
Rudder issue that plagued the Boeing 737 throughout the 1990s - IFR
https://imgur.com/a/5wcFx8M
======
dang
This was written by Admiral_C, aka
[https://www.reddit.com/user/Admiral_Cloudberg](https://www.reddit.com/user/Admiral_Cloudberg),
and comes from
[https://www.reddit.com/r/CatastrophicFailure/comments/adl0jk...](https://www.reddit.com/r/CatastrophicFailure/comments/adl0jk/the_crashes_of_united_airlines_flight_585_and/).

See
[https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19393741](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19393741)
and
[https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19393715](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19393715)
for more.

------
jfk13
Wow. The quote from Capt Ray Miller is particularly telling:

“I have been told by my company . . . that the FAA and Boeing (were) aware of
the problems with the spurious rudder inputs but considered them to be more of
a nuisance problem than a flight safety issue. I was informed, that so far as
everyone was concerned, the rudder hardovers were a problem but that the
`industry' felt the losses would be in the acceptable range. I was being
mollified into thinking the incident did not happen, and for the `greater
good' it would be best not to pursue the matter. In other words I am
expendable as are the passengers I am responsible for, because for liability
reasons the FAA, Boeing et al cannot retroactively redesign the rudder
mechanisms to improve their reliability."

And this was _after_ the fault had not just caused in-flight emergencies, but
had already killed people...

~~~
gameswithgo
I wonder what solutions there are to these liability/blame problems. I have
seen a similar case in Australia, where a parking barrier was an extreme
danger as it cross over a biking path, and was hard to see until the last
minute. It caused a crash that took a mans leg, and the legal proceedings took
years. During that time the barrier remained in place, still a danger, because
removing it would have admitted fault.

~~~
why-el
What was the result of the litigation? From a money perspective, it seemed
like "admitting fault" would be far more reasonable, and I think in this sense
executives tend to exaggerate effects of "admitting fault", because, in the
end, they are betting that legal proceedings would nullify its effects, but as
we are learning now, it's not the case at all. Public memory might be short,
but it regenerates at alarming speeds if you continue down this path.

~~~
testvox
They might have not been contractually allowed to admit fault. Many insurance
policies do not allow the insured to admit fault, or they forfeit the policy.

~~~
btown
This type of term should be made illegal. No civil contract should be able to
incite a party to knowingly withhold evidence that could save lives.

------
kibwen
To add a human element to this story, I'm from north of Pittsburgh and the
crash of flight 427 is one of the events from my childhood that I can
determinedly recall. One of my classmates--eight or nine years old--lost her
father in that crash. Our class planted a tree outside our middle school with
a plaque to memorialize him. I bother saying this only because, while air
travel is impressively safe overall (hats off to the FAA and NTSB), it's
natural to mentally dismiss a mere ("mere") 132 deaths in the grand scheme of
things without pausing to consider the broader ripples such an event has on
history.

If you'd like to experience a moment of somber horror, Wikipedia has a
computer reconstruction of the final moments of the plane based on the
recordings recovered from the black box:
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:USAir_Flight_427_Chase.og...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:USAir_Flight_427_Chase.ogv)

~~~
cdolan
Also from Pittsburgh, and my wife lost her dad in this crash.

The top comment on this thread (re: "acceptable loss"), is infuriating.

~~~
Dylan16807
> The top comment on this thread (re: "acceptable loss"), is infuriating.

Do you ever drive a car? Do you think the risk is "acceptable"?

And don't get hung up on semantics, "acceptable" doesn't mean it's not
terrible, it means that it's not feasible to prevent every risk with that
danger:cost ratio. Especially because anything that causes a drastic reduction
in flight will increase car trips and probably cause _more_ deaths.

This is of course different from someone _lying_ about the level of risk. But
some risks really are "acceptable".

~~~
cdolan
Get out from behind your computer and talk to people for once.

~~~
Dylan16807
It's easy to explain to people in the real world how treating life as having
infinite value is actually impossible, and nobody actually does it.

Also, the "acceptable" part is the _statistical average_. It's still a tragedy
that any _particular_ person dies. I do have sympathy for you and your wife,
but we have millions of deaths per year that deserve equal respect, and we
only have so much we can do to prevent each one. We should try very hard, but
we can't try infinitely hard.

------
Admiral_C
I wrote this, not happy it got picked up and posted here without credit.
Here's the original Reddit thread:
[https://www.reddit.com/r/CatastrophicFailure/comments/adl0jk...](https://www.reddit.com/r/CatastrophicFailure/comments/adl0jk/the_crashes_of_united_airlines_flight_585_and/)

~~~
coryfklein
I'm not justifying how this was linked here, but I'd recommend putting your
own attribution on the original source of the content (in this case, Imgur)
rather than relying on everyone to access it through the specific forum you
originally posted it on.

Also, Hacker News doesn't have submitter filled "descriptions" for linked
pages, so there literally is no way to add attribution meta-data when posting
a link.

~~~
Admiral_C
More recent ones do have my username in them. I just never expected anyone
outside of Reddit to read it so I didn't structure it in a way that would make
that convenient.

~~~
coryfklein
Out of curiosity, does Imgur not allow you to modify the text passages in the
album after you create it? If it does and I was the author, I would certainly
be putting my name/username and a link to the Reddit post in there!

~~~
Admiral_C
Since I'm not logged in to Imgur when I post the albums, it allows me to
modify the text only within 12 hours after posting. This annoys me a lot but
I've yet to find a better platform that has all the attributes I want. (I
don't want to make an account and actually upload it there because then I'm
submitting it to an audience that I have no intention of engaging with and
know nothing about.)

~~~
AnssiH
You don't need to make the gallery "public" just because you are logged in.

The gallery will not be shared publicly unless you click the "Share to
community" button - it will just be available through the URL, exactly like
now. With the benefit that you can edit it afterwards.

------
laen
Boeing rudder issues in the 1990s? How about the 2010s? A KC-135R(Boeing 707
variant) in 2013 crashed of the same issues as the article.[1] The KC-135R is
essentially a modified 707 retooled with 737 engines and a beefed up vertical
stabilizer to account for the increased power of the engines. This
modification of the KC-135R occurred in the 90s and has been plagued with
rudder problems ever since. The accident in 2013 was attributed to pilot
error, because there are procedures to turn off the PCU if the rudder goes
haywire... but why not just fix the problem outright?

[1][https://www.amc.af.mil/News/Article-
Display/Article/786708/w...](https://www.amc.af.mil/News/Article-
Display/Article/786708/what-happened-aboard-shell-77/)

------
tuna-piano
While we're bashing Boeing, let us not forget how they tried to swindle
taxpayers into buying their tankers... a scandal which led to their CFO going
to prison.

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2003/10/06/t...](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2003/10/06/the-
boeing-scandal/dd52e666-0022-420d-b737-9d1bae1011d1/?utm_term=.ae4ecdd2bec1)

