
New vulnerabilities found in ARM mbed TLS - guidovranken
https://guidovranken.wordpress.com/2017/03/10/new-vulnerabilities-found-in-mbed-tls/
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ncw33
It's good for the library to be robust, but four code cleanliness issues (not
triggerable remotely) hardly counts as news in the world of vulnerabilities!

Keep them coming, I'm glad that so many of us who use mbedTLS are reporting
these little issues and getting a better library (with an excellent track
record of very few serious problems).

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guidovranken
There are not code cleanliness issues. These are all public API functions.
Whether any of these bugs can be triggered remotely depends on the application
and which API functions it chooses to expose to untrusted data (or how it
deals with the results of the multi-precision integer functions). From the
limited number of open-source projects that use mbed TLS, it's difficult to
gauge how widespread the overall use of these functions is. That said, you are
right in saying that it they are not critical in the sense that they are
reachable through the library's public-facing TLS state machine.

~~~
briansmith
You can probably find the same or similar bugs in lots of crypto libraries. I
occasionally fix similar issues in _ring_ and BoringSSL so that the
BoringSSL/LibreSSL/OpenSSL/ _ring_ community can discover and fix the issues.

Arguably, the real bug is that these crypto libraries even try to represent
negative numbers at all in the first place. In _ring_ I'm close to removing
all support for negative numbers.

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jjawssd
What can ARM do about this?

~~~
feld
mBed TLS was previously known as PolarSSL. This is software, not hardware

