
U.S. to ground Boeing 737 Max 8 - wine_labs
https://www.businessinsider.com/us-bans-boeing-737-max-8-after-ethiopian-airline-lion-air-crashes-2019-3
======
40acres
This is the correct move. Airline crashes are so rare that two crashes of a
new model within 6 months of each other must be cause for grounding flights.

The fact that Boeing cut as many corners as they did to bypass mandatory
training just adds more smoke to the fire. When the dust settles on this
episode I won't be surprised to learn that Boeing (and FAA regulators) is
found completely at fault for engineering shortcuts to save costs on re-
training.

~~~
arcticbull
I think we should be careful to look wholistically at this. Will grounding the
plane cause more people to drive? Driving is so much more dangerous than
flying even if there’s a MAX crash every 6 months (doubtful). How many more
people will take connecting flights — the danger is in the take off and
landing after all. I don’t have the answers, I’m suggesting this isn’t a
straightforward decision. Humans have an amazing ability to overweight
incredibly unlikely outcomes with severe consequences.

Some napkin math. 150,000 flights, each with 172 seats (based on the American
Airlines 7M8 configuration, which is admittedly tight). That's 25.8 million
journeys. Two accidents, let's that's ~350 deaths. Your chance of dying on any
given journey is therefore 0.00135% (four nines to live).

You've got a 0.0167% chance of dying [1] for every 10,000 miles driven. Let's
assume that each 7M8 journey averages 2500mi (generous, a transcontinental
average). A linear projection tells me that's a 0.004175% of dying in an
equivalent car ride.

You're still 3X safer on a 7M8 than you are in your car.

Now, by no means should this be taken to say the planes shouldn't be fixed or
that Boeing should "get away with it." However, grounding all these planes and
pushing people into a less safe form of transit may actually end up causing
more harm than allowing the planes to fly with a fixed, short schedule to
resolving the problem.

[1] [https://www.seeker.com/how-common-are-skydiving-
accidents-17...](https://www.seeker.com/how-common-are-skydiving-
accidents-1765419215.html)

~~~
Reason077
> _" Driving is so much more dangerous than flying even if there’s a MAX crash
> every 6 months (doubtful)."_

I'm not sure that's correct. Let say there's 350 MAX aircraft in service,
flying 5 flights per day on average. In 6 months, thats about 320,000 flights.
So a 1 in 320,000 chance of a fatal crash. Let's say the average route length
is 1000 miles. That's 1 crash per 320 million miles flown, or 3.125 crashes
per billion miles flown.

If we assume an average of 150 passengers per flight, then it's _468 deaths
per billion miles_ for the MAX, compared to only 0.02 deaths per billion miles
across all aircraft. [1]

In the US, there are 12.5 deaths per billion miles driven, including
pedestrian and cyclist deaths from motor vehicle collisions.[1]

If it crashed once every 6 months, the MAX would be around _37X_ more
dangerous than driving, and _2340X_ more dangerous than an average commercial
flight in the United States.

[1]
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transportation_safety_in_the_U...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transportation_safety_in_the_United_States)

~~~
arcticbull
150,000 flights, 172 seats per is 25.8 million passenger seat-journeys. Given
the type, I think it's fair to say they're at least 1200mi long (why fly a 7M8
on a sub-2 hour flight, when you can just throw a regional jet at it). The
whole point of the MAX family is that it can fly further than a normal
variant. This is 30.96 billion passenger seat-miles. There were ~350 deaths.
This is 0.000000011 deaths per passenger seat-mile, or 11 per billion. This is
in line with but still less than driving (12.5 per your data source).

I imagine 1200 miles is short for an average 7M8 flight though, which could
make it substantially safer. With 2500 mile averages you get back to that 3X
number I cited. It's still no more a death trap than your average Honda Civic
(10% safer by your metrics, more by mine).

To your point, it is of course riskier than a different aircraft.

My whole thesis was to ask what effect this will have across the entire
population and how will humans react, irrationally, to this news.

~~~
ryantgtg
There are arguments against measuring crash rates by “number per vehicle miles
traveled” and instead by “number per vehicle hours traveled.” VMT is a product
of speed and time, and thus a fatalities-per-VMT metric will nearly always
show the faster routes to be safer.

But compare spending 20 minutes traveling 10 miles on a local street, vs 10
minutes traveling 10 miles on a freeway. Both are considered equally safe
using a fatalities-per-VMT model. But in the former, you’ve stayed safe for a
longer portion of your life. (See
[http://pedshed.net/?p=1050](http://pedshed.net/?p=1050))

Using that metric would make that Boeing far less safe compared with driving.

~~~
Pristina
But you travel to get somewhere not to be in a vehicle for X amount of time.
So why would any metrics besides per-distance be more relevant.

~~~
heliodor
As a traveler, I care about the trip, not the time nor the distance. If I take
this trip, what's my probability of dying if I fly it versus drive it.

Airplane travel have fixed segments (takeoff and landing, ascent, descent) and
variable segments (the coasting phase that varies by distance traveled). Car
travel is only the variable segment. Hard to compare apples to oranges.

------
Someone1234
They had no choice. When no other major regulator would stand with their
position, and the public didn't wish to fly on the Max 8, the position became
untenable.

After the flight data recorders are recovered from the Ethiopian Airlines
accident they could reevaluate if it turned out to be something else. But this
seems like a rational safety first position given what we know today.

Hopefully Boeing's April patch and mandatory additional training mitigates the
issue well enough to resume normal flight operations.

~~~
walkingolof
The fix may be as simple as a patch, but the customer confidence in the plan
is damaged, maybe beyond repair.

I know I will look twice next time going on a trip which plane I end up on,
I'm not sure I will go with a 737 Max anytime soon.

~~~
corbet
Remember all the early A320 crashes? Do you worry about stepping onto an A320
now? Unless the problem turns out to be far deeper, I suspect that this, too,
shall pass.

~~~
mrtksn
It doesn't look like anything like the 737MAX crashes though:
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_accidents_and_incident...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_accidents_and_incidents_involving_the_Airbus_A320_family)

"an a320 crashes every two years" sounds quite different than "a brand new
737MAX crashes during take off every 6 months because of the faulty sensor
thingy".

Also a320 family of 8605 aircraft took the life of 1393 passengers in 30
years, 737MAX is at %30 of that in two years and 350 aircraft.

737MAX accidents look very brutal and specific. It doesn't look like "ironing
out imperfections" but more like "this plane is broken, it falls off on take
off" \- regardless if that's the case, people see a pattern here.

~~~
syshax
Worth noting: 150 of the A320 count may be Germanwings Flight 9525 (unless you
already accounted for this) - which was suicide by pilot.

