
Qantas keeps A380s grounded over engine 'anomalies' - georgecmu
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5g2MVTyVspzu87qZ9GVdIqQ0VCkIg?docId=CNG.74bac5b4cc9462fd7346e1c94b90120a.121
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jrockway
Are engines for quad-engine planes designed and maintained as rigorously as
engines designed for twin-engine planes? (I know there is ETOPS that dictates
maintenance standards for twin-engine planes, but I am asking about the design
process rather than day to day operation.)

Or is this just a bug to work out with a new aircraft and engine design? Or is
it just random chance?

(Also, it's odd to blame Rolls-Royce for the failures, when the engines are
both owned and maintained by Qantas in Singapore.)

~~~
clinton
According to Qantas CEO Alan Joyce the engines are not maintained by Qantas.

"This is an engine issue and the engines have been maintained by Rolls-Royce
since they were installed on the aircraft..."[1]

[1] [http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/plane-reportedly-qantas-
sheds-...](http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/plane-reportedly-qantas-sheds-parts-
before-landing-at-singapore/story-e6frea6u-1225947835439)

~~~
clinton
Rolls-Royce has also recommended "basic precautionary checks" be carried out
on all Trent 900 engines (i.e. the model that failed)[2]

[2] <http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/11/05/3057785.htm>

~~~
jrockway
Interestingly, Trent 895 engines were the cause of the only 777 hull-loss
incident.

I'm making a mental note to only fly on planes with GE engines from now on :)

~~~
hga
The blame there seems to be more that the Trent 895's fuel-oil heat exchangers
(FOHE) were presented with too much ice than that the design of the engine was
at fault:
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Airways_Flight_38#Final...](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Airways_Flight_38#Final_report.2C_9_February_2010)

" _3) The FOHE, although compliant with the applicable certification
requirements, was shown to be susceptible to restriction when presented with
soft ice in a high concentration, with a fuel temperature that is below -10°C
and a fuel flow above flight idle.

4) Certification requirements, with which the aircraft and engine fuel systems
had to comply, did not take account of this phenomenon as the risk was
unrecognised at that time._"

