
Schneier on Security: Separating Explosives from the Detonator - stakent
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/12/separating_expl.html
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algorias
"I wish that, just once, some terrorist would try something that you can only
foil by upgrading the passengers to first glass and giving them free drinks."

That's pretty much the best summary of the issue I've ever read.

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nfnaaron
Schneier says that security worked in this case, because passengers subdued
the bomber. But as others point out, that _only_ worked because the bomber
screwed up. And it was only an issue because the bomber was allowed on the
plane, with a bomb; let's not forget that.

Now the TSA may be considering restricting people to their seats in the last
hour, with nothing on their lap. (Does that mean no blankies too?)

I eagerly await the first no-tolerance arrest, when a passenger leaves his
seat against regulations in the last hour to subdue a bomber.

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ErrantX
So far one of the interesting things I noted was the TSA keep talking about
being "unpredictable" in the security measures.

Theatre in that form might have more effect; random security measures might
confuse or throw off potential terrorists.

(I still think it's all pretty silly but that struck me as at least a slightly
less than inane idea :))

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ubernostrum
The smart thing to do, if you want to set up an effective TSA-like
organization, is go to Israel, the UK, and other places which have a history
of significant terrorism and which have developed effective or mostly-
effective responses. Study what they do, learn what they've learned (since
often they've learned it the hard way), then come back and use it as a basis
for your own general counter-terrorism plan.

The way the TSA is actually doing things, however, is simply to ask "what did
the last terrorist do? OK, ban that." Which doesn't stop the last guy, since
he already did it, and won't stop the next guy, since he's going to do
something else.

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marltod
It is true that terrorists rarely attack planes in Israel. There they blow up
coffee shops and restaurants and buses. A successful TSA just means that the
threat will be targeted somewhere else.

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jbellis
If we're going to claim that an ineffective TSA is a "feature," then let's at
least have an _efficiently_ ineffective one.

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tlb
The "stay in your seat during the last hour" rule isn't completely frivolous.
Bombers arriving in the US are likely to wait until they are over their
destination city because it will make the bombing more dramatic. The goal is
fear, not deaths. Also, people tend to procrastinate suicide bombings.

Obviously, stewardesses telling people to stay in their seats won't prevent
bombers from detonating their bombs, but it may make their behavior more
noticeable to other passengers.

I'm very surprised that there still isn't some screening machine that detects
all explosives. How hard can it be? It'd be much nicer to just walk through a
big sniffing machine than all the other ineffective rigmarole.

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camccann
_I'm very surprised that there still isn't some screening machine that detects
all explosives. How hard can it be?_

I think the state of the art technology for odor-based explosive screening is
"dogs".

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stse
Trace Detection Systems, like the GE EntryScan, are available.
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s9GuPMWh9A>

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Entlin
We were lucky this week. If the only thing that prevented the plane from
blowing up is early detection by other passengers, flying has become extremely
insecure: terrorists just have to detonate their bombs in the lavatories.

