
Boeing push to make training profitable may have left 737 Max pilots unprepared - JumpCrisscross
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-20/boeing-s-profit-push-may-have-left-737-max-pilots-unprepared
======
LeifCarrotson
I hate the "everything must be a profit center" MBA attitude. Boeing is a
profitable company because they make machines that fly people from place to
place safely and efficiently. Part of that is having training, support,
service, replacement parts, sales, manufacturing, IT, R&D, and all the other
things required to make things fly.

It's easy to sit in a conference room and say "gee, IT hasn't made any money,
instead they've spent a lot of it! Let's downsize, outsource, and make our own
divisions pay for IT, we'll see whether we're successful by measuring the IT
department's profit next quarter." Inevitably, that department makes more
money under that regime, but the company is worse at flying people from place
to place.

If you're a hardware company, the software should be free. The support should
be effective. You should be hosting training events at nice facilities with
free pizza because people who know how to use your hardware will buy more of
it. If I have to pay for your software, I'm going to be pressured to buy the
Light version instead of Enterprise, and I'm going to pay for only one
training class and not learn about your next iteration, and you will sell less
hardware.

~~~
notreallymee
Using a throwaway account.

A few years ago I did some consulting work for British Airways. It was
interesting in that as far as the planes themselves, and the operational risk
of the planes was concerned, the company had their shit together. Decisions
made from a safety first point of view. Engineers making the calls. Everything
else no object.

But ALL the software around the planes, from the ops to ALL of the b2c was
outsourced to hell. Cue a few months later their entire datacenter went down
for 3 days, then a massive security breach.

Their idea of agile was to release stuff once every 3 months in a 2 week
window.

The thing that I found odd was that they didn't really perceive software
engineering as engineering. They had time, money and patience on the aero
engineering, but software to them was just another cost center.

~~~
brycesbeard
This was my experience as a contractor for the Navy, years ago. We’ve had
radar systems that can detect planes after a reflection on another plane, but
the software is dogshit.

Someone once told me, it’s because generals and admirals can see hardware, and
fell like they got value for their money. Software, not so much.

Perhaps it’s something innate in humans. Remember how Beats headphones used to
add weights to feel more substantial?

~~~
dantiberian
> Remember how Beats headphones used to add weights to feel more substantial?

This was not really true, the original tear down that found weights was of a
counterfeit pair of Beats headphones.

[https://www.gizmodo.com.au/2015/07/are-beats-headphones-
real...](https://www.gizmodo.com.au/2015/07/are-beats-headphones-really-
designed-to-trick-you/)

~~~
BEEdwards
"As a few folks have pointed out, the version of the headphones we tore down
was likely counterfeit. We have posted an in-depth comparison of these and a
pair of authentic Beats headphones here. TL;DR: the authentic pair is nearly
identical to the counterfeit one."

[https://medium.com/@BenEinstein/how-it-s-made-series-
beats-b...](https://medium.com/@BenEinstein/how-it-s-made-series-beats-by-
dre-154aae384b36)?

------
daddylonglegs
Two things really struck me in this article. The first was the graph of sales
over time. The current boom in sales is the biggest and longest - only the
boom from 1985 to the mid-90s comes close in duration. All the other booms
seem to have ended in a sharp drop in sales.

The second is the continuing trend - in both private industry and government -
to atomise organisations by outsourcing important work. The immediate, formal
needs of the organisation will be met by the contractual requirements but
informal communications and long term development of people and institutional
knowledge aren't paid for and won't happen.

~~~
itronitron
>> outsourcing important work.

That reflects the management trend of seeing themselves as the customer and
not the developer (of the company). What better way to reduce the number of
opinions that must be considered than to turn your employees into service
providers?

------
MaupitiBlue
I'm sorry, but what does squeezing jobs have to do with:

1\. Drive MCAS with only one AOA sensor.

2\. Don't tell MCAS to look for (or even think about) bad AOA data or AOA
disagreements.

3\. Equip airplane with two AOA sensors as usual, but make the AOA disagree
warning light a "value added option" that customers have to pay extra for.

4\. Don't actually bother to tell pilots that they don't have AOA disagree
warning lights.

5\. Don't bother to tell pilots that MCAS exists at all.

6\. Don't test MCAS subsystem to see what it actually does with bad AOA data.

7\. Give MCAS a ridiculous amount of control authority, operating cumulatively
over repeated applications to exceed what the pilot can manually override.

8\. Change how the trib stab switch has been wired since 1966 and not tell
pilots.

How any engineering team let this through is unfathomable. Don't blame the
MBAs or the unions. Didn't these guys get the lecture about the Hyatt?

