
On anthropomorphism in science (1985) - dopkew
https://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/EWD/transcriptions/EWD09xx/EWD936.html
======
chickenfries
I have a coworker who describes everything in a very anthropomorphic and
casual way, and their code is excessively imperative: everything is
accomplished through conditionals rather than by designing the code in such a
way that functions only run on data structures that they support.

I would share this with him, but I imagine it would go completely over his
head.

> The implied abstraction, in which time has disappeared from the picture, is
> however beyond the computing scientist imbued with the operational approach
> that the anthropomorphic metaphor induces. In a very real and tragic sense
> he has a mental block: his anthropomorphic thinking erects an insurmountable
> barrier between him and the only effective way in which his work can be done
> well.

~~~
leoscuro
I was a foreign language specialist in the military. When we were learning a
new language, a few of the students hit a wall because they were approaching
the material as "analogous to English." You can't think that way with most
non-romance languages.

I'm now doing sysadmin work, and do a little bit of scripting here and there
while working on teaching myself Python and C. Do you have any advice to avoid
the kind of anthropomorphic thinking you mentioned your coworker does? The
last thing I want to do is learn the "wrong way" and potentially struggle to
rethink how to code.

~~~
GuiA
I've been learning Japanese for a bit over a year now, and while I am still
very far away from being happy with my level in the language, I definitely
noticed a distinct shift for the better in my understanding of the language
and how fast I picked up new grammatical constructs etc when I stopped trying
to contrast it to the western languages I already knew.

You have to accept that Japanese grammar might have some basic concepts in
common with the grammar of western languages (verbs, objects, adjectives, etc)
but that really doesn't get you far.

(for japanese learners reading this comment, the article that pushed the first
domino for me was this one:
[http://www.guidetojapanese.org/blog/2007/09/03/repeat-
after-...](http://www.guidetojapanese.org/blog/2007/09/03/repeat-after-me-
there-is-no-such-thing-as-the-subject/) )

Regarding your question about programming, I'd encourage you to read both The
Little Schemer and Structure and Interpretation of Computer Programs.

~~~
gizmo686
Speaking as someone who is studying both linguistics and Japanese, this this
type of comment is just cringy to read. In the grand scheme of potential
"languages" Japanese and English (as well as all natural human languages;
including signed languages) have incredibly similar grammars. It is only when
you restrict your view to the range of human languages that Japanese and
English start to look incredibly different.

With regards to your link. Japanese absolutely has subjects.

The question of presisly _what_ -ga marks is a bit more controversial, but
calling it a subject marker is a perfectly defensible position. Indeed, having
studied linguistics before studying Japanese, I found that thinking of -ga as
a subject marker and -wa as a topic marker made the distinction easy for me.

The point of this comment is not to say that we should be teaching English-
native Japanese students that Japanese _does_ have subjects and -ga marks
them. I am not qualified to make that judgement, and my benefit likely came as
a result of leveraging my linguistic studies.

As others have pointed out, thinking of Japanese as analogous to English is
counter-productive for most students. This is despite the fact that Japanese
_is_ analogous to English in most cases, including (potentially) cases where
seeing the analogy could be counter productive.

Returning to the original article; this is a good indication that just because
something is _wrong_ does not mean that it is not useful. Anthropomorphizing
might not be technically correct, but it could still be a useful tool to help
our human brains make sense of the world or subject matter. In the same way
that saying "Japanese does not have subjects" might not be technically
correct, but it might still be useful.

~~~
PhasmaFelis
> _Speaking as someone who is studying both linguistics and Japanese, this
> this type of comment is just cringy to read. In the grand scheme of
> potential "languages" Japanese and English (as well as all natural human
> languages; including signed languages) have incredibly similar grammars. It
> is only when you restrict your view to the range of human languages that
> Japanese and English start to look incredibly different._

That seems like a total non sequitur. Do you also find the expression "like
comparing apples to oranges" cringey, since apples and oranges are quite
similar when compared to black holes?

~~~
gizmo686
That might not have been the best way for me to make my point, which is just
that, qualitatively, all human languages appear to be incredibly similar. I am
not aware of any way to quantify this observation. I do know, however, that
children who do not acquire any language during the critical period find it
much more difficult to acquire a language as an adult relative to a typical
adult acquiring a second language [0]. This means that a native English
speaker would be realying heavily of his knowledge of English when learning
Japanese (although not necessarily at a conscious level).

I tried to avoid the "apple to oranges" objection you are raising by
restricting the domain to that of "potential languages", which seems like the
"fair" point of reference to take. Since Japanese and English are both natural
human languages, I would consider comparing them more akin to comparing red
apples and green apples.

The main point I was trying to make (which admittadly got berried at the end
of my post) was that "wrong" and "not useful" are two very different concepts.

[0] This is best observed in deaf children who are not exposed to sign
language at a young age.