~~~
cc439
Honestly, I can't understand how this was a bad thing given just how dated and
stretched-thin the KC-135 fleet was at the time and those problems have only
growm worse. The Air Force has been trying to replace thr KC-135 for decades
since the newest airframe was produced in 1965 and their entire in-flight
refueling logistics rely on these aircraft. Yes, it is unseemly to slip
something into a continuing resolution to fund a war effort but when the
bureaucratic roadblocks to purchasing something so critically important yet so
unsexy as a flying gas station, one has to wonder if the people involved were
acting out of good-willed desperation to help avert a massive problem with
critical defense infrastructure. While $16 Billion for 100 aircraft may seem
exorbitant, it has taken until this past year for the KC-135's replacement to
enter servjce at a cost of $179 million per unit. That still beats the
inflation adjusted cost of $160m per 767 tanker but think about how !uch money
has been wasted on upfit and restoratiom programs for the 60+ year old KC-135
airframes over the 15 years since that "scandal".

Source on KC-46 info and general issues with the agjng KC-135 fleet:
[https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/01/16/pe...](https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/01/16/pegasus-
arrives-kc-46-tanker-makes-america-more-effective-in-era-of-growing-threats/)

------
avar
Aside from this specific issue, all of aviation works like this.

E.g. the reason the 747 was decommissioned from passenger flight in the US
when it was is because they flew it right up to the day that the FAA mandated
that they couldn't fly it anymore.

The reason was that they didn't have then-mandatory fuel tank inerting. For
something like a decade there were a bunch of planes in the air carrying
people that were known to be more likely to explode than some other planes.

Regulatory safety is always a messy combination of new requirement and timed
phase-out of old systems.

Same with cars, you can buy a used car today and even use it as a taxi to
ferry passengers without it having safety features that would make it illegal
to sell as a newly manufactured vehicle.

~~~
rwc
"E.g. the reason the 747 was decommissioned from passenger flight in the US
when it was is because they flew it right up to the day that the FAA mandated
that they couldn't fly it anymore."

I'm sorry, what? Do you have a source?

~~~
avar
In 1996 TWA 800, a 747 flight, exploded[1]. The cause was lack of fuel tank
inerting. The FAA subsequently published a rule in 2007[2] saying that by
December 26th, 2017 all passenger airliners needed to have an inerting system
by manufacture or retrofitting.

UA and Delta[3][4] flew such variants of the 747 to within a month of the FAA
deadline. The final flight was on November 7, 2017. You can still fly the 747
into or within the US (as e.g. BA does), you just need to have a newer or
retrofitted 747. The rule also doesn't apply to cargo planes.

Sorry about the "[747] flight[s] in the US" ambiguity. I was referring to the
domestic fleet at the time. Also it wasn't literally "right up to the day" of
the rule going into effect, but in the grand scheme of things that's accurate
enough. The phase-out was planned to coincide with that rule going into
effect, among other reasons.

The point being that airlines can and will fly airframes that in one way or
another would be illegal to manufacture today for safety reasons, or which
will be grounded by the regulator tomorrow unless an expensive retrofitting is
carried out.

I think that's fine, but apparently the fact that airlines are allowed to fly
planes with fixable flaws that have "already killed people" just to save some
money is surprising to some. It's all a cost/benefit trade-off, and is
considered normal by regulators.

There's some more details in this HN comment chain at the time in 2017 that I
contributed to[5].

Edit: Some weird HN glitch or mod action seems to have happened. My comment
upthread is now a top-level comment, but initially I'd replied to the "already
killed people" top-level comment by jfk13[6], and that's definitely how it was
rendered for a while.

1\.
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TWA_Flight_800](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TWA_Flight_800)

2\.
[https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/...](https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC%20120-98A.pdf)

3\.
[https://eu.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/todayinthesky/2...](https://eu.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/todayinthesky/2017/11/07/united-
airlines-final-boeing-747-flight-today/838922001/)

4\.
[https://eu.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/todayinthesky/2...](https://eu.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/todayinthesky/2017/12/19/delta-
air-lines-sends-off-its-boeing-747-s-grand-farewell-tour/964101001/)

5\.
[https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16015304](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16015304)

6\.
[https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19390633](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19390633)

~~~
will4274
> The point being that airlines can and will fly airframes that in one way or
> another would be illegal to manufacture today for safety reasons

Of course, this is also true for cars. The vast majority of cars on the road
would be illegal to manufacture today.

~~~
logifail
> The vast majority of cars on the road would be illegal to manufacture today.

Source?

Illegal to manufacture due to lacking significant safety features, or due to
other changes over time such as evolving emissions standards?

~~~
avar
Both, there's lots of both safety and pollution mandates like that. As just
one recent example[1]:

> "the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration announced that it
> would require all automobiles sold in the United States built beginning in
> May 2018 to include backup cameras"

That's less than a year ago. It's a fair bet that most vehicles on the road
don't have such systems, but they're now illegal to manufacture.

1\.
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backup_camera](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backup_camera)

~~~
logifail
> 'The area directly behind vehicles has been described as a "killing zone"
> due to the associated carnage'

Got to love Wikipedia and their strict adherence to NPOV. That kind of camera
does look to be a US (and Canada?)-only requirement at the moment.

Are there (m)any internationally-recognised compulsory _safety_ feature
standards that mean a vehicle manufactured, say, five years ago would no
longer to be legal to manufacture today?

~~~
avar
The "killing zone" isn't something Wikipedia invented, they're quoting
Consumer Reports, which isn't exactly just some guy's blog when it comes to
this topic.

You seem to just be moving the goal post. No, you are not going to find some
safety feature of cars that was introduced in lockstep across the entire globe
overnight whose impact is as dramatic as say seat belts or airbags were.

Car safety is all about marginal improvements at this point, and there are
many regulatory agencies. In practice the US and EU set the tone for safety
across the globe, but they don't act in lockstep.

Most of these mandates are also going to be relatively mundane, e.g. mandating
that the A-pillar in newly sold cars this year must be 5% stronger than the
previous mandate, or given statistics about pedestrian impact mandating some
small adjustment to the design of the front bumper or hood.

------
georgecmu
This reminded me of the Yak-42 jackscrew failure due to a design defect, which
caused a crash killing 132 onboard in 1982 [1]. The entire fleet was grounded
for more than two years until the full investigation was completed and the
defect was fixed. Three design engineers were convicted.

[1]
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeroflot_Flight_8641](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeroflot_Flight_8641)

~~~
hopler
Convicted of what? Smells like scapegoating.

