
Gun Trouble - smacktoward
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/01/gun-trouble/383508/?single_page=true
======
vacri
Just to keep things in perspective: the Iraq war and occupation, taking eight
years, cost 4500 US military lives. The Battle of Antietam, a single day, saw
2100 Union and 1500 Confederate lives lost. The Meuse-Argonne Offensive was
about six weeks, and saw 26000 US military lives lost. The Battle of the Bulge
was six weeks long and saw 20000 US soldiers die. The entire Vietnam war, a
similar timeframe to the Iraq war, saw 53000 US soldiers die.

Somewhere along the way, the US public seemed to decide that it was okay to go
to war, but not okay to lose soldiers doing so. 2.5 million US military have
served in Iraq, and 4500 is 0.18% of those. Painting a picture of soldiers
dropping like flies is misleading - and yet the US still meets its military
goals (though failing at the corresponding political ones).

In any case, against that backdrop of success, you're not going to shift the
embedded graft keeping the current top dog in place.

~~~
Lavery
While I'd tend to agree with your larger point, when looking at decades- or
centuries-old wars it's worth keeping in perspective that the falling death
rates have much more to do with improvements in evacuation time and trauma
care. Even beyond the obvious improvements in things like antibiotics,
soldiers are now living through wounds that would have been fatal to them as
recently as twenty years ago.

The cynic in me says that the way that this continues to be reported--as
military dead instead of military casualties--is meant to deliberately obscure
this fact. How many people returning from these modern wars will need full-
time medical care for the rest of their lives?

~~~
vacri
It's not that distorted. Antietam had a wounded:killed ratio of 4:1, Meuse-
Argonne was 4:1, Vietnam had 6:1, Iraq had 8:1. Bulge was a particularly
deadly sample at 2.5:1 (If you include all allied forces and not just US
military, Iraq drops back down to ~5:1). Basically you could convert 4500 US
casualties in Iraq into deaths as a pseudocontrol for 'ye olde medicine' to
bring the ratio back into line, and it wouldn't particularly change the
numbers above.

I also think that total casualties needs to be taken with more care than total
deaths, as a casualty is anything from a nicked ear that takes you out for
only a day, right on up to an amputation. Death is unambiguous. Casualties are
far more mutable - witness the presidential candidate who had a successful
smear campaign run against him because he supposedly 'wasn't wounded enough'
to merit a Purple Heart...

 _How many people returning from these modern wars will need full-time medical
care for the rest of their lives?_

Probably much less as a proportion than previous wars, though it's really
anyone's guess. 'Full-time' medical care is a big thing; it basically means
hospitalisation for the rest of your life. Remember also that while some
soldiers would survive who previously wouldn't, treatment overall is superior
- someone who previously would have been left with a lifelong crippling
disability may have a much reduced effect in the modern day. It's not like
modern medicine improves the lot of only those patients who are at death's
door.

~~~
hga
" _witness the presidential candidate who had a successful smear campaign run
against him because he supposedly 'wasn't wounded enough' to merit a Purple
Heart..._"

You misstate that part of the case against Kerry: in short, he transferred to
the riverine force not knowing it would soon be sent into serious combat, and
thanks to the three Purple Hearts was able to leave that duty Real Soon after
the third, see e.g.
[http://www.snopes.com/politics/kerry/service.asp](http://www.snopes.com/politics/kerry/service.asp)
for confirmation of the basic latter facts.

------
leroy_masochist
USMC OIF vet here. A lot of great comments here but most appear to be missing
one key idea: the primary purpose of the infantry rifle is not to kill, it is
to suppress. When infantry tactics are properly executed, irrespective of
clime and place, most of the actual killing will be done by belt-fed weapons
(machine guns such as the M249, M240, MK48) and high explosives (hand
grenades, mortars, artillery).

If you were to make an analogy to boxing, the M4/M16 is the infantry squad's
jab, and machine guns and grenades are its power punches. The point of
suppression is to keep the enemy's head down so that you can both close with
him and force him into geometries that make it easier to kill him with more
powerful weapons. It is true that a 5.56mm round does not have a lot of
stopping power, but it is designed for point-target accuracy up to 600 meters,
and a well-maintained M4 with good optics can put rounds through a window (eg,
suppress the enemy) at 800 meters. It is also important to note that a 5.56mm
NATO round weighs about a third as much as a 7.62mm NATO round; my kit in OIF
was about 100 lbs including body armor and would have been around 120 had I
been carrying a rifle chambered for 7.62 and the same number of rounds. Also,
another important thing to note about stopping power is that anything worth
shooting once is worth shooting many times. Stopping power definitely matters
when we're talking about sniper rifles, less so for an infantryman's primary
weapons system.

With all that said, the M4 is not a great weapon for reasons others have
enumerated in these comments. I agree that the HK416 is a beautiful rifle and
barring the development of something better should be the primary weapons
system for the infantry rifleman, but the procurement / acquisition system is
completely screwed up so I'm not holding my breath waiting for that one to
happen.