~~~
petilon
You missed the big one that even made MCAS necessary:

0\. Reposition the engine forward on the wing such that the airframe is
inherently unstable and needs software for stabilization.

~~~
sokoloff
The airframe is not unstable. It exhibits positive longitudinal aerodynamic
stability. It’s positively but _insufficiently_ stable to meet certification
requirements, which is what required them to add MCAS.

MCAS is nowhere near fast enough to compensate if the Max were actually
unstable.

~~~
petilon
> _insufficiently stable to meet certification requirements_

Sounds like unstable to me. "I am not fat, I am just insufficiently thin".

~~~
na85
It's stable. In aerodynamics, stability has a specific meaning and it's
possible for two things to be stable, and for one of those things to be less
stable than the other.

Picture a pendulum that is hinged on a greased axle vs one that is hinged on a
high-friction axle.

Both will reach equilibrium eventually (they're stable) but one will do it
faster/with fewer oscillations.

The 737 MAX is longitudinally stable, but it doesn't meet certain nuanced
requirements of the Airworthiness regs.

~~~
petilon
There is so much doublespeak here. If it is less stable than required for
airworthiness then it is not airworthy. Can we agree on that?

~~~
na85
Sure, but that doesn't mean it's unstable.

~~~
petilon
If it is not stable enough then it is unstable. Where do you draw the bar on
stability, if not airworthiness?

~~~
na85
>If it is not stable enough then it is unstable.

Nope, sorry, that's not what stability and instability mean.

Stability means it will return to equilibrium if disturbed, but the issue with
the MAX is that it requires a positive force gradient per the Part 25
Airworthiness Regulations, which the MAX does not exhibit in a specific part
of the envelope.

Stability is not a binary condition. The MAX is longitudinally stable in every
part of the flight envelope.

"Not airworthy" does not equate to "unstable". Those two terms are orthogonal.

------
goldcd
I've read a few stories, with different 'takes' on 'what went wrong'

They're all obviously coloured by the sources/reporter as obviously (in this
case) if your pilot/simulator was impacted by cost cuts, then you're going to
pin those dead passengers on your pilot/simulator changes. I'm fine with that.
I'd do the same myself.

What scares me though, is that even now the story is still a pile of anecdotal
tumble-weed.

What do we know? 1) Enough passengers died for the planes to be grounded. 2)
These deaths happened due to: 2.1) Larger engines being bolted onto an old
airframe 2.2) Plane not being sufficiently updated to compensate 3) FAA being
a bit too cozey with Boeing in certification.

"Mistakes were made"

What I'm not hearing is Boeing going through the stages on this.

Where did they make the mistakes? What should they have done? What have they
put in place/restored to ensure it never happens again? etc etc

Boeing needs to try to own what it'll take to get their planes flying again.
And that requires them to engage with the bazillion people they've pissed off
- to defend why this particular cost-cut wasn't why people died.

~~~
chx
> Boeing needs to try to own what it'll take to get their planes flying again.

