
Boeing Believed a 737 Max Warning Light Was Standard - aaronbrethorst
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/05/business/boeing-737-max-warning-light.html
======
ErikVandeWater
> But months after the planes were flying, company engineers realized that the
> warning light worked only on planes whose customers had bought a different,
> optional indicator.

If I am to read this correctly, the angle-of-attack disagree light is
installed on all Boeing 737-MAX aircraft. For customers who did not buy on
optional additional indicator, the angle-of-attack disagree light was always
off, even if there is a disagreement between to sensors of the angle of attack
of the aircraft.

Doesn't this seem dangerous in-and-of itself? If a pilot assumes that the
light is off because there _is not_ a disagreement, instead of because there
is no information available, she is acting on incorrect information, and might
try to address problems unrelated to the actual problem.

Also, pilot may switch aircraft and expect the same functionality of safety
features and may make incorrect assumptions about the functioning of this
light.

~~~
peteretep
> Doesn't this seem dangerous in-and-of itself?

To me, more dangerous, is that some safety systems are considered optional.
Surely the plane either needs a safety feature or not, and it shouldn't be
down to someone at an airline to make a decision on?

~~~
firethief
Different countries have different standards of safety, and different budgets.
Boeing got more $$$ from airlines in the US by making planes in Ethiopia and
Indonesia less safe. Yay capitalism.

~~~
briandear
That’s weird to say. Lion Air is a sloppy, cheapskate airline — look at their
horrible maintenance and crash history for evidence of that. That they didn’t
want to pay slightly extra for additional options on the plane was their
choice. And Ethiopian is a flag carrier: they could have easily gotten the
extra option, but likely some accountant thought it wasn’t necessary. Who
spends over $100 million on an airplane and then declines a $1 million safety
option?

~~~
thaumasiotes
> Who spends over $100 million on an airplane and then declines a $1 million
> safety option?

Someone being pitched 30 different $1 million safety options?

~~~
grkvlt
Someone who wants to buy 100 of those airplanes, but knows that the safety
option reduces the risk of incurring a $100 million total hull loss by _less
than_ one percent, thus saving _less than_ the $100 million extra cost for the
option? Obviously the numbers are different, but see the oft-quoted 'Fight
Club' line about product recalls for similar logic.

------
Aeolun
This sounds so much like my enterprise experience, where you can bring up a
huge security vulnerability, have everyone senior to you explain to you that
it isn’t a problem. Leaving you utterly confused.

Then when someone else finds out a few months later, suddenly alarm bells
start ringing, and everyone up to the CTO is called into an emergency meeting
because there is a _huge_ security vulnerability.

Yeah, no shit.

 _sigh_

~~~
mikekchar
Sometimes I think this is a victim of the "invented here syndrome". I don't
know why it is, but many, many people seem to have absolutely no respect for
their coworkers. If you bring up an issue (of any kind), it's often treated
with suspicion before people even understand what it is. But if the issue is
generated by "an authority", suddenly it's a massive problem -- again even
before people understand what it is.

I've found this also happens for _good things_. "I've found this amazing thing
that will save us millions of $". "It'll never work and as soon as I
understand what you are talking about, I'll tell you why".

What's absolutely horrible about this is that I've caught myself having the
same attitude! I've been trying to stop myself from doing it, but man is it
difficult. The default, "My coworkers are brilliant" point of view is just so
contrary to my cultural upbringing ;-)

~~~
ascar
> _The default, "My coworkers are brilliant" point of view is just so contrary
> to my cultural upbringing ;-)_

It's not just cultural upbringing. It's difficult to really realize that the
intelligence/competency distribution at work is vastly different than in the
rest of your life and all those years before work. Especially if you work for
a highly selective employer in a high-skill job market. We learn from
experience afterall and encounter a lot of incompetency throughout life. We
also tend to weight negate experiences much higher than expected ones.

I still catch myself being happy and surprised, if I encounter someone
competent and usually expect incompetency. It's rude and on average probably
wrong, but trained from experience.

------
lqet
> After discovering the lapse in 2017, Boeing performed an internal review and
> determined that the lack of a working warning light “did not adversely
> impact airplane safety or operation,” it said in its statement.

> As a result, Boeing said it did not inform airlines or the Federal Aviation
> Administration about the mistake for a year.

There was a warning light installed in the cockpits which was completely non-
functional in 80% of the 737 max fleet, and Boeing did not notify the airlines
for an entire year? Did they honestly think that "lack of a warning light" is
equal to "lack of _working_ warning light"?

