
The China tea trade was a paradox of global capitalism - Vigier
https://aeon.co/essays/the-china-tea-trade-was-a-paradox-of-global-capitalism
======
alextheparrot
A lot of the British global trade advantage came from transport and logistics
advantages — growing opium in India, moving that to China, tea being
transported back to Europe. Alongside this, a strong navy to ensure the safety
of shipping routes. The quantity and value of resources they extracted during
that time really are staggering.

A similar logistic marvel was the transport of ice from North America and
Europe — this wasn’t a business where industrial scale was the primary
complexity, but a challenge of supply-chain construction in an age without
local refrigeration and cooling.

The article’s joining of “capitalism” and “industrialisation” is, in my
opinion, a narrowing of reality that naively ignores all the other contexts in
which capitalism has been quite successful. Large ships are capital intensive,
mercantilism in general has been a long-term, capital intensive business far
longer than industry has been.

~~~
bsanr2
>growing opium in India, moving that to China

I think, in understating socioeconomic dynamics of this portion of the trade,
you overstate the impressiveness of the rest. The British forcefully drugged
an entire country and then compelled it in this weakened state towards its
model of an economic monoculture. They didn't so much build their own
advantage as tear down China's. In that light, one has to wonder the character
of the trade in terms of its benefits for the populations involved and
civilization as a whole. The imperialist regard for trade and diplomacy alike
lead directly to multiple devastating wars, and the distortion of the economic
model in vassal states arguable retarded resource cultivation (outside if what
was useful for Europe) and encouraged bloody revolutions that further warped
society in these regions.

Taking the long view, it's possible that these "marvels" of global trade were
actually examples of colossal mismanagement of resources on a grand scale.

~~~
alextheparrot
I think the feedback is generally fair — the comment as a whole was definitely
lacking a lot of nuance and did not explain itself well in context.

The key thesis for me is that this was the local optimum for British control
of the tea trade, and I would say Asia writ large. Controlling the source of
opium in a local-ish way gave them an easier time moving it to China, while
also allowing them to extract additional wealth from their previous conquests
in Asia. In a meta sense, it may be very inefficient, but I’m less convinced
that from a British perspective it was at all sub-optimal. Their input costs
were primarily capitalistic: Ships, guns, bribes.

This is where the marvel comes from, the magnitude with which Europe
successfully extracted grand value out of Asia (Just as it had previously done
with Africa, South America, and North America to varying degrees). Upon
reflection, it is so extractive that it seems slightly misleading to even levy
it in discussion as trade.

~~~
bsanr2
>Upon reflection, it is so extractive that it seems slightly misleading to
even levy it in discussion as trade.

I think my contention is that how narrowly scoped this extraction is belies
the alternative, of broader-based capital development which might have
produced greater value in the long run. It seems impressive, because it fed
the imperial machine in an extremely lucrative manner for the empire; however,
what happens when you factor in the value extracted _from Britain_ by the 20th
century's wars, resulting in a rapid decline to present circumstances? The
British Empire was incredibly short-lived compared to its predecessors,
depending on how you look at it. Is this part of a trend? Possibly. But
there's room to conceptualize the situation as one of optimizing towards
catastrophe, of the entire enterprise being wrongheaded on balance, and of an
alternative approach - one which doesn't strip mine non-European civilization,
leaving existing structures not to collapse so violently, with ramifications
to the present day - being "better" because the knock-on effects might have
been less destructive.

Would Mao's purge of intellectuals have happened in a world where Britain's
appetite for wealth extraction had been less voracious or narrowly-focused?
Would we today be reaping the rewards of Chinese academia emerging from the
mid-century intact?

I mean, in a sense, it's impressive what the modern war "trade" bankrolls.
200-300 years from now, will we characterize the military-industrial complex
as eliciting the same sort of sense of awe, in its complexity but basic
effectiveness in maintaining hegemony and access to resources crucial for the
unprecedented build-up of global wealth since the 1950s?

------
gumby
What a great article. In particular I like that in the middle it provides an
excellent example of how Marxist theory and vocabulary is deeply steeped* in
the Victorian capitalist vocabulary of the industrial revolution and how that
model of thinking still affects us today. Specifically, on HN and the press in
general, despite the discussion of “tech” business, the vast majority of
businesses are mostly or completely low tech in their operation.

I have a quibble with the headline writer (which actually relates to the
above): that capitalism didn’t arise without “factories”: as the article
shows, the tea production process would have been perfectly clear to Adam
Smith. It was simply low tech (and the article is quite clear about this). In
addition, though “factory” today means manufacturing, in the early days of
European empires, the “factory” was the warehouse where goods were stored and
financed (factoring accounts receivable is still common today). The factories
of the Bombay Presidency were the first effective toehold of British expansion
into India. Over time value add (labor/processing) crept into those warehouses
as the goods were already there, leading to today’s meaning. The author seems
to understand this so it’s only whoever wrote the headline that I am
criticizing.

* apologies for the accidental tea metaphor

------
pjc50
The word this article is looking for and not mentioned is _Taylorism_ \- the
Western codification of time-motion study as a means to improving efficiency.
Not that Taylor invented it, obviously; the pressure to produce more in a time
period is inherent in piece-work and contract agricultural labour.

It does raise a good question as to what exactly was meant by "capitalism".
All the freely-optimising workers mentioned in the story definitely existed
within a more feudal system of land management.

I'm pleased that it mentioned the Opium War, even in passing.

------
detritus
There was a good link to another Aeon article posted here on HN last year
about the role a silver-rich Bolivian mountain played in the Chinese tea
trade...

[https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20582387](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20582387)

\- ed

Might help if I posted the right URL!

[https://aeon.co/essays/potosi-the-mountain-of-silver-that-
wa...](https://aeon.co/essays/potosi-the-mountain-of-silver-that-was-the-
first-global-city)

------
rado
Ironically, US' biggest export to China before 2018 was soybeans, which they
"appropriated" from the Middle Kingdom in 18 AD.

And yes, farming was subsidized by Washington.

