who adopt positions as the only sane
ones in the room, the only ones who can isolate the _real_ parts of scientific
rationality.

~~~
daveid
The author's choice of the word "Taboo" refers to the game called "Taboo"
described in the first paragraph. It does not imply any special ideological
stance.

~~~
denom
It's clear that the author is not referring to the game Taboo:

> The illusion of unity across religions can be dispelled by making the term
> "God" taboo, and asking them to say what it is they believe in; or making
> the word "faith" taboo, and asking them why they believe it.

He chooses to not represent certain things in language, but if we are
operating in a situation where science has not or cannot make firm
pronouncements, how do we act? The approach he is presenting is akin to just
slicing off the fuzzy corners of a map, since by his estimation the clear
parts are the only _real_ map. How we cut off those chunks of the map is
arbitrary, and in that sense belies the ideological background of whoever
employs this technique.

------
gabemart
I find this interesting. I particularly enjoy the idea of proscribed words in
Taboo leaking information that helps describe the taboo word. It reminds me of
a pentester checking robots.txt to see what parts of a website the admin
doesn't want crawlers to see.

However, I disagree with the "tree falls in the forest" example. The thought
experiment was formed in a time when the only way to measure acoustic
vibrations was with the human ear. I don't think it's any great leap to extend
the conceit of the experiment to cover all forms of measuring acoustic
vibrations.

Albert may claim:

    
    
        A tree falling in a deserted forest matches [membership test:
        this event generates pressure waves in a material medium].
    

And Barry could quite reasonably reply:

    
    
        How can we be sure those pressure waves are generated if we
        don't have any wave detectors in the forest?
    

In other words, I don't think this is a case where ambiguous language is the
source of the apparent disagreement. No matter how far down the abstraction-
chain you go, the detection of acoustic waves always requires an observer of
some fashion, which brings us back to the sense of the original thought
experiment.

~~~
MichaelGG
I think it changes a lot of peoples thoughts about the question. It moves it
from a "let's play with the concept of sound" to a basic question of induction
and physics. At that point, why not ask how can we be sure the tree actually
fell at all?

If you chase that rabbit hole, it probably devolves into arguing about what
"know" and "is" and "sure" "actually mean".

~~~
gabemart
I disagree. I don't think the original plays with the concept of sound, I
think it plays with the concept of an objective reality. I don't think the
thought experiment is substantially different in effect if it's changed to
"does a tree fall in the forest if no-one is there to see it" or "does a tree
have rough bark in the forest if no-one is there to feel it".

~~~
rjknight
Or "do bears shit in the woods?"

------
tunesmith
In the Theory Of Constraints "Thinking Tools" (a method to try and apply logic
to group/systems dynamics/conflicts/constraints) they call this a "clarity
reservation". I got caught up in a big discussion board argument about "gun
control" before realizing everyone was arguing passionately about wildly
different mental models that "gun control" represented. I could have said, "I
have a clarity reservation on gun control" and spun the discussion out into
several more simultaneous conversations.

It also got me thinking that most terms like this could be mapped on a 2x2
grid of "content" versus "signal". "Content" is the meaningfulness of the
definition, and "signal" is the emotional impact of the word, or its ability
to elicit certain emotional responses in the audience. "Gun control" could be
seen as a high-signal low-content term, and that's the quadrant that you
probably most want to avoid (or taboo).

This happens a lot in software engineering, too, probably more in the low-
signal low-content quadrant (since most overloaded terms in software
engineering are rather boring in the grand scheme). We regularly have
confusion at work about words like "profile" (performance? user info? data
type?) and "dev" (our test server? our git branch? our team?). This can also
be hard when introducing layers of abstraction in a codebase - I feel like
more than once I've struggled with running out of synonyms when trying to name
certain classes.

------
cpsempek
I don't understand the distinction the author is making between defining the
problematic word and the process of "tabooing" the word.

I do see the distinction in terms of the actual game: certainly 9 innings, 3
outs is not a definition for baseball. But the tabooing process described by
the author seems no different to me than coming up with a definition.

~~~
tedunangst
People will argue about whose definition is correct. By simply mechanically
substituting the definition in place, you don't need to worry as much about
whether it's correct.

Albert and Barry may have strong feelings about what the word "sound" means.
They'll never agree to use the other's definition. Search and replace and you
can advance the conversation past that point.

------
simondedalus
This article is RAGE-fuel for anyone with > 101 experience with analytic
philosophy of language. It's the theory of reference equivalent of

"Your epistemology is bad because an evil demon might be fooling you." "Whoa."

~~~
James_Duval
I think it's supposed to be useful insight into how you can improve your
approach to daily life, nothing more -- at least in the context of being
posted to Hacker News, that's what it is. It's a dirty cognitive hack to help
you look past high-level concepts rather than anything academic.

------
dinkumthinkum
I don't recommend this "LW" web site. This way only madness lies.

------
begriffs
Less wrong, more autistic.

~~~
gwern
Maybe not as autistic as one might assume, based on the facial recognition
scores:
[http://lesswrong.com/lw/28l/do_you_have_highfunctioning_aspe...](http://lesswrong.com/lw/28l/do_you_have_highfunctioning_aspergers_syndrome/)

