
Ron Rivest: Keys Under Doormats – Mandating Insecurity [video] - mzl
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hqacHM6Wm0Q
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Intermernet
This talk is (as expected) a very level headed summary of why exceptional
access in encryption is a _very bad idea_.

The only point I think it's worth adding to those in the talk (which may be
covered in the original paper) is one of temporal trust. That is, even if you
manage to convince yourself that there could be a way to safely solve the
technical problems of setting up exceptional access in the current world, and
you decide that all LE agencies that get access are currently trustworthy, and
you believe that other issues such as LE agency corruption and spying are
currently minimal to non-existent, There is no way to ensure that this "ideal"
(and somewhat naive) world will continue into the future.

I think any person or government that tries to argue that exceptional access
is a good idea either hasn't considered historical precedent, hasn't thought
the situation through to it's logical conclusion, or is being deliberately
disingenuous.

~~~
diskcat
b-but terrorists and pedophiles

~~~
a_imho
lovejoy's game: when you invoke lovejoy's law, you lost the argument

