
Boeing 737 Max pilots complained to feds for months about suspected safety flaw - mbgaxyz
https://www.dallasnews.com/business/airlines/2019/03/12/boeing-737-max-8-pilots-complained-feds-months-suspected-safety-flaw
======
tuna-piano
Some context:

1\. There have been 865 737 related ASRS reports since 1/1/2018

2\. I don't know how to quickly separate out 737-MAX reports from the non
737-MAX reports, as the ASRS database doesn't include 737-MAX as an airplane
type! From scanning, I can say that there are more than five MAX related
reports, though.

[1] All 865 737 reports since 1/1/2018

CSV -
[http://s000.tinyupload.com/index.php?file_id=546686797940621...](http://s000.tinyupload.com/index.php?file_id=54668679794062195281)

DOC -
[http://s000.tinyupload.com/index.php?file_id=726497188798253...](http://s000.tinyupload.com/index.php?file_id=72649718879825392207)

[2] Airplane model filter with no MAX option:
[https://imgur.com/a/09rRtzX](https://imgur.com/a/09rRtzX)

[3] ASRS database: [https://titan-
server.arc.nasa.gov/ASRSPublicQueryWizard/Quer...](https://titan-
server.arc.nasa.gov/ASRSPublicQueryWizard/QueryWizard_Filter.aspx#)

[4] Document linked in the article with plane models listed under 737-800 or
737-Next Generation Undifferentiated
[https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5766398-ASRS-
Reports...](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5766398-ASRS-Reports-
for-737-max8.html)

~~~
jashkenas
Great links! Here are the three 737-related ASRS reports that mention MCAS:

ACN: 1597286

"Day 3 of 3 departing in a MAX 8 after a long overnight. I was well rested and
had discussed the recent MAX 8 MCAS guidance with the Captain. On departure,
we had strong crosswinds (gusts > 30 knots) directly off the right wing,
however, no LLWS or Micro-burst activity was reported at the field. After
verifying LNAV, selecting gear and flaps up, I set "UP" speed. The aircraft
accelerated normally and the Captain engaged the "A" autopilot after reaching
set speed. Within two to three seconds the aircraft pitched nose down bringing
the VSI to approximately 1,200 to 1,500 FPM. I called "descending" just prior
to the GPWS sounding "don't sink, don't sink." The Captain immediately
disconnected the autopilot and pitched into a climb. The remainder of the
flight was uneventful. We discussed the departure at length and I reviewed in
my mind our automation setup and flight profile but can't think of any reason
the aircraft would pitch nose down so aggressively."

ACN: 1597380

"It was day three of six for me and day three with very good FO (First
Officer). Well rested, great rapport and above average Crew coordination. Knew
we had a MAX. It was my leg, normal Ops Brief, plus I briefed our concerns
with the MAX issues, bulletin, MCAS, stab trim cutout response etc. I
mentioned I would engage autopilot sooner than usual (I generally hand fly to
at least above 10,000 ft.) to remove the possible MCAS threat.

Weather was about 1000 OVC drizzle, temperature dropping and an occasional
snow flake. I double checked with an additional personal walkaround just prior
to push; a few drops of water on the aircraft but clean aircraft, no deice
required. Strong crosswind and I asked Tug Driver to push a little more tail
east so as not to have slow/hung start gusts 30+.

Wind and mechanical turbulence was noted. Careful engine warm times, normal
flaps 5 takeoff in strong (appeared almost direct) crosswind. Departure was
normal. Takeoff and climb in light to moderate turbulence. After flaps 1 to
"up" and above clean "MASI up speed" with LNAV engaged I looked at and engaged
A Autopilot. As I was returning to my PFD (Primary Flight Display) PM (Pilot
Monitoring) called "DESCENDING" followed by almost an immediate: "DONT SINK
DONT SINK!"

I immediately disconnected AP (Autopilot) (it WAS engaged as we got full horn
etc.) and resumed climb. Now, I would generally assume it was my automation
error, i.e., aircraft was trying to acquire a miss-commanded speed/no
autothrottles, crossing restriction etc., but frankly neither of us could find
an inappropriate setup error (not to say there wasn't one).

With the concerns with the MAX 8 nose down stuff, we both thought it
appropriate to bring it to your attention. We discussed issue at length over
the course of the return to ZZZ. Best guess from me is airspeed fluctuation
due to mechanical shear/frontal passage that overwhelmed automation
temporarily or something incorrectly setup in MCP (Mode Control Panel). PM's
callout on "descending" was particularly quick and welcome as I was just
coming back to my display after looking away. System and procedures coupled
with CRM (Resource Management) trapped and mitigated issue."

ACN: 1593017

"The recently released 737 MAX8 Emergency Airworthiness Directive directs
pilots how to deal with a known issue, but it does nothing to address the
systems issues with the AOA system.

MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) is implemented on the
737 MAX to enhance pitch characteristics with flaps UP and at elevated angles
of attack. The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch
characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and during flaps
up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot
input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to
allow the flight crew to use column trim switch or stabilizer aisle stand
cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the
Flight Control computer using input data from sensors and other airplane
systems.

The MCAS function becomes active when the airplane Angle of Attack exceeds a
threshold based on airspeed and altitude. Stabilizer incremental commands are
limited to 2.5 degrees and are provided at a rate of 0.27 degrees per second.
The magnitude of the stabilizer input is lower at high Mach number and greater
at low Mach numbers. The function is reset once angle of attack falls below
the Angle of Attack threshold or if manual stabilizer commands are provided by
the flight crew. If the original elevated AOA condition persists, the MCAS
function commands another incremental stabilizer nose down command according
to current aircraft Mach number at actuation.

This description is not currently in the 737 Flight Manual Part 2, nor the
Boeing FCOM, though it will be added to them soon. This communication
highlights that an entire system is not described in our Flight Manual. This
system is now the subject of an AD.

I think it is unconscionable that a manufacturer, the FAA, and the airlines
would have pilots flying an airplane without adequately training, or even
providing available resources and sufficient documentation to understand the
highly complex systems that differentiate this aircraft from prior models. The
fact that this airplane requires such jury rigging to fly is a red flag. Now
we know the systems employed are error prone--even if the pilots aren't sure
what those systems are, what redundancies are in place, and failure modes.

I am left to wonder: what else don't I know? The Flight Manual is inadequate
and almost criminally insufficient. All airlines that operate the MAX must
insist that Boeing incorporate ALL systems in their manuals."