~~~
lcam84
Regarding subsidies, this article changed the way I look at the european
common agriculture policy.

Many local economies (sugar in Jamaica, cow meat in South Africa) could not
compete with this practices and went bankrupt.

[https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Dumping_on_the_Poor...](https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Dumping_on_the_Poor_The_Common_Agricultural_Po.htm)

~~~
raverbashing
It's been long since I haven't read such a biased text.

Yes, subsidies suck, production is not always as efficient as it can be and
there's a political aspect to subsidies. But food insecurity sucks more. And
no, outsourcing everything won't work.

But if you can't compete with agricultural produce done with higher labour
cost and with freight on top there's something very wrong with your means of
production. Because I can assure you most 3rd world countries don't need to
import sugar or beef.

But hey now the UK farmer's won't have the big bad EU subsidies and tariffs
anymore so I guess it will work all good for them, no?

~~~
DiogenesKynikos
> if you can't compete with agricultural produce done with higher labour cost
> and with freight on top there's something very wrong with your means of
> production.

Isn't the point that EU agricultural surpluses are being dumped in undeveloped
economies below cost? You can't compete on price against free (to exaggerate a
bit).

As I understand it, the EU subsidizes agriculture in order to ensure an
overabundant food supply (and because of the political agricultural lobby).
This may be a completely fine policy, because you don't want there to be
famine if something goes slightly wrong.

These subsidies lead to overproduction. Some of the surplus is dumped in
foreign markets at prices that are well below cost. Farmers in undeveloped
countries cannot compete on price. Since undeveloped countries depend more
heavily on agriculture, this has an outsize impact on their economies.

~~~
raverbashing
> Some of the surplus is dumped in foreign markets at prices that are well
> below cost. Farmers in undeveloped countries cannot compete on price.

Yes, but you would still have the transportation costs on top of them. Which
depending on the product is not so cheap.

It seems the policies and subsidies change with time as well and some of the
overproduction was used by the EU in humanitarian programs as well.

It definitely seems to be a politicized topic and I definitely don't think it
is without problems.

But saying it costs "16GBP per week per each family in increased food costs"
is a misrepresentation at the most charitable interpretation. Feel free to
compare supermarket prices of unprocessed products (with comparable quality)

------
netcan
If we think of capitalism in the 18th century... it's worth remembering that
this the canonical "Capitalism." That is, it is what Marx was describing (and
deriding) as he popularised the concept of "capitalism." It's also the world
of trade that Ricardo described, and his concepts are still at the core of
trade economics today.

The Dutch British Empires started as companies. Nationally backed, but
shareholder owned and employee run.

In any case, the lynchpin to all this trade had to be something that had value
at home.. where the ships ultimately returned.

The Spanish and other empires before the Dutch & British sought gold directly.
Steal it, Buy it, Mine it... Doesn't matter. This was, broadly "mercantilism."
Get Gold. Bring it Home.

Adam Smith noted a century earlier that this wouldn't work. Gold has no
inherent value. I think Smith was wrong on the margin, but right on the bigger
point. The gold did have value. Kings could use it to raise armies, for
example. The Spanish monarchy was always trying to fill its war chest. But,
gold didn't fuel a trading cycle. Consumer goods & industrial materials did.

Anyway... my point is that whatever happened in between leaving London ports
and returning, they were returning with goods... not gold. They may have been
trading gunpowder for slaves, to be sold in the colonies and exchanged for
cotton. They may have traded for spices in India. When the ships returned,
they returned with goods. Tea & spices were luxury goods, that beneficiaries
of the empire could enjoy. This is important, because it balanced consumption
with revenue and created a cycle. Tea sippers had money because they owned
shares. Revenue flowed to The Company from tea sipper. The Company used that
revenue to keep bringing tea (also cotton & indigo for the mills and other
luxury goods like spices). The market was secured (to an extent) by rising
share values.

When a spanish ship returned with gold, someone had gold, probably the king,
probably for war. When a British ship returned, someone paid gold for tea, to
The Company, to fund more trade.