~~~
hga
" _the primary purpose of the infantry rifle is not to kill, it is to
suppress_ "

Isn't this a chicken and egg issue? After WWII, where the snide might note
that the only country employing such infantry rifles _lost_
([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/StG_44](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/StG_44)
and I know it was not for that reason, and that the StG 44 was not evolved for
the mission, e.g. no straight line recoil), first the Soviets adopted this
concept (I gather after experience with a submachine gun and such tactics),
and then _a purely political decision_ forced the AR-15 and 5.56x45 on our
Army and Marines (the Air Force loved it for guarding their planes, very much
not the same mission).

 _IF_ we had a better cartridge (but certainly not 7.62 NATO, including for
the reasons you cite), and more emphasis on individual marksmanship, might
tactics shift a bit? Not a lot, I understand the concept (to the extent
someone who's eyesight kept him out of the military might), I just think we
went too far with it. Especially since a fair amount of this was motivated by
fraudulent research (SLA Marshall).

Let me also bring up the issue of our past, current and no doubt future
"dirty" wars: rifles are potentially more discriminating than those more
powerful weapons, so potentially less "collateral damage" and harm to our own.

Then there's the morale issue: how many of our men trust their rifle to save
their lives when they're depending entirely on it? I've heard way too many
accounts, including forca's on this page, about 5.56x45's lack of stopping
power, and seem my comments on Martin Fackler's elucidation of how it works,
or doesn't.

Then again, and echoing all of our comments on the completely screwed up
procurement system, the failures to stop he cited would be less common with 20
inch barrel M16s instead of "Made By Colt" 14.5 inch barrel M4s. And because
of that screwed up system, and $$$, this discussion is academic at this time,
we should have done the right thing in the '50s :-(.

~~~
leroy_masochist
It's not really a chicken / egg issue, and the tactical logic of fire and
maneuver long predates WWII. Yes, the StG 44 was a revolutionary weapon and
certainly influenced the AK and Stoner designs, but I'm not sure I buy the
argument that it influenced tactics per se.

FWIW, the story I've heard behind the introduction of the 5.56 round is that
it was designed to wound, not kill. Supposedly the generals in charge of
doctrine in the 50's surmised that wounding Soviet soldiers would be a better
way of slowing their advance across the Fulda Gap than would killing a similar
number.

With regard to SLAM being a fraud -- there is indeed debate as to whether his
stats about what % of men in WWII fired their weapons are accurate. However,
to the extent that any of SLAM's writings influenced the rollout of the M16,
it was Soldier's Load, the TLDR version of which is, "our gear is too heavy".
He had a point there, and we shouldn't ignore the significance of the 5.56mm
round's light weight, and not just for the M16. Being able to carry 5 drums of
SAW ammo on patrol can come in handy.

~~~
hga
" _the story I 've heard behind the introduction of the 5.56 round is that it
was designed to wound, not kill. Supposedly the generals in charge of doctrine
in the 50's surmised...._"

The story you've heard is dead wrong on many particulars:

The '50s "generals" were fixated on creating 7.62 NATO and the M14 upgrade of
the M1 Garand (and BTW it was another TFX/JSF one long arm to do everything
semi-debacle). The AR-10 (the parent of the AR-15 that used 7.62 NATO) was
part of the "competition" that somehow ended up selecting the Army's very own
M14, through expedients like replacing screws and/or pins with coil springs
while the rifles where in the custody of the Army.

