

Did Lawrence doubt the bomb? - caf
http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2015/09/04/did-lawrence-doubt-the-bomb/

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hga
A heck of a lot of people "doubted" the bomb, in the sense that they weren't
_sure_ smashing N Japanese cities would prompt them to surrender. I've just
finished _Now It Can Be Told_ , published in 1962 by General Leslie Groves,
who was in charge of the Manhattan Project, and from various things including
how he praises one guy for his confidence that 2 would do it, it's pretty
clear even he wasn't sure.

The excellent _Five Days in August_
([http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0691168431/](http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0691168431/))
the author recommends comments how after Nagasaki there was quite a bit of
discussion whether to use the 3rd bomb, which if I remember correctly was
being constructed in Tinian at the time, for another strategic strike or to
reserve it for tactical use in Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushuu
projected to start in 3 months. Which all but MacArthur had realized that
absent the liberal use of nuclear or chemical was not going to happen, the
Japanese had reinforced it too well, and had built too many kamikazis.

------
Animats
I thought this was going to be about Lawrence's unhappiness with special
relativity. Cyclotrons have an upper limit on particle velocity. As particles
are accelerated, they have more mass, and the cyclotron's elegant balance
between inertia and the containment fields is lost. This was the first time
relativity had engineering consequences. Lawrence didn't like that, and
doubted whether something as abstract as special relativity could affect his
machines.

Nobody knew if bombing Japan was going to end the war, including the Supreme
War Council in Japan. War Minister Anami wanted to go on with the war after
the first atomic bombing, saying the Allies couldn't have more than one bomb.
After the second bomb, he signed a surrender document and committed ritual
suicide. There was a big Army pro-war fight-to-the-end faction, which tried a
last-minute coup attempt to prevent the surrender.[1]

[1] [http://www.amazon.com/Japans-Longest-Pacific-Research-
Societ...](http://www.amazon.com/Japans-Longest-Pacific-Research-
Society/dp/4770028873)

~~~
rational-future
You are completely ignoring the other big reason for surrender - USSR
declaration of war.

~~~
IkmoIkmo
Another theory is that the bomb was used because the USSR was shifting its
focus towards Japan.

In Europe, all allied forced descended on Germany, and Europe the region was
divided between the west and east, specifically the US/Marshallplan/NATO and
the USSR/Molotovplan/Warschaupact.

Had the war ended in Japan the way it did in Europe, with the USSR playing a
major role in the final battle and the inevitable Japanese peace process,
Japan (and the region) may have been divided much like Europe was. Japan might
not have become an ally of the US, might not have been part of the gigantic US
economic motor in the post-war era that heavily relied on Europe and Japan as
(economic) allies, and Japan may have ended up as some kind of North/South
Korean divide but between the US/USSR instead of US/China.

The theory goes then, that the nuclear bomb hastened the process to swiftly
force a Japanese surrender before the USSR could exercise its influence in the
region.

As such under this theory, the nuclear bomb is seen as the beginning of the
cold war, which is normally recognised to have begun two years later. The bomb
ensured the US its first major exclusive ally, Japan, in the cold war.

I haven't studied it but it seems like a credible theory in that it's
plausible. Whether this plausible type of reasoning actually played a role in
the bombings is another story, one I haven't ever taken the time to explore.

In contrast, the notion that the USSR's declaration of war made the Japanese
surrender strikes me as implausible. After all, the Japanese had been
viciously decimated for many months, the nuclear bombs were dwarfed by the
firebombings campaigns of all major cities over and over again, and it was
well known that the Japanese's military capacity was reduced to virtually
nothing, and that as a country with few natural resources and reliant on
imports, it was bleeding dry after every single one of its logistics routes
(air, land, sea) were completely cut off. Finally it had no air supremacy left
and was defenceless to bombing. My point is, victory was impossible and defeat
inevitably, the USSR declaration changed very little from the Japanese
perspective. But it changed a lot for the American perspective, which is why
it's plausible the US wanted to force surrender quickly.

