

Modeling cyberattack deterrence on nuclear deterrence fails - jballanc
http://arstechnica.com/science/news/2010/04/modeling-cyberattack-deterrence-on-nuclear-deterrence-fails.ars?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=rss

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jballanc
What's really interesting about this is that, since cyber-attacks aren't as
openly destructive or nearly as effective as nuclear weapons, they are
actually more dangerous and threatening in practice!

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count
I think modeling it on the old 'black ops' intel/counter-intel activities is
the right strategy. Sometimes, it's only a few people (or an individual), but
the effect can be tremendous (see: Russian oil pipeline explosion).

I think much of the senior military leadership 'gets' it to the extent that
they know to be worried. The middle management, however, ignores threats that
are non-kinetic in most cases.

Great article!

