
Elite violence and elite numeracy in Europe from 500 to 1900 CE: A co-evolution - hhs
https://voxeu.org/article/elite-violence-and-elite-numeracy-europe-500-1900-ce-co-evolution
======
stereolambda
> after the trauma of nomadic invasions, Eastern societies created
> institutions primarily aimed at defence rather than economic development,
> even over the following centuries when the threat had long disappeared.

This is not even wrong and assumes that old institutions were built on some
deep strategic policy considerations. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth did
have "nomadic invasions" even in the 17th century, but its main institutions
were built on republican ideology, and more authoritarian/centralist arguments
at the time were based mainly on internal affairs, not external threats. On
the other hand, which Early Modern countries had institutions aimed primarily
at "economic development"? It's probably debatable in the cases of the
Netherlands and England.

Also they neglect to mention that many of these countries were not even
independent for a long time. Modern populist Poland and Hungary, incidentally,
both have had continuously own elites and statehood traditions since around
900-1000 AD (in contrast to some other Eastern European countries). But in
Hungary in 16th-middle 19th century, Poland in the 19th century their own
elites had to take the back seat or struggle with the foreign empires. So they
weren't the ones creating dominant institutions.

And these, I would say, were the real formative years. If we are to play "find
historical roots", the current Polish government (and probably the Hungarian
one) is the direct descendant of romantic nationalist tendencies of the 19th
century. It's basically LARP'ing a fight for independence which appeals to the
intellectual core of these political camps. But admittedly it's hard to build
nice charts out of it.

~~~
shantly
> On the other hand, which Early Modern countries had institutions aimed
> primarily at "economic development"? It's probably debatable in the cases of
> the Netherlands and England.

IIRC Spain was the first major European country to see serious state
centralization (large moves toward the modern nation-state) _plus_ a major
state focus on policy aimed at economic development across their entire
controlled territory (well, the core of it, anyway—Spain proper, not sure how
far that control extended to farther-flung territories). England and others
followed.

~~~
stereolambda
This is consistent with what I was taught, but I interpreted the goalposts
here a little differently. Of course kings of Spain wanted economic
development but probably not for the sake of it, but to build up their own
power. Most political regimes want development in this sense and in the East,
PLC, Muscovy and the Ottomans all had some kind of pro-economic policies (even
if in the PLC it was mostly maintaining low taxation and duties on
everything). If they were successful it's another matter, I understand it as a
question of motivation. [for the OP's argument anyway]

In this sense there were not many countries ran mostly, primarily to build
wealth on a large scale, and not only for the purposes of the social circle
controlling the government -- with some wider ideology (which I believe was
more the case for Spain than for France) or not. In fact this is, to mind, in
that period, equivalent to the dominance of a merchant class.

~~~
shantly
I think a powerful, centralized, and stable (across transitions of power,
especially) state is likely a necessary pre-requisite to focused economic
development across larger kingdoms. Otherwise there's too much temptation to
treat parts of "your" territory as potentially part of a future rebel state
you (or one of your children) will have to fight for control of the crown,
because there's a really good chance _that will in fact happen at some point
in the not-so-distant future_. Might be better to _undermine_ the development
of some of them, even. Not a great environment for cohesive, grand, long-term
economic planning. Gotta quash the infighting, gotta get the inheritance laws
sorted out so the crown's territory's not being carved up all the time among
kids who'll often end up going to war with one another. Then the serious
economic development can start.

I think that's one of the key differences between how a monarch of France and
a monarch of Spain, say, would have approached economic development, around
the time Spain was starting to get serious about the whole nation-state thing.
I think there may _actually_ have been different incentives and motivations
driving less-effective patterns of economic development in less-centralized or
less-internally-secure states, caused, more or less, by differences in
effective state power.

I'm not sure how politically stable and internally secure Eastern states were
then, but my _guess_ would be less so than what Spain was beginning to
achieve.

------
ellimilial
Baffling, the liberties taken by this article trying to link ‘current’
discrepancies using correlated variables from well over 500 years ago. Without
mentioning trivialities such as evolution of religious beliefs, history or
totalitarian regimes, industrial changes of 17th century or Industrial
Revolution. Not to mention the generalisations and lack of definitions (unless
I missed an appendix). It really shows that in order to perform
interdisciplinary research you not only need competency in both but also
understanding how those toolkits interconnect.

~~~
acqq
> correlated variables from well over 500 years ago

Not to mention that ithe reliability of inputs is completely ignored. If one
would try to honestly estimate the error bars for all that, it should be
obvious that the data for most of the places can’t be used for any such
analysis and even less to draw any conclusions, especially not to support
current policies.

It’s something produced with an agenda and it shows.