Beyond that, the cold war was very much, perhaps most powerfully
characterised, by constant shows of power. Demonstrating nuclear power as the
first nation must have played a role in the US's claim to hegemony. Any doubts
there may have been that the era of European supremacy was over, and that the
US had become the world's superpower, must have instantly faded. It's the
equivalent of China overtaking the US in GDP, building a base on mars,
dominating at the olympics and showing unprecedented military power and
weaponry. In that sense, too, a show of power with the bomb was perhaps the
first action of the cold war.

~~~
hga
_it was well known that the Japanese 's military capacity was reduced to
virtually nothing_

Not even MacArthur, the only one who still was planning on carrying out
Operation Olympic as conceived, believed that. He had ordered up 1/4 of the
Purple Hearts thought necessary (perhaps for it and Operation Coronet, the
invasion of Honshu), _and we 're still using those_.

People who trusted our intelligence intercepts knew between the IJA
reinforcements in Kyushu and the 8,000 ready kamikazes that the original
concept was dead. Based on our apocalyptic invasion experiences culminating in
the Battle of Okinawa, those who didn't know about the Manhattan Project were
planning on liberal use of chemical weapons, those who did, using a handful of
nukes.

 _My point is, victory was impossible and defeat inevitably the USSR
declaration changed very little from the Japanese perspective. But it changed
a lot for the American perspective, which is why it 's plausible the US wanted
to force surrender quickly._

This thesis fails because the USSR didn't do it until after we'd bombed
Hiroshima, in fact, they started on the day we bombed Nagasaki (or a hour or
so before that day; I haven't seen a timezone adjusted timeline). By then we'd
learned how totally untrustworthy Stalin was, and of course his eyes were on
the prize of Eastern Europe.

In fact, if anything, I would expect the causality ran the other way. Prior to
the dramatic results of bombing Hiroshima, and certainly prior to Trinity 3
weeks earlier, I would expect that Stalin believed he had plenty of time to
gain what he wanted in the east, but those brought the distinct possibility
the war would be over immediately, as indeed happened.

As for the threat of a divided Japan, exactly whose navy would have deposited
enough Red Army troops on the Home Islands for that to be a concern?

~~~
IkmoIkmo
Everything you said has no bearing on my point, which maybe I should've stated
more strictly: 'Japan had no military capacity to win the war or subject other
countries to its will'.

The fact they still had the capacity to fight to the last man and that this
would be bloody is a truism that doesn't need to be stated. But my point is
that they (1) had no capacity beyond their borders and (2) their defeat was
inevitable. In that respect, the USSR's decision to go to war, too, changed
nothing for them. That's my point. An anecdote about how a lot of purple
hearts were printed because the end was expected to be bloody doesn't change
that point. Of course it made Japan's case even more hopeless (in particular
because the Soviet's would likely invade Manchuria, one of the remaining
places for Japan to gain natural resources, although even those were
effectively cut off as Japan's merchant fleet had been decimated).

For example the US Strategic Bombing Survey established by the secretary of
war (1940-1945) established: > Based on a detailed investigation of all the
facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders
involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945,
and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered
even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered
the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.

Eisenhower says: > During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been
conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave
misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated
and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I
thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a
weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to
save American lives.

And he was joined by other generals, e.g. McArthur. The guy in charge of the ,
LeMay, who of course famously firebombed Japan in a way much more destructive
than the nuclear bombs (death tolls between 200k and 500k, and destroying
nearly half of all built up areas of 66 cities) who opined he had committed
war crimes and that he'd be tried as a war criminal had the US lost the war
somehow, said

> The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all.

Fleet admiral Nimitz said:

> The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace. The atomic bomb played no
> decisive part, from a purely military point of view, in the defeat of Japan.

Fleet Admiral Leafy said: > The use of [the atomic bombs] at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese
were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea
blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons... The lethal
possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling
was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard
common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in
that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.

The fact that the end of the war might've have involved more fighting and that
some campaigns had been planned that would have been bloody (again, an
invasion wasn't the only scenario accounted for, the nuclear bombs proved at
the very least that), doesn't change the fact that Japan had in essence
already been defeated, whether they'd surrendered or not, whether the last
mile would be painful or not.

> In fact, if anything, I would expect the causality ran the other way.

