
Boeing employee: I would not put my family on a Max plane - howard941
https://mynorthwest.com/1421554/boeing-employee-max-plane/?
======
mbostleman
Boeing has ~150k employees. Given that pool of people I'm pretty sure you can
come up one that has any opinion you want. Just decide at first what you want
your story to portray, then go find your employee.

~~~
hombre_fatal
The other thing that annoys me about the Max coverage are those polls where "X
people say they would never fly on one," as if even 1% of people actually
factor in the plane model when buying their ticket.

~~~
mbostleman
Yea, I have never looked at equipment when buying a ticket and still wouldn't.
Price, departure, arrival, and duration - roughly in that order - are the only
things that matter to me.

~~~
newsoul2019
I have looked at it to choose between two puddle-jumpers, I chose the one that
was the jet over the turboprop.

~~~
daveslash
Interesting. Why?

~~~
SimonPStevens
Not the op, but for me the turboprops I've flown on [0] have a deeper, louder
droning noise that really gives me a headache after a while. I think it's
personal though, I've spoken about hating them with travelling companions and
no one else shares my dislike. I've never actively tried to avoid them though,
mainly because I rarely have a choice of time or route when I fly on the
airlines I know use them.

[0] -
[https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Havilland_Canada_Dash_8](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Havilland_Canada_Dash_8)

~~~
magduf
>I think it's personal though, I've spoken about hating them with travelling
companions and no one else shares my dislike.

That's because most people these days have significant hearing loss.

------
kartan
I see people complaining about the fact that it is just employee opinion.

I agree that just one employee opinion it's not important or so relevant by
itself.

But, for most people, a human face for a problem makes the problem easier to
understand and to sympathize with the situation. So, it seems that the
journalist decided to give voice to Stuart as an stylistic choice. HN readers
may like or not this choice. But, it does not invalidate the content of the
article.

An example does not invalidate the rule. It would be interesting to discuss
the content more than the style, even that it's also a valid discussion.

My take out of the article is that lack of trust on upper management is part
of the problem.

> “I want to think that I work for one of the best companies in the world. I
> want to think that when I come home from a 10-12 hour shift that I’ve done
> something good. But I don’t know because I see the lies. They’re going back
> on everything that they’ve told us. So it’s really difficult for me to feel
> good about any of it.”

Most people see themselves as good persons. Most people wants to do a good
job. When your company leadership fails you there is a conflict between that
believe and reality. That is why company leadership is so important and it
should not only respond to share holders but to all stakeholders in the
company including customers and employees.

~~~
mcv
It's a problem when society keeps telling people that the only job of
companies is to increase shareholder value. Recently there have been more and
more people pointing out what a stupid idea it really is [0], but there are
still a lot of companies focusing way too much on shareholder value to the
exclusion of all other values, and there are still people repeating this
harmful mantra.

Companies that only care about shareholder value run the risk of becoming
parasites preying on society, looking for any way to extract value from
society.

A healthy company should balance the needs of their shareholders, their
employees, their customers, and society at large. Only if you balance those 4
concerns can you have a healthy, sustainable business that's a boon to society
rather than a bane.

[0] Example:
[https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2017/07/17/making-...](https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2017/07/17/making-
sense-of-shareholder-value-the-worlds-dumbest-idea/#ff9b1bf2a7ed)

~~~
jacobr1
The real probably is the focus on short-term, quarterly financial reporting
and how that relates to share-price. There is nothing wrong with focusing on
maximizing value for the owners of a company, but if you focus on short term
measure that look good to securities analysts, you'll actually undermine
longer term value. The companies that build the most value ALSO have satisfied
employees, happy customers and are respected by those outside in society.
Neglecting the other factors might work for a while, but at a very high cost.

------
ptero
For an opposite view: I have no relationship with Boeing, but I fly about once
a month and have no issues flying on 737 Max, alone or with a family.

Current aircraft and flying is very safe. Even with the recent 737 fiascos,
flying those is by far safer than driving to work. If I am OK with taking a
road trip on vacation I am OK with flying Max.

This is not to say that improvements, re-certification and additional pilot
training are bad. But from a purely practical point of view (which I try to
practice for routine decisions), if we want to improve safety, there are
better areas to spend $$ and / or hours than on endless re-polishing of a
system that is super safe already. Life is dangerous; estimate your micro-
deaths and extract most utility and fun from each of our 1e6 microlifes. My
2c.

~~~
trimbo
> Even with the recent 737 fiascos, flying those is by far safer than driving
> to work

I can't find the numbers easily right now, but I'd really like to see "deaths
/ person-hours flown on a 737 Max" vs. "deaths / person-hours driven".

~~~
cameldrv
Roughly: There have been about 400 737MAXes produced over two years, average
time in service 1 year, so figure 400 plane-years. Figure about 8 flight hours
per day, so 365 _8_ 400=1.2 million flight hours, 600,000 flight hours per
accident or 1.5 fatal accidents per million hours.