"The investigation concluded that among the causes of the crash were poor
maintenance, as well as the control system of the stabilizer not meeting basic
aviation standards”

~~~
kortilla
Probably this:

>the control system of the stabilizer not meeting basic aviation standards

------
marcosdumay
Aviation has an well known acceptable risk level at around 10^-9 for each
issue. That's the number that leads government intervention, pilot procedure
designing, aircraft designing and everything else. It's expected to lead to a
less than 10^-6 chance of accidents per flight. (Somebody calculated the B783
Max odds on 4*10^-6 yesterday, what is a crazy high level.)

That number has been higher in the past, and is moving into 10^-10 per issue
with 10^-7 overall risk right now, with large airplanes in scheduled flight
very near that level.

~~~
DuskStar
> Somebody calculated the B783 Max odds on 4*10^-6 yesterday, what is a crazy
> high level.

I think that may have been me (1/250000), but that was based on a couple of
generous assumptions - two crashes across 4 flights/day on 350 planes for an
average of 365 days. Unfortunately I think a more reasonable flights/day
number is 3 or lower - a lot of Max 8s are on longer routes - and the flight
day average is almost certainly lower than 365 (which assumes linear
deliveries for the past two years, with no days for maintenance).

~~~
Lorkki
Also, I believe the statistic of interest here is incidents per operating
hour, not per flight?

~~~
organsnyder
Given that the Max crashes both happened shortly after takeoff, I'd be more
interested in a per-flight statistic. But I'm not sure how the industry does
it.

~~~
Kavenerinds
The industry/NTSB/FAA generally cares more about flight hours, but I agree
with you. Both of these accidents happened shortly after takeoff. I am
surprised that no accident has happened during landing.

~~~
hopler
Is the same sensor used the same way in landing?

~~~
Kavenerinds
I would imagine so. As long as the pilot wants to control the rudder, that
same sensor would be used. What I would like to know is if the MAX has a
different setup. I think it'd be idiotic of Boeing to use the same rudder
control configuration as the old 737 considering the problems that they had as
demonstrated by this post.

------
ams6110
I had heard of the history of the "rudder hardover" problems with the 737 but
have never heard that Boeing was actively subverting the investigation.
Assuming it's true, I'd agree that it's appalling behavior, but this post
alone doesn't convince me. A lot of complex systems can fail in unlikely ways
and it doesn't imply malfeasance that the company was wrong about the cause.

How many times have you investigated a weird, intermittent software or system
problem and gone down the wrong path (or paths) because what turned out to be
the actual cause seemed so unlikely, even if there were clues that in
retrospect you should have given more weight.

~~~
mrguyorama
I have never hindered any investigative agency, internal or otherwise,
attempting to discover flaws in systems I have built. Doing so would be
morally abhorrent, and hopefully someday illegal

~~~
blattimwind
I also never filed the serial numbers off replacement parts that I then put
into a rudder servo of a large airliner while forgetting to fill out the
necessary paperwork.

------
usaphp
> Instead, Boeing tried to claim that flight 427 crashed because a pilot had a
> seizure and depressed the rudder. NTSB investigators dismissed this as
> ridiculous.

> Boeing had no choice but to carry out the changes, but the company never
> stopped trying to deflect blame. While the investigation was ongoing, it
> adopted a philosophy of trying to avoid paying out damages to families of
> crews because this could be legally interpreted as an admission of
> responsibility. It had tampered with the PCU from the Colorado Springs crash
> and repeatedly tried to misdirect the investigation with “alternative”
> theories.

Should not there be some criminal charges?

~~~
rkangel
That would require more evidence than it sounds like there is. And that's
assuming that you subscribe to the motivations put forward in this article. I
generally follow Hanlon's razor - "Never ascribe to malice that which can
adequately be explained by incompetence". I have a hard time believing that a
cover-up in Boeing was orchestrated over several years by a group of people
all who didn't care about loss of life. I can easily believe that they didn't
take the problem seriously, and that they were biased towards conclusions that
weren't their fault.

~~~
kartan
> I have a hard time believing that a cover-up in Boeing was orchestrated over
> several years by a group of people all who didn't care about loss of life.

No orchestration is needed. Managers only need to look with disdain to anyone
that brings the issue.

If your company does not put a lot of resources to make it transparent it is
going to be opaque by default. Transparency is hard to achieve when humans are
so good reading a superior expression of disapproval. Most people does not
need to be told to not bring that problem again, all that we need is a subtle
clue.

So, to get a cover up you only need to do nothing.

“It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends
upon his not understanding it!”

~~~
stcredzero
_No orchestration is needed. Managers only need to look with disdain to anyone
that brings the issue._

Networks and social media extend the reach of these kinds of disdain, and take
these mechanisms beyond the walls of the office and organization. In the
present day climate, where accusations causing outrage tend more easily to
become viral, one need not be someone's manager or even have a close
relationship to exercise such power of disdain. The incentive structures in
social media can act as a very efficient transmission substrate for these
mechanisms.

One doesn't have to look far, to see how social media amplified groupthink has
short circuited professional judgement -- even in highly visible and public
circumstances. In particular, forums, email lists, and social media groups of
journalists can be seen to be having such effects.

 _So, to get a cover up you only need to do nothing._

With just a modicum of digging, this can be seen quite clearly in 2019, in the
mainstream media, which is declining but still trusted by the public.

 _“It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary
depends upon his not understanding it!”_

This effect is very real and very powerful. This is why we as a society should
be wary of the political exclusiveness of entire professions, entire
industries, and of academia. If you're surrounded only by people of like
minds, you're far less likely to have your idea checked by people highly
motivated to find your faults. It's only diversity of opinions which guards
against groupthink.

~~~
Retric
It’s not really social pressure when managers have so much direct power not
just in major events like a lay off or promotion, but also day to day tasking.
This generally results in people becoming hypersensitive to their boss’s
disapproval.

Social networks on the other hand have far less direct impact which results in
less socially accepted statements becoming common.

~~~
stcredzero
_This generally results in people becoming hypersensitive to their boss’s
disapproval._

In 2019, there are lots of examples of people being quite sensitive to
approval over social media. This differs by individual circumstance. However,
in 2019 there are entire fields where people must ascribe to some form of
group consensus, or basically become un-personed from it. Media work seems to
be particularly sensitive to this.

 _not just in major events like a lay off or promotion, but also day to day
tasking_

There are examples of journalists consulting and influencing each other in the
context of news cycle events.