~~~
burpsnard
IIRC the chinese were exporting tea, oranges and porcelain to Europe in
exchange for silver.

Early/mid 19C, with metal-backed currencies, as most of the circulating Silver
had ended up there, it was deemed necessary to reverse that flow.

The Opium wars began, to get all the silver back.

I think westerners underappreciate the salience of these events in the chinese
worldview.

And which Colony was established by treaty with the chinese defeat ?

Hong Kong.

[https://www.bl.uk/learning/histcitizen/trading/story/trade/4...](https://www.bl.uk/learning/histcitizen/trading/story/trade/4tradingplaces.html)

~~~
mytailorisrich
Hongkong, Taiwan, extreme North East and West, Tianjin, Dalian, Shanghai,
Xiamen, area bordering Vietnam, probably some more I forget.

The period of the opium wars saw China stripped piece by piece and, indeed,
that is having consequences to this day.

~~~
magicsmoke
The aftermath of WW2 had far bigger consequences. The US was willing to let
the Republic of China be the hegemon of East Asia like in the old days in
return for an ally against the USSR. But when communist China won the civil
war the US began supporting China's old tributaries Japan and Korea against it
and kept the RoC alive on Taiwan. That whole interplay between the PRC and the
US over the hegemony of East Asia is the crux of most of the issues in that
region today.

~~~
082349872349872
cf
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_Course](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_Course)
(I am still seeking an explanation for Japan's signing of the Plaza Accord
that doesn't rely on calling in favours from the LDP. Anybody have one?)

------
alextheparrot
I previously read “Imperial Twilight” which examines the historical context
that led up to the Opium Wars.

Given it was recommended to me on HN, I’ll pass on the recommendation in kind
for anyone wishing to learn more about some of the context surrounding this.
Really a quite different world with respect to power balances and, as has been
noted in this thread, a cornerstone of the Chinese worldview.

~~~
clairity
the interesting tidbit from the article related to this:

"The lopsided British victory in the first Opium War (1839-42) inaugurated
what is known today in China as the ‘century of humiliation’.... Only with the
rise and victory of the Communist Party in 1949, the nationalist lore goes,
could the original shame of military defeat and colonialism be redeemed."

so in effect, british imperialism, through a coerced opium trade, pushed china
from capitalism to communism.

~~~
joyj2nd
"through a coerced opium trade,"

You forgot to mention WHY the opium trade happened. China was exporting tea,
silk and porcelain like there is no tomorrow and at the same time had
accumulated the majority of the world silver reserves since they did not want
to buy anything, therefore chocking the world economy. Then the British said,
wait, we have something that you want to buy!

~~~
enitihas
So in short, the British wanted stuff from China, but had nothing China
wanted, so they resorted to smuggling drugs to China, and when the government
objected and burnt a large amount of Opium, the British went to war against
China for their right of "dealing drugs".

~~~
solidsnack9000
It's important to distinguish between what Chinese people wanted and what the
administration wanted. The imperial administration's pursuit of mercantilist
policy didn't mean that "The British could offer little in return that Chinese
merchants wanted to buy." as the article incorrectly states.

China had been purchasing opium abroad from other countries for several
centuries. The importation of opium was banned in the 1700s, but opium was
still legal for sale in China. The effect was that _foreigners_ were barred
from participating in the business. Chinese merchants smuggled British opium
into China and sold it as Chinese opium.

Chinese people definitely wanted British opium and Chinese merchants
definitely wanted to sell it to them. If opium had been illegal, you might
have a point; but it was legal for sale in China until 1799.

