

Ask HN: Is it possible that hardware backdoors have direct access? - wyck

Is it a possibility the PRISM related direct access is a hardware backdoor?<p>References:<p>NSA has their own chip manufacturer: http:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;National_Security_Agency#Role_in_scientific_research_and_development<p>Hardware backdoors are practical (defcon 2012 slideshow): http:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.slideshare.net&#x2F;endrazine&#x2F;defcon-hardware-backdooring-is-practical<p>Backdoor in military chips from China: http:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.scribd.com&#x2F;doc&#x2F;95282643&#x2F;Backdoors-Embedded-in-DoD-Microchips-From-China<p>Rakshasa: http:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.extremetech.com&#x2F;computing&#x2F;133773-rakshasa-the-hardware-backdoor-that-china-could-embed-in-every-computer
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tptacek
If it was a hardware backdoor, why would it be limited to the specific subset
of companies it claims to be limited to? Occam's Razor strongly suggests it's
just poor wording on the part of whatever schlub wrote the slide.

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hazov
I'm only throwing my opinion, I'm not really into security but I spend some
time studying networks and low level stuff as a hobby, any specialist will
probably point my errors below.

Depends on the device no? Suppose you have a chip with a backdoor, if said
chip depends on a OS to operate and you can for example block connections
(using a packet filter, either blacklisting the undesirable ones or drop all
except the whitelisted ones), then whatever backdoor is there will need an
unblocked connection to be activated.

As I see it the majority of hardware backdoors would only be useful if you can
have some sort of access to the device, either remotely in a network the
device is connected, physically (as far as I understand that's how Stuxnet
spread in Iran) or if the user willingly executes some code that exposes the
backdoor to you over some routing.