~~~
ordinaryradical
These all sound extremely serious and damning, but it's hard to know whether
these match the typical tone and content of these kind of reports. Is this is
well inside the standard for adjusting to a new aircraft or does this suggest
a serious hazard left unaddressed?

~~~
dTal
> I would generally assume it was my automation error, i.e., aircraft was
> trying to acquire a miss-commanded speed/no autothrottles, crossing
> restriction etc., but frankly neither of us could find an inappropriate
> setup error (not to say there wasn't one).

Regardless of the usual tone, I find this particular paragraph a fairly
terrifying indictment of cockpit human factors across the board. Apparently
it's not unusual for aircraft behave unusually with the pilots not
understanding why - and the poor pilots "generally" blame themselves!

~~~
CompelTechnic
If you ever have some time, you should try playing microsoft flight simulator
and you will come to an understanding of this phenomenon.

Aircraft have many states, and there is a lot of information to process to fly
an aircraft, even in normal flight. When situations develop in real time, it
takes a lot of mental horsepower to understand the situation and react
appropriately. Despite all this, aviation is safer than driving a car.

It is one of the reasons I find aviation to be inspiring. Conscientious humans
have mastered this unforgiving domain through effort and power of will. When
you talk to a real pilot, there are certain mannerisms that they share that
tend to show that the practice of flying really makes you a thoughtful person.

------
sfilargi
For a car analogy, imagine Tesla creates a new model that under certain
conditions tends to over-steer left. To prevent any accidents because of that,
they have added a system that turns the steering wheel clockwise. To disable
the system it is not enough to try to prevent by force the steering wheel from
turning, but you have to press a button that disables electric steering
assistance.

Notice they have never briefed you about this new system because they didn't
want to retrain you.

You happily drive along the highway at 70mph when the system malfunctions and
incorrectly thinks the car is over-steering left, so the steering wheel starts
rotating clockwise. The car swiftly moves to the lane in your right as you use
all your strength to prevent it and manage to bring the car back in the lane.

In the mean time all kind of lights and sounds go off on your cockpit. In 5
seconds, while you are trying to find out what to make out of all the lights
flashing, the steering wheel starts turning the card right again. This time
you are not so lucky and you crash into the truck on your right.

~~~
rootusrootus
I feel like every time someone insists on making a car analogy, it just piles
on more evidence that car analogies never work.

At least you don't have to get a new endorsement on your license for every
model of car.