~~~
enitihas
Opium was made illegal in China since 1800
([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Destruction_of_opium_at_Humen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Destruction_of_opium_at_Humen)).
The government even appointed a commissioner to solve the Opium issue and the
commissioner proceeded to destroy huge amounts of Opium, which was the trigger
point of the Opium war.

> Chinese people definitely wanted British opium and Chinese merchants
> definitely wanted to sell it to them.

As in the Americans want substances banned by their federal government, and
Escobar and others definitely wanted to sell it to them?

Will that justify another country dumping those in America?

~~~
solidsnack9000
It's not correct to say that Chinese people didn't want things from the west,
or that imperial trade policy -- restricting all trade to Canton and so forth
-- was representative of a lack of interest in goods that westerners had to
trade.

Opium is the obvious case.

------
hogFeast
The article is not good. It is not terrible either but it seems a little like
the author is shoehorning in their preconceptions about what they think
historians believe about China.

But, there is no lack of study into China pre-Industrial Revolution or the
period mentioned by the author. This was maybe true when Landes was writing
(the author picks the leading culprit of Eurocentric economic history...this
is somewhat inaccurate, Landes just didn't know much about China but his books
are valuable) but isn't true anymore.

There is a huge volume of books comparing China and Europe: Pomeranz is
probably the best, there are many others. Many of these also look at
India...Tirthankar Roy has some great stuff on Indian business history but
India is also in Pomeranz (Great Divergence is by far the most important book
here...it is huge).

So yeah: I would say that what the field is lacking a good bottom up history
of Chinese business (say pre-1900) but documentation is tricky and there is a
fairly complete top-down understanding of capitalism/how people worked/etc.
anyway.

And just generally, I would actually say that most economic historians that
look at this period don't actually look at Europe at all anymore...they almost
solely focus on the integration of hinterlands into the capitalist global
economy (I studied economic history in the UK...I did precisely no courses on
UK/European economic history...in this period: Australia, the US, China,
Caribbean/early US colonial...and all looking at the interactions that the
author alludes too...talking about Eurocentrism is largely an anthropology
student's meme of history students at this point) which was the most
interesting trend in the period.

------
gridlockd
There's no paradox. Capitalism predates industrialization by hundreds of
years. You can have one without the other.

I'd argue that if you really want industrialization and you want it quick,
capitalism will only slow you down.

------
keiferski
Capitalism is an economic system. Industrialization is a production method. In
historical narratives, they are usually correlated, as they occurred near-
simultaneously, but in fact they aren’t the same thing.

~~~
joyj2nd
They are basically the same thing since capitalism requires industrialization
and the pre-financing (read debt based) of production methods on a giant
scale.

You seem to mistake a market economy with capitalism, which are not the same
thing. In the middle ages we had a barter economy and more or less a market
economy. Nevertheless we dd not have capitalism.

~~~
alextheparrot
The counter-example to this I’ve historically used is that great merchants and
explorers were often taking on loans or loan—like contracts to finance their
trade and exploration. This seems like a place where capital requirements and
devices are useful in abstract of industrial systems. The Medici Bank is
probably the easiest reference point to draw on, as a financing organisation
as early as the 1400s.

Which pieces of the system described above don’t match up with capitalism?

~~~
joyj2nd
Scale and per-financiation of industrial production that requires economic
growth to pay back loans (that are actually paid back with future loans).

Economic growth was also likely close to zero due to lack of energy resources.
With no expected future growth you won't make any investments that bet on
future growth. Capitalism also requires an external energy source like coal,
gas, possibly nuclear since economic growth and wealth needs energy to be
sustained. I have a paper about it, which calculates it in mW per dollar
growth and mW per Dollar of wealth.