 _Social networks on the other hand have far less direct impact_

This was once true but now is simply out of date and very wrong. In 2019,
there are social networks which have very direct impact, and very large
impacts on people's livelihood. There are entire fields where such social
networks and online communication can get someone _un-personed_. These are
basically the 2019 version of the "old boy network."

~~~
Retric
Over 32,000 journalists are working full time in the US, social media focus on
a minute fraction of them.

Social media can be a near full time job. One many successful people simply
don’t have time for.

So sure many NYT reporters might post their wedding photos online, but deeper
interactions are often limited to people focusing on such things.

~~~
stcredzero
_Over 32,000 journalists are working full time in the US, social media focus
on a minute fraction of them._

You're conflating two entirely different things here. Much of the
dysfunction/groupthink occurs through things like legacy media journalists
using social media.

The point is that networks and social media enables offline channels for
groupthink, which then affects other media.

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AA2JII6TG4o](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AA2JII6TG4o)

 _So sure many NYT reporters might post their wedding photos online_

This of course, isn't an issue. (But mistakenly considered as such, it might
as well be a strawman.) What is an issue are blue checkmark journalists
engaging in toxic groupthink on Twitter. This also happens on email lists and
industry insider forums.

(This isn't actually a new phenomenon. There are Vietnam era journalists who
complained about how some correspondents never left bars in Saigon. The
difference is that the groupthink can follow people around in their smartphone
and come at them every waking hour.)

~~~
Retric
> “some correspondents” never left bars in Saigon

My point is group think requires significant interaction over social media.
This requires more than visiting a bar one a month / posting wedding photos.
It requires significant amounts of time and crossing that threashold is not
very common.

So, sure a small fraction are significantly influenced but the majority is
not. Making the overall influence far less significant than it might appear.

On top of that mainstream news organizations like FOX, CNN, NPR differentiate
based on appealing to different groups. Which creates different spheres of
social media for each segment. This has been intensified with online sources
the Drudge Report going mainstream and gathering vast followings. Which means
social media is pulling different reporters in different directions.

~~~
stcredzero
_My point is group think requires significant interaction over social media._

Then the behavior of many journalists over social media should greatly concern
you.

 _This requires more than visiting a bar one a month / posting wedding photos.
It requires significant amounts of time and crossing that threshold is not
very common._

This is common among journalists. Particularly those working in niche media.

 _Making the overall influence far less significant than it might appear._

Those who know the facts behind certain niche stories are _amazed_ at the
degree of reality warping done by the mainstream media. Just look at what
happened around the Covington kids.

~~~
Retric
The Covington Kids story shows how social media amplified both sides of an
issue. It’s the opposite of group think with multiple narratives showing up.

What you’re describing “group consensus” is a systemic bias. A historical
example of say US WWII propaganda qualifies as essentially all US news is
shifted in the same direction.

Waves of news with story X being updated to story Y over time is a different
thing. That’s a question of which organizations get involved over time. You
can find examples that support any narrative based on timing. But, bias would
mean the story did not evolve.

~~~
stcredzero
_The Covington Kids story shows how social media amplified both sides of an
issue._

The behavior of mainstream journalists calling for the doxxing of and violence
against these kids just strikes me as amazing. The groupthink involved with
accepting the initial narrative is quite apparent.

 _What you’re describing “group consensus” is a systemic bias._

When systematic bias reaches the point where journalists completely abandon
fact-checking and basic adult judgement, it's more than just "group
consensus." Offering sexual favors to do things against kids? I'm sorry, but
if I made something like that up, it would be purple prose. Journalists were
swept up in _that_ kind of groupthink!

 _A historical example of say US WWII propaganda qualifies as essentially all
US news is shifted in the same direction._

Read _Manufacturing Consent_ \-- it's the same in 2019 as it was in the
1980's, we in the west just do it faster and harder with the bias, emotional
words only for one side, and selective coverage. The thesis was that the west
is just as bad as Pravda. In 2019, I find that Pravda was more subtle about
it.

 _bias would mean the story did not evolve._

Bias can also mean that the retractions were either absent or all but meant to
be invisible. In 2019, the typical media modus operandi is to technically be
about the truth and retract, but engineer this to have basically zero effect.
The number of mainstream sites who will edit a story, but give no indication
of that, is just amazing to me.

~~~
Retric
Individual action does not imply collective action. Talking points can make it
seem that way.

You need to factor in how stories are simply copied around the ecco chamber of
mainstream news. But also how stories evolve not just what gets retracted.

You are focusing on an individual story, but also a specific point in time. A
different narrative showed up and was passed around mainstream media changing
your view of what happened. That’s more than a simple retraction.

What I find fascinating is it was even considered a story in the first place.
But, it really resonated with you, so I guess they know what they are doing.

------
BoorishBears
I worked under a CEO who had worked at Boeing before, and he said before that
at times there was a number that a life was worth when making decisions while
he worked there, in a conversation about diminishing returns in quality.

Now I’m not sure if he meant that literally and there’s a number in the Boeing
employee handbook, but he had a point. He said they _could_ make planes cost
twice as much and save a few lives that will be lost one day, but no one would
be able to afford flying.

This case definitely seems like that mentality gone wrong, but it’s
interesting to realize yes, cost was spared in making your
plane/car/boat/train as safe as possible

~~~
jdsully
The NHTSA has a similar number, I believe its in the realm of $2 million per
life. Its based off of medical costs and a few other "organic" numbers to
estimate what the population as a whole values a life at.

Its morbid but it has to be this way or transportation would be unaffordable.

~~~
notahacker
Unsurprisingly, the aviation insurance industry has also cost per life
calculations. An aviation insurance broker who bought industry data from us
wanted to know if there was any way we could provide them with hard data or
reliable estimates the percentage of passengers flown by an airline flights
who were American citizens, because the potential liabilities associated with
the loss of American lives were so much greater...

------
umvi
That was harrowing... I feel like there should be quite a few Boeing
executives in prison for life because of this.

~~~
imglorp
Yeah, if things had gone just slightly differently. That, and also the company
may well have ended and another gained US airline dominance.