Your statement just supports the idea I raised, which is that the US threw the
bombs knowing the USSR would at some point shift its focus towards Japan. I'm
not saying that the US decided within 24 hours 'oh, the USSR attacks Japan,
never woulda imagined that, took us by complete surprise, let's quickly drop
the bomb'. Of course not, and of course that wouldn't make sense as you stated
given the first bomb was dropped before that. My point is that with the war in
Europe roundly settled, the USSR would very likely at one point have looked to
exert its influence south of its borders, the region of Japanese influence,
the US knew this and in fact the US was aware that the USSR delayed surrender
proposals to make itself ready to shift its forces to the east. Given the
above statements by top-ranked military personnel it's sensible to say that
Japan had already been defeated, was dependent on imports, had no merchant
fleet and barely a naval fleet that couldn't be refueled anyway. Thus an
atomic bomb wasn't required to defeat Japan, unless you were on a timeline
because at some point the USSR would shift its attention. The fact the USSR
did shift immediately after the first bomb was dropped proves exactly their
interest in being there for the end and playing a role in the peace process
and aftermath. And indeed the very fact the USSR had the ability to invade
quite quickly (much quicker than the Japanese had expected the Americans to
invade), perhaps even caused the US to choose targets that'd show maximum
damage (outside of Tokyo which was ruled out for obvious reasons), as opposed
to using multiple nuclear weapons 'for show'. After all, the US would have the
third bomb ready later that month, and the 4th in August, and others
following, and was not at threat by Japan. Given a few months they could've
continued to bomb with impunity, drop nuclear weapons for show with impunity,
block off Japan's trade with impunity, and be strengthened by their Soviet
allies.

> As for the threat of a divided Japan, exactly whose navy would have
> deposited enough Red Army troops on the Home Islands for that to be a
> concern?

The same fleet that allowed the 16th Army (100k strong) invade Sakhalin, or
the fleet that facilitated the invasion of the Kuril islands, or the planned
Russian invasion of Hokkaido which never happened due to the surrender. Don't
take it by the way as a divided Japan in terms of two different countries on a
militarised border like say Korea, but rather one like a divided Europe, in
which the USSR has half of the influence. Unlike in Europe however, the USSR
didn't acquire as much influence in Japan and Japan turned into a very strong
US/Western ally, and one can argue sensibly that the atomic bombs may have
helped the US in that regard, and that in turn this may have inspired the US
to use the bombs in spite of a resolution to the war that would've taken
longer.

~~~
hga
Most of what you say moves the goalposts, from ending the war as soon as
possible, i.e. with the least loss of life, especially non-Japanese, to the
hypothetical of "defeat" equaling actual surrender, which things like the
Battle of Okinawa make quite questionable, and could at worst set up another
cycle of war (see ending comments).

After the fact statements by non-Air Force flag officers? Probably in the
context of nuclear weapons being perceived as making their services obsolete
(a mistake that took the bloody Korean War to start correcting, but before
that see e.g. The Revolt of the Admirals)?

As for Sakhalin, it was an invasion of the southern half of the island. The
USSR used an amphibious landing of a rifle brigade and a marine battalion in
the effort, that's not the same thing as landing 100K, and the rest of the
islands the took were quite small. Could they have taken a fair amount, or
maybe even all of Hokkaido? Very possibly, but this is not hardly the same
sort of thing as occupying Eastern Europe. Today the island has 4% of the
total Japanese population; due to it having 1/4th of the home islands' arable
land, I'd assume it was larger in proportion back then, but compared to
grabbing most of what was traditionally "Germany", with a very long land
border, plus almost all of Eastern Europe (does Austria count as part of it)?

Anyway, your thesis rests on the assumption our end of WWII leadership, ridden
as it was with Soviet agents, was so bloody minded they'd casually slaughter
10s of thousands of Japanese merely to decrease Soviet influence in East Asia.

An extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary proof when the simpler
explanation works so well. That the two atomic bombs ended up saving even more
Japanese lives, 250,000 civilian lives per month in the rest of the Greater
East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, and 10s of thousands of Allied military that
would have been lost in the invasions.

The only debatable point I see here is that of unconditional surrender, which
after WWI, after, as Tom Lehrer put it " _We taught them a lesson in 1918. And
they 've hardly bothered us since then._", we were determined that we wouldn't
go through another cycle. Which we accomplished; maybe Germany and/or Japan
will once again threaten the world, but that's not in the foreseeable future.