Not really fair to blame the plane in that case.

~~~
snowwrestler
It's not fair to blame the plane at all unless you're sure the crash was the
plane's fault, but that isn't stopping most of the people in this thread from
doing it.

~~~
hannasanarion
Airplanes don't have the right to a trial of their peers with presumption of
innocence.

Two crashes within six months is very abnormal. Abnormalities are evidence of
problems. Airline regulators are tasked with keeping people from dying, not
with protecting manufacturers' feelings.

~~~
snowwrestler
The Boeing 767 experienced _three_ crashes between the months of September
2001 and April 2002. I think you can guess what caused the first two.

You need more information than just a calendar and a model number to make
determinations of flight safety.

~~~
Alex3917
> I think you can guess what caused the first two.

You do realize they redesigned the plane after 9/11 to prevent that from
happening again, right?

~~~
snowwrestler
Yes but my point is that people don’t avoid the 767. Look upthread please,
this whole sub thread is about whether these incidents will cause consumers to
avoid 737 Max planes in the future.

My (apparently very controversial) opinion is that we don’t know enough to
predict that now, because we don’t know what caused the Ethiopian Air crash
yet.

~~~
brazzy
People never avoided the 767 because it was clear all along that the crashes
had noting to do with the plane.

People are avoiding the 737 MAX because given the current information it
definitely _could_ be a problem with the plane, in fact the information we
already have from the first crash makes it look like it's _very likely_ to be
a problem with the plane.

You option is not controversial, it's just wrong.

~~~
snowwrestler
> People are avoiding the 737 MAX because given the current information

Again: the topic here is predicting long-term damage to consumer confidence. I
understand what is happening right now.

The entire 787 fleet was grounded not more than a few years ago due to battery
issue. How many people actively avoid 787s today? Long-term consumer trust
depends not just the root cause of an accident, but also the perception of how
it was addressed. As the GP correctly points out, the 767 (and all other
planes, and security screening procedures) were redesigned to protect against
the type of attack that succeeded on September 11.

------
gdubs
Good lord, this has been such a disaster for the FAA’s image. Slower than
everyone else to ground the plane _and_ they project the appearance of being
susceptible to political winds. Not a good look.

~~~
mlindner
Isn't it more that the rest of the world is susceptible to political winds (US
plane) and the FAA is just holding the course?

~~~
nemothekid
A plane crashes and kills over 300 people, in two separate incidents, in an
industry where even minor crashes are rare, and you think the grounding of the
planes is "political"?

~~~
metalliqaz
FAA is not in the business of operating based on unsupported assumptions. The
investigation for the second crash is not complete and a root cause is not
known.

~~~
gregmac
If a third 737 Max 8 were to crash before a root cause of this crash can be
determined, would you then say it's a prudent move to ground them all? What
about a fourth? Fifth?

Is your position that _any_ grounding of the planes is unjustified until the
full root cause is determined, or that _" only"_ two crashes isn't enough to
justify this action?

While I would always rather understand root cause -- and it's absolutely
essential to get there eventually -- the world is full of imperfect
information and assumptions are sometimes all you have.

~~~
FabHK
One inexplicable crash is not a case for grounding, no; otherwise the
(incredibly safe) 777 would still be grounded because of MH 370.

Regarding the 737 MAX now, the prior Lion Air crash is reasonably well
understood. It has exposed some fundamental weakness and questionable design
choices, but the plane was still deemed safe to fly.

Thus, what we have is one unexplained crash. Why should it be grounded?

(Having said that, I'm avoiding the MAX as far as I can. But that's based
already on the Lion Air crash. So, I argue that it should've been grounded
after Lion Air became understood, or not at all.)

~~~
gizmo385
We have one unexplained crash where early reports about what happened
/strongly/ match the circumstances that brought down the LionAir flight. We
also have hundreds of public complaints from pilots across the United States
of similar unexpected nose down behavior from 737 MAX airplanes.

~~~
FabHK
Oh, I hadn't heard of those reports. It must be terrifying when your plane is
actively trying to kill you.

I don't understand how they could build MCAS on the basis of one (!) AoA
sensor.

~~~
salawat
It's one sensor per flight computer, and the diagnostic indicator to warn a
pilot of disagreeing AoA sensors is a paywalled upgrade.

------
lsh123
An interesting point was made by an airline pilot in one of the plane forums.
It appears that Max 8 with full trim deflection down doesn't have enough
controls authority to recover (at least in the syms). Thus, the trim issues
followed by disabling the trim can lead into a situation when pilots can not
recover the plan from steep descend. Of course, this is not necessarily what
have happened in real life and we need to see the data.

~~~
clon
Pilot here. Correct, in most aircraft that incorporate a trimmable horizontal
stabilizer, elevator authority will be insufficient to counteract the
aerodynamic effects of a the entire tailplane having deflected through a
certain point. Thus it is important to quickly recognize and correct a runaway
trim situation.

Of even more significance is that is currently unclear if it is even possible
for a pilot, once it has disengaged the trim motors (following faulty commands
from MCAS) to manually correct the trim as per Boeing procedure [1].

The problem lies in the fact that it makes a lot of sense to haul back on the
yoke as hard as you can if the nose starts dropping. Elevator upwards
deflection loads the tailplane aerodynamically in such a way that it becomes
harder to trim the tailplane in the required direction. Called colloquially a
yo-yo maneuver, you are then require to "offload" the tailplane (think - push
yoke forward..) in order to be able to manually correct the runaway trim.

Plane going nose down, push yoke forward at 500ft? I do not envy the crews at
the pointy end of those flights. My heart breaks just thinking about it.

The Lion Air pilots must have been pulling back on the sticks until their
tendons break, to no effect. I hope there is a special place in hell for
Boeing execs.

[1] 737 Flight Crew Training Manual, chapter Non-Normal Operations/Flight
Controls, sub heading Manual Stabilizer trim:

"Excessive air loads on the stabilizer may require effort by both pilots to
correct mis-trim. In extreme cases it may be necessary to aerodynamically
relieve the air loads to allow manual trimming. Accelerate or decelerate
towards the in-trim speed while attempting to trim manually."

This was recently brought to the attention of members of a certain pilots
forum that does not welcome lurkers, hence not adding a link.

~~~
mywittyname
Would it be inappropriate to ask for an explain-like-i'm-5 version of this?

~~~
bencpeters
Maybe not quite 5-year-old, but here's my attempt:

The elevator is the little wing at the back of an aircraft that tilts up and
down to make the nose go up and down. When the pilot is flying, this up-down
is what moving the yoke forward/back does.