Edit: With me "having a paper" I mean on my data collection. It was not
published by me.

~~~
alextheparrot
Would you feel comfortable linking to the paper? I haven't shifted entirely to
accept the "Capitalism requires industrialization" idea, but irrespective the
paper sounds interesting and contextual

~~~
joyj2nd
It is mentioned in this post: Wealth And Energy Consumption Are Inseparable
[http://www.declineoftheempire.com/2012/01/wealth-and-
energy-...](http://www.declineoftheempire.com/2012/01/wealth-and-energy-
consumption-are-inseparable.html)

I don't know a book in English out of my head that explains some inherent
features of capitalism. Gail Tverberg does a pretty good job but she does not
explain a lot of things, she just assumes that you are aware of some things:

"There is No Steady State Economy (except at a very basic level)"
[http://ourfiniteworld.com/2011/02/21/there-is-no-steady-
stat...](http://ourfiniteworld.com/2011/02/21/there-is-no-steady-state-
economy-except-at-a-very-basic-level/)

Limits to Growth–At our doorstep, but not recognized
[http://www.resilience.org/stories/2014-02-12/limits-to-
growt...](http://www.resilience.org/stories/2014-02-12/limits-to-growth-at-
our-doorstep-but-not-recognized)

Partly relevant if you accept: 1\. The need of growth in capitalism 2\. That
growth and energy consumption are interlinked:

Galactic-Scale Energy [http://physics.ucsd.edu/do-the-math/2011/07/galactic-
scale-e...](http://physics.ucsd.edu/do-the-math/2011/07/galactic-scale-
energy/)

The was one guy he wrote, I think it was in the HBR if I remember correctly,
that he found that the US has more and more industrial output/GDP growth with
fewer energy needs. This is not wrong but it is only true because the US
outsources energy hungry productions to China. I actually emailed him with
some data. Unfortunately he never replied.

~~~
philipkglass
_This is not wrong but it is only true because the US outsources energy hungry
productions to China._

It's true that the US effectively imports energy via foreign goods, but I
don't think that effect accounts for all the decline in US energy consumption
per capita.

Carbon dioxide emissions are an imperfect but (IMO) good-enough proxy for
energy, since the world's energy supply is still dominated by fossil fuels. If
the US counted imported goods toward its CO2 emissions, as of 2016 they would
be 7.7% higher:

[https://ourworldindata.org/consumption-based-
co2](https://ourworldindata.org/consumption-based-co2)

Primary energy consumption per capita peaked in the US in 1978:

[https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/energy-use-per-
capita?tab...](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/energy-use-per-
capita?tab=chart&country=USA)

It was down to 79,056 kWh/capita as of 2015, compared to 98,139 kWh/capita in
1978. If you adjust the 2015 number up by 7.7% it's 85,143 kWh/capita -- not
down as much, but still down. That's lower than the average for the 1970s,
1980s, or 1990s. (And China didn't really become an export powerhouse until
after it joined the WTO in 2001.)

~~~
joyj2nd
"It's true that the US effectively imports energy via foreign goods"

Not only this. Apple designs IPhones. iPhones are produced in China, some may
be shipped to the US, some may be shipped to Europe. If you do this via HK,
you basically pay zero Tax on the profits. This leads to:

1\. High profitable US tech companies

2\. Little tax revenues

3\. As a side effect, the US and Europe have a trade deficit with China since
an iPhone shipped to the US or Europe appears in the export balance sheet of
China. There is a paper, I think from 2007 about this, that calls this "dark
matter in accounting"
[https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=878096](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=878096)

Based on google (it shows me a graph:
[https://www.google.com/search?q=us+energy+use+per+capita](https://www.google.com/search?q=us+energy+use+per+capita)
)

I would call the per captia consumption basically constant from the 80ies to
2008. After that is is shrinking.

Please also see:

Is it really possible to decouple GDP Growth from Energy Growth?

[https://ourfiniteworld.com/2011/11/15/is-it-really-
possible-...](https://ourfiniteworld.com/2011/11/15/is-it-really-possible-to-
decouple-gdp-growth-from-energy-growth/)