I'd like to see a James Burke "Connections" style series on near-misses. What
could have been. Another case I like to think about is Sears missing the boat
on the Internet. They were catalog based 80 years before Amazon and well could
have decimated the industry if a few key decisions were different.

~~~
interestica
This would be an awesome series. Blockbuster/Netflix. Fall and rise of certain
social media networks. "Missed Connections"

------
js2
Somewhat related:

[https://nsc.nasa.gov/resources/case-
studies](https://nsc.nasa.gov/resources/case-studies)

This one is interesting:

 _In March 2010, a 29-year-old shift nurse left her job in Atlanta, Georgia
and headed to her boyfriend’s house. She was driving her 2005 Chevy Cobalt on
a two-lane road as she approached a half-mile downhill straightaway. As the
road leveled after the straightaway, she approached an area where some
rainwater had accumulated. Shortly after encountering this section of roadway,
she apparently lost control of her Cobalt as it hydroplaned across the center
line. The rear passenger side of her car was struck by an oncoming Ford Focus,
causing the Cobalt to spin off the road and fall 15 feet before landing in a
large creek around 7:30 p.m. The impact of the crash broke the nurse’s neck,
an injury that led to her death shortly after she arrived at the hospital.

While this tragedy might sound like a typical crash scenario, it was
particularly puzzling to the victim’s parents. Why? According to Atlanta
magazine, she always wore her seat belt and never had a speeding ticket. So
how did she suddenly lose control of her car on that fateful evening? Sadly,
this unsettling question remained unanswered until several years later—after
many more drivers suffered similar fates.

...

The ignition switch did not meet the mechanical specifications for torque and
required less force to turn the key than its designers originally ordered. If
the driver’s knee hit the key fob, the car would often turn off, causing
stalling at highway speeds and disabling the airbags._

[https://nsc.nasa.gov/features/detail/hidden-
hazards](https://nsc.nasa.gov/features/detail/hidden-hazards)

Edit: apparently NASA is checking referrer and you can’t follow this link
directly. It’s the third case study down the page from the first link.

~~~
humblebee
_While this tragedy might sound like a typical crash scenario, it was
particularly puzzling to the victim’s parents. Why? According to Atlanta
magazine, she always wore her seat belt and never had a speeding ticket. So
how did she suddenly lose control of her car on that fateful evening? Sadly,
this unsettling question remained unanswered until several years later—after
many more drivers suffered similar fates._

I don't understand why this paragraph was written this way. Driving highway
speeds and hitting a puddle of water seems like a reasonable cause to lose
control of a car and result in the crash. I don't understand why _this_ would
be puzzling. On the other hand, the lack of airbag deployment would be
puzzling.

~~~
js2
The case study is worth reading even if that one paragraph isn’t the best
introduction to the issue. It goes off on occasional tangents in order to
relate the issue back to NASA and repeats itself here and there, so maybe it
just needed an editor.

------
everdev
> Investigators discovered upon their arrival that someone had made off with
> the spring and end cap, but at the time they did not know the significance
> of this act. The NTSB and Parker Bertea replaced the spring, the end cap,
> and several other parts that were ruined in the crash and began running
> tests on the valve. Nothing abnormal was found. Boeing, which had packed the
> valve for shipping, did not explain why it kept the spring and the end cap.
> It instead tried to steer the NTSB toward a conclusion that the crash was
> caused by a wind rotor, a phenomenon similar to a sideways tornado that
> could sometimes be found along the Rocky Mountains.

Is this true?

------
howard941
FWIW the rudder hardover described in this very interesting link doesn't
appear to be related to the Max 8 issues near MCAS.

~~~
fixermark
Correct. Not to play psychic, but I'm assuming the original poster chose to
share this as a friendly reminder that as a general rule, Boeing does not have
a track record of placing human lives above their continued corporate
profitability.

"If Boeing knew about a problem with the MCAS, they'd have told the FAA and
corrected it" is not a hypothesis in-line with their past behavior, should
anyone be holding that hypothesis in their minds.

~~~
cryptonector
I don't understand this. Each of these scandals is a mortal danger to Boeing.
One of them might someday finally put it out of business. Whereas if they
reacted to each case by being committed to finding the problem whatever it is,
they could greatly reduce their liability by reducing the ultimate number of
fatalities due to any one problem.

~~~
marcinzm
Boeing is a US military supplier and a strategic US asset in the airspace
industry, the US government will ensure that they do not go under no matter
how much damage they do (see car industry). Furthermore even if that wasn't
the case the people who cause these issues have almost zero chance of facing
personal liability. As a result, it's in the personal interest of the people
running Boeing to cut corners and extract maximum short term reward (ie:
personal promotions, stock grants valuations, etc.).

~~~
aabeshou
This is an excess of capitalism: those with capital are given too much power,
and their self interest ends up being entirely selfish at the expense of
society at large. Capitalism needs regulation, and if the system ends up
entrenching itself so that regulation becomes impossible (because of
corruption, self-interest, short-term gains, etc), then it means the entire
system of capitalism is faulty.

~~~
CamperBob2
Regulation is _exactly_ why the problem that you're complaining about exists.
Only in the presence of regulation does a company become "too big to fail."
That's not an attribute of market economics.

Note that I'm not making a value judgment about regulation in the general
case, just pointing out that you've misidentified the problem in this
particular case.

~~~
aabeshou
I'm not saying market economics is the problem. I think that concept gets
conflated with capitalism too often. I think markets are a good tool for
economic organization. The problem is the system of capitalism, i.e. the
centralization of power and capital in the hands of the few, and the rules of
a system that incentivize and enable that. This bad system of rules,
capitalism, is certainly a form of regulation (is that what you mean?). But
when I use the word regulation, I mean a rule that checks the otherwise
unlimited exploitative power of capital, rather than any rule at all. Maybe
you think that any rule at all would cause this, and I think that's not true.

------
jackschultz
I know these comments are kind of frowned upon on threads talking about an
issue like this, but very interesting use of imgur. Effectively a blog post
focused on images, which is a very good way of thinking about posts I feel.
People love images rather than only words. Has imgur been looking at this?
Trying to push it as another big use for its platform?

~~~
frosted-flakes
This is a common pattern for posts on r/DIY on Reddit, where people have 5-100
photos covering each step of a project, and each photo has a bit of text below
it explaining the process.

I thing it works great, and I much prefer it over videos because I can take my
time, and videos tend to gloss over the details. My only issue with Imgur is
that on mobile the images are very low-res, so zooming in to see details
doesn't work.

~~~
cr0sh
My biggest complaint with the pattern is that there's no way to easily save
the text with the images. If you "download the post", you get the images, but
not the text. Even an XML or JSON of the text as a large "blob" would be
better than nothing. Heck, for that matter, a flat ASCII file delimited with
line breaks would be fine.

~~~
NikkiA
IMO "Print to PDF" works perfectly for this kind of thing (and blog posts,
etc)

------
Someone1234
That was a surprisingly interesting read. I have to admit I was skeptical just
because it was hosted on imgur, but both the images/text paint an interesting
picture worthy of discussion.

~~~
thatswrong0
If you want to read more, this is from a series on the subreddit
/r/catastrophicfailure, written by Admiral_Cloudberg:
[https://www.reddit.com/user/Admiral_Cloudberg](https://www.reddit.com/user/Admiral_Cloudberg)

~~~
aurailious
I was going to ask if this was his, I always look forward to the new one each
week.