~~~
sfilargi
Analogy implies partial similarity. Of course there will be differences.

------
ergocoder
This is off topic. But I've been skeptical of the commercial aviation accident
risk compared to cars.

I'm not saying cars are safer. But using accident count per mileage seems a
bit odd, especially when the most risky parts of flying are taking off and
landing.

A plane travelling 400 more miles doesn't incur much more risk. But a car
travelling 400 more miles incur a much bigger risk (e.g. fatigue, car
malfunctioning). So, of course, the stats for planes is going to look much
better.

I wonder if anyone has an insight into why we are using this metrics, and what
is a better metrics?

~~~
Udik
I'd say it's accidents per person/hour. And I've read somewhere that the
figures used to be similar for cars and airplanes (though aircraft safety is
constantly improving, cars probably less).

~~~
ummonk
Cars have been improving safety significantly over time as well. However, the
fatality rates seem to be significantly better for airlines.

[https://www.bts.gov/content/fatality-rates-
mode](https://www.bts.gov/content/fatality-rates-mode)

For the sake of argument, assume cars travel an average of only 10 mph, and
air carriers carry just 50 passengers (low estimates tilt the comparison in
favor of cars). That would mean cars had 1.1 fatality for every 10 million
hours in 2015. The corresponding figure has been between 0.0 and 0.6 for the
last decade, and airlines come out way ahead even after amortizing the 5.8
from 2001 over the following years. And this is with very conservative
assumptions.

On the other hand if you add in non-occupant deaths, the numbers might work
out better for cars, even after using less conservative assumptions, once you
amortize the non-occupant deaths from 9/11.

------
mannykannot
There are at least three inter-related issues here: 1) Was MCAS an issue in
the Ethiopian Airlines crash? 2) Did Boeing err, prior to the Lion Air crash,
in not informing pilots of the existence of MCAS, and the way it changes how a
failure is experienced by the flight crew? 3) Does MCAS pose a risk that
cannot be adequately addressed through appropriate awareness and training?

IIRC, after the existence of MCAS was disclosed, the US pilots' unions were
divided over this issue, with the union representing Southwest pilots
castigating Boeing for its nondisclosure, while that representing United
pilots did not consider it to be a big issue. Unfortunately, this article does
not make it clear where pilots stand on issue 3, and the investigation of the
Ethiopian Airlines crash might reveal additional issues.

The forthcoming software upgrade for MCAS certainly implies that there were
improvements to be made.

~~~
ddoolin
I don't know the answer to 1 or 2, but regarding 3, if the issue in the
reports via this article are the same issue, which it seems like they may be,
then no I don't believe it poses a risk that can't be addressed through
training. Through awareness these pilots and FOs filing reports seemed to
know, at least through intuition if not outright knowledge of the new MCAS
system, to disconnect the autopilot system when the nose goes down
inappropriately.

My question is, should the onus be on the pilots? Yes, they should know about
it if they're going to be piloting an aircraft with it, but is this expected
behavior? To me it seems more like a bug than expected behavior...why would
you want to pitch downwards in a climb?

I don't really understand defense of Boeing in any scenario. This seems like a
mistake in any case, whether it's just lack of instruction or documentation in
the relevant flight manuals, or an outright system failure.

~~~
salawat
>why would you want to pitch downwards in a climb?

Because due to the different shape and position of the nacelles, there are
aerodynamic effects that cause the plane to want to pitch up at high AoA. If
you are already close to a stall condition, and you were caught unawares, bad
times would be had.

The major issue though is pilots were left to 'just figure this out' instead
of being informed of the change. I have a feeling Boeing felt justified doing
this because they pitched it as a "reconfiguration" of an old airframe, not
warranting any explanation.