~~~
fenomas
So what? You understood, and to all appearances agreed with, the point being
made ("thinking of Japanese as analogous to English is counter-productive for
most students"), right?

The poster clearly wasn't making any broader claim about the "qualitative
similarity of all human languages" (whatever _that_ might be).

------
skybrian
Apparently Dijkstra thought that if we could somehow think more abstractly and
mathematically then we'd avoid making mistakes.

But in practice, it seems to be the opposite: most people have a hard time
thinking abstractly. We need analogies to make sense of things.

For example, there was an experiment [1] showing that even basic logic is
easier to handle if it's thought of as "detecting cheating" than as a pure
logic problem.

[1]
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wason_selection_task](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wason_selection_task)

~~~
bitwize
Dijkstra wanted us to think on paper, use abstractions that accurately
describe real-world systems, and arrive at answers methodically with a trail
of checkable work. If our data and methods are sound our answers will always
be correct.

Using just-so stories does nothing to aid in the methodical derivation of
conclusions from premises; and can serve to obfuscate and confuse the issues.

~~~
pdonis
_> Dijkstra wanted us to think on paper, use abstractions that accurately
describe real-world systems, and arrive at answers methodically with a trail
of checkable work. If our data and methods are sound our answers will always
be correct._

I understand the aspiration, but I always think of the counterpoint implicit
in Knuth's famous statement: "Beware of bugs in the above code; I have only
proved it correct, not tried it."

~~~
bitwize
The point is, if a system's behavior can be characterized with a set of
equations, use the equations to talk about the behavior -- not a flawed
metaphor for human cognition. If you find out that your equations incorrectly
or incompletely characterize the system's behavior, Occam's razor requires you
to assume that what you need is a better set of equations.

~~~
pdonis
_> if a system's behavior can be characterized with a set of equations, use
the equations to talk about the behavior_

I agree, and I don't think Knuth's quote was saying anything different.

 _> If you find out that your equations incorrectly or incompletely
characterize the system's behavior, Occam's razor requires you to assume that
what you need is a better set of equations._

Yes, but you might not have them, and they might not be easy to find. So you
might have to face the fact that, now and for the foreseeable future, you
might not be able to use your equations to completely predict or characterize
the system's behavior, so you need to actually test your code instead of just
proving it correct, as Knuth said.

------
GuB-42
Our brain is for hunting and gathering.

We somehow managed to repurpose it for mathematics in a very short amount of
time on the evolution timescale.

So while we are capable of abstraction, our brains work better when we rethink
the problem in terms of throwing rocks. Anthropomorphism help us make our
primitive mind and higher functions cooperate.

------
clock_tower
"But then Galileo made the troubling discovery that the heavier stone does not
fall any faster than the lighter one."

It does fall faster, if you drop both stones in the atmosphere; the heavier
stone has more mass per unit of surface area, to better overcome a constant
level of air resistance.

Aristotle's physics were based on pretty accurate observation of the pre-
industrial world, although they're surprisingly short on first principles. The
really serious shortcomings were mostly related to impetus, the Aristotelian
theory of motion -- it accidentally models friction well for objects in
continuous contact with the ground, but it's very hard for Aristotelian
physics to explain why an arrow keeps flying after it leaves the bowstring,
and even gains speed after its apogee.

~~~
defined
> It does fall faster, if you drop both stones in the atmosphere; the heavier
> stone has more mass per unit of surface area, to better overcome a constant
> level of air resistance.

Not necessarily; for one thing, if the masses of the two stones are not
significantly different, the difference in the effects of air resistance would
be unmeasurable given the instruments of the day.

For another, the shapes of the stones are important. One with a much greater
sectional density, oriented correctly, could fall faster than the other, even
if it were lighter.

But that's just nitpicking. If I remember correctly, Galileo used inclined
planes because there were only imprecise water clocks available to measure the
passage of time. His choice of apparatus was brilliant :)

~~~
clock_tower
I see I shouldn't have let the article's reference to stones stand; the
specific experimental apparatus used by both sides was lead balls -- Galileo
rolled them down inclined planes, while his opponents dropped them from the
Leaning Tower of Pisa.

