
Surveillance firm asks Mozilla to be included in Firefox's certificate whitelist - jakobdabo
https://www.zdnet.com/article/surveillance-firm-asks-mozilla-to-be-included-in-firefoxs-certificate-whitelist/
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dTal
The article presents this as some kind of difficult decision, but doesn't
adequately explain why this should result in anything other than an answer of
"no", with a side order of "hell no". Mozilla is under no obligation to add
any particular organization to its list of trusted root CAs, and users rely on
it for security. Some bizzare notion of "fairness" to a known bad actor
doesn't seem like a remotely strong argument to me.

Play stupid games, win stupid prizes.

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uodtl
The rules are the rules. They want to follow the rules. If they don't follow
the rules, they'll be making an exception. What's the point on having rules if
you make exceptions?

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vokep
Because most of the time the rules are in effect, except for the exceptions.

Rules exist for the purpose they serve, functions they allow to be easier and
cheaper. Rules are not made so that rules have been made.

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apostacy
While I agree with Mozilla's decision, the reason that there are rules is so
that it isn't arbitrary. Who is to say who is trustworthy? What if Mozilla
wants to charge a fee or else they will remove someone?

Those circumstances would easily fall under the purpose they serve.

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ncmncm
... Hurries to delete QuoVadis and Chinese gov authorities from my Firefox
trusted lists.

Seems like I did this a few years back, on a previous system.

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zamalek
I just did this on my work laptop; is there a way to replicate my certificate
lists (or, at best, the deltas)?

> Chinese gov authorities

How would I identify these?

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kup0
Why even allow surveillance firms to be CAs in the first place?

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ncmncm
Who decides whether anybody is allowed to be a CA? Do they have your interests
at heart?