As with any task I've attempted that involves deadly failure modes, this
should have struck someone as being a terrible idea.

~~~
kayfox
From what I have read, the NG series had the habit of pitching up under go-
around conditions and this system exists because Boeing expected that issue to
be more prevalent on the Max and also to try and solve it.

So its not a new thing on the Max, its just expected to be more prominent.

------
yason
The thing that worries me most is that, based on mere amateur observations in
the media, the number of incidents involving user interfaces, repeated changes
to procedures, and software fixes to "unexpected" corner-cases seems to have
been in the increase.

To the uninitiated, it seems that problems in airline incidents used to
revolve around mechanical failures, bad wiring, sensor malfunctions, toasted
electronics causing smell of smoke and such. Plain and simple. Issue a fix in
the design and apply to all planes of the same type, and you'll end up
reducing the failure surface bit by bit.

I might be totally wrong about this because I don't track actual data. But if
I've spotted the trend right it's scary because the problems are shifting into
_our space_ , i.e. software engineering. And being a software engineer, I know
we're pretty much fucked at that point. We've only ever managed to write
reliable and trustworthy software when we've split it into very tiny pieces
that we can verify and kept the number of pieces small.

Maybe aviation computers used to be much simpler that they could be verified
more throughoutly. Maybe airplanes used to have less features and they could
keep the complexity sufficiently down and functionality orthogonal. Maybe
there was enough human glue in between the systems so that there was a live
sanity-check during flights and pilots could react properly if the computers
didn't agree on something.

But now I sense a new category of error conditions that are eerily similar to
what we've had in non-critical software for decades where assumptions are laid
on top of other assumptions, and when they fail the whole stack comes crashing
down. Only this time there might be a whole plane coming down instead of
getting a curious SIGSEGV on the screen with a blinking cursor. It might start
as an innocent "couldn't access flight plan because of wifi went down" but
such interdependencies between certified and uncertified systems grow
exponentially and this will snowball into the unmanageable very soon.

~~~
tomaskafka
If you split a complex systems into a tiny pieces, you imo just shift a locus
of problems from individual modules into their more and more complex network
of interactions and emergent behaviors.

~~~
yason
Hence you keep the number of pieces small to avoid the exponential
interactions. You only ever implement what is really needed instead of letting
feature creep and excess convenience work their way into your plane. It's not
like N times more of that sweet complexity is required to fly a plane today
than what was needed in the 80's or 90's.

------
jcroll
> The News found at least five complaints about the Boeing model in a federal
> database where pilots can voluntarily report about aviation incidents
> without fear of repercussions.

Is this a lot?

~~~
qrbLPHiKpiux
Yes. Recalls with autos happen more often with a lot less. Consider the amount
of cars out there. It only takes a few to put one in play.

~~~
stefan_
If the US would treat car safety like airplane safety there would be no SUVs
driving out there.

~~~
k_sh
Airplane safety should be more strict than car safety, because the damage an
airplane crash causes is a handful of orders of magnitude higher than a car
accident...

~~~
stefan_
Yet deaths in the latter vastly outpace adverse events in the former. What is
the criteria by which public safety should operate? Is it biggest explosion?

~~~
1stcity3rdcoast
Opportunity cost of safety improvements to vehicles. Airliners cost like $100
million each, so they can afford to perfect safety. You can’t get airliner-
level safety in a vehicle that costs less than $50,000.

~~~
Johnny555
Maybe not airliner level of safety, but based on the top causes of car
accidents, they could probably be reduced by an order of magnitude with
relatively inexpensive improvements:

    
    
      1. better driver training
      2. breathalyzer ignition interlocks
      3. speed limiters (even more reduced speed at night/rain)
      4. traffic light detection/automatic braking
      5. enforced following distance
    

(I'd add "sleep/impaired driver warnings", automatic emergency braking
(including pedestrian detection) even though it doesn't quite relate to the
top causes of accidents))

Here's the top ten:

    
    
      1. Distracted Driving
      2. Drunk Driving 
      3. Speeding
      4. Reckless Driving
      5. Rain
      6. Running Red Lights
      7. Night Driving
      8. Design Defects/Maintenace
      9. Tailgating
     10. Wrong-Way Driving/ Improper Turns

------
CodeSheikh
Please make a conscious choice when flying 737 Max on US domestic flights. It
is your right to know the type of aircraft when you are booking your flight.
Switching to a reasonably expensive alternative is worth more than any
foreseeable trouble.

~~~
cjbprime
> It is your right to know the type of aircraft when you are booking your
> flight.

This is not actually any kind of right in the US. The airline can switch to
using a MAX just before the flight boards without breaking any law or contract
with you, and would not have to honor your request to travel on a non-MAX
aircraft instead.

------
Someone1234
This article is less compelling than the title would suggest.