The elevator also has a tab (the trim tab) part of the wing that can move
independently from the main part. This trimming movement allows for
adjustments to the plane's up/down movement that don't require the yoke
forward/back (this is useful to "lock in" the current desired
climb/descent/level flight so that pilots don't have to be constantly
pushing/pulling on the yoke to get the plane to be climbing/descending/level
the way they want it).

The 737-MAX has a system that automatically uses this trim tab to pitch the
nose of the plane down when it senses certain conditions, without notifying
the pilots. In this case (plane inexplicably pitching down), the natural
response from a pilot is going to be to pull back on the yoke to counteract.

This can cause issues because the act of pulling back on the yoke increases
the pressure on the elevator (because physics - the more the elevator deflects
in an attempt to change the plane's attitude, the more force the airstream
flowing over it exerts. This "catching the airflow" is why it can change the
plane's attitude at all). Apparently on this plane if the trim tab is way out
of line even if disconnect the erroneous system that was automatically
adjusting the trim tab and try to reset the trim to a safe position by hand,
the airflow over the "loaded" elevator (which is trying to counteract the
position of the trim tab and keep the plane from crashing) is too strong to
physically allow the manual control to move the tab. So the "correct"
procedure is to push the yoke in (allowing the nose to go down/lose altitude)
to reduce the airflow that's hitting the elevator, while frantically spinning
the manual trip wheel to get it back to neutral. Then, once you've reset the
trim manually, you presumably pull back on the yoke to get the nose up and
pull the plane out of the dive.

The issue with that is that the ground can get in the way in between when
you've let off the yoke and you've spun the wheel enough to get the trim tab
back to neutral.

~~~
clon
Incorrect, this describes a typical General Aviation aircraft with trim tabs.
Most (all?) airliners use a trimmable tailplane, meaning the entire tailplane
tilts up and down to trim for a specific speed.

~~~
inferiorhuman
_Incorrect, this describes a typical General Aviation aircraft with trim tabs.
Most (all?) airliners use a trimmable tailplane, meaning the entire tailplane
tilts up and down to trim for a specific speed._

The only airliner I can think of that uses trim tabs is the DC-9 and its
derivatives (MD-80/MD-90/Boeing 717). Some, like the L-1011, went in the
completely opposite direction and use an "all moving tailplane" where the
functions of the elevator and stabilizer were integrated into one piece.

------
clon
The current "industry standard" is 1 accident per 10 million flights. I think
the MAX 8 has racked up something around 150K flights with 2 accidents. So
yes, the statistics represent an anomaly.

~~~
avip
Naive null hypothesis: ~0.8% that MAX 8 is as safe as other planes and the
shared accidents are a coincidence.

~~~
fela
I assume you meant: If an airplane is as safe as average then it has
PUT_NUMBER chance of having 2 incidents after 150k flights. 0.01% is actually
the number I'm getting, assuming parent estimates are correct and making naive
assumptions. In other words only 1 every 10 000 airplane models will have 2
incidents that early on if they are of average safety.

That is different then stating the probability of it being as safe as the
average airplane, which you can't do as easily without additional
modelling/priors and bayesian statistics.

~~~
avip
<addressing all comments>

Lies, damn lies, and statistics. The NH is that a plane has 1/10 [M * flights]
failure rate. The odds of 2 failures in 20M flights falling in same (random)
stride of 150K flights are 150K/20M = 0.75%.

[E: fixed numbers] [EE: yes, I admit this calculation is incorrect]

------
foobarbazetc
[https://twitter.com/ByMikeBaker/status/1105909327255080960](https://twitter.com/ByMikeBaker/status/1105909327255080960)

This is more revealing than they’d like, I think.

~~~
elliekelly
> In a statement, Boeing said it recommended to the Federal Aviation
> Administration that the 737 Max be grounded "out of an abundance of caution
> and in order to reassure the flying public of the aircraft's safety."

A company is recommending _to their regulator_ that the regulator take action
_against_ them. That is a pretty solid indicator that the lawyers have a rough
idea of potential liability and are now trying to mitigate damages.

~~~
stochastic_monk
A day after personally calling the president to ask him to prevent the
regulator from taking action. This is just a bad attempt at saving face.

~~~
jtuente
Since the grounding has affected search queries, could you help me with a
citation?

~~~
ceejayoz
[https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/business/boeing-737-groun...](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/business/boeing-737-grounding-
faa.html)

> Early Tuesday, Dennis A. Muilenburg, the chief executive of Boeing, spoke to
> President Trump on the phone and made the case that the 737 Max planes
> should not be grounded in the United States, according to two people briefed
> on the conversation.

------
kregasaurusrex
What's the current status regarding analysis of the black box data recorder?
The only source I've seen [0] states that Germany lacks the software to
analyze it. "This is a new type of aircraft with a new black box, with new
software. We can't do it," BFU spokesman Germout Freitag said.

[0] [https://www.dailysabah.com/africa/2019/03/13/ethiopia-
cannot...](https://www.dailysabah.com/africa/2019/03/13/ethiopia-cannot-read-
black-box-from-boeing-jet-crash-to-send-it-abroad)

------
dragontamer
This shouldn't be Trump announcing the ban. Either FAA or Secretary of
Transportation should be announcing the grounding of flights. Its just odd to
me that Trump would be involved...

~~~
caprese
The President is analogous to the Chairman/CEO of [most of] the executive
branch. That role can tell them what to do and what do focus on, but mostly
doesn't. He told them what to do, now the FAA has to do it. The Secretary of
Transportation could likely have unilaterally issued an order without needing
it to tell the FAA what to do, or waiting for the President.

But either way, this is symbolic and shows the stance of the government to the
world and internally. The highest office in the US is grounding the planes
like the rest of the world is, the administrative nuances are irrelevant.
Boeing and the airlines would be the ones to challenge it, way to go for PR.

~~~
dragontamer
Of course the President can just tell the FAA what to do. I understand that.

The question is how the public should have been informed by the event. Dan
Elwell, the acting director of the FAA, is both a military and commercial
pilot. If he made the announcement, it would have carried far more weight than
Trump (who likely doesn't know much about airplanes).

~~~
Const-me
> Trump (who likely doesn't know much about airplanes)

Trump owned an airline with a fleet of 17 Boeings. He also used 2 large
Boeings as private jets.

Very likely he knows a thing or 2 about airplanes.

~~~
rsynnott
I own quite a nice spider plant.

Surprisingly, I am not a botanist.

~~~
Const-me
You likely know about spider plants much more than average person who doesn't
have any of them.

------
ergothus
Does anyone have any idea WHY the US was the holdout here? I'm not well-
versed, but my understanding is that aviation safety is generally very good,
and that the US is not an outlier on the bad side. While grounding a plane at
this point is premature from the stance of conclusion, it seems reasonable
from the standpoint of excessive caution that seems to be the norm for the
industry.