I think they will need to meet the EASA at the Canossa Castle so to speak for
that plane to fly again. The FAA so completely screwed up the EASA won't trust
a word from them for a very, very long while -- not only did they let Boeing
effectively certify their own plane but when the fertilizer hit the circular
cooling device and the EASA served them a face saving opportunity by not
issuing an EU wide grounding order immediately but individual member
countries, one by one, banned the plane from their airspace without grounding
them. And the FAA didn't budge! Finally the EASA said, fine, the 737 MAX is
grounded. And now all the trust and goodwill carefully built between the two
authorities is all gone. Getting the MAX flying again in the USA is one thing,
getting it through the EASA after this will be an entire different matter...

~~~
jrumbut
+1 and I wish I could give more for Canossa, that's really what is missing.

From Wikipedia:

"The Road to Canossa...refers to Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV's trek to Canossa
Castle, Italy, where Pope Gregory VII was staying as the guest of Margravine
Matilda of Tuscany, at the height of the investiture controversy in January
1077 to seek absolution of his excommunication.

According to contemporary sources, he was forced to humiliate himself on his
knees waiting for three days and three nights before the entrance gate of the
castle, while a blizzard raged. Indeed, the episode has been described as "one
of the most dramatic moments of the Middle Age"

[https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Road_to_Canossa](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Road_to_Canossa)

I also really enjoy Norman Cantor's description in "Civilization in the Middle
Ages," where he takes a more cynical view of the actions involved.

------
LatteLazy
Wasn't the whole point of the 737max to all planes with new engines (which
were more efficient but changed significantly the flight characteristics) to
be flown by pilots without having to re certify?

As I understand it, airlines or the faa only permit pilots to be licensed for
2 airframes at a time. So a 747 pilot can also fly 737s but not other
commercial airliners. That's a problem because if the new boeing isn't a 737,
existing pilots can't fly it without giving up one of the other two. Airlines
dont want that as it makes introducing the new plane a massive pain in the
arse and it means either dumping old planes or running a complex mixed
infrastructure.

So Boeing effectively had pilots fly a 737 simulator that would make the
actual Max fly when/where/how they wanted.

Except the simulator had a bug where if a single sensor failed it crashed the
plane.

So the trigger of the issue is a single point of failure in a sensor but the
fundamental causes are needing to not change pilot certification and/or only
being allowed 2 certifications at a time.

~~~
yardie
Boeing backed themselves into a corner they weren’t going to get out of
without major restructuring. The 737 is an old airframe design. They’ve
extended the design for decades with longer cabin and more powerful engines.
But underneath it all is the 60s era design considerations.

They needed a new regional airframe design a decade ago. Something to iterate
on for the next 50 years. And that could be introduced while the 737 was
phased out. A smaller version of the 787 would have a been a good foundation.

~~~
LatteLazy
Broadly I agree, but the corner isn't just boeing: the faa and airlines banned
pilots from knowing more than 2 (I think) air frames a while ago. That's
anticompetitive and any progress. It's the reason Boeing is still selling 50
year old designs: no one will buy anything newer.

What exactly to do about that, I'm not sure...

~~~
redis_mlc
> the faa and airlines banned pilots from knowing more than 2 (I think) air
> frames a while ago.

The FAA does not limit how many type certificates that a pilot has. However,
large airlines have policies that likely do limit their pilots to flying two
airliner types.

Source: commercially-rated airplane pilot.

------
nottorp
begin off topic rant:

Dear bloomberg, ny times and other major news outfits.

Please sort out a decent micropayment solution that works on _all_ news sites
without hassle.

I'm willing to pay you a couple cents to read articles linked to by HN and
other aggregators. However, I will never subscribe because I'm not interested
in the other 99% of your content.

end offtopic rant

------
WomanCanCode
This is business as usual. Nothing will change if executive doesn't get jail
time. I'm surprised that Boeing hasn't' been sued yet for the Lion and
Ethiopian crash.

------
neonate
[http://archive.md/zvv0X](http://archive.md/zvv0X)

------
itronitron
I initially read this as Boeing push to make _trains_ profitable...

~~~
Aperocky
Might as well now that they proved their entire culture of design is unsafe,
at least train doesn’t usually have variable angle of attack.

------
Causality1
This is what happens when a company becomes too big and entrenched.

------
nmfert
Initially thought that this said they were trying to make trains profitable.

------
rootusrootus
I am totally ready to see the last of the Boeing threads on HN. It's like
Groundhog Day.