An early limited use of the AR-15 in Vietnam produced outsized reports of
_extreme_ stopping power and lethality, explained by the very high velocity of
the the 55 grain bullets of the time (3,250 fps in something I just looked up,
which matches my memory). From my research, before the civilians in the DoD
forced it on the Army and Marines, mere wounding was never a selling point,
that sounds more like excuses after real experiences showed how bad it really
was.

SLAM was a fraud, his schedule could not have produced the data he claimed to
have collected then, a scholar reviewed his appointments calendar and noticed
the discrepancy. It appears he did a limited number of bullshitting sessions
and pulled his results out of his ass. Read e.g. the completely unrelated
Hackworth _About Face_ for a bit more on his feet of clay, in Vietnam.

My counterpoint to the soldier's load argument is that the tradeoff went too
far, e.g. I've read some accounts of SAW operators who _really_ wished the
round was more effective. I submit there's a case to be made for fewer but
more effective rounds, but not battle rifle level. E.g. would 3-4 more
effective drums do as well or better?

Have to run, maybe more later.

~~~
leroy_masochist
Thanks for setting me straight, do you have any sources for the account of
what happened in the 50's? I'm a history nerd and would love to read up on it.

~~~
hga
You're very welcome.

For the '50s, nothing off the top of my head, although it's really just a
synthesis of a bunch of things I've observed and learned over decades:

First is the obvious, that the M14 is a Garand with a detachable box magazine
and a much better gas system in the front end, but it still has an op rod and
the same exposed bolt on top. Compare to the other major designs of the 50s:

The AR-10 wasn't exactly, except it inspired the AR-15, then there's the FNH
FAL and the H&K G3/91: the only exposure the action gets is the necessary
ejection port.

And of course the M14 officially won the US competition. The corruption in
that should be searchable both directly (e.g. search for "sabotage" of the
alternatives, but you'll also find hits alleging sabotage of the M16), and
indirectly in the much studied history of the adoption of The Black Rifle, as
one of the major books on it is titled. Some of those accounts should detail
why the civilians in the DoD took this out of the Army's hands (and I gather
terminating with extreme prejudice that unit of the Army, and of course
closing down Springfield Armory in 1968; the M60 debacle probably also played
a role).

It's also self-evident that something major happened to establish 7.62 NATO.
E.g. I just read in Wikipedia that the British were going forward with their
own rifle design using their own intermediate .280 British (which looks to be
noticeably better than 7.62x39, a bit hotter than 6.8 SPC but probably
wouldn't travel as far), then Labour lost the 1951 election...:
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FN_FAL](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FN_FAL)

------
VLM
Its interesting that its completely absent factual data, all persuasive
arguments. Fairly obviously, someone hoping to sell a new rifle is paying him
to write, but who?

(Oh and edited to add a computing analogy, his argument is basically Microsoft
Bob both sucked and needed debugging a couple decades ago, and there are only
minor geeky technical changes between Bob and today's Windows, therefore we
need a new OS, because new things never need debugging)

------
kev009
There are a number of excellent gas piston rifles that are much more reliable
and not far from the cost of ARs (especially with mass production) - the SCAR,
ACR, HK416.

One of these was supposed to become the new system, but it ended in a
bureaucratic mire:
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Individual_Carbine](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Individual_Carbine)

------
exabrial
There is nothing wrong with a Gas Operated AR15. It has _less_ moving parts
than an ak47 in that regard. While you do get some chamber fowling, it's
inconsequential since the bolt carrier rides with minimal contact with the
chamber walls. Contrary to popular belief, an AR15 does _not_ require careful
maintenance, but this seems to be beaten into deployed personnel.

The real problem is the 5.56mm cartridge. It's under powered, especially in
sub-sonic applications, and it can't do crap for penetrating barriers. It
should be replaced with the .300 AAC blackout which offers better terminal
ballistics and offers an effective sub-sonic option for silenced applications.
The coolest part about this cartridge is that ALL M4s and M16s could be
upgraded with just a barrel change. The mags, bolt, bolt carrier, lower, and
upper chambers are all 100% compatible. That could reduce the cost of the
upgrade significantly.

~~~
hga
What do you think of the 6.8mm SPC, which at first glance looks like it'll be
better at long range (splitting the difference between 6.5 and 7mm was a
compromise between range and damage)?

From the Wikipedia article the " _[300 AAC] purpose is to achieve ballistics
similar to the 7.62×39mm Soviet cartridge in an AR-15 platform while using
standard AR-15 magazines at their normal capacity._ " Surely we can do better
than that, 7.62×39mm is not a terrifically great round either.