I can conjecture about Boeing being a big US manufacturer, etc, but is there
any evidence at all for why the US held out on this one? My initial reaction
was that there must be a good reason for the holdout, given our safety record,
but on reading more about it, I've not seen one. (Again, relative to the
stance of excessive caution).

~~~
sschueller
Boeing and the FAA have a deal to let Boeing self regulate. In exchange they
are supposed to tell the FAA of any internal issues. [1]

This of course is insane when you are talking about a for profit business.

[1] [https://youtu.be/vWxxtzBTxGU](https://youtu.be/vWxxtzBTxGU) 20min in.

~~~
snowwrestler
It's a shame this is getting upvoted because it's an incomplete picture.

FAA Delegated Organizations

Page:
[https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/designees_...](https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/designees_delegations/delegated_organizations/)

"Regular FAA oversight of an ODA is accomplished by a team of FAA engineers
and inspectors to ensure the ODA holder functions properly and that any
approvals or certificates issued meet FAA safety standards."

List of delegated organizations:
[https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/designees_...](https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/designees_delegations/designee_types/media/ODADirectory.pdf)

Spoiler: there's a lot more than Boeing on there.

I don't know about the specific concerns in that video, just replying to the
insinuation that Boeing has some strange deal that exempts their planes from
oversight by the FAA. They don't.

------
laythea
Maybe the F.A.A is a bit too cosy with Boeing?

~~~
aaronbrethorst
Probably, but I’m guessing the problem lies elsewhere in this case.

[https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2019/3/13/18263719/b...](https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2019/3/13/18263719/boeing-ceo-dennis-muilenburg-trump-tweet-call)

[https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-
military/2019/03/13/...](https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-
military/2019/03/13/shanahan-faces-ig-complaint-over-boeing-ties/)

------
qrbLPHiKpiux
Reading one of the pictographs in the article, it's noting that the heavier
engines changed the aerodynamics of the plane in a negative way. Boeing
engineers added what they call MCAS to counter these negative effects.

Now, I'm not an aerospace engineer, but common sense tells me that if you add
something to a system that introduces a negative effect, you remove that
something - not add something else to counter it.

But, that's me.

~~~
0xffff2
That's kind of a simplistic view, isn't it? By that logic you should remove
the pilots, crew and passengers since they add a negative effect (weight) to
the plane.

~~~
AnimalMuppet
In medical instruments, we preferred to _eliminate_ a failure mode rather than
_mitigate_ it (when possible). That's not the same as saying "just don't build
the device".

~~~
0xffff2
Preferred how strongly? Eliminating the failure mode in this case means
designing a whole new wing from scratch, which is nearly the same amount of
work as designing a whole new plane from scratch. So Boeing's alternatives
(while maintaining the same efficiency) were to completely replace the 737, or
fix the issue in software. The latter option is obviously vastly less
expensive. If you're confidence in the software fix is high, it's probably a
reasonably choice. _In hindsight_ Boeing's confidence may have been misplaced.

------
everybodyknows
Also see @salawat above on nacelle lift-induced pitch instability. We now have
airliners that begin to resemble the F-117 in their dependence on computers
for controllability in flight.

~~~
fsloth
There's nothing wrong with unstable airframes. Military craft have required
computer assisted flight for decades.

What's problematic with 737 MAX is that the stability assist was obviously
installed as an after thought, and even worse, it's dependent on
instrumentation that does not have several layers of fault tolerance as would
be the case if it was actually built with the care that planes actually
require to be as dependable as they are.

So the instability is not a problem. That boeing tried to get around it with a
cheap patch of jury rigged software that is depending on input from non-fault-
safe instrumentation, is.

~~~
brianberns
Inherent instability in a commercial aircraft seems like a very bad idea.
Safety has to the top priority. The military has very different priorities.

~~~
cm2187
And would that affect its capacity to glide?

~~~
cjbprime
Not in this case, since the instability is caused by the lift generated by the
engines.

~~~
siralonso
IIRC, the instability is caused by the engine nacelles (the metal shroud
around the turbofan), and therefore is present whether the engines are active
or not.

------
paxy
It was inevitable at this point. Sad that it had to happen due to the external
pressure of _every other country in the world_ banning it first.

~~~
mlindner
IT wasn't inevitable. There's nothing that's found to be unsafe about the
aircraft. If anything it shows that airlines in other countries don't train
their pilots properly. MCAS can be disabled by an easily visible switch
directly in the cockpit and you can override it with manual trim control as
well. The Lion aircraft that crashed before was having MCAS problems _FOUR_
flights repeatedly before the one that crashed. Third world aircraft
maintenance combined with poor pilot training and non-idiot proof software
made these disasters happen. It's not something that would happen in the US or
any other first world country.

~~~
taurath
I’m sure you’re willing to hop on a flight with one of these planes, but I’m
not and I doubt the majority of people who’ve heard about it are. Canada saw
the same sort of flight pattern dip in the new crash that happened to the old
one. It’s only that the FAA administrator is a lobbyist of the air
manufacturing industry that they didn’t follow suit.

~~~
sgregnt
Still, the flight might be a way safer than taking a ride in a car.

------
SomeHacker44
“Based on new information...”

What new information??? Or maybe “the taste of egg on our face?”

~~~
joelhaasnoot
See this PDF:
[https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/media/Emergency_Order.pdf](https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/media/Emergency_Order.pdf):

"On March 13, 2019, the investigation of ET302 crash developed new information
from the wreckage concerning the aircraft's configuration just after takeoff
that, taken together with new ly refined data from satellite-based tracking of
the aircraft's flight path, indicates some similarities between the ET302 and
JT610 accidents that warrant further investigation of the possibility of a
shared cause for the two incidents that needs to be better understood and
addressed"

------
kaycebasques
All of this news has prompted me to see where Boeing stock is at. Beyond the
expected decline in price, I was more interested to find out how parabolic
BA's price rise has been in the last 5 years.

Side note: I tried finding a site that would let me link out to a chart
showing the full price history of BA. It's surprisingly difficult to find.

~~~
nostrademons
Basically they bet right on where the future of commercial aviation is going:
more direct flights rather than hub-and-spoke connections, smaller jets that
the airlines can fill completely, fuel efficiency is critical, and the air
travel industry as a whole would recover after a pretty miserable first decade
of the millenia. Their main competitor, Airbus, bet wrong, investing heavily
in the A380 which hasn't found much of a market. That's been reflected in
their profits lately: 787 and 777 sales have been quite robust, while
A330/A350/A380 orders have been anemic.

~~~
kaycebasques
Good insight, thank you!

------
gabrielblack
In this list of 737 accidents, correct me if I'm wrong, seems that the crashes
for similar reasons (shortly after takeoff) are 3 , not 2. There is other one
(May 18, 2018 ) involving a 737-100/200 that seems strictly related to the
other two by time and dynamic:
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_accidents_and_incident...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_accidents_and_incidents_involving_the_Boeing_737)

~~~
disillusioned
The 737-200 that crashed was a 40-year-old airframe, and the crash
characteristics are only similar in that they all occurred shortly after
takeoff.