------
atomicbeanie
Manufacturers take the blame for this. And they take the blame for things like
no global transponder in the loss of the 777 over the Atlantic. Unfortunately
the FAA processes, while enlightened in some ways, and firmly grounded in the
science of safety, are effectively a strong deterrent for a manufacturer to
avoid changing anything in a design.

The result is that many aircraft operate for a very long time with very
outdated systems. Replacing designs is prohibitively expensive to prove to the
FAA that there will be no corresponding degradation of the system's
performance or new safety risk. Unfortunately such a process does not
calculate the cost of not replacing the system. No cost is attributed with
keeping something that is old and lacking in capability.

The result is that aircraft systems are woefully behind what technology can
offer. And this is not just the hardware or the software, it includes the
procedures and the overall set of capabilities. The result is that aircraft
are being operated to the standards of the 50s, when in fact a much higher
standard of crew and aircraft performance is possible. When I say performance
I am also talking about safety performance, the ability to operate without
harm causing failure.

~~~
sspyder
That's not what happened in this case. They used a single piston where
commonly two or more pistons would be used to control the rudder.

~~~
atomicbeanie
I do not agree in general, but I admit to not knowing the details of that
system. Those of us in the industry have been waiting for 737 rudders to fail
for a long time. The data was there. This is the same as waiting for a pilot
to rip the tail off an airplane as happened over New York. The certification
basis of those aircraft was not in harmony with the information the operators
used to fly them and gravely distorted the engineering that had gone into
designing the aircraft.

In both cases, there was a certain inevitability given the processes at work,
the conditions, the changes and the difference between engineering reality and
what is presented in the FAA Type Certification process as the basis for the
modification of the Type Certificate. As an engineer working on aircraft, one
thing is for certain, engineering data is laundered to the bare minimum in the
interests of certification. This is in contrast to the engineering NASA does.
The cert process does not achieve transparency, as it is a legal not an
engineering process.

One can blame manufacturers, but there really is no way for them to be
transparent and ever ship anything (ref. Lear Fan). I am not, however,
advocating retracting any responsibility from Boeing. They must bear the
responsibility for their product. I am only saying that we have created an
environment as a country that makes it unlikely we will see the behavior we
desire from manufacturers. As a person who likes to land the same number of
times I take off, my interest is in helping the government improve as well as
the manufacturers.

So Boeing decided to conclude that the existing system was sufficient. And
they proved it to the FAA. There is no precedent or standard applied to the
parts of the airplane that are not changed, once they are deemed not to need
changing. This is similar to the housing code. Replace a socket in a house
with knob-and-spool wiring, and you do not need to fix a thing. Rewire a
bedroom in a house with knob and spool wiring, and the code will not let you
put new knob and spool wiring in, one must then bring the house's electrical
system up to code.

The reason there _still is_ a 737 is the tremendous economic benefit afforded
to manufacturers who use safety analysis to show that the previous iteration
of the aircraft's systems are sufficient given proposed changes on the
aircraft. That's why it has ridiculous engine nacelles, ridiculous landing
gear, in many 737's ridiculous avionics. A new airframe is required, but the
cost of a new airframe's certification is much greater than the hacky re-
certification of an old type certificate obtained when standards and processes
were very different and much out of date.

~~~
atomicbeanie
There are many examples too. The concorde is one that has my current prize for
being the most extreme example. One crash, retire them all. There was no
reasonable way to operate that aircraft by modern safety standards. But it was
certified in what, the 60's. One likely could have certified a barn door
strapped to a Concorde engine in those days ;-)

~~~
pedrocr
The Concorde was not retired directly after the crash. It flew for three more
years and was retired for financial reasons. The crash probably reduced the
demand though and thus contributed.

~~~
atomicbeanie
I think that is inaccurate. One fleet was grounded quickly. The 30 million
Kevlar tank linings were underestimated in cost I think dramatically. As for
profit, I am not sure the aircraft was ever a profit center. Any reasonable
observer saw Non-recoverable Engineering Expenses that the company any could
never recover from as a result of having to mitigate a new safety requirement
onto an old aircraft that was never designed with modern standards in mind.

I think it is a very good example of how old systems continue to operate while
the public believes they are up to modern standards. We see it in civil
engineering now too. A bridge collapses in Pennsylvania and the public is told
that over 1/3 of US bridges are outside of their designed life span and more
expensive to fix than replace with municipalities that cannot afford to do
either. The Concord was old and had what we call Tech Debt. It could not be
made modern. Risk is just negative opportunity cost. When it crashed that debt
was realized and the company had to write it down. One thing for sure is
correct in your statement. It is about money driving the decisions, not
engineering.

~~~
pedrocr
What is inaccurate? The accident happened in 2000 and the last flights were in
2003 by both airlines. What do you mean by one fleet being grounded quickly?

The exact motives for retiring the plane are hard to know. Safety almost
surely played a part if nothing else by reducing demand. I was just correcting
that you seemed to be saying the plane has been retired after the accident
when it did in fact return to service.

------
southern_cross
Boeing certainly hasn't been inspiring a lot of confidence lately, given that
decisions like this:

[https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-
aerospace/boein...](https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-
aerospace/boeing-overhauls-its-quality-controls-more-high-tech-tracking-but-
fewer-inspectors/)

have apparently been leading to decisions like this:

[https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-
aerospace/air-f...](https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-
aerospace/air-force-wont-accept-any-more-boeing-tankers-until-manufacturing-
process-is-cleaned-up/)

~~~
lukewrites
"Best" part of the first article:

> Aero Mechanic, the District 751 monthly newspaper, accused Boeing of
> “essentially masking defects,” by pressuring inspectors to not record
> defects when found but instead to simply have them fixed, then afterward
> produce data to the FAA showing a big decrease in defects as a justification
> for cutting out inspections.

------
rb808
To me its interesting that they wouldn't redesign the part as it would be
admission of causing previous crashes? Kinda scary that the lawyers rule USA
at the end of the day.

Its easy to blame Boeing for faults like this but its a miracle that these
things fly so reliably with so many moving parts and human involvement.

~~~
hopler
Lawyers don't design planes. CEOs who intentionally lie about their planes'
safety do.

Without lawyers, those CEOs could go on killing people and never have any
accountability.

------
argd678
This is why we have the NTSB, prioror to it’s existence manufacturers were the
primary investigators of their planes’ accidents with predictable results like
above.

~~~
duxup
They write such great reports. Technical, but also accessible. I'm not a pilot
and I find them interesting to read.