EDIT: Added the link the the dark matter paper

~~~
philipkglass
I saw Gail Tverberg's writings regularly back in the Oil Drum days. I don't
think that she is a credible prognosticator. Like some other people on The Oil
Drum, her theme seemed to be that industrial civilization was facing an
imminent crisis from energy supply contraction. Did she ever go back and
explain why she was so wrong the first time around with predictions like
these?

[https://ourfiniteworld.com/2007/07/16/what-is-peak-
oil/](https://ourfiniteworld.com/2007/07/16/what-is-peak-oil/)

[https://ourfiniteworld.com/2007/07/16/is-this-a-false-
alarm/](https://ourfiniteworld.com/2007/07/16/is-this-a-false-alarm/)

[https://ourfiniteworld.com/2007/08/06/peak-oil-whats-
ahead/](https://ourfiniteworld.com/2007/08/06/peak-oil-whats-ahead/)

Did she make more cautious predictions going forward, after making such badly
failed predictions 13 years ago? If she did, I didn't see it. It looks like
Our Finite World is still a drumbeat of predictions about crises just ahead.
If she's eventually correct about a specific prediction it will be a case of
the stopped clock showing the correct time by chance.

That doesn't mean that I'm unconditionally optimistic about the future. The
"Galactic Scale Energy" post is exactly right. The problem is that constraints
like "growth can't go on like this for another 1000 years, because of physics"
can't provide much guidance for the next 15 years. And predictions from the
Peak Oil crowd from 15 years ago about what would happen in 15 years were
mostly wrong.

My personal take: after the 1960s, people basically stopped inventing more
energy-intensive goods and services that could achieve mass market adoption.
Jet air travel was the last big energy intensive service to reach the
mainstream. The diffusion of energy-intensive lifestyles continued in the
United States and is still diffusing throughout the world, so we're rushing
toward a global warming disaster faster than ever. But GDP growth per capita
in the developed countries has slowed. Energy consumption per capita in the
developed countries has stabilized or reversed.

Small efficiency improvements in existing technologies accumulate without
enough new energy-intensive technologies being invented to push up the per-
capita demand from the median American. We are encountering the per capita
"limits to growth" in highly developed nations but the limits showed up on the
demand side before the supply side.

Global warming also -- and unfortunately -- seems unlikely to be curbed by
supply-side fuel constraints any time soon, since we don't need any new
energy-intensive technologies to blow out the global carbon budget. All we
need for that is for the rest of the world's population to try to live like
Americans circa 1990.

~~~
joyj2nd
Well, her prediction is pretty close for conventional oil:
[https://www.postcarbon.org/new-u-s-record-level-oil-
producti...](https://www.postcarbon.org/new-u-s-record-level-oil-production-
peak-oil-theory-disproven-not/)

How sustainable the production of non conventional oil is, has to be seen,
taking into account: costs of production and ROEI.

"And predictions from the Peak Oil crowd from 15 years ago about what would
happen in 15 years were mostly wrong."

I am not sure about this either. The limits of growth projected the problems
into the 1st half of the 21th century. This would end 2050, in 30 years. The
questions is: Are the roller coaster oil prices and negative interest rates we
are seeing the pre-curser of problems ahead or just a funny coincidence?

"My personal take: after the 1960s, people basically stopped inventing more
energy-intensive goods and services that could achieve mass market adoption."
This is wrong. Most people would like a flying car or a trip to the moon.
Bitcoin consumes energy too.

This may be an overstatement: By 2040, computers will need more electricity
than the world can generate

[https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/25/semiconductor_indus...](https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/25/semiconductor_industry_association_international_technology_roadmap_for_semiconductors/)

Please also consider jevons Paradox. A more efficient use of resources leads
to faster depletion:
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jevons_paradox](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jevons_paradox)

"We are encountering the per capita "limits to growth" in highly developed
nations but the limits showed up on the demand side before the supply side"

I doubt that either. In this book scientists explain there most dangerous
ideas: [https://www.amazon.com/What-Your-Dangerous-Idea-
Unthinkable/...](https://www.amazon.com/What-Your-Dangerous-Idea-
Unthinkable/dp/0061214957)