The 737-MAX-8 crashes occurred within 6 months of each other, both on a brand
new airframe on a new aircraft with a new control and sensor system that
produced VERY similar profiles in rapid climbs and descents that point to an
issue with said new autopilot.

The MAX-8 and the 200 are VERY different aircraft, even if they're
fundamentally built around an original ancestor.

------
pravda
Is this a buying opportunity for Boeing stock?

NYSE: BA $373.96

Seems to be 'discounted'.

~~~
anonu
Never catch a falling knife.

Source: Career spent as a Wall Street Trader

~~~
ceejayoz
You can pick one up off the floor, though.

There's every reason to believe a) Boeing will take a hit for this and b)
Boeing will _not_ go out of business because of this.

~~~
astine
Yeah, but whether the hit is permanent or long lasting is still up in the air
(unlike the 737 Max 8). On the one hand this could just turn out to be a
coincidence or an easily fixed issue and Boeing's stock will rebound quickly.
Or it could mean a massive recall of this model which will hurt Boeing for
years to come. The current price is a reflection of this uncertainty and it
could go either way.

~~~
aphextron
It wouldn't surpise me if this were the final nail that shifted global orders
toward the A320 Neo. Boeing has been putting lipstick on a pig with the 737
for 20 years now and people know it. They've only held out so long on their
reputation at this point, and now that's in the gutter. The A320 Neo is an all
around better, more modern aircraft built with computerized systems in mind
from the ground up.

~~~
anamexis
> The A320 Neo is an all around better, more modern aircraft built with
> computerized systems in mind from the ground up.

Isn't the A320neo _also_ new engine lipstick on a 30 year old airframe?

~~~
snovv_crash
The 737 was a 30 year old airframe 20 years ago. Boeing was really trying to
sneak past regulators on this one - reading pilot forums, people are also
complaining about avionics updates that they didn't get any re-training for
either.

------
ilaksh
It sounds like what you really need are flawless automated systems because
humans will not always be able to compensate if the system errors are serious
enough. And in this case they tacked on a kludgey flight control subsystem
without adequate testing to see how it impacted the overall flight control,
and did not bother telling the pilots. The executives probably did this to
save money even though engineering told them it was unethical.

------
CydeWeys
I'm curious to know how much civil disobedience there's been at airports once
passengers realized they'd be flying a 737 MAX. With well over 100 people on a
typical flight, and it only taking one dissenter to cause a disturbance that
can ripple out to many more passengers, it may have been untenable to continue
flying these anyway.

~~~
sfilargi
> civil disobedience

What do you mean civil disobedience? It’s not like there is a law forcing you
to board the plane if you don’t want to.

~~~
wizzard
Sure, but you won’t get a refund for your ticket or your time. And some people
might feel compelled to alert their fellow passengers if they felt the airline
was planning to put them on a plane they felt was unsafe. These things could
lead to anger, hence civil disobedience.

~~~
mywittyname
My experience has been airlines will rebook you if you have legitimate safety
fears.

------
jshowa3
Honestly, this is tantamount to negligence by the FAA. This plane should've
been grounded immediately and all of them checked for maximum safety. But the
US, as dumb as always, just goes "nothing to see here", "we're waiting for
data despite the data being 2 crashes where everyone died in 5 months".

~~~
briandear
What "checks?" They've already been checked for maximum safety and US and
Canadian pilots aren't crashing in them.

~~~
jshowa3
So if over 200 people die on your watch in a statistically unlikely event,
you're not going to re-check the planes? What makes US and Canadian pilots
anymore worse than Indonesian and Ethiopian pilots? In the Indonesian case, it
was a known software fault.

------
chx
I asked yesterday on Aviation stackexchange
[https://aviation.stackexchange.com/q/61069/11524](https://aviation.stackexchange.com/q/61069/11524)
whether the EASA and the FAA has disagreed on the airworthiness of a plane
before. I doubt they did.

~~~
acqq
At least there is a new statement from FAA, different from the one you link to
in there:

[https://pbs.twimg.com/media/D1j5YuBXQAATWlk.jpg](https://pbs.twimg.com/media/D1j5YuBXQAATWlk.jpg)

"March 13, 2019 | 3:00 p.m. ET

STATEMENT FROM THE FAA ON ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES

The FAA is ordering the temporary grounding of Boeing 737 MAX aircraft
operated by U.S. airlines or in U.S. territory. _The agency made this decision
as a result of the data gathering process and new evidence collected at the
site and analyzed today. This evidence, together with newly refined satellite
data available to FAA this morning, led to this decision._ The grounding will
remain in effect pending further investigation, including examination of
information from the aircraft's flight data recorders and cockpit voice
recorders. An FAA team is in Ethiopia assisting the NTSB as parties to the
investigation of the Flight 302 accident. The agency will continue to
investigate"

Their previous one, less than 24 hours ago, had: "Thus far, our review shows
no systemic performance issues and provides no basis to order grounding the
aircraft. Nor have other civil aviation authorities provided data to us that
would warrant action."

------
dreamcompiler
And Boeing recommended it, which was (finally) the smart move on their part.
It's the only way to regain the public's confidence. If one more 737 Max had
fallen out of the sky, it would have meant the end of the company. At least
this way, Boeing is getting out in front of the problem. Better late than
never.

------
tinyhouse
Right move finally. Like I said in the post about Canada, at this point it's
even better for Boeing. No one in the US wants to fly in this plane so it's
better for Boeing if it's grounded.

------
sanj
I studied aircraft UX as my dissertation work. I’ll admit it is a few years
out of date, but unlike JavaScript libraries, aircraft don’t change that fast.