~~~
AnssiH
The "warning light" is an "AOA DISAGREE" text that appears on the main flight
display:

[http://www.boeing.com/resources/boeingdotcom/commercial/737m...](http://www.boeing.com/resources/boeingdotcom/commercial/737max/updates/AOA_VaneIndicator_AoA_Disagree_lg.jpg)

So there was no non-functional physical light on the cockpit.

~~~
lqet
Ah, I was not aware of that. But surely the pilots were under the impression
that such a warning message existed?

~~~
nraynaud
So there a weird thing about angle of attack: the autopilot uses it, but
civilian pilots don’t use it (they use airspeed and descent angle). It’s used
in the military, and airlines who recruit a lot of military pilots tend to buy
the angle of attack option to get them comfortable. Ignoring the little MCAS
issue, it was a fine reasoning, the autopilot can detect a disagree (I guess
they just drop out, but I don’t know about cat 3 landings), ex-military pilots
need a disagree because they read it, and other pilots don’t need to know.

~~~
inflatableDodo
I found it amazing that civilian pilots don't use angle of attack so went
looking and found this article about the debate on installing angle of attack
indicators on commercial aircraft, which cleared up for me why this would be
the case. But not in the most reassuring manner.

[https://apstraining.com/the-angle-of-attack-
debate/](https://apstraining.com/the-angle-of-attack-debate/)

>"From day one, pilots should be—and in most cases are—taught that stall
occurs when the critical angle of attack is exceeded. They are then told to
memorize the stall speeds in various configurations. By the time they have
become proficient, they relate stall to a certain airspeed, and don’t really
relate it to an AOA anymore."

~~~
wnkrshm
Air France 447 immediately comes to mind, where the crew (or maybe
specifically the copilot who kept pitching up for minutes) lost their airspeed
indication and thought the stall warning was frivolous despite falling
vertically at terminal velocity for minutes.

~~~
danaliv
Critically in that case, the stall warning stopped when the nose was pulled up
even further, because the computers rejected the indication as too large to be
correct. So every time the nose was lowered, the stall warning _activated_.

~~~
inflatableDodo
Fucking hell. That is a fucker of a dark UX pattern.

~~~
danaliv
Indeed. And it goes to show that rejecting “impossible” values is a dangerous
strategy.

~~~
inflatableDodo
I think you can reject impossible derivatives, though only if being very
fucking careful.

~~~
shawnz
Let's say you notice a sudden change in a sensor which is surely not
physically possible. Was the value more accurate before or after the sudden
change? Do you reject the current actual value or the dead-reckoned value
based on the old data?

------
tqkxzugoaupvwqr
> In the months after the Lion Air crash, Boeing quietly worked to appease
> some customers, according to a person briefed on the matter. In several
> instances, it activated the angle of attack indicator for free, which then
> turned on the disagree alert.

Instead of activating the indicator for all customers, Boeing only activated
it for customers that explicitly asked. Greedy until the end.

------
mvonthron
Boeing statement: [https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-releases-
statements?item=1...](https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-releases-
statements?item=130431)

This PR is helpful in that it reminds me that there are actually people paid
to take a simple set of information and mix in with a ton of PR bullshit so
that you have to read it 4 times before you actually understand that yes, they
screw up.

~~~
nobrains
Here is the ass saving statement from the press release: "Senior company
leadership was not involved in the review and first became aware of this issue
in the aftermath of the Lion Air accident."

~~~
hef19898
Courious they try the same strategy as VW. We all know how that is most likely
to end...

~~~
neuronic
With increased sales and better revenue?