After the Lion Air crash the FAA released a Emergency Airworthiness Directive,
these five comments are in response to that directive. That differentiates it
from pilots that had a negative run-in with MCAS or other defects in the 737
Max 8 (which would be significant news).

This article might inform you pilots are unhappy, but that fact has been
widely circulated elsewhere since the Lion Air crash. The fact that five
pilots submitted official comments doesn't add to what we knew.

These comments for example wouldn't have helped inform the FAA's decisions,
since the FAA told the pilots about the issues in the Emergency Airworthiness
Directive that these comments are based upon.

~~~
mimixco
The Dallas News report shows two separate complaints where the pilots knew of
and discussed MCAS on the flight deck before take off and still had serious
problems with it.

~~~
kayfox
They had serious problems with the autopilot, which also disables MCAS.

------
acqq
In the wake of the previous Boeing 737 Max crash:

"Boeing Co. _withheld information about potential hazards_ associated with a
new flight-control feature suspected of playing a role in last month's fatal
Lion Air jet crash, according to safety experts involved in the investigation,
as well as midlevel FAA officials and airline pilots."

"Safety experts involved in and tracking the investigation said that at U.S.
carriers, _neither airline managers nor pilots had been told such a system had
been added to the latest 737 variant_ — and therefore aviators typically
weren't prepared to cope with the possible risks."

[https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18438607](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18438607)

------
rootusrootus
If I am reading the article correctly, the complaints all came after JT610? It
would have been more damning if they had been complaining about this for the
last couple years.

~~~
FigBug
That's impossible, 737 MAX hasn't been in service for 2 years yet.

~~~
rootusrootus
I meant in round numbers ;). It's been pretty close to two full years now, so
I wrote "a couple years" instead of 22 months.

------
neonate
[https://outline.com/fLAE8N](https://outline.com/fLAE8N)

------
doctorshady
You can see the archive.is copy of it without jumping through hoops:
[http://archive.is/GsHVR](http://archive.is/GsHVR)

------
nothrows
man fuck canada and the usa. how are we the only ones in the world to not care
about safety. even if its a 0.5% chance 150+ people die, isn't that enough to
warrant temporarily grounding a handful of planes. sigh common

------
kenneth
This is a great video that does a concise and understandable of the main
theory for the issue that occured on the LionAir flight:
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zfQW0upkVus](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zfQW0upkVus)

It was very helpful for me to understand exactly what "runaway trim" meant.
Essentially, it's a force (down or up) on the elevator on the horizontal
stabilizer. The pilot still controls it from his yoke, but the more trim
applied the more it pushes the result in a given direction. If the system
applies trim consistently to push the nose down (to avoid what it thinks is an
imminent staff), it will progressively more difficult for the pilot to
counteract that and pitch up. Eventually, it's too much to handle.

This situation should be easily detectable, from what I understand, due to
large wheels moving visibly in the center console, and the pilots can
counteract the trim in a known procedure.

------
purplezooey
I think it would've been cool to have a database for anonymous complaints at
most of my previous jobs.

~~~
siwatanejo
that's a very interesting idea! let's build it :D

~~~
est
reminds me of ratemyprofessor

------
objektif
Can anyone at this point provide a legitimate argument for not grounding this
model?

~~~
woofcat
A best it's reactionary as we simply don't have enough data. The FAA said it
will review once the crash investigation has been completed.

Sometimes clustering occurs, such as Maylasian airlines being shot down and
lost in an ocean and never found. We didn't ground the whole airline.

~~~
cjbprime
It sounds like you're going for a "innocent until proven guilty" approach to
the Max's airworthiness, if I'm understanding your comment correctly. That
seems opposite to the culture of air safety, where planes are certified
airworthy because the data prove them to be so.

I don't think the data prove airworthiness of the Max anymore.

~~~
woofcat
However no data that originally certified it as airworthy has changed. All we
have is two incidents, one of which we have no information about. For all we
know it was a hijacking, or a drunk pilot.

Absurd ideas, however in my mind without any evidence it is equally likely.
They have the CVR and I'm sure very shortly we'll know for sure.

If it turns out to be MCAS then we can ground the fleet, the extra day of
delay doesn't seem like the highest risk factor.

~~~
cjbprime
That's not really true. MCAS can not be argued to meet
[https://www.risingup.com/fars/info/part25-672-FAR.shtml](https://www.risingup.com/fars/info/part25-672-FAR.shtml),
so it's not airworthy. The FAA's allowed them to continue flying anyway while
they disclose the problem and workarounds, and deploy a fix which is now very
delayed. That's a much more questionable decision now that another flight with
similar characteristics has crashed.