~~~
exabrial
6.8mm SPC is an incredible cartridge. It's far superior to .300 AAC in range
and terminal effects. It offers a wide variety of loads including an effective
subsonic load. There are a few quibbles about efficiencies (powder and
materials): The standard infantrymen doesn't really need long range cartridge.

However, the big reason I wouldn't suggest 6.8mm as an upgrade to the 5.56mm
is the upgrade path is more expensive. While the 6.8mm _can_ work with the
standard buffer tube spring, it's best those get upgraded for accuracy and
shooter comfort. The 6.8mm requires a new bolt and barrel in the upper
receiver. The 6.8mm also requires new magazines (to be used at full capacity).
The 6.8mm requires new brass and new loading dies, so your ammo production
lines have to change significantly. Finally, the chamber pressure increase in
the 6.8mm may introduce reliability issues in certain models of the AR15,
especially in the gas impingement system. And personally, I the recoil from
the 6.8mm kinda sucks.

The .300 AAC requires _merely_ a barrel swap. Everything else in the upper is
compatible. The brass from 5.56mm can be cut down to make .300 AAC brass (yay
for recycling) and existing loading dies can be used to load .300 AAC. The
existing magazines can be used at full capacity.

While the 6.8mm may be a superior round, I think the .300 AAC wins in terms of
practicality. Just my opinion :)

------
squozzer
Something that we don't mention enough - the m16 lower might be the best
ergonomic piece ever made. All controls accessible without breaking cheek-
stock weld. The boing-boing-boing of the buffer spring is a bit annoying. I
left the service before the A3 saw wide deployment so not sure about the 3
round burst mech.

Change the upper receiver to a piston-type which for civvies is about 1000 USD
and you essentially have a Galil. Israel got religion about the AK after the
'73 war. They have a good record of learning from their military mistakes.

What I'm not sure about is a new cartridge. A heavier projectile will maintain
momentum for longer distances, but to have the same muzzle velocity, you will
need to add more propellant. My hand loading experience with .223 says it's
possible, but maybe not desirable. And I think to move beyond the 62 grain
projectile you will have to increase bore size. Once you move out of the .223
/ 5.56 envelope, you're looking at new magazines, ammo pouches, etc.

I like the idea of adding reflex sights, as no iron sight really allows for
quick target acquisition. But not sure how long anything with glass will last
in combat.

As for the article's timing? Ask FN.

~~~
hga
I've read, but never had adequately confirmed, that the 3 round burst
mechanism absolutely destroys the semi-auto ergonomics. Specifically, each
pull has increasing weight until the 3rd resets it back to the first pull's
weight.

As I understand it, 6.8 SPC requires new magazines but the rest of the form
factor is the same, so no new pouches etc. I've just read that .300 AAC can
use the same magazines, although it was claimed in Wikipedia it was designed
to essentially be a 7.62x33mm clone, with of course subsonic provisions.

I gather that if you really want to do it right, you want something in-between
a full power battle rifle cartridge and an assault rifle one, like the
interwar .276 Pedersen or post-WWII .280_British
([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.280_British](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.280_British)).
But that would require replacing too much stuff today, we really should have
done it in the '50s when we had the money, everyone else needed to change
their service rifles, and everyone but the Germans needed to procure General
Purpose Machine Guns. But we just went with a nearly pointless shorted .30-06
with a beefed up rim for better semi- and full auto reliability, got everyone
else in the West to adopt it, then screwed them over with the M16/5.56x45
debacle.

~~~
strlen
6mm rounds seemed to be common in pre-War II era: Swedish Mauser, Arisaka,
Carcano (aka "JFK assassination rifle"). Interestingly enough, the Fedorov
Avtomat -- the first select fire rifle -- used the 6.5 mm Arisaka round (from
the captured Japanese stockpiles after war of 1905).

------
gortok
There are a number of factual errors in this article. It may be presented as
fact, but it is mostly an opinion piece with facts wrapped in. I'm speaking as
a veteran; my MOS was 13F (forward observer), and I was regularly attached to
infantry units.