[https://www.volkswagenag.com/en/news/2019/03/VW_Group_delive...](https://www.volkswagenag.com/en/news/2019/03/VW_Group_deliveries_2018.html)

~~~
hef19898
And got a the former CEO and other exects indicted in two countries and cost
the conptany billions. The story is still ongoing. And might have contributed
to the issue with the new Golf 8. Did I mention that some former managers are
in jail already?

------
blensor
What worries me even more is the monkeypatching they are now trying to do in
order to get the permission to fly the plane again.

In the original design they had designed the MCAS to be able to make drastic
changes which then caused the crash.

Now they are trying to fix that by making the system less intrusive, but
didn't the engineers design the system to be so strong for a reason (because
of the changed position of the engines)?

This seems to me like going through a codebase from someone else because there
were errors and just deleting stuff that made problems. Even if the initial
version had problems, it was designed that way for a reason?

------
blt
> In several instances, [Boeing] activated the angle of attack indicator for
> free, which then turned on the disagree alert.

This sounds like the "indicator" and "warning light" are not physical devices
that must be installed at extra cost, but rather are software features that
can be "activated" by changing some configuration file.

If so, then Boeing has blood on their hands. The active control system is
already a cost-cutting hack. Charging extra for zero-cost safety features
related to the new, unproven control system is an act of appalling greed.

~~~
kayfox
So, the AoA indication is a feature that can be activated for a fee (which
most likely exists to cover costs of modifying the configuration from the base
configuration, so imagine as an analogy a $2 fee for some really minor change
to a car you ordered). The reason this is an option is that it requires
additional training for the pilots, some airlines already have this training
(American Airlines is one example) and theres no enabling it and then not
training the pilots on it.

As many have noted, AoA is not commonly used in non-military piloting in the
United States, so its no surprise its not commonly ordered.

I am also under the impression that the AoA Disagree indication was new on the
737 MAX, I haven't checked the 737 NG manuals for it.

------
phkahler
This story is really starting to annoy me. Now there's a new person named
"Boeing" who somehow lacks self awareness to know what they're doing or
selling even though this Boeing character designed, built, and sold two
variations on their product. I feel like Boeing will soon become the main
character, and try to plead insanity.

~~~
CoolGuySteve
Hey now, if we started holding individuals accountable for the criminal
negligence of the corporation they run, surely bedlam would errupt.

It's Limited Liability in it's purest, most distilled form.

~~~
cjbprime
Interesting linguistic phenomenon: Commonwealth grammar uses plural verbs for
collective nouns -- i.e. English newspaper articles will say "Boeing have
decided.." instead of "Boeing has decided..".

Strikes me as subversive in this current environment: language reminding you
that a corporation's decisions are made by actual people.

~~~
aitchnyu
As an Indian, I was surprised at "Collective are..." and believe it arose
after the colonial days.

~~~
cjbprime
That's interesting! I wonder when this strong preference for plural verbs
appeared in British English.

------
moron4hire
This is a phenomenal failure of management. The failure of the team is always
the fault of the leader.

I've seen this so many times in industry. Some decision on high comes through
that costs need to be cut, which means cutting corners. It always means
cutting corners, because the only way they have to measure costs is Salary ×
Butts-In-Seats. So they hire lower cost people (i.e. less experienced, often
off-shore where there is no oversight on process) and cut the number of people
(often several key roles that would put the brakes on bad plans).

They make a short-staffed team of people who don't know any better, then look
around confused when things go wrong. "But the PowerPoints said we'd be
successful. The management consultants said everything was on track".

When it's a website for a government bureau, people just throw up their hands
and act like this is normal. The customer eats the cost of the useless product
and they start over, usually with the same contractor on an extension, often
not learning any lessons in the process (how could they? They can't imagine a
world in which any of this is their fault).

It should never happen for any project. It should be a damn crime, upwards of
fraud, with massive fines. But stuff that can kill people, this should be
sending people to jail.

I can hear the meetings in my head, I've been through them so many times. "Who
knew this was a problem?" "Uhhh, I brought it up at the outset, you said it
wasn't my place to bring it up." "You're on report for your negative
attitude."

------
zzma
> Boeing performed an internal review and determined that the lack of a
> working warning light “did not adversely impact airplane safety or
> operation,”