------
larnmar
The question posed here, about why Eastern Europe fell behind the West, is an
interesting one, but the approach taken here (pick two random-ass variables we
can measure and try to explain everything with them) seems pretty damn weak,
as does the attempt to tie these explanations to modern EU politics.

~~~
fsloth
Darren Asemoglu's "Why nations fail" gives a pretty good attempt at explaining
the east vs. west divide in from the point of view of extractive vs. inclusive
institutions and manages to build up a pretty convincing case.

I warmly endorse this book to everyone who is even sligthly interested of
history or economics.

------
dimitar
Its about the appearance of serfdom in the early modern era, just as western
Europe was freed from it, which in turn is partly driven by population-
density.

This is far from a new idea BTW, and largely drove the abolition of these
institutions in the 19th century (it largely came from the top, not as a
result of great rebellions).

Here is a nice and short explanation from Paul Krugman:

"my old teacher Evsey Domar wrote a classic paper arguing that serfdom and
slavery often were the response of ruling classes to labor shortage. Thus
Russia imposed strict restrictions on the mobility of peasants from the late
16th century onward, precisely because the availability of rich new farmland
on the expanding frontier would otherwise have increased their bargaining
power against landlords. (The frontier expansion itself was probably the
result of the growing effectiveness of firearms, which turned the military
balance against the steppe nomads; so gunpowder, which contributed to the rise
of the bourgeoisie in the West, created serfdom in the East). And, of course,
slavery - which, along with serfdom, had died out in the West during the
labor-abundant high Middle Ages - was reintroduced in the land-abundant
conditions of the New World."
[http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/Serfdom.htm](http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/Serfdom.htm)

Darren Asemoglu's and Robinson's "Why nations fail" in turn go on in length
about effects of repressive economic and political institutions to economic
growth.

Forms of serfdom and slavery were (re)introduced around the same time in the
Muscovite state, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Hungary, Wallachia,
Moldavia, the Ottoman Empire and even the Cossack Hetmanate which had roots in
anti-serfdom rebellion had a form of serfdom.

~~~
AnimalMuppet
Given that historical pattern, it's worth noting the exception: When the US
west was being settled, they gave away the land to those who wanted to move
there, rather than imposing serfdom to prevent it.

(Yes, I know, the US south fits the serfdom/slavery pattern...)

~~~
dimitar
When the US (east coast) was first settled, it was largely by indentured
servants and prisoners.

The settling of the US west parallels the cossack settlements - these guys
were free to take land and paid few taxes, but were expected to defend
themselves.

Normally the goverments of Poland and Russia tried to reduce the cossacks to
serfdom (which triggered wars like the great rebellion of Bohdan Khmelnytsky)
or at the very least turn them into a warrior class that enforces the serfdom
institution (like what happened with the Russian cossacks after the defeat of
the big cossack-peasant uprisings there).

I think the North of the US started colonizing the West late, when the North
was already pretty urbanized, densely populated and industrial, which made the
free-soil type settlement possible.

The South of course was still fully agricultural, which insentivised a
different type of settlement driven by soil erosion by inefficient slave-based
agriculture.

------
mac_was
This article seems weak - it is extremely disappointing that it was written by
a research assistant and a 'professor'. This line here 'Eastern societies
created institutions primarily aimed at defence rather than economic
development, even over the following centuries when the threat had long
disappeared' \- someone who know history of Eastern countries will be aware
that those countries where constantly attacked by Western ones - Germany-
Poland wars lasted between 1000-1400. Poland was under relative peace in the
16th century when it gained wealth ( according to some statistics, Polish
Kingdom was the biggest importer of luxurious cloths at that time, and as we
know today if basic needs are satisfied people turn into consumption). Then in
the 17th century Poland was attacked by Swedes, Germans, Russians which
started the dawn of the country which ended in the end of the 18th century by
splitting Poland between Russia, Germany and Austro-Hungary. Then when Poland
re-gained independency in the 20th century it stared building an army, economy
was raising, then WWII happened during which Poland was completely destroyed
and until today it did not receive any compensation from Germany, obviously
after WWII Communist Russia ruled in Poland which didn't help the economy.
Since 1989 Poland is developing again, nobody is attacking the country and it
is developing again. I'd like to know taking into account the above citation
when did the threat had long disappeare? Obviously taking into consideration
the dates which the article mentions, not know, as there are no wars ATM.

From my own experience Polish people are not EU sceptic, and the ruling party
is not sceptic at all. The problem has far more deeper roots and is related to
transformation process in which post-communist stayed in power even though the
Communism collapsed. But this requires another article by people who know more
than me.

~~~
danielam
To add further to your point, while no one in the EU is currently mobilizing
their armies across the Oder or the Neman, a synoptic view of history shows
that the present situation is rather unusual, geopolitically and historical
speaking. And just because armies aren't involved does not mean a kind of
"soft" economic and cultural imperialism isn't at work, often through the
abuse of EU institutions. Sadly, the Western media (which includes >80% of the
media in Poland) ignorantly or maliciously misrepresents the ongoing political
realities in Poland, employing simplistic, boorish and slanderous slogans to
discredit anyone that could possibly disrupt the comfortable but corrupt
status quo in the country and on the continent. Too often, people eat all that
up because, frankly, Westerners known next to nothing about Poland and the
region. Years of propaganda during the Cold War and before only encouraged
crude and bigoted stereotypes that make it that much easier to push false
narratives.

N.b., for those interested in a brief introduction to Polish history, Adam
Zamoyski's "Poland: A History" is worth a read.

------
pjc50
This is a bit weird; it seems to be taking a 10,000 foot view on history that
isn't really warranted and not a great explanation for Eastern Europe being
"behind" the West.

It notices the various "golden horde" invasions, but skims entirely over the
huge impact of the 20th century - wars, occupation, pogroms, Communism.