The article lost me when the author blithely claimed that it was Galileo who
dropped two <droppable-item>s from the Leaning Tower of Pisa. The author
clearly has no idea what happens when you do that; while Galileo was far too
good at choosing the experimental setup that would give him the answer he
wanted, while ignoring any such setup that would prove him wrong, to make such
an obvious mistake.

~~~
adrianratnapala
_while Galileo was far too good at choosing the experimental setup that would
give him the answer he wanted, while ignoring any such setup that would prove
him wrong_

By this you mean that he was good at designing experiments that were sensitive
to the basic physics of what was going on, while being insensitive to
confounding factors?

~~~
clock_tower
Yes. But did he know that?

This is the Renaissance we're talking about; I wouldn't be at all surprised if
he just picked the experiment he wanted and laughed off the rest, applying
Petrarch's style of rhetoric in the sciences.

------
_rpd
> (Delivered at The Philosophers’ Lunch, 25 September 1985)

------
FullMtlAlcoholc
This issue is pernicious in the biological sciences. Evolution is often
depicted as having a will and is referred to as a marvelous creator which
completely misses the point of evolution, a system driven by simple
instructions that over time create emergent complexity (like a cellular
automata). People assume that their is some mechanism for adaptation
exercised. Adaptation happens at the species level and the only thing
exercised is survival.

~~~
SomeStupidPoint
Does a baby have a will? How about a cat? Bacterium?

I'm actually curious why people believe one emergent system does (eg, people)
but another doesn't (eg, evolution/biosphere).

What lets you determine when a composite object or pattern in an automata has
crossed that threshold?

~~~
FullMtlAlcoholc
> What lets you determine when a composite object or pattern in an automata
> has crossed that threshold?

There isn't really a threshold beyond that pattern or object somehow
communicating to you that it does indeed possess a will or some form of
consciousness. The default assumption is to assume it doesn't until it shows
it does instead of invoking an animist world view that imbues a spirit to
every complex phenomenon (weather, death, etc.)

I'm in agreement with you though in general. It is arrogant to think that
humans are at the terminal end of emergent complexity. Maybe our minds are too
limited to conceive of something arising from a global or galactic scale.

Are our individual cells aware of the person?

~~~
SomeStupidPoint
Why is the animist view not the default assumption?

That seems a strictly more complicated model (with equivalent or even lesser
predictive power), in that it supposes two classes of objects rather than a
single class (in some sort of distribution), and supposes there must be some
special quality to things, wherein they gain an extra trait.

The simpler assumption (at least to me) would seem to be the animist one,
albeit that most wills don't look much like ours (since most _things_ don't
look like us).

I mean, I could see if you were arguing that humans _don 't_ have a will, but
evolution doesn't either -- but to divide them in to categories based on
feelings (which seems to be the case) seems to needlessly complexify the
model.

~~~
FullMtlAlcoholc
> Why is the animist view not the default assumption? That seems a strictly
> more complicated model (with equivalent or even lesser predictive power), in
> that it supposes two classes of objects rather than a single class (in some
> sort of distribution), and supposes there must be some special quality to
> things, wherein they gain an extra trait.

Although you raise an interesting point, that was the default view of many, if
not most, societies until modern times. Once that threshold is crossed, we
reflexively imbue it with other superstitious traits. In theory it makes
sense, in practice, it'll lead to shit like human sacrifice.

~~~
smhost
In what theory would that make even remote sense?

If there's no selective pressure for a will to emerge, a will will not emerge
(barring some infinitely improbable random event).

------
gonvaled
For me nothing embodies anthropomorphism more than the stubborn insistence in
looking for water and carbon when looking for life.

Talk about bias!

~~~
cshenton
You may be thinking of anthropocentrism​.

~~~
gonvaled
My bad for not rtfm