Why is this review not done by a third party auditor? The cynical view is that
corporations have a conflict of interest. They are only incentivized to act
ethically up to the point that the cost of ethical behavior exceeds the damage
done by unethical behavior... These costs do include future fines/penalties,
but these are often woefully disproportionate to the damage done as evidenced
by the fraudulent NASA metal supplier incident.

~~~
salawat
Because the third party auditor (the FAA) has had it's operating budget
slashed so viciously, it can't compete in attracting the talent required for
independent certification.

Remember, to regulate something, you need to be 10% smarter than what you are
regulating. Which means you have to be able to make sure you can attract the
best talent possible.

As a regulator, you have to be on your game all the time. The regulated just
need to get lucky once to get away with what they shouldn't.

------
runciblespoon
“Boeing Believed a 737 Max Warning Light Was Standard. It Wasn’t.”

This is retrospective ass-covering, to distract us from the fact that the the
pilots were never informed as to the existence of MCAS (Maneuvering
Characteristics Augmentation System) and therefore could not even know how to
disable it. The presence of or lack thereof of a warning light being rendered
specious. And MCAS read only the one AoA sensor, from the captains side.

So to summarize, the pilots don't know about MCAS, MCAS is still engaged even
when the auto-pilot is disengaged. A single AoA sensor failed, triggering the
MCAS into a nose-down mode, the pilots begin ignorant of this, repeatedly
tried to regain level flight using the trim wheel. This they failed at.

“The warning light notifies pilots of a disagreement in the sensors that
measure which direction the plane is pointed”

This wouldn't even work in the way described, in a two sensor system, the
computer can't tell which sensor is giving false readings. That's why they
hooked up MCAS to only the one sensor. And Boeing didn't tell the FFC or the
pilots as they would of had to get the plane re-certified and the pilots
retrained.

~~~
sundvor
It's (almost?) wilful. If ever there was a suitable time for using a military
acronym such as FUBAR, this is it.

In my own view, leadership should be held criminally responsible for the loss
of lives. Of course it will never happen, but that's what ought to happen.

Hopefully they'll at least be responsible for liability in a lawsuit by the
victims' families. They deserve being taken to the cleaners, well and proper.

~~~
blotter_paper
At this point I feel like it's fair to call Boeing's actions malicious. You
charge for safety features that cost you nothing to deploy? Yeah, that's
malicious. They knew people could die, but they wanted more money, so they let
people die. Now, the company needs to die. Buyers of aircrafts would be clever
not to trust Boeing ever again, and buyers of tickets would be clever to avoid
flights that use Boeing planes. If everybody acted cleverly, Boeing would die
and other aircraft manufacturers would take note. I doubt everyone will act
cleverly, but repeatedly informing people of their malicious actions could
help facilitate it. Not flying on Boeing planes would help too, but unlike a
traditional boycott you have an actual selfish incentive to do so (not dying).
Just like a traditional boycott, your individual participation is
statistically meaningless unless you're actually in a position to buy a large
number of aircrafts. I honestly don't think I'll avoid flying on Boeing planes
in the future, but I'm also probably more willing to gamble with my life than
most people are; I never said I was clever.

~~~
sundvor
Agree on malicious, especially given that the Max change was a big hack of an
existing airframe. It _needed_ all the extra safety features it could get; to
charge through the nose for them was shocking and callous.

However, given the amount of Boeing planes out there, and the number of
employees, the company dying would be harsh. What needs to happen is a
fundamental shift of culture; this is why I think that leadership should be
held responsible for what's happened, and that this (with leaders in jail, new
ones would have to take their place) would help force the changes that need to
happen for safety and engineering quality again to be the number one drivers -
not just profits and bean counting.

It's an opportunity for them to fully reset the company. Fingers crossed, it
will happen.

~~~
inflatableDodo
>However, given the amount of Boeing planes out there, and the number of
employees, the company dying would be harsh.

346 dead from wilful incompetence, followed by utter bullshittery, half-
truths, outright lies and finally, when it has to admit what it has been
doing, a desperate insistance that executives could not possibly have known.

And all the while fighting against them being grounded.

Break the damn thing up already.

~~~
sumedh
> Break the damn thing up already.

I dont think any US politician has the guts to take down Boeing, if it goes
down there wont be any major US aircraft manufacturer.

~~~
inflatableDodo
That's another reason, given the evident issues with the total fuckwits
currently in management, it should be broken up. If it isn't, then the US may
end up without a major US aircraft manufacturer.

~~~
pms
So far, Boeing stocks went up since the time _before_ the first crash...

------
FabHK
One question to ponder: Would the two crashes still have happened without this
particular mistake, that is, if the planes had had a working AoA disagree
indicator?

It depends, I think:

1\. Did the AoA sensor malfunction occur before the takeoff roll?

2\. Would the AoA disagree indicator come on early enough to abandon takeoff?

3\. Would the crew reject takeoff once the AoA disagree indication comes on?

If it's a "yes" on all three questions, then presumably the accidents would
not have happened.