Here's my understanding/analysis of the situation: 1\. Boeing was under
pressure to create a more fuel-efficient version of the 737NG to compete with
Airbus's A320neo. The 737MAX was the result. 2\. In order to be lower
investment for airlines, it was critical that the 737MAX share a type rating
with the 737NG. This meant that a pilot certified ("checked out") on an NG
would be able to fly on the MAX without further certification. 3\. To gain
fuel efficiency, the MAX has larger engines. To first order, larger engines
result in more efficiency: by accelerating _more_ air by a smaller amount you
leave less energy in the air that's exiting the aircraft. The larger and more
efficient engines results in 14% less fuel burn. That's a major improvement!
4\. The larger engines and their placement resulted in a "pitch-up moment"
during certain flight regimes. What this means is that when you add a lot of
power to climb, and/or during steep turns. 5\. To compensate and – this is
critical – to maintain the same type certification, Boeing added something
called MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation) which nudged the nose
down by trimming the stabilizer (the horizontal bit of the tail) down (which
pushes the tail down and therefore the nose up). It appears to be activated
without pilot input. 6\. There are other mechanisms which also "trim the stab
down" and there has always been a mechanism which disconnects them: pulling
back hard on the yoke. This is a natural motion for pilots because in all
flight regimes pulling back on the yoke pulls the nose up, which is what you
want to if the nose is going down. There is a backup mechanism as well which
involves flipping a pair of cutout switches and manually taking over. 7\. My
speculation is that because MCAS was considered critical to making the MAX fly
"like" the NG, the first disconnect mechanism was removed on the MAX. This is
critical bit #2: the obvious/intuitive mechanism to disable something pushing
the nose down was removed. 8\. Because MCAS was so important, two (?) Angle of
Attack sensors were added to the MAX. These sensors appear to fail more often
than they should. In aviation terms that might mean they work 99.99% of the
time, not 99.999%. 9\. So now you have a situation where an aircraft has a
required mechanism to fly/feel like another aircraft in order to maintain a
consistent type rating but which is reliant on a shaky sensor. And when the
sensor fails, the mechanism has – purposefully – been made more difficult to
disconnect. From what I can tell, this entire set of decisions was driven by
this type certificate/rating decision. That's the key mistake. I understand
why this was done from a business standpoint, but if you're going to rely on
manipulating flight characteristics it had better be bulletproof. Note that
I'm not against the philosophy: Airbus has been doing it successfully for 25
years starting with the A320. But this isn't bulletproof. As it stands today,
I wouldn't fly on the aircraft. Pilots are following this stuff pretty closely
and are incredibly well-trained, but in a high pressure, low altitude, high
wingload, high AoA situation, having them fiddle around looking for switches
is a huge mistake. I have never said this about an aircraft before. I expect
Boeing to re-enable the yoke disconnect and for the FAA to require
recertification and a new type certificate for pilots to fly the MAX.
Unfortunately, for Boeing, this will make them far, far less enticing to buy.

~~~
salawat
>To compensate and – this is critical – to maintain the same type
certification, Boeing added something called MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics
Augmentation) which nudged the nose down by trimming the stabilizer (the
horizontal bit of the tail) down (which pushes the tail down and therefore the
nose up).

You reversed that.

MCAS is designed to force the nose down (that part is right) to counteract an
upward pitching moment. That requires the leading edge of the horizontal plane
to trim upwards, increasing lift at the tail, which pitches the craft's nose
downward.

I think.

------
sangd
Maybe FAA should be grounded too, it's obvious to have the plane grounded
based on the public data and patterns. Why does it take longer than that to
make a decision.

------
benatkin
I'm guessing that Southwest didn't have these. They seem to get everything
important right.

Edit: I was dead wrong. They had more 737 Max 8's than any other airline in
the US.

~~~
ak217
Southwest has more 737max than anyone else. However they have outfitted it
with an optional avionics package that includes a HUD, an additional AoA
sensor and indicator in the HUD and PFD, and an "AoA disagree" indicator
light. ([https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/southwest-
airlines...](https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/southwest-airlines-is-
adding-new-angle-of-attack-indicators-to-its-737-max-fleet/))

They also train their pilots using a 737max specific curriculum.

~~~
Relys
Why was a safety critical system (which was really only needed to place a
bandied on retrofitting bigger motors on an older frame design) being sold as
an "optional package". You need at least 3 redundant sensors in any safety
critical system. This is just basic rocket science. Boeing and the FAA are
negligent and should not be trusted.

~~~
crocal
« You need at least 3 redundant sensors in any safety critical system «

Huh? Says who?

~~~
PuffinBlue
You need at least three in any system that can deliver conflicting data so
that if one faults then the other two can 'out vote' the faulty one.

That allows the system to have at least one failure and still operate.

With just two sensors any fault is an unidentifiable failure - how does the
system know which is correct when there are just two votes?

It may be there's a third input from some other sensort, but then technically
we're back to at least 3 sensors voting on the issue.

~~~
dreamcompiler
It's an AoA sensor. Planes flew without AoA sensors for 100 years; it's a
_useful_ sensor but not a _critical_ sensor. Pilots and autopilots are
perfectly capable of flying planes without it. If two AoA sensors disagree,
you just stop making decisions based on the AoA sensor and fly the plane
without it.

~~~
inferiorhuman
The crux of the problem is that the NG/MAX isn't certified to fly with
malfunctioning alpha vanes. On the NG and MAX the effort required to move the
control column varies based on the angle-of-attack (a.k.a. elevator feel
system). On the MAX the airspeed calculation is influenced by the AoA and MCAS
is triggered by data from a single alpha vane with no sanity checking.

Functioning alpha vanes are critical on the MAX and NG.

~~~
dreamcompiler
That's the huge design flaw. They should have made the AoA sensors either
critical and triply redundant, or not critical at all (as is typical).

------
mrhappyunhappy
It feels like there is an online service business idea in here somewhere. Some
sort of way to verify the items that impact your life every day are safe and
updated.

------
zitterbewegung
Does Boeing have the ability to disable the subsystem in the 737 Maxes that is
the issue? (I’m not saying that this would be an alternative just curious .)

~~~
linuxftw
Probably, but from everything I've read to date on the issue, the feature is a
safety requirement due to the increased possibility of nose lift during
takeoff, which might create a stall.

So, 'just disable the trim' that has been throw around really sounds like
they're disabling a critical feature, safety-wise, and while it's possible to
fly the plane successfully without it, someone somewhere determined it was
less-safe to do so.

------
vonseel
Is this somehow related to the recent articles on historic problems with
rudder design in the 737?

------
VectorLock
Its a shame that the airplane safety streak we were one has been so firmly and
decisively ended.

------
wine_labs
I wonder if this will create a "land rush" situation in the aircraft leasing
market.

Maybe not given that only 130 737-Max aircraft have been delivered to
airlines.

Does anyone here know how aircraft leasing works in scenario like this? e.g.
grounding of an aircraft model for an unknown duration, do airlines have the
option so "switch out" currently leased aircraft?

~~~
kenneth
350+ 737MAX have been delivered

------
SubiculumCode
I have to fly soon. Do yu suppose prices will go up, or are there enough
planes to go around?