First, in training up for Iraq, soldiers were trained on house-to-house
clearing operations and urban warfare operations -- not in the long distance
'open field' operations the author seems to indicate.

While the Army does have large scale operational training (at the National
Training Center in Fort Irwin, CA), soldiers also went through a Joint
Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, which emphasized urban
operations. These operations take place in much, much smaller distances than
needed for a long rifle; and any soldier carrying an M16 wished for an M4.

As far as not having the same amount of accuracy -- the author is correct, but
at 300+ meters, most line soldiers (including infantryman) can't hit the
target but 2 times out of 10 anyway. We simply do not train to try to hit a
target at 300+ meters. The silhouettes we would shoot at even depict an enemy
soldier _standing up_ at 300 meters, which tells you how ludicrous such a
thing is. "Someone's firing at me, let me stand up!"

That's the first factual error the author makes; claiming 'most' engagements
take place at long distances (read: "an especially serious disadvantage in
modern combat, which is increasingly taking place over long ranges."). Even
with an M16, a soldier does not want to engage something that far away and
waste their ammunition -- at best they'll lay suppressing fire and try to get
in closer and flank the enemy.

The author then goes on to blame the weapon's issues on its construction --
he's right. It does need to be cleaned and maintained. We were always told, if
you have five minutes, clean your weapon. Clean it. Clean it. Clean it.

The author then states that an AK47 can fire at twice the rate an M4/M16 an.
He's right. That would be a problem if the American soldier were trained to
fire indiscriminately; but they are not. They're trained in firing precisely;
and only to fire extraneous rounds when needed (like to lay covering or
suppressive fire).

The author points out that "today's soldier" wants a modular weapon. Rails
systems are really cool; and they're really useful -- but not every soldier
needs such a thing, and even infantry soldiers don't need One Weapon To Rule
Them All. That's what got the JSF in trouble -- it tried to be everything to
everyone.

Soldiers need different weapons for different purposes; yes it's "Cool" to be
able to swap out parts between weapons (and in battle, probably a requirement)
but it's folly to think that one soldier would even be issued parts that
weren't directly necessary for _their_ MOS and position in their unit.

A soldier isn't saying, "Man, I wish I had a 7.62 because I'd love to fire
400+ meters", they're saying, "Man, I wish I had a 7.62 because I want to make
sure when I hit something, it's dead." The author again plays the distance
card -- that's not on the minds of your average soldier (if it were, more
soldiers would use telescopic scopes).

There are good reasons why soldiers don't use computerized sights -- they
break. Invariably they break at the wrong moment, like when you just fell into
a hole you didn't see at 3am on a moonless night, when you were issued single
sight Night vision goggles because the binocular NVGs are only given to squad
leaders.

The author is correct about the problem: We need a new weapon that is durable
and able to be modularized. The author just gets the details wrong.

~~~
hga
" _First, in training up for Iraq..._ " is about training, not what happened
or _could_ happen on the ground. Which leads to the observation that the US
Army _gave up on marksmanship_ in the '60s or thereabouts (in part based on
SLA Marshall's fraudulent WWII "research"). _Of course_ you aren't trained to
take advantage of weapons capabilities available to mid-19th Century soldiers
when your issue weapons are _very_ weak in them.

That you make the best of a bad weapon system and round does not say anything
about what could be achieved with better ones, and more emphasis on personal
marksmanship, something I'm told the Marines never gave up on. And aren't
rifle rounds a little more discriminating than the alternatives?

(My background, BTW: only JROTC in the late '70s due to eyesight, but my
Senior Army Instructor was an Infantry officer who mentioned he fired around
10,000 rounds as part of the effort in fixing the original issue M16s and
their ammo, and was a _great_ rifle team instructor. The rest is based on
growing up with guns and hunting, and studying this issue immediately after
the Vietnam War when I wondered how things had gone to hell in the previous
decade and a half while I was too young to really follow or study them, and
preparing for a stint as an infantry officer that was not to be.)

------
CapitalistCartr
This is a subject that is endlessly debated in gun and military circles. This
is one position on one end of the spectrum. There are good points on all
sides, much of which is complicated and ambiguous. HN is no place to get into
such an involved subject. Suffice it to say, whole books have been written
about military weapon choices by experienced soldiers.