Once you're in the air, and all hell breaks loose (stick shaker etc.) while
MCAS tries to dive you in the ground, I doubt that the indication would have
made any difference: before the Lion Air crash, crews didn't even know about
MCAS. After, they did know, and the Ethiopian Airlines crew, from what I
gather, diagnosed the problem, though maybe too late - but again, I doubt
whether the AoA disagree indication would have helped.

That leaves above questions.

1\. For the Lion Air crash, the AoA malfunctioning was there before takeoff.
For Ethiopian, I'm not sure.

2\. I'd think yes.

3\. Don't know. Anyone an idea? (Today, presumably you'd abort with a MAX and
AoA issues. Back then?)

~~~
Arn_Thor
I think you're too quick to dismiss the importance of the disagree indicator,
and doing so on a shaky basis. A significant amount of time was spent trying
to figure out what the hell was happening. I think it's safe to assume that if
the pilots saw an error warning pop up warning that there was a disagreement
between two sensors, that would focus their attention on that system—which
quite conceivably could have caused them to shut it off manually sooner.

~~~
FabHK
> that would focus their attention on that system—which quite conceivably
> could have caused them to shut it off manually sooner.

But you can't shut off the AoA measurement "system", AFAIK. And the system
causing the trouble (under wrong AoA information), the MCAS, can be shut off
by setting the Stab Trim switch to Cut Out, but how should the crew know the
connection between AoA and MCAS when they weren't even briefed about MCAS in
the first place?

~~~
Arn_Thor
iirc the Malaysian flight had in the cockpit a pilot that was hitching a ride,
who figured out what was going on but too late. He knew about the MCAS. Had
they vocally stated something about the AoA sensor early on, or had he caught
a glimpse of the message, perhaps he could have intervened sooner.

For the Ethiopian flight, you're right. They likely wouldn't have known what
to do with that information. But it might have prompted them to get on the
radio and ask someone, or consult a certain part of the manual (assuming there
was any relevant information there.. I don't know).

It certainly seems like crucial information. And even in the small chance it
could have made a difference, the absence of it is critical

~~~
salawat
For Lion Air, he remedied the symptom; he realized there was some sort of
periodic trim runaway, and guided them to remedy it with Stab Trim cutout
without having any intrinsic understanding of what the cause or underlying
principle of the runaway was.

Big difference. Still didn't do anything for the fellows on the next flight.

------
cmurf
The warning light might matter for squawk reporting (pilot to maintenance bug
report, if you will).

But even if the pilot notices the warning, if they don't know about MCAS, then
they don't know about "MCAS upset" which can result when MCAS acts on bogus
AoA information. And this particular variety of "MCAS upset" quickly induces a
mistrim, and high airspeed. So I'm unconvinced the indicator is a "safety"
feature in-flight that will result in any different behavior on the part of
pilots in an "MCAS upset" situation.

It is a mistake to think that trim is only about attitude (nose up or down
relative to the horizon), it also implies an airspeed. Nose down trim
effectively translates into a higher airspeed, all other things being equal.
If you reduce power, the plane will nose down (this is a function of positive
static stability, a FAR 25 certification requirement for transport category
airplanes), and the plane will stabilize to maintain the airspeed implied by
that trim. Add power and it will climb, to maintain the airspeed implied by
the trim.

The central problem is still that the pilots weren't trained about MCAS in
either it's intended working condition, or "MCAS upset", or how the airplane
behaves with autotrim disabled and therefore without the benefit of MCAS. The
pilot not being aware of these three of these behaviors is just flat out
wrong. It's bad enough they weren't also required to demonstrate competency
(knowledge and practical test) for all three.

------
cletus
So I draw two conclusions from this clusterF of astronomical proportions:

1\. The A320neo really caught Boeing off guard. The 737 MAX was a panicked
reaction to something that they thought would threaten their business to a
significant degree. The A320neo and A320 have a common type rating too.
Googling seems to suggest the differences are fairly minor however. I guess
Airbus benefits in the A320 being a newer airframe than the 737 (which is ~50
years old now)?

2\. Somewhere along the line this is a management failure of gigantic
proportions. That management would risk Boeing's reputation on something that,
in hindsight, is so incredibly foolish is mind-blowing. And the buck stops
with the CEO. If this ends with anything less than the CEO deciding to spend
more time with his family it's a joke. And whoever replaces him should clean
house with anyone remotely responsible for this.

