
Two Heads: A marriage devoted to the mind-body problem (2007) - benbreen
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/02/12/two-heads
======
ta1234567890
> In the past, it seemed obvious that mind and matter were not the same stuff;
> the only question was whether they were connected. Everyone was a dualist.

This is a very western view. Many eastern religions and philosophies have, for
thousands of years, expressed the unity of matter and consciousness (non-
duality). Not only have they expressed it, but they developed
exercises/practices to experience it.

~~~
Natsu
If we can ever move minds to different hardware, will dualism make a comeback?

~~~
yters
Since the smallest particles of matter are indifferent, as far as we can tell
(i.e. swapping one particle for another makes no difference in the physical
state of the thing), then insofar as minds are individualized some kind of
dualism is inescapable. This is because the mind must be at least an emergent
phenomenon of some configuration, and the configuration is not affected by
what particular particles make up the configuration.

------
ssono
I'm not an expert in the philosophy of mind, but I did just finish a class
that spent a lot of time talking about the Churchlands. I figured I'd give my
two cents in case someone might be curious as to weaknesses in their
arguments.

The way the Churchlands' approach the mind is through reductive materialism.
Basically they argue that the mind is identical to the brain given that brain
process A causes mental/internal process B. With that reduction we should
either eliminate language for mental experience or root it entirely in the
corresponding physical process.

This sort of reduction is more or less a scientific reduction in that it
serves an explanatory purpose. However, some philosophers reject the idea that
scientific reduction is sufficient for a philosophical reduction which is
something along the lines of brain process A completely explaining mental
experience B. The problem that a philosophical reduction poses is that of
internal experience.

Non-reductionists would argue that no amount of physical data could explain
subjective experience. Brain scans can show what happens physiologically when
you are happy, but not the 'what it's like to be happy'. Whether or not that's
convincing to you is a matter of personal preference.

The bottom line seems to be that there is a major physical aspect to the mind,
but also that we feel like we are more than chemical reactions. It is not
clear that we can practically get rid of either dualism or materialism.

If you are curious, look at Thomas Nagel, and 'the hard problem of
consciousness' by Chalmers.

------
yters
Strange that most are materialist when it comes to mind, but dualists in most
other areas of life. E.g. capitalism is a dualist theory, that assumes humans
have individual agency and thus property ownership. Our system of law is the
same, assume people have agency so are responsible for their actions.

~~~
tsco77
I thought quantam mechanics was enough doubt to refute the materialistic mind.
A probabilistic system does not lead itself to a physical reduction of
outcomes as follows from specific inputs.

If someone more knowledgeable about the subject would like to chime in, I
would appreciate it.

~~~
scooble
I suspect that a key question is whether a probabilistic system is enough to
bring agency into the picture. I can't be held (e.g. legally) responsible for
my actions if they are the product of strict cause and effect processes. But
it is also not clear if I can be held responsible for my actions if they arise
from probabilistic mechanisms.

~~~
tsco77
True. But agency is just how we rationalize responsibility being "fair", no?

The legal system is designed with "agency" in mind, but it's true purpose is
to create law abiding citizens. We hold people responsible, because doing so
alters behavior, mechanism of altered behavior is just window dressing.

~~~
scooble
> True. But agency is just how we rationalize responsibility being "fair", no?

I doubt this is a description many people would agree with - that agency
doesn't exist but we just pretend it does so we feel better about locking
people up to modify their behaviour. Aside from anything else, if we are
probabilistic systems, we presumably can't actually do things like
rationalise, or design things like legal systems. Similarly, I'm not sure it
makes sense to talk about the legal system as having a goal if it is a
(presumably slightly more complex) probabilistic system.

Of course, just as with materialism we can bite the bullet and accept that our
typical descriptions of human life are strictly false and the real story is
just a scaled up version of billiard balls knocking each other around (mutatis
mutandis for the probabilistic picture). But if we want a picture that lets us
keep some of our current view of human life, it is not clear that bringing
probabilistic systems into the picture helps any.

~~~
state_less
> if we are probabilistic systems, we presumably can't actually do things like
> rationalise, or design things like legal systems.

Why not? Computers can reason and have constructed proofs. Probably a computer
could construct legal arguments too. They might have some probability for
errors (e.g. cosmic rays) that need to be accounted for and corrected, just
like humans.

> But if we want a picture that lets us keep some of our current view of human
> life, it is not clear that bringing probabilistic systems into the picture
> helps any.

It might help people understand why people murder, or commit crime. Criminals
might have errors that need to be corrected rather than focusing on a crime
that needs to be punished.

~~~
scooble
Rationalising is a kind of ethical reasoning - constructing an account of
something that shows it to be consistent with a wider body of ethical beliefs.
So in your example, the idea of agency is a way of making the idea of
responsibility mesh with our belief that things should be fair.

It is not clear to me that a computer can hold ethical beliefs, or that it
would be troubled when some other beliefs are inconsistent with those beliefs
and motivated to find a rationalisation that makes them compatible.