~~~
argd678
Agreed, the CSB has great reports too.

~~~
kristaps
And their videos are excellent too:
[https://www.youtube.com/user/USCSB](https://www.youtube.com/user/USCSB)

Think all the investigation shows on Discovery, but with zero filler.

~~~
duxup
I like the idea of a Discovery like channel ... but full those videos.

Discovery, the History Channel, used to be full of random filler like old
military equipment videos that were just videos from demos and trade shows and
someone who sounded like they were reading out of a Jane's book or something
;)

Same went for some disaster / failures videos done by (I forget who) some risk
/ aftermath assessment company.

I miss those days.

------
gok
The Wikipedia article on this is also good
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues)

------
rsweeney21
My previous company made software for DOTs. Over the years I learned that DOTs
assign a dollar amount to human lives/deaths when calculating the cost benefit
ratio of implementing roadway safety improvements. It very much reminds me of
the acceptable number of deaths mentioned in the article. DOTs don't like
talking about this of course.

There should be a law that grants companies safe harbor for reporting and
fixing defects in their product without the risk of accepting liability. Sort
of like self-whistle blowing.

~~~
Erlich_Bachman
Is there realistically any other way to do this though? The value of life, as
estimated by a human in a generic situation is presumably infinite. However,
companies, governments, regulating bodies, etc, have to regulate actual
physical measures, which cost money, time etc- all very finite things. These
agents need to act in actual physical environment like for example limited
budgets or having to choose between two different safety measures. At some
point the human life is going to have to enter that equation, if we are going
to be talking about safety issues. How do you calculate en equation with
finite and infinite variables without assuming a finite value for the human
life?

------
syllable_studio
Wow and this content is just posted on imgur with no link to sources? Is
anyone already working on posting this through a legit source? If this content
is real, it seems wild that it's not even published somewhere that is
searchable online.

~~~
Admiral_C
The source is here:
[https://www.reddit.com/r/CatastrophicFailure/comments/adl0jk...](https://www.reddit.com/r/CatastrophicFailure/comments/adl0jk/the_crashes_of_united_airlines_flight_585_and/)

I wrote this. I noticed it jumped 12,000 views and I got no username mention
on Reddit, so I asked around and found it came from here. Made an account just
to post the source. I'm pretty pissed that someone linked it completely
without credit.

As for what it is, it's part of a series I write for reddit where I read as
many sources as I can about a plane crash, write it up in a way that's
understandable to laymen, and then post it for others to read. Taken away from
me and my reputation on Reddit it has zero credibility because it's just a
random album on Imgur.

~~~
FrankBooth
I'm not sure you have the right to be upset about lack of attributions when
your articles lack attributions for the sources of information and all of the
images.

~~~
kerneis
I'm not sure what you mean, the second paragraph of the article is: "Images
sourced from The Seattle Times, the NTSB, Boeing, Tails Through Time, the
Colorado Springs Gazette, The Times of India, Wikipedia, TribLIVE, The Flight
427 Air Disaster Support League, and Forbes. Video clips courtesy of Cineflix
and the Weather Channel. Special thanks to the Seattle Times for its series of
articles on the subject in 1996, which brought to light many of the details
referenced here."

~~~
FrankBooth
That was added after my post.

------
forkLding
This was uploaded in January 7th by the way if you check the date, not
recently so this isn't to explain the Lion Air issue but rather Boeing's
history

------
JackFr
I imagine that Boeing engineers are decent people who want to be able to look
at themselves in the mirror and be able to sleep at night. So I find it hard
to believe in an active conspiracy, but the propensity for groupthink and
self-delusion seems extraordinarily high.

~~~
_s
If you've spent your career at a company, who can fire you for not parroting
the company line, in a field as small as aviation, chances are you'll not get
hired elsewhere, and you'll do as your indirectly expected to.

~~~
JackFr
I am as cowardly and timid about my job as any other clock puncher, but I
would not knowingly risk peoples lives.

I suppose the distinction I'm making is one between bona fide self-delusion
and knowing cynicism.

------
btmiller
This makes me wonder how we'll view space travel generations from now. Will
the descendants of companies like SpaceX and Blue Origin face outrage and
calls for criminal charges like Boeing is receiving now?

Risk is inherent in fast modes of transportation, and I think it's very easy
for us to ignore the underlying complexity of these feats. Great example:
regular air travelers I'm sure are use to the preflight safety announcement
run by the cabin crew, but when was the last time you (of the royal variety)
actually stopped what you were doing, focused on the briefing, and made a
mental note of the plane's safety features?

~~~
lutorm
"when was the last time you (of the royal variety) actually stopped what you
were doing, focused on the briefing, and made a mental note of the plane's
safety features?"

 _Every. Single. Time. I fly._

I'm a pilot, and I know the chance of an accident is small and the chance of a
situation where my actions will make a difference to the outcome are even
smaller. However, since I'm locked in a seat with nothing important to do,
paying attention and noting where the life vest is, how you put it on, and
where the exits are in relation to my location has an opportunity cost of
zero.

------
southern_cross
New information (to me anyway) and I didn't see it mentioned here yet.
Apparently the MCAS was put into place to begin with in order to deal with a
potential "imbalance" situation created by attaching new, bigger engines to an
old airframe design.

"The new 737, named as the 737 MAX, would require -as usually- bigger engines,
to offer an increased fuel efficiency, competitive to the one of the A320neo.
And again, there was no room for them. So, the solution was to extend the
front landing gear by eight inches and at the same time to move the LEAP-1B
engines even more forward and higher up (image 3). This last design
modification was later found to create an upward pitching moment during
flight, which could bring the aircraft closer to stall under specific
operating conditions. To tackle this problem, Boeing introduced the so-called
Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS). The MACS simply trims
the stabilizer nose down, to counterbalance the moment created by the new
engine positions."