This isn't unprecedented either. Through this fiasco I came to learn about the
1990s 737 rudder issue [1] and it's scary how similar the reaction is. "The
planes are fine". "There is no issue". You know, until there is.

I expect the only thing stopping a lot of airlines from cancelling their 737
MAX orders and buying A320neos instead is at this point they'd probably have
to get in the back of the line and wait years. They really have no choice but
to stick with the 737 MAX now.

Actually I guess airlines like Southwest (who are 100% 737 IIRC) are kind of
stuck anyway. It's the likes of American Airlines who has such a large and
diverse fleet that really bet on the wrong horse.

I really hope this ends in a court case or even better, a criminal case. I
really want to know who signed off on this plan and at what point warnings
were given and ignored.

[1]
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues)

~~~
nerdbaggy
If the airlines switch from 737 to A320neo then all the 737 pilots would have
to be trained on the new plane which would cost the airlines big $$$

~~~
travisjungroth
Southwest has ~10k pilots. At $20k type rating per pilot, that’s $200mil. An
A320neo is $110mil. So, a big cost but not the biggest.

~~~
cmurf
There are on-going costs of maintaining each type rating, so it isn't a one
time cost. Also, you'd want most or perhaps all the pilots maintaining both
type ratings, so they can still be matched with any 737.

~~~
phire
Apparently, pilots can only be rated for one type at a time.

So during the cross-over period, you will need two completely independent
fleets of pilots, one to operate the old 737s and one to operate the new
A320-NEOs.

Each fleet needs to have different spare pilots to cover absences or overtime
emergencies. And the pilots who currently are training for the new type rating
can't be in either fleet.

The airline will have to temporally increase the number of pilots until the
whole switch-over finishes.

~~~
spockz
Interesting, if this is the case it would also have meant needing a second set
of pilots for the MAX if it received a different rating.

~~~
phire
It gets more complex.

Airbus have designed their A320, A330/A340/A350 planes with almost identical
cockpits and handling characteristics to allow cross-crew qualification.

A pilot with an A320 type rating can take a 7 day course to become qualified
on the A330 (instead of the 40 day course normally required). And they can
maintain the type rating on both types simultaneously.

Since the A330 shares a type rating with the A340 and A350, this allows a
pilot to fly quite a few airbus planes.

Given the Max is so close to older 737s, I see no reason why Boeing and the
FAA couldn't come to a similar arrangement, were pilots can be cross-trained
with a 1 week course and maintain simultaneous type ratings on both the Max
and Older 737s.

Boeing does have a few common type ratings: The 757 and 767 share one; The 777
and 787 share another. But as far as I'm aware, pilots can only be qualified
on one Boeing type rating at a time.

~~~
CaptainZapp
_Given the Max is so close to older 737s, I see no reason why Boeing and the
FAA couldn 't come to a similar arrangement, were pilots can be cross-trained
with a 1 week course and maintain simultaneous type ratings on both the Max
and Older 737s._

Greed and hubris, would be my best guess.

------
pornel
> Boeing performed an internal review and determined that the lack of a
> working warning light “did not adversely impact airplane safety or
> operation,”

> after the crash of Lion Air Flight 610 […] conducted another review and
> again found the missing alert did not pose a safety threat

How was it possible to come to this conclusion? Twice!? Even after it caused a
crash!?

~~~
cjbprime
"Well, we didn't tell pilots that MCAS exists, which means we didn't tell them
that AoA is hooked up to it, which means that AoA failure isn't relevant to
their decision making, so there's no safety threat from not communicating it."

(In case there's doubt: I am not joking, I think this is seriously the
argument.)

------
Havoc
>“You better start knowing things about the airplane you’re building and
selling because my life and the passengers that I carry safely across the
globe depends on it,” Mr. Tajer said.

haha wow. If that's representative of how pilots feel then Boeing is in
trouble.

~~~
tqkxzugoaupvwqr
May I ask how this gets Boeing into trouble? The only thing pilots could do is
strike which I find improbable.

~~~
Tor3
SAS had a seven-day pilot strike just last week, over (mainly) working
conditions, so how would a pilot strike over this be so improbable?