------
brainpool
I thought that was up to the FAA, but maybe it is an executive order.

~~~
dingaling
Perhaps this will be the point at which the current state of the FAA comes
under scrutiny and review.

In the UK the equivalent CAA is half-jokingly called "Campaign Against
Aviation" for its merciless regulation.

The FAA seems to have veered in the opposite direction, inviting manufacturer
staff to lead certification processes etc

------
miguelmota
Good move but wish they did it sooner compared to other countries.

------
kappi
Boeing 737 Max 8 has a different software system. That software is now a focus
of investigators. The Max 8 is outfitted with bigger, more fuel-efficient
engines than earlier 737s, and the weight and positioning of those engines
shifted the plane's center of gravity forward, increased the potential for the
nose to pitch up after take-off. To counteract this risk, Boeing developed
software known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or
MCAS.

Max 8s come equipped with a sensor that reads the plane's angle relative to
the wind flow, prompting MCAS to automatically trigger the plane's nose to
angle downward if it gets a specific reading.

However, problems could arise if the MCAS system gets erroneous sensor
readings. The system automatically pushes the plane's nose down, potentially
surprising pilots who are unfamiliar with the system and overriding their
commands.This is what investigators believe happened to Lion Air Flight 610
before it crashed in October

more details
[https://www.cbsnews.com/news/boeing-737-max-8-boeing-737-800...](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/boeing-737-max-8-boeing-737-800-how-
are-the-planes-different/)

~~~
subhro
>The Max 8 is outfitted with bigger, more fuel-efficient engines than earlier
737s, and the weight and positioning of those engines shifted the plane's
center of gravity forward, increased the potential for the nose to pitch up
after take-off.

Umm, a little confused here, if the center of gravity shifted forward, why
will the pitch up tendency increase?

~~~
aphextron
>Umm, a little confused here, if the center of gravity shifted forward, why
will the pitch up tendency increase?

Because the center of thrust is also moved forward, and its effect is much
greater than that offset by the center of mass. The 737 airframe was never
designed to handle such powerful engines.

~~~
teleclimber
The center of thrust moving forward would not have any effect on the pitching
moment.

~~~
aphextron
>The center of thrust moving forward would not have any effect on the pitching
moment.

Sure it would. Here's a better explanation than I care to make:
[https://www.quora.com/Where-should-the-center-of-mass-
lift-a...](https://www.quora.com/Where-should-the-center-of-mass-lift-and-
thrust-be-on-a-jet)

"If the Center of Thrust does not act through the Center of Gravity there will
be a moment causing the aircraft to pitch, yaw or roll about the axes of the
aircraft and the moment(s) must be counter balanced by design (including
provision for trimming when the thrust is varied)."

Boeing chose to counteract that newly induced pitch moment with software, so
that they could sell the MAX 8 to airlines as not requiring any new training
or type ratings. And now nearly 400 people are dead because of a marketing
decision.

~~~
teleclimber
If you move an engine forwards (or backwards) you are moving it along its
thrust vector. Therefore the moment resulting from the distance between the
thrust vector and the center of mass is unchanged.

Source: Physics 101

~~~
AnimalMuppet
Right, but if you increase the _power_ , you increase the moment.

------
gist
Let's be clear about what is happening here. This is simply a 'not on my
watch' and 'CYA' philosophy that is what society has become today with so many
news hungry sources and social media. Anyone in a position of power is so
worried about getting blamed by irrational people for a bad outcome that they
will simply make a choice to prevent that from happening at any cost. This
doesn't mean that it's the wrong choice. But the fact is all anyone has to
think is 'wow if this happens a third time I will get blamed'. [1] The old
'abundance of caution'.

The fact is at what point do you do this? What about an extreme. Like every
time there is any crash just ground every single plane until the extensive
investigation is done?

[1] And it should be irrelevant what has happened in other countries as far as
grounding as well. Assumes they have concluded something and have more facts
which of course they don't.

Edit: I love when people who comment on HN based on what they read feel that
they know more about the actual risk than the people (per my reply to a
comment) at Boeing.

~~~
Mizza
I don't feel this way at all. The more we learn, the more it seems like Boeing
misrepresented the extent of the changes they made inbetween the 737 and
737MAX8/9 models in order to avoid recertification, then undereducated the
pilots about those changes.

As a consumer who has flown on these plans many times, I'm glad they have been
grounded until a fix can be deployed.

~~~
gist
> The more we learn, the more it seems like Boeing misrepresented the extent
> of the changes

Based on what? News stories that have come out? Is that the highly accurate
source?

~~~
blackflame7000
Based on the physical fact that the engines are different, mounted in a
different place, and generate different thrust vectors.

~~~
ssambros
Engines are also very different between 737 Original and Classic, so having
different thrust vectors between generations is not happening for the first
time.

~~~
gist
And exactly my point. The parent comment stated a fact that could be true or
not be true. And it's almost certainly something they read and therefore
interpreted as significant an important fact. And that was what I was saying.
All the info you read regardless of whether it is quoting an expert or not [1]
comes 2nd hand and with nominal validity vs. people at Boeing being in a
position (by the fact they employ and have access to actual experts) much
better able to assess the danger. Of course I don't know if what you are
saying is correct but that doesn't matter for the point I am making but thanks
for making it just the same!

[1] Which assumes the expert is even being quoted correctly which as anyone
knows is not always the case.

------
brainpool
Assuring to see that Trump has more sense than the FAA and Boeing, although he
is a bit late to the party.

------
Trisell
I find it scary that Trump had to issue an Executive Order to get this to
happen. It tells me that the FAA no longer cares about safety, but is more
interested in corporate interests over the lives of 180+ people at any given
time.

------
shaki-dora
Welcome to the end of the thought process.

~~~
dang
Could you please stop posting unsubstantive comments to Hacker News?

------
nodesocket
Since this was Trump who issued the grounding order, can we finally dismiss
all the previous HN comments of people saying the FAA and Trump are in cahoots
to keep 737 Max 8's flying in the US to prop up Boeing.

\-- Edit -- Apparently not. Now all the comments are blaming the FAA and
saying it is fishy it took an executive order.

~~~
everdev
I think it's the lack of information that's scaring people. We don't know why
the Ethiopian flight went down, it's just really suspicious that 2 brand new
airplanes crashed catastrophically so soon after delivery.

I think it's a good move until we know the full picture though. Better to err
on the side of caution when lives could be at stake.

~~~
ams6110
Everyone seems to be zeroed in on MCAS. Completely unknown at this time
whether that system was related to the Ethopian crash. What the two crashes do
have in common other than the aircraft model is a third world carrier, dubious
pilot qualifications, and heavy reliance on automation. But it's somehow not
OK to talk about that.

