
In 1959, A 707 variant had design issue similar to 737MAX (1992) [audio] - Treblemaker
https://soundcloud.com/aerosociety-podcast/audio-the-dp-davies-interview-comets#t=1:28:06
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Treblemaker
I wonder if there was sufficient institutional memory to consider this during
the 737MAX certification.

In a 1992 recorded interview David P. Davies -- chief pilot of the UK Air
Registration Board (ARB) from the 1950's through 1970's -- described a problem
during certification of a new 707 variant that is remarkably similar to the
recent 737MAX issue.

Fascinating full set of interviews at the main site if you have time to listen
to them:

[https://soundcloud.com/aerosociety-
podcast/sets](https://soundcloud.com/aerosociety-podcast/sets) (scroll down to
"An Interview With...", and scroll that list for "The D. P. Davies Interview",
#'s 19, 18, 17, 16)

Summary: 707-330C variant added leading-edge devices to the wing that caused
center of lift to move forward at high Angle of Attack, increasing the
pitching moment and reducing the stick forces. Even though the stall behavior
was fairly benign, Davies refused to certify it against broad opposition from
the airline customers, Boeing, and even his own management in the ARB.

A significant part of his argument was (what I now know as) "Normalization of
Deviance". They "solved" it by adding a stick pusher to "nudge" the yoke
forward in certain conditions.

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nutcracker46
It sure appears that the 707 flew like a truck. Not simply a truck, but a
truck with too small a rudder. Davies certainly didn't like the low V speeds /
difficult controllability in the original version.

You know there's a problem when the manufacturer doesn't like being aboard for
an engine out test around Vmcg.

Goddam those pilots goofing off, rolling the 707. And then, the others doing
excessive Dutch roll without yaw dampers on...

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salawat
This is very illustrative of where Boeing's attitude comes from, and
furthermore should make very clear that regulatory capture of the FAA is
indeed a clear and present threat.

I can now say with great satisfaction, that my small collection of individuals
whom I steal from in the pursuit of healthy quality/certification practices
just got a little bit longer. I take my hat off to this gentleman for all his
hard work, and his tenacity in the face of pressure from industry.

He is an example of how adversarial certification and testing is meant to
work. You have to be willing to be the brake that holds up everything until
the job is done. If not you, some poor sod down the line who hasn't anywhere
near the expertise you do gets to pay the price.

I also found it interesting that Boeing has a history of "overselling" planes.
Forgot which one it was, but that one really stuck out at me.

I understand that companies change with the people composing them, but I still
see indications that a sense of cavalierism with regards to regulatory
compliance, a willingness to pressure regulators to get what they want, and a
dangerous tendency to overstate the capabilities and understate the poor
behaviors of their aircraft aemre still alive and well today at Boeing as part
of their corporate culture. This is not the hallmark of a company you entrust
self-certification privileges to.

The last thing that stuck out is the unwillingness of Boeing to admit there is
a problem with a design, which Davies attributed to Product Liability law.
This practice clearly needs to be addressed. I'm not sure how exactly, but as
a society, we cannot afford for our institutions to be incentivized to stuff
their fingers in their ears and do everything in their power to keep from
acknowledging a problem they created. We as a people, and our Government,
simply do not have the bandwidth to counter the evasive behavior incentivized
by Product Liability. The law doesn't need to be repealed. However, we need to
reevaluate whether the law is doing what we need it to since this perverse
incentive to act as a 2 year-old and ignore all the facts of the matter until
someone else has dug them up independently needs to be addressed.

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nutcracker46
At 1:33:00 Davies gives an essential argument about the dangers of compromise,
the nonsense of "equivalent level of safety." Compromise a little here, a
little there, so why not shitcan the whole project?

The Boeing 707-336 stick nudger was fitted fleetwide at no extra cost, much as
the 737-Max will get annunciations and software to remedy crashes due to
AOA/MCAS faults.

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nutcracker46
At about 1:08:00 Davies tells a great account of a crew hand flying a
Brittania 300 from Heathrow to Vancouver, arriving on fumes. Ha! They started
without chocks (or brake pressure) and almost rolled into concrete blocks on
the apron.