------
jzwinck
So even now Boeing will not include all safety features for all customers. Not
that Airbus is doing better, but this indicates that Boeing is not concerned
that it could face serious charges for continuing to sell planes with some
safety features missing. That's interesting! Why are they so assured?

~~~
solarkraft
The USA have a long history of being very supportive of their companies
("regulation is evil!").

------
os7borne
It’s surprising that there has been no legal proceeding initiated against
Boeing for this. They traded the lives of hundreds of people in exchange for
an important safety feature.

~~~
sseth
There are cases in court filed in relation to both crashes. And there are
various official investigations, including an FBI investigation.

------
dbg31415
So a year from now, when we are flying and see that it’s a 737 Max... who is
going to opt for another flight? Everyone? Because this shit is kinda fucked
how flippant Boeing was with getting around safety testing.

This video was both hilarious and terrifying.

[https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=NhZ0D-JRtz0](https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=NhZ0D-JRtz0)

~~~
bdowling
Note: The linked video is by foul-mouthed Canadian YouTuber AvE, in which he
disassembles and comments on an angle-of-attack sensor from a C-130 military
aircraft. He comments favorably on the build quality of the assembly, but is
not impressed with the sensor itself or the lack of internal redundancy.

The analysis is interesting but of limited value to consideration of the
sensors and MCAS system on the Boeing 737 MAX.

~~~
dbg31415
Yeah, I just thought the guy's voice was hilarious. He sounds like someone who
lives in the machine shop, knows his shit, and has never had to interact with
customers. If I had a personal J.A.R.V.I.S., I'd want to use his voice for it.

------
nicolas_t
Even next year when the 737 max will no longer be grounded, I will pay special
attention not to fly on them. I'm also increasingly worried about flying on
787s...

I wonder what percentage of customers will do the same and how that will
impact airline's bottom line.

~~~
Dirlewanger
How does one even figure that out though? Almost every flight one books, the
aircraft model isn't listed.

~~~
nicolas_t
You can enter the flight number and date in seatguru to get the aircraft
model. It's not 100% accurate but helps. The other way is to check flightaware
for that flight number.

This doesn't protect you from an aircraft change and I don't know how I would
deal with it if it happened.

------
mimixco
It's a very bad sign when an aircraft manufacturer builds a warning light and
then says, if it doesn't work, that's not a safety issue.

------
oakmad
Here’s an article from 1995 that talks about how 737 pilots didn’t know they
had to turn off auto throttle on takeoff abort -
[https://www.csmonitor.com/1995/0821/21082.html](https://www.csmonitor.com/1995/0821/21082.html)

I wonder how software testing will change (if at all) in the industry post
this revelation. There was an old joke during 777 development (Boeing’s first
full fbw) about the difference between airbus and Boeing software testing
architecture - airbus used formal techniques and Boeing put the software
engineers on the first flight.

------
0n0n0m0uz
I bet even more will come to light.....[https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-
knew-about-safety-alert-...](https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-knew-about-
safety-alert-problem-for-a-year-before-telling-faa-airlines-11557087129)

------
RaceWon
Reading the article I was reminded of the depths auto makers would sink to in
order to saver pennies on every car made.

On another note; am I the only person that these AOA vanes seem so hokey and
inelegant to? I am not a pilot, nor a designer, but if I was buying and flying
something that had these sticking out like an after thought; I'd be like WTF
are you kidding me?!

------
zaphar
This sounds like a case of a system so complex that the humans trying to
reason about were unable to do so. As a software engineer I've sometimes had
to run a piece of software to properly understand how it works. This doesn't
seem like a desirable property for systems that are critical for safety.

------
computerex
What gross negligence. I hope this forever remains a stain on Boeing's legacy.

------
godson_drafty
This issue of the AOA-disagree warning light keeps getting brought up again
and again, which is unfortunate because the presence of such a light would not
have saved those 346 lives. Imagine you are a pilot and your airplane's nose
keeps getting pushed toward the ground no matter how much you pull back on the
stick. You try everything. Now you notice a little warning light 'AOA
disagree'. How does that help you, exactly? The lack of this warning light is
completely irrelevant. The problem is that they allowed the readings from 1
single sensor to force the nose of the aircraft toward the ground.

------
antihero
What fucking piece of shit decides that MORE SAFETY is a PREMIUM ADDONT? That
is literally suggesting that some passengers lives are worth less than others.

