

Perfect eavesdropping on a quantum cryptography system - husein10
http://arxiv.org/abs/1011.0105

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michael_nielsen
I haven't verified the results of this particular paper, but there is a broad
class of potential problems along these lines with quantum cryptography.
Here's a short piece I wrote about these problems in 2004:
[http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/whats-wrong-with-those-
quantu...](http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/whats-wrong-with-those-quantum-
cryptosystems/)

The short summary is that side channel attacks are a real problem with quantum
cryptography, potentially moreso than with conventional crypto. The reason is
that only a limited number of people have the resources to seriously test (and
thus improve) real-world implementations of quantum cryptosystems systems.
I.e., quantum crypto greatly raises the bar to do white hat hacking.

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lordlarm
On our university these guys built a complete eavesdropper, installed in a
running quantum cryptography link, and actually extracted the full ‘secret’
key unnoticed.

Read more about it here: <http://www.iet.ntnu.no/groups/optics/qcr/>

Pictures and description: [http://www.iet.ntnu.no/groups/optics/qcr/full-
eavesdropping-...](http://www.iet.ntnu.no/groups/optics/qcr/full-
eavesdropping-2011/)

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cldwalker
For the majority of us, a much more readable description of this experiment:
<http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/46305>

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enki
that's why we came up with <http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0408179> in 2004
(one of the co-authors here)

announcing the bases in public isn't a great idea

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roschdal
Vadim Makarov's homepage: <http://www.vad1.com/>

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flippyhead
Well, that didn't take long