~~~
salawat
Ethiopian Captain had over 8000 hours, and the airline is a Category(right
word?) 1 Airline, able to fly into and out of the U.S. directly. They actually
have a stellar safety record.

Just because it's Africa doesn't mean the operators were lacking.

------
pulse7
(Guessing upon all available information) It seems that something is wrong
when the auto-pilot is turned on... And this seems to happen a few minutes
after the take off...

~~~
fixermark
Official rulings aren't in yet, so this is all wild speculation, but the
dominant hypothesis appears to be that these new planes are equipped with MCAS
("Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System") software that is supposed
to account for inherent aerodynamic instability in the design by making it
much harder for the pilot to accidentally crash the plane.

Without going into too much detail: there are many tradeoffs in airframe
design, but one of them is fuel efficiency vs. inherent stability. Some
airframe designs eke out a bit more miles-per-gallon at the cost of having
ranges of motion where if the pilot gets the plane into that state, the
feedback loops on motion become positive and the plane is likely to tip over,
stall out, spin, etc. Boeing's Max-8 design makes this tradeoff, and the MCAS
system is supposed to help compensate for this design by forcing the pilot to
nose the plane down (to improve airflow over the wings and generate more lift)
if the plane is pitched too high.

Problem might be that MCAS can malfunction and think the plane is pitching up
when it's not, and if the pilot can't figure out how to disable it, they get
very confusing signals--- _they 're_ pulling back on the stick to get the
plane to climb, but MCAS is pushing the stick _forward_ to avoid an expected
stall that a malfunctioning sensor is telling it will happen. End result:
pilot and the computer fight each other while the very important business of
"keeping the plane in the air" isn't done and the plane crashes.

~~~
heisenbit
It sounds to me not just a software issue but a systems issue where software,
hardware and architecture play a role. What used to be a sensor to measure the
angle of attack became suddenly key input, single source in a short term
control loop for the most vital axis. What could go wrong...

Taking into account the other sensor data is an obvious choice. A better
understanding the quality of the sensor data in real field operation may also
be required. Clearer stabilization problem indication, quicker manual
disengage of auto pilot (several reports of nose down events) and MCAS are
others. Decreasing the allowed tail trim for MCAS is another.

Then that leaves: Another one or two sensors. Independent review of the engine
control laws (report of unexpected low thrust when climbing).

There is a lot to be done. The plane was rolled out too early and fixing the
cut corners for real could take a while.

------
irq11
It wasn’t _inevitable_ ; if it happened solely because Trump made them do it
(edit: the article now seems to contradict this, but did not when I wrote the
comment) it’s truly a red-letter day for rationality and evidence-based
reasoning.

The conversation around this subject has degraded to irrational hysteria, but
really: do you think Trump knows anything about airline safety? Is this really
how we want the system to work?

Today it’s an airplane model, but tomorrow it’s banning travel from Africa
because of an emerging disease, or capitulating to anti-vaxxers because of a
news story.

~~~
jerkstate
I mean.. the guy did own and operate an airline at one point. So it's a little
silly to say he knows _nothing_ about it, no matter how much you don't like
the guy.

~~~
hilbertseries
I mean, he also claimed that newer airplanes are less safe than older
airplanes. Which seems pretty absurd given that crashes have been trending
down for sometime.

[https://theweek.com/speedreads/828609/trump-claims-old-
simpl...](https://theweek.com/speedreads/828609/trump-claims-old-simpler-
airplanes-safer-such-planes-actually-crashed-more-often)

------
taurath
That it took the president to do this is a pretty awful condemnation of the
FAA. Maybe he shouldn’t have appointed an industry lobbyist to the position in
the first place.

------
ausjke
The whole software is made in India and now is said having major software
flaws. This is not the first time.

The rest engineers in Boeing, many are not longer first class, they got their
jobs because of race and gender.

Your future heart doctor might be from the best medical school, but they might
get in either by bribery or worse, by AA(affirmative action), they're not
really up to the job, and they may kill you with good intentions without you
knowing it.

Let the merited-based engineers do the most critical designs in this country
please, people actually are different. For those who thinks everything should
be absolutely equal, while that thought make you high whenever you think about
it, you and many others may get killed by that ideology.

------
tuna-piano
The reactions of Boeing (and potentially the FAA) deserve much more criticism
than the actual mistakes which led to the crashes. Accidental
mistakes/oversights are expected and can be forgiven. Thoughtful responses
which seem to have attempted to put profit above moral standards cannot be
forgiven.

Many other thoughts...

-People, including executives, seem to have a very hard time thinking big picture. Q4 2018 financial results seem so important only in the time period around Q4 2018. History doesn't care about Q4 2018. History will care about the crashes (especially the second, more preventable one which happened while Boeing was working on software fixes "to make a safe plane safer")

-Overall, it is bizarre living through and watching these two crashes and the reactions to them in real time. I've often watched episodes of air crash investigation shows, the most interesting being series of crashes of the same aircraft models from decades ago (before I was in adulthood).

-No doubt that Boeing will be viewed negatively in historical light. Their culpability was sealed with their reaction to Lion Air, and only further worsened with their reaction to Ethiopian.

-I think the worst possible outcome for Boeing will be if it is determined that the MCAS issue is nonrecoverable even with the instructions that Boeing has repeated.

Still curious... what made the FAA and Boeing switch sides on this issue?

1\. Was there new information? (Satellite data, etc)? -or-

2\. In the inevitability of a ban, is it just a better look to seem
"proactive" than to go down kicking and screaming?

~~~
an_account_name
It sounds a lot like Trump overrode the FAA, more than the FAA changing its
mind.

~~~
tuna-piano
Boeing did definitely switch sides though:
[https://twitter.com/ByMikeBaker/status/1105909327255080960](https://twitter.com/ByMikeBaker/status/1105909327255080960)

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linuxftw
I think we should also lay some blame on the airlines as well. Why should they
have accepted such planes in the first place? Don't they have their own
engineers and safety inspectors to counter-balance a plane company's marketing
department?

More so, I hope there are subpoenas of Boeing's internal communications
regarding this matter. Rumors I have read elsewhere indicate some real
skullduggery if true.

Lastly, it really calls for the need of independent software auditing and
compliance. There should be no proprietary software operating in regulated
airspace.

~~~
zacwebb
> There should be no proprietary software operating in regulated airspace.

Lmao seriously??

~~~
moneytalks
Yes, the entire flight control system could just be an Electron app running
open source javascript. Or typescript if you're a (type) safety nut.

# npm install boeing-aileron boeing-throttle boeing-flight-controls

~~~
ReptileMan
Trust me, somebody somewhere have said that unironically...