~~~
ropman76
yes the debate between 5.56mm and 7.62mm crowds is hot enough to rival a
.Net/Java debate LOL. Still I am glad to see it. How many soldiers lost their
lives because of faulty M-16's in Vietnam? How many lives were lost because of
faulty equipment in WW2? I have two friends who are active duty military and
if they come under fire I want to make sure that their equipment does what it
needs to do when they need it. So a little spot light on these issues doesn't
hurt.

~~~
hga
The basic service rifles and carbines of WWII _were reliable_. So was the BAR
light machine gun by then.

We're talking about the reliability and effectiveness of the very most basic
weapons issued to our troops.

Heck, when counting effectiveness, the current Europellet (9mm) pistol, which
has to use FMJ ammo, is much less effective in stopping than the old M1911
(the latter of which just happens to be the design I carry every time I exit
my dwelling).

~~~
forca
I agree. As a veteran myself, I often wondered about the decisions to move
from the proven 7.62 to the not-so-effective 5.56. Back in WWII, if a German
soldier took at .30-06 in the chest from an M1, he wasn't getting up from it.
Even the British Enfield and Vickers guns using the venerable old .303 (7mm)
would put a man down reliably with a solid hit.

I personally know troops who have shot insurgents several times with M4s at
lethal ranges (less than 200') and they took the hits and kept fighting long
enough to return fire. Those same insurgents hit with a 7.62 slug would be
DRT. Full stop. There is a reason quite a few Marines and soldiers carried
.357 revolvers in Vietnam. The reason was the stopping power. The 125 grain
.357 traveling at 1400 FPS boasts 96% one shot stops on human torsos that are
not armoured. The .357 is still the gold standard for handgun stopping power.
Like you with your 1911, I'm a .357 guy. If I cannot do it with six, I need
something belt fed. Plus, like a lot of guys I know, I favour a New York
reload anyway.

Stay safe.

~~~
hga
Thanks!

Although I quibble that I'm a Facklerite instead of a Marshall and Evans type,
so I don't trust their .357 results, I'm specifically and convincingly told
their data is just not of high enough quality to support their conclusions (I
haven't investigated for real because since I was a teen the M1911 has fit my
hand like a glove, so it's weapon choice/shot placement first, followed by the
natural choice of .45 ACP over .38 Super, which I'll note is not the equal of
.357).

The Martin Fackler camp believes that at service pistol velocities killing
scales with the number of holes poked in a person, stopping scales with the
area of the bullet. And all things being equal, .45 is a lot bigger than .357.

However I note that that famous .357 load has a nominal velocity that's twice
as high as .45 ACP, so _maybe_ it really is disproportionately effective (note
that only the 10mm has really duplicated or rather substantially exceeded its
ballistics, even .357 SIG doesn't quite reach the .357 Magnum).

One thing that got me to wondering in this direction is the "unreasonable
effectiveness" of ~.30 caliber ball (FMJ) ammo (e.g. including the .303,
German 7×57mm and Russian 7.62×54mmR). Absent construction like the relatively
fragile West German 7.62 NATO round, like e.g. AK-47 rounds it's going flip,
at least partly, before exiting without fragmentation, and without dumping
much of its energy unless it hits solid bone or the like.

Fackler's general thesis about wounding is that permanent crush cavity counts,
"hydrostatic shock" and the like don't much or at all, soft tissue by and
large gets pushed out of the way and snaps back. Note that he got his start in
this in Vietnam field surgery....

But when I look at the temporary effects of a high power 7.62 or thereabouts
slug, I note that in most any torso hit their radius is going to encompass the
spine. So I've been wondering if their proven effectiveness on the battlefield
is a combination of a potentially temporary shock effect on the CNS via the
spine (plus of course the direct effects), followed by bleeding out etc.
before sufficient medical care can be rendered. The first being the "put
down", the second being the "stay down", or at least weak enough not to get
back up and be effective.

~~~
strlen
For what it's worth, I believe the original specifications for 9mm NATO
involve a higher pressure than standard commercial 9mm (effectively +P, i.e.,
probably not something to fire a C&R WWI Luger, but again not quite a .357
magnum).