The U.S. motor vehicle accident rate is about 1.2 fatalities per 100,000,000
vehicle miles travelled. Figure a car's average speed is 30mph so 1.2
fatalities per 3.3 million hours = 0.36 fatalities per million hours.
Therefore on an hourly basis, the 737MAX is very roughly 5x more dangerous
than driving. OTOH the 737MAX averages about 400mph, so per mile it's probably
something like 2-3x safer.

~~~
codedokode
There might be other differences. On the road, a lot depends on your style of
driving, whether you are careful, but in case with a plane, you cannot do
anything to make the flight safer.

~~~
cameldrv
Yes, but on the other hand you can't do very much to make it more dangerous
either. If you show up to your flight drunk, you're no more likely to crash.

------
mehrdadn
> the 737 Max plane remains grounded as the company scrambles to develop a fix
> for software problems that are blamed for two deadly crashes within a year.

Great, so they've managed to convince people this was a software problem...

~~~
sdinsn
What kind of problem do you consider it to be?

~~~
phire
It's not a software issue because the software was working excatly as
specified. There is no bug.

And its not really an aerodynamic issue either.

Boeing have a massive procedural issue where they didn't do proper safety
analysis of how the system works as a whole. The fact that they didn't
identify this failure case as a major issue makes you wonder what other
failure cases (on other planes too) that they missed.

The original version of MCAS only moved the stablizer by 0.6 degrees, and only
in situations with high angles of attack AND abnormally high g loading. That's
the version they ran the safety analysis on, it relies on two types of sensors
that shouldn't fail simultaneously. Later they modified MCAS to move the
stablizer by much larger amounts (2.6 degrees, 4x larger) and they removed the
high g loading restriction so it would operate in more situations. This also
means it was now relying on a second sensor.

And they never re-ran the safety analysis.

~~~
magduf
Exactly. The whole thing is a gigantic failure of systems engineering, and if
they made this big an error there, what error similar errors are lurking in
their other planes? Then, to make matters worse, their response to the problem
showed that they simply cannot be trusted.

------
gregmac
There isn't a pilot alive that isn't now fully aware of MCAS. Is there still a
risk of MCAS causing another crash?

I think the issue Boeing has now is credibility, and the idea that there may
be other MCAS-type issues lurking.

> we were told certain things such as ‘the companies that bought these planes,
> a lot of them, their countries didn’t require them to go through the test
> flight process that needed to happen.’ So we were told, ‘Hey, that’s not on
> us, that’s on them. We have this program, they’re suppose to take it, they
> don’t have to take it, that teaches them how to use this thing.’”

To me (as a layperson), it seems pretty obvious that Boeing specifically
didn't mention MCAS in the flight crew operations manual because it would have
meant extra training/certifications to fly the MAX, and there is a pretty
clear profit motive to avoid that. By attempting to weasel out of this by
saying things like "a pilot should never see the operation of MCAS in normal
flying conditions" and "not a separate system to be trained on" [1], as well
as the above paraphrasing, it doesn't exactly inspire confidence that Boeing
is really putting passenger safety above all else, which is what I as a non-
stockholding potential passenger would prefer.

[1]
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maneuvering_Characteristics_Au...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maneuvering_Characteristics_Augmentation_System#Training)

~~~
nix0n
> Is there still a risk of MCAS causing another crash?

Yes, because it's difficult to recover when MCAS goes wrong, even when you
know about it. The pilots of Ethiopian 302 turned MCAS off and still
crashed[0].

[https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-
aerospace/boein...](https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-
aerospace/boeings-emergency-procedure-for-737-max-may-have-failed-on-
ethiopian-flight/)

~~~
Someone1234
They even tried reproducing it in simulators and added 1000 feet (relative to
the Ethiopian aircraft) in order for the aircrew to use the recovery procedure
(nose down pitch) to be able to move the horizontal stabilizers with just the
handle.

At low altitude, even with full knowledge, MCAS can make the aircraft
unrecoverable. Aircraft should not fly without it being corrected. The
Ethiopian crew maybe have had knowledge of MCAS.

------
throwaway5752
The 737 Max issues are complicated, real and should be the object of study for
generations of engineers and business students. That said, this article is
useless aside from anecdotal (and not surprising) morale issues in Boeing.

~~~
salawat
Unfortunately, I believe that more value can be extracted from grinding the
lessons into future management types, government representatives, and
regulators.

All the engineers in the world can't stop a bunch of executives capable of
creating an environment so full of confusion, second guessing, and clouded
communication capable of allowing these types of tragedies to occur.

The mechanics of the problem laid bare were simple. The problem ended up being
the levels of obfuscation and lack of coordination/miscommunication
surrounding the certification process that allowed the aircraft to be
certified and flown with a clearly uncategorized avionics system, and
insufficient communications to pilot's that in the end could have negated the
technical need for a more robust system, if they'd only known to look out for
it..

~~~
throwaway5752
Honestly, I think it's crappy engineering, too. You can't throw this on the
feet of generic execs or regulators. The behavior with AoA sensor disagreement
(and the treatment of malfunctioning sensors) seems wrong. MCAS should have
had failsafes around the number of trim adjustments it could do.

You can talk all you want about how regulators should have required
recertification, how Boeing shouldn't have just strapped a couple of higher
bypass ratio engines onto the bottom of a 737 in the first place, or how it
information about MCAS should have been presented.... but in the end, it's
possible there would not have been accidents (or maybe more of them because of
unexpected stalls, we'll never know) if there had been sanity checking of
response values from either of the AoA sensors and if MCAS capped how many
times it could trim.

edit: it sucks to work on critical systems. In case it comes off differently,
I feel badly for those involved. Nobody gives them credit thousands (more?)
times a year an automatic flight control system engages and saves hundreds of
lives without any passengers knowing. They ended up making MCAS because of
decisions made outside of the realm of their control.