One idea was: Purpose of live is energy dissipation. Consequently, I remember
a scientist saying, in what to look for in extraterrestrial live: Look for an
entropy source.

~~~
philipkglass
She wasn't just predicting conventional oil declines. In her 2007 posts she
explicitly considers and rejects the adequacy of unconventional oil sources
(Canadian oil sands, American shale) to prevent oil from peaking imminently
[1].

 _Most people would like a flying car or a trip to the moon._

That's possible. But the technology to offer those to the mass market hasn't
been invented! If the only problem with flying cars was that they burned a lot
of fuel, millions of high-income people would be flying around in them today.
I'm not saying that we can _never_ invent more energy-intensive devices that
reach the mass market. But I have observed that nothing like this has reached
the mass market in 50 years. I'm not going to hold my breath waiting for
routine Moon vacations or flying cars.

I find that the Jevons paradox is cited more often in online discussions than
it is understood. The Jevons paradox can be considered a special case of the
energy rebound effect. Energy rebound is the tendency of people to use more of
an energy service when that energy service can be supplied more efficiently.
For example, replacing incandescent light bulbs with LED light bulbs saves
energy, but some of that energy savings is negated if people also install
_brighter_ bulbs when they switch from incandescent to LED. The Jevons paradox
is the unusual case where the rebound effect is greater than 100% -- like
somebody installing 20 new LED lights for every incandescent they replace.
It's remarkable enough to get its own named paradox because it is a
surprising, rare situation. The far more common case is that energy saving
technology really does save net energy, without inducing enough new demand for
a 100%+ rebound.

[1] Is This a False Alarm? [https://ourfiniteworld.com/2007/07/16/is-this-a-
false-alarm/](https://ourfiniteworld.com/2007/07/16/is-this-a-false-alarm/)

~~~
nickik
Arguing with the Peak-Resource crowed is beyond pointless. These people have
not except basic economic arguments for 200 years, and every 15 years they
come up with a new crisis that gone happen in the next 15-20 years.

The was a lot of Peak-Coal talk in 1800 Britain as well. Now they seem to have
moved on to 'rare' earths (that aren't that actually rare).

They always excuse every individual wrong prediction with 'well this factor we
couldn't predict and nobody could have' so we were right. No matter that that
does not make sense and is exactly the point the other side makes.

The Club of Rome and the 'Population Bomb' are some of the most mainstream
example. The author of the 'Population Bomb' was often on mainstream TV.

The 'Populationbomb' crowed for example wanted limit growth of population in
India, and wanted to US government not to trade with them or help them with
agriculture. Their logic was that millions were gone die anyway, not helping
them might kill them sooner and that will limit growth, much more humane.
There is a long history of that thinking.

The Club of Rome of course hilariously came back back and said 'we were
actually right, juts off by multiple 100%'. Great, thanks guys, I'm defiantly
gone listen to you now.

People who think in zero sum games will never understand how a non-zero sum
game works. These are the most dangerous people in the world. The earth is not
threatens by limited resource, but rather people who believe resources are
limited. The biggest catastrophes of the modern happened because of people who
believed in zero sum games.

Even if Jevons paradox were always true, there is no issue with growing energy
use for the next couple 100 years, or even couple 1000s. There are plenty of
energy sources around. As long as we have energy, food is not an issue either.

------
aristophenes
Unrelated to the point of the article, but in the picture at the top look at
the third woman from the left's feet. Grotesquely bound, I can't imagine the
pain and what they looked like with the bindings removed. Could she walk? And
her and the woman next to her are displaying their hands in a strange way, I
wonder if long slender fingers were appealing?

~~~
1_player
> Grotesquely bound, I can't imagine the pain and what they looked like with
> the bindings removed

I wanted to link the Wikipedia page for Chinese foot binding, but last time I
googled that my stomach turned by how disgusting bound feet look, to me at
least. You will have to do the research yourself, sorry.

It's incredible how physical attractiveness is mostly a product of its time
and culture.

------
andarleen
"The Chinese tea trade actually represented China’s entry point into global
capitalism." \- what about the silk road?

~~~
mytailorisrich
"Global capitalism" means the Western international order.

The silk road was not Western, but represented (or real or mythical) a time a
Asian (China to Middle East) golden age. There's a reason that "Belt and Road"
is presented as building a new silk road.

~~~
andarleen
Well yes, and that's the issue. Capitalism was there in a basic form way
before the western international order. Worth reading on it.

------
iunternik
Fascinating. It seems like the British people thirst helped China rise.

~~~
Synaesthesia
I would say the British and the West in general suppressed China for over a
century and it only started to rise after attaining independence in 1947

~~~
seanmcdirmid
China did not gain its independence in 1947. China has never been run by a
foreign country (though the Japanese came the closest by occupying large parts
of it during WW2).

~~~
rypskar
Thing you are forgetting about the Mongols
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mongol_conquest_of_China](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mongol_conquest_of_China)

~~~
seanmcdirmid
Well, in that case the Qing (Manchurians) themselves would be consider foreign
conquerors, the ones in control of China during the 1800s. Ghengis Khan was
also born in what is today Inner Mongolia of the PRC.

After some time, it doesn’t make much sense to think about what it is to be
under occupation by a foreign invader or not.

