

The Limits of Language - pron
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/classes/2015/09/take_a_wittgenstein_class_he_explains_the_problems_of_translating_language.single.html

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ttctciyf
It is quite striking to me that the decentralised, statistical, emergent
treatment of meaning in PI fits so well with neural-networks and
connectionism[1] whereas Fodor's "Language of Thought Hypothesis" and other
opposing views seem wedded to "top-down" cognitive approaches.

Given the ability of neural nets to produce "modeling functionality" (like
playing Breakout as though there was a model of the game somewhere in the AI)
without requiring the actual model implementation, Ockham seems to favour
Wittgenstein over Fodor &co. (despite the excellent qualities of the Fodor fog
parody linked in the article[2].)

As PI is often at pains to show, however, our own naive thinking tends to
assume that the modeling function of language is in virtue of some fundamental
metaphysical relation with reality, so that when Wittgenstein wrote:

    
    
      "There must surely be a further, different connexion
      between my talk and N, for otherwise I should still not
      have meant HIM."
    
      Certainly such a connexion exists. Only not as you
      imagine it: namely by means of a mental mechanism.
    

he now seems to me to be aiming squarely at our inner cognitivist.

1:
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Connectionism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Connectionism)

2: [http://garbage.world/fodor/](http://garbage.world/fodor/)

3: PI: #689

~~~
foldr
>decentralised, statistical, emergent

How do any of these buzzwords apply to anything that Wittgenstein says in PI?

>Ockham seems to favour Wittgenstein over Fodor &co

Fodor &co have _arguments_ for their position. The simplest explanation isn't
the best explanation if it's wrong. And in any case, there's no obvious sense
in which connectionist architectures are simpler than classical ones.

~~~
ttctciyf
> buzzwords

Ok, so apologies for that - the point I was trying to make is that PI's view
of "meaning is use" is consonant with some quite recent and popular (and
therefore buzzword-prone) ideas about AI and psychology.

Right at the start of PI, the "Augustinian picture" of meaning is set out:
"words in language name objects - sentences are combinations of such names" a
picture where "every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the
word. It is the object for which the word stands." And so (later, #81) we
"think that if anyone utters a sentence, and _means_ or _understands_ it, he
is operating a calculus according to definite rules." This is the view of
language which PI aims to - sorry, buzzword incoming - disrupt.

By contrast, PI puts the case that there is no central unifying model
applicable to all instances of language use, rather: "I am saying that these
phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all
- but that they are related to one another in many different ways, and it is
because of this relationship, or these relationships that we call them all
language." (PI #65)

There follows a discussion of vagueness. In the Augustinian picture where the
meaning of a word is an object, and a calculus of these objects is performed,
it is difficult to avoid the consequence that meanings are exact. PI uses the
example of defining the word "game": "How should we explain to someone what a
game is? I imagine that we should describe _games_ to him, and we might add:
"This _and similar things_ are called 'games'". And do we know any more about
it ourselves? [...] But this is not ignorance. We do not know the boundaries
because none have been drawn. [...] we can draw a boundary - for a special
purpose. Does it take that to make the concept usable? Not at all! [...] One
might say that the concept 'game' is a concept with blurred edges."

So much for "decentralised" and "statistical". As far as "emergent" goes, I
think even with the large variance in readings of PI it's uncontroversial to
say that it seeks to ground meaning and understanding in relation to "customs"
or social practices rather than in some variety of metaphysical correspondence
between language and reality required by different variations of the
Augustinian picture. In this sense, meaning emerges from the use of words
relative to these cultural forms.

Connectionism, as an investigative paradigm, (oops, buzzword!) is simpler (I
believe) in that it doesn't require the identification of an actual realised
model (or "mental mechanism") such as a neural encoding of a "language of
thought" or cognitive frames, etc., in the brain - it "just" requires that a
bunch of simple elements can result in complex rule-following behaviour
without needing to explicitly encode the rules. Hopefully the quotes above
will go some way to indicate how this programme is philosophically somewhat in
tune with PI.

(Indeed the extensive sections on samples and teaching language games are
eerily reminiscent of descriptions of training neural nets, now that I think
of it... "How do I explain the meaning of 'regular', 'uniform', 'same' [...]
if a person has not yet got the _concepts_? I shall teach him to use the words
by means of _examples_ and by _practice_ \- And when I do this I do not
communicate less to him than I know myself." (PI #208))

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onion2k
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the only book I've never managed to get past
the first page. It's _really_ hard to read - Wittgenstein actually numbered
all the _paragraphs_ so they can be discussed individually it's so dense. I'd
still recommend picking up a copy though, because there's a foreword by
Bertrand Russell that's really worthwhile reading.

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JadeNB
> Wittgenstein actually numbered all the paragraphs so they can be discussed
> individually it's so dense.

I'm not sure that this is indicative of particular density of the TLP, though;
I believe that it is common practice in text-heavy scholarly works. (I can't
cite any examples off the top of my head, so it's possible that my vague
recollection is leading me astray.)

~~~
onion2k
In twenty years of reading philosophy books it's the only one I've encountered
that does it.

~~~
handojin
The Ethics?

[http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3800/3800-h/3800-h.htm](http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3800/3800-h/3800-h.htm)

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OJFord
Earlier discussion:
[https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10155251](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10155251)

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afleck
An interpretation of the limits of language aided by Finnegans Wake:

[http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/jul/12/what-
ma...](http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/jul/12/what-make-
finnegans-wake/)

