
Preliminary Summary of the FAA’s Review of the Boeing 737 Max [pdf] - datway
https://www.faa.gov/news/media/attachments/737-MAX-RTS-Preliminary-Summary-v-1.pdf
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salawat
From the Executive summary:

>Duration of the MCAS command is a function of AOA and airspeed. At higher
airspeeds, flight control surfaces are more effective than at lower airspeeds.
Therefore, a smaller MCAS command at higher airspeed has the same effect as a
larger MCAS command at low speeds. Without MCAS, the 737 MAX would not meet
FAA’s regulatory requirements.

> _Without MCAS, the 737 MAX would not meet FAA’s regulatory requirements._

First, called it.

Secondly, how in the hell did a system _on which certification of compliance
with all regulations governing it 's primary intended use case not get vetted
more thoroughly_?

This determination casts a rather large pall of doubt over why the FAA
accepted pilot' s as a satisfactory failsafe for an MCAS failure if the
failure of MCAS should have constituted an emergency requiring immediate
landing and removal from passenger service of the aircraft.

Even though the report says the development process was essentially followed
to the letter, we ended up with an aircraft which is leagues away from what I
would call a reasonably sound civilian transport aircraft.

So it sounds to me like someone is either pulling punches, or specifically
avoiding asking the hard Or uncomfortable questions.

Namely:

How is the process not to blame when following it led to a sub-par
implementation?

Or if you really insist the process as it stands is sufficient, why was Boeing
capable of following the process yet still delivering a dangerous product"

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thisismyusrname
For reference, the report’s conclusion: “Through a thorough, transparent, and
inclusive process, the FAA preliminarily determined that Boeing’s proposed
changes to the 737 MAX design, flight crew procedures and maintenance
procedures effectively mitigate the airplane-related safety issues that
contributed to the Flight 610 and Flight 302 accidents. The FAA further
preliminarily determined that the proposed design change also addressed
additional safety concerns beyond those identified during the accident
investigations. This report does not address other safety issues that might
have contributed to the accidents but are not related to airplane design,
including maintenance, aircraft operator, and air traffic control. The FAA
believes recommendations related to these other potential contributing factors
should be addressed bythe appropriate organizations. Further, the FAA will
evaluate Boeing’s proposed flight crew training through the Flight
Standardization Board process. The FAA will issue a draft Boeing 737 Flight
Standardization Board Report documenting the results of the operational
evaluation. The report will be posted for public comment. You may subscribe to
this page to receive notification when the FAA posts the draft report.”