~~~
salawat
>Honestly, I think it's crappy engineering, too. You can't throw this on the
feet of generic execs or regulators. The behavior with AoA sensor disagreement
(and the treatment of malfunctioning sensors) seems wrong. MCAS should have
had failsafes around the number of trim adjustments it could do.

Watch the Australian 60 Minutes Expose on the MAX. A whistleblower has come
forward and stated that they had to pipe in only a single sensor's input to
avoid costly simulator training, which management pushed as an absolute
necessity to avoid.

I love Engineering. I love doing things right. I can't deny though that when
you've got business breathing down your back, everyone seems more interested
in getting what they _want_ instead of what _actually solves the problem in a
sound way_ , that things never degenerate to the point where the engineering
teams throw up their hands and say "Eff it! Take your plane and choke on it!"

This is a textbook case of toxic engineering culture yielding toxic engineered
product. Richard Feynman said it best after the Challenger disaster, and his
words ring as true now as they did back then.

"For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public [or
customer] relations, for Nature cannot be fooled."

------
not_a_moth
The thing is, I feel like if both of those planes had crashed on US soil, each
full of Americans, then it could have very well been the end of Boeing as a
corporation.

Since they happened halfway around the world, it seems like we judge it
differently?

~~~
julienfr112
There is few American victims, though.

~~~
o-__-o
A few is not a full plane of Americans on American soil.

------
trilobyte
"“The way management kind of works is we never really know who our managers
are sometimes,” he said. “We get shuffled around so much that our job codes,
our job titles, everything changes. Because they are trying to make progress.
With the Max being down, they are bringing other people down, trying to
correct the issues and trying to make it a better place.”"

This is a huge management mistake. Teams need a direction, consistency, and
time to execute. During that time managers often need to keep things on track
and keep up team morale, but also need to know that they have to step back and
be more passive while the team is executing. Constantly changing things means
the teams are distracted, probably a little frightened, and not operating
where they could be.

------
thefounder
>> Boeing employee: I would not put my family on a Max plane right now

Who would? Surely some people like to risk but why would you take such a risk
when there are so many safer options(i.e airbus)?

~~~
dingaling
IAG ( parent of British Airways, Iberia, Aer Lingus, Level and Vueling ) just
ordered 200 Max at the Paris Air Show.

So plenty of executives lack such qualms.

~~~
thefounder
Airbus didn't even had the chance to bid on that order so chances are the
order was cooked between UK-US governments. Walsh says "I believe the aircraft
is safe" though all of them are grounded and Boeing is yet to fix it...

------
jpollock
Google says Boeing had 153,027 employees as of Jan 2018.

Why should we listen to Stuart? They don't list his job, so he could be just
about anyone.

------
40acres
I was in Hawaii last month and had an interesting chat with a former Boeing
engineer. He was involved with ramping up the South Carolina plant which built
the Dreamliner. I asked him if he would fly Boeing right now and he also said
that he would not.

~~~
jly
This is a bit sensational.

Most Boeing jets that you can book a flight on today are some of the safest
the world has ever seen. For example, the 777 has been in service 25 years
with only a few serious accidents we can conclusively say are related to the
aircraft design or operation. The 737-NG (precursor to the MAX and also in
service ~25 years) experiences one hull loss incident for every 4 million or
so departures. Even their other fairly new jet, the 787, has never experienced
a hull loss or fatality in almost 8 years of commercial service.

~~~
silversconfused
That certainly makes the max less of a safety concern.

------
geggam
The structure of the plane is solid and it will fly. The issue I have and
obviously the FAA has a similar one is the fact buggy software is driving it.

Its one thing when the system offers assistance but when it takes over to the
degree you cannot fix it and lives are in danger it needs to be reworked

~~~
snarf21
I don't even think it is a bug. It was intended to work this way. The real
issue is that Boeing flat out _LIED_ and claimed it flew _exactly_ the same as
any other 737 so they could avoid having to factor re-training pilots on this
plane. It was all caused by greed and people should be going to jail.

~~~
geggam
The fact its all by wire and doesnt have an override stop button or something
is a bug. A serious one.

------
durdleturtle
There's a great deep dive on the engineering of the plane in the IEEE
magazine: [https://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/aviation/how-the-
boeing-...](https://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/aviation/how-the-
boeing-737-max-disaster-looks-to-a-software-developer)

------
iooi
Soon to be ex-Boeing employee. Why not just quit at that point?

~~~
jdsully
If he’s union then his job will be pretty safe.