------
infinity0
> Nor have other civil aviation authorities provided data to us that would
> warrant action,

What, except for the data of __the two crashes happening __? The person that
wrote this statement is a fucking idiot.

------
toweringgoat
>> Thank you for being a patron of the Dallas Morning News. Unfortunately, our
site is unavailable to European Union visitors

Please learn some basic geography. Norway (and Switzerland) are not in the EU.

~~~
AnabeeKnox
GDPR applies to Norway, even if it's not in EU

~~~
slezyr
Well, they give same message for Ukraine.

------
yeukhon
Are we grounding MAX yet? Seriously...

~~~
tibbydudeza
Sec of Defense is an ex-Boeing man.

~~~
cjbprime
And on a less individual level, just the MAX order book alone is larger than
the market cap of Apple. Boeing is the largest exporter in the US.

~~~
chopin
But how would it help to not grounding the plane in the US if it is grounded
pretty much elsewhere? I am pretty sure orders will get canceled or at least
postponed over this. And Boeing pretty sure cannot risk another incident.

~~~
cjbprime
It helps because it influences other authorities and buyers not to do anything
drastic.

------
known
In order to increase fuel efficiency on the 737 MAX, the engine fan diameter
was increased;

    
    
       "Premature optimization is the root of all evil" -- Knuth

------
newnewpdro
This is insane.

Between this and Tesla Autopilot I'm left speechless.

------
nothrows
Here are a few links to petitions you can sign to help out and ground boeing:

[https://groundboeing.com](https://groundboeing.com)

[https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/ground-
boeing-737-...](https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/ground-
boeing-737-max)

[https://www.change.org/p/your-government-ground-the-
boeing-7...](https://www.change.org/p/your-government-ground-the-
boeing-737-max)

------
rurban
More context missing in this news. Southwest certainly was aware of the MCAS
issues, they are the only airline having demanded a second AOA sensor to be
installed and used, they also changed the UI to display the attack angle.

So they lied. Even if it's safer to fly a SW max than AA.

> A spokesperson for Southwest Airlines told The News that it hasn't received
> any reports of issues with MCAS from its pilots, "nor do any of our
> thousands of data points from the aircraft indicate any issues with MCAS."

------
tomerbd
Maybe it was scheduled for next sprint?

------
known
Car manufacturers RECALL defective cars; Why isn't Boeing doing that?

And hope Boeing is NOT simulating
[https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cruise_control](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cruise_control)

~~~
callalex
This comment reallly comes off as a procedurally generated combination. Can
you rephrase your point another way? I don’t think it’s even clear what point
you are trying to make.

~~~
anentropic
that's interesting, their other comment in this thread is also a bit wtf

> In order to increase fuel efficiency on the 737 MAX, the engine fan diameter
> was increased;

> "Premature optimization is the root of all evil" \-- Knuth

------
tibbydudeza
Looks like another DC-10 PR disaster in the making.

------
mobilemidget
Is it time to buy Boeing put options already?

~~~
nocture
wait until the mounting pressure makes FAA ground the plane, then buy shortly
after

~~~
mobilemidget
[https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/12/investing/boeing-stock-
up...](https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/12/investing/boeing-stock-
update/index.html)

------
ringaroll
Well guess I'm not flying on 737 Max anymore. Unsafe plane with a terrible
record. Should be banned.

------
therealmarv
US media. Why do I need always a VPN from Europe? Beeing GDPR compliant is not
rocket science. "Unfortunately, our site is unavailable to European Union
visitors... blablabla".

UPDATE: And this news website even detects if I use incognito mode: "To
continue reading, please disable private/incognito mode, log in, or enroll as
a member" omg

~~~
shawnz
Wow, the incognito mode blocking is something I've never seen before.
Disgusting. Hopefully Google corrects the bug which they are using to discover
the incognito mode status.

~~~
jordanthoms
They are working on that actually, planned to be in Chrome 74 and then enabled
by default in Chrome 76.

~~~
helper
Interesting. Here's an article describing the changes:
[https://9to5google.com/2019/02/15/google-chrome-detect-
incog...](https://9to5google.com/2019/02/15/google-chrome-detect-incognito/)

