
Florida Court Deliberates Manual Recount Problems with Touchscreen Voting - DiabloD3
https://www.eff.org/press/releases/can-floridas-election-officials-ignore-law
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tommoose
Isn't the requirement for paper recounts simply unnecessary with electronic
voting?

It seems to me that the errors which a recount is attempting to correct are
only inherent to paper (not filled in correctly, mishandled paper etc) and
simply non-existent in a correctly implemented electronic system, and thus
irrelevant.

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NickNameNick
Electronic voting machines are inherently unsafe. (Consider the difficulty of
validating that the software has not been tampered with eg trusting trust,
that the drivers have not been tampered with, that the network transfer of the
counts is secure and validated, that the hardware is safe and reliable, that
the screens and display controllers are displaying what the software thinks
they are displaying, etc).

The 'best' option is to use them to print a paper ballot that the voter can
validate before putting it in a ballot box. But at that point, you've
basically invented a $2000 pencil.

Options that rely on the voting machine itself to count or transmit the votes
can't be adequately validated. Options that publish the votes in the clear -
allowing voters to check their votes were recorded properly violate anonymity
requirements, and options that publish obfusticated votes don't actually
provide useful auditability.

Not being able to provide a paper (or equivalent) ballot recount is (or should
be) completely unacceptable.

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awqrre
A properly engineered votechain (blockchain-like) could also possibly solve
this problem without needing a paper trail.

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NickNameNick
That doesn't preserve the anonymity requirement for safe voting systems.
Blockchains are only pseudonymous and a malicious landlord, employer or family
member could easily coerce you into divulging your ID.

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synchronise
You could give out randomised voting smartcards with an embedded private key
at every polling station, which would preserve the anonymity.

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NickNameNick
If you take the key with you after you vote, which you will need to do if you
want to validate your vote later, then you can be coerced into disclosing it.

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synchronise
I believe that the keys would just be taken by the machine, that way you'd be
able to verify the vote was placed without the risk of revealing the identity
of the voter attached to that card.