------
hga
Let's me echo just about everything the author is saying:

In theory and practice, the Stoner direct impingement system where gas is
vented directly into the receiver requires _vastly_ more maintenance than
piston based designs. To my knowledge, _no one_ who isn't accepting large
numbers of donated M16s uses this design in their service rifle, with Canada
an obvious exception to the rule. _Absolutely no one_.

It has two advantages that I'm aware of: the front of the rifle is lighter in
weight, and has better inherent accuracy since nothing in the front is moving.
However the Swiss, who care _infinitely_ more than the US _Army_ about
marksmanship, didn't find the latter to be an issue when they developed their
own 5.56 NATO rifle. (The Marines still care about marksmanship, but don't
have any choice in their service rifle, except in rejecting the M4 and
sticking to the 20 inch barreled M16).

5.56 NATO is a lousy round for stopping people, although the exact details
were not elucidated until Martin Fackler did the research in the '80s. At low
velocity, all things being equal the round just travels straight through,
doing one flip to exit backwards (what happens when a bullet changes media
like this). If the velocity is high enough, the round breaks at its cannelure
(a crimped indentation that mates with the end of the cartridges brass to keep
the bullet in place during rough handling and firing of other rounds),
creating two pieces. At higher velocities, the back end will fragment. As a
rule of thumb, for every inch chopped off the barrel, you loose ~50 yards of
effective range due to this mechanism. Which causes one to wonder why the Army
switched to the M4, sacrificing ~275.

The answer I see to that is the total, and I mean total, corruption of this
part of US Army procurement in the post-WWII era. The Army did OK with the
1903/6 Springfield bolt action rifle (a copy of the 1898 Mauser), and superbly
with the M1 Garand semi-auto rifle for WWII and Korea. But after that the
procurement process was totally corrupt, as in samples of other designs were
physically sabotaged so the M14 could be adopted. It's a Garand with a better
gas system and a detachable box magazine, both good improvements, but outside
of a good trigger pull it's probably the worst design adopted in that era
because it leaves so much of the action unprotected from the elements.

The situation was so bad the Robert Strange McNamara's DoD of Vietnam infamy
forced the AR-15 onto the Army, which as mentioned in the article totally
screwed up the procurement of it (and one is allowed to suspect sabotaged it
by e.g. not properly supporting the cleaning of the rifle). As the author
mentioned, a lot of good men died in Vietnam due to unreliable M16s, which,
I'll agree with the others, has been kludged to a barely acceptable state. But
again, I'd say it's the worst of the currently issued rifles, except perhaps
for the Heckler & Koch G36, a rifle that's infamously issued to armies that
don't actually it in war.

Continuing with the procurement corruption, what prompted the move to the M4?
Uncharitable people like me believe it's likely the fact that Colt lost the
M16 contract to Fabrique Nationale d'Herstal (National Factory of Herstal,
Belgium), which despite its name and origin has had a tight relationship with
Americans and America since at least the '30s. So Colt came up with the
propitiatory M4 and lo and behold, the Army switched to it.

Except now Colt has also lost that contract to FNH, and their factory in South
Carolina is even more busy (they also at last count provided all the barrels
for our machine guns, plus manufacture Winchester and Browning guns; in
history, John Moses Browning (PBUH) first worked with Winchester before moving
mostly to working with FNH).

~~~
imglorp
> corruption of this part of US Army procurement in the post-WWII era.

Supporting allegations regarding the current sidearm, the Beretta M9, which
replaced the m1911:
[http://archive.gao.gov/d4t4/130439.pdf](http://archive.gao.gov/d4t4/130439.pdf)

~~~
hga
Interesting. Although IMHO deciding on an Europellet dispenser caused it to be
fatally flawed from inception. (IMHO it ought to also be single action, but
realistically a smooth DAO would be the best that would also be acceptable to
our ridiculously risk adverse officer corps).

I should also mention that the M60 was the worst General Purpose Machine Gun
(GPMG) ever adopted by a major military. Details as reported by a M60 operator
in Vietnam on request, but it was vastly inferior to the FNH, German and
Soviet designs, witness our almost complete later adoption of the FNH design.

------
kylered
one of the best articles with interesting commentary on the subject:

[http://www.thetruthaboutguns.com/2013/01/robert-
farago/marin...](http://www.thetruthaboutguns.com/2013/01/robert-
farago/marine-223-may-not-be-lethal-enough-for-civilians/)