Planes should be as safe as they can possibly be. Full stop. Premium should be
for things like comfort and things you can do with out.

~~~
retSava
It's the same in the car industry, unfortunately. Many options that are more
or less pure safety-only, and not convenience, are not included unless you
open up a little more.

It economically (to the car industry) may make sense (opt ups, recover costs,
etc), but it's sad in a way.

------
msiyer
This is "crime against humanity" level of corporate bullshit. I think, they
saved a lot of money by neglecting thorough testing. Also, like in all large
corporates, they have n number of departments with terrible infighting and
consequentially poor communication.

------
addicted
I find Boeing's dismissal of this as not being a safety concern unconvincing.

Boeing spent the money adding this to their design. They spent the money
adding the capability to every plane they had. And they thought it was
important enough that they shouldn't be charging airlines for it, unlike the
addition of a backup sensor (which wasn't considered important enough to be
delivered standard).

What was the thinking when doing the review? Hey, here's this feature we
thought was important enough that we added several costs without charging
airlines for it, while we were nickel and diming them on backup sensors, but
actually it was all a big mistake. We were just being generous on this for no
reason at all?

------
decker
Send the CEO to jail for life, only way to be sure.

~~~
hu3
Pretty sure everyone who died in the two crashes would agree with you if they
could voice their opinion. Specially the pilots.

------
distant_hat
If you look at Boeing stock price over the year, it seems none of this has
significantly affected it. It is actually up YoY. I can safely say that this
scandal will have no major effect on the management.

------
rconti
Sort of OT, AvE did a BOLTR on an AoA sensor last week. (from a military cargo
plane, I forget which. Said plane has _4_ of them)

I watched it last night in the same state that he apparently films his
vidjeos, and I enjoyed it. YMMV.

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NhZ0D-JRtz0](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NhZ0D-JRtz0)

------
ponderatul
Sure, but they are still responsible for the effects. That we can't forget.

Ignoring the complex system they have created is their fault

------
village-idiot
It’s probably time to revoke the 737 Max’s type certificate and send Boeing
back to the regulatory drawing board.

------
godson_drafty
Not only is Boeing too big too fail, it's too big to succeed.

------
known
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rvkEpstd9os](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rvkEpstd9os)
explains about MCAS

------
swamp40
The money quote:

 _The anti-stall system, created to compensate for the Max’s large new
engines, will push down the nose of the plane if the angle of attack sensors
indicate the plane is dangerously close to stalling.

But the system relied on only one of the two angle of attack sensors,
introducing a potential single point of failure into a critical flight system.
And the anti-stall system was also changed late in the design process to make
it much more powerful._

------
ww520
Is Boeing's problem lack of competition?

~~~
kn0where
If anything the problem is they rushed this plane so they could compete with
Airbus

------
jordache
so these Boeing fools set the entitlement flag for the necessary AOA disagree
display as a child of another, non-required "safety" display option?

Idiots. How the hell do they not have a robust system to validate the correct
application of instrumentation rules?

------
connorcodes
This is a sad month for Boeing.

------
killjoywashere
This is the sort of fault that causes everyone to pray the investigation comes
back "pilot error". Because the alternative is the entire company gets pulled
through the mud. Rightfully, but man, this is going to hurt Boeing, and by
extension the US.

~~~
na85
I find the idea that society should not keep corporations and their behaviour
in check because "the economy may be damaged" to be frightening and dangerous.

~~~
killjoywashere
I didn't say we shouldn't. I'm fairly comfortable with the idea of bitter
medicine. But acknowledging "this is going to be bitter" is a remarkably
helpful way to gain rapport, and doesn't actually interfere with the
administration of the treatment. If anything, it reduces the patient's odds of
rejecting the medicine.

------
nerdbaggy
I think part of the blame can be placed on the airlines. They willingly didn’t
buy the Warning light

~~~
phire
The airlines thought they had the warning light. Boeing thought they had
delivered the warning light all airlines as a default.

It was only later that Boeing discovered they messed up and had made the
warning light dependant on another feature which was optional.

And then Boeing didn't tell airlines about the broken warning light until just
a few months ago.

~~~
jordache
what a cluster F of permissions management

F Boeing

------
gimli9500
The media seems to be on a mission to kill commercial aviation similar to what
happened to recreational aircraft. I wonder how long before we see an article
about how Boeing knowingly omitted flare and chaff systems despite the risk of
surface-to-air missiles. They'll talk about how the AN/ALE-47 system could
avoid 22 deaths/year for only $30k.