[https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/case-737-max-old-design-
moder...](https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/case-737-max-old-design-modern-
complications-asteris-apostolidis-phd)

------
the_arun
Any whistle blowers in Boeing who could come out & share facts on how
employees of Boeing are reacting to these incidents?

~~~
rootusrootus
Do we think they're all in conspiracy overdrive mode looking for ways to cover
their asses and burning all the evidence?

Chances are better that (assuming they don't already know the answer) that a
bunch of them are working long hours trying to find the cause and solution to
this problem. I imagine every flight simulator at Boeing's disposal is being
used to analyze this from every angle.

------
danny-g
I am reading this on an airplane right now. I think I’ll stop now.

------
fopen64
Put all Boeing engineers flying nonstop around the globe in Max 8 planes until
someone breaks down and speaks up :)

~~~
winslow
Why only the engineers? Shouldn't management and the rest of executives also
be on the planes?

~~~
fopen64
Good idea.

------
rocketraman
Leaving aside the (unconvincing) possibility that Boeing was actively covering
up issues (which, if they were, is potentially a criminal issue due to fraud),
there is a deeper philosophical point to be made about how people should view
industry in the modern world, which includes aviation, but also all other
production, ranging from farming and mining, to the manufacturing and use of
products, and even to services.

It's easy to point to the various risks and lives at risk, due to the products
of industry, such as aviation accidents as well as pollutants and even mundane
things like typing on a computer (RSI anyone?).

However, what is often forgotten is all the amazing benefits of this industry
-- from being able to fly to anywhere in the world in less than a day at a
cost affordable by almost anyone in a developed country to having energy to
light and heat our homes and run our medical devices, to the existence of this
very forum. It is right and moral for both producers in setting their own
safety and emission standards, as well as the state in setting limits on
production in the name of "protecting society", to consider these positives as
well as the negatives. It is morally right even _knowing_ that not setting
these limits higher will result in lives and health lost, because the
alternative is, bit-by-bit going back to a pre-industrial society in which
humans were lucky to live past 35. The way to achieve setting these limits
higher is in fact by becoming richer, such that we can afford the better
controls. If the state attempts to too tightly control an industry before it
can afford those same controls, it is essentially the same as destroying it,
and keeping its benefits from the world forever.

Aviation is an example of this whole process _working_. It's exactly why
aviation has become so incredibly safe, while at the same time becoming ever
more economical. Companies like Boeing are to be, overall, praised. When fraud
occurs, it needs to be investigated and punished, but that doesn't change the
essentially good nature of Boeing.

~~~
jayrot
Thanks for this. Perspective is refreshing sometimes.

------
chmod775
So instead of seriously looking for a problem, Boeing wasted their engineer's
time trying to disprove accusations and deflecting blame.

It's too early to say, but Boeing's tactics don't appear to have changed so
far.

Here's hoping Being gets their heads out of their asses before more people die
- this time.

------
adaptiveValleys
There's a fascinating youtube channel called X-Pilot that does videos on
flight incidents/disasters. The creator gathers a lot of really interesting
info and does a brief step by step recreation of the incident in a simulator,
and then explains what the regulatory bodies did as a result.

Often in-flight recordings are included. Some of which are quite frightening.

Here's the one on the Rudder issue mentioned in the post:
[https://youtu.be/ochby0LiGfM](https://youtu.be/ochby0LiGfM)

------
docker_up
Did Boeing executives go to jail for this disgusting cover up? I hope that the
diesel cover-up of Volkswagen and the people that went to jail will motivate
governments to pursue criminal charges against Boeing and/or Airbus if similar
things happen.

Fighting blame by lying and deflection at the risk of death should be a
criminal offense. It's mass murder.

~~~
gist
Why are you assuming what you have just seen is even true? An image, no
attribution and you honestly don't even know who cooked it up or why.

~~~
lgvln
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues)

------
mthoms
This page
[http://www.airlinesafety.com/faq/B-737Rudder.htm](http://www.airlinesafety.com/faq/B-737Rudder.htm)
contains (now broken) links to the relevant Seattle Times articles and (very)
short summaries.

Although the links to the Times articles are broken, it might be possible to
extract the articles from the Wayback Machine using the known URLs if anyone
is interested.

------
Glyptodon
I think these kinds of shenanigans (stonewalling/hiding/papering over safety
issues/corruption) should be able to be penalized with forced stock splits,
maybe something like 1:3, where 1/3 of the split shares go to the
gov/court/victims and become a fine essentially.

The fact that ownership doesn't have any real risk makes it so there aren't
appropriate corrective pressures from the market side.

------
wintorez
Is it just me or a lot of big names in various industries are dropping the
ball on QA? From exploding Nike shoes to crashing Beings, to faulty MacBooks.

~~~
lukewrites
I don't see much similarity between Nikes torquing apart and what Boeing has
done/is doing. I'd say a better comparison is between Boeing and Tesla's self-
driving deaths.

------
helper
There's a really interesting book about the NTSB investigation into flight 427
called "The Mystery of Flight 427: Inside a Crash Investigation". If you like
the story behind root cause analysis of engineering failures (and aren't
squeamish about plane crashes) its a great read.

------
hinkley
I kept thinking, how mad were the people who worked on the yaw damper for
getting scapegoated that whole time?

------
g-erson
Was that the final resolution then; that Boeing were ordered to replace the
part, and the crashes stopped happening? Was there ever a formal investigation
into whether Boeing knew the true cause of the rudder hardover, and chose to
ignore it and blame other stuff?

~~~
ams6110
Without doing any research I'd assume that either there was an investigation
and insufficient evidence was found, or that there was not because there was
not even probable cause to begin one.

To think otherwise is to believe in a conspiracy between Boeing, NTSB, FAA,
and the FBI or whichever law enforcement agency would have jurisdiction.

The FAA has some conflict of interest in its mission, but the NTSB does not
and is generally considered to be the premier accident safety investigation
group in the world.

~~~
lutorm
The NTSB is in the business of determining causes of accidents, though, not of
assigning blame and certainly not of assigning criminal liability.

------
rubicon33
>It is widely suspected that Boeing knew about the problems with the PCU for
decades but had done nothing, despite the hundreds of reported incidents.
Because no one was collecting all the accounts of rudder deflections, it was
likely that no one except Boeing realized how common they were. It was not
until people started dying in crashes that enough scrutiny was placed on the
737 to uncover this history of ignoring the problem.

I can't help but read these stories, and all the accounts of various other
crashes, and question the whole "safest mode of transport" line we've been
fed? "Safest" doesn't really mean anything to me, I guess.

Is it really outside of the realm of possibility that flying is less safe than
the number we've all been given? I've certainly never seen the raw data
myself, but it's hard not to take this skeptical perspective when you dig
deeper into the number of crashes that happen world wide.

~~~
swasheck
Statistically fewer incidents. Greater scale of tragedy, emotionally.

Though there are entire branches of fields that use statistics to mitigate
risk, probabilities are tricky things. I found this interesting read a few
days ago [https://aeon.co/ideas/the-concept-of-probability-is-not-
as-s...](https://aeon.co/ideas/the-concept-of-probability-is-not-as-simple-as-
you-think) and it seems to have some overlap here.

How are we calculating "safety" when it comes to transportation. I'm not sure
that air transportation is less safe than other forms, but I wanted to pass
this along as support for some sort of skepticism.

------
known
Sounds like another
[https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volkswagen_emissions_scandal](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volkswagen_emissions_scandal)

------
amelius
If the extreme deflection of the rudder causes serious control problems, then
shouldn't the extremes simply be set at lower deflections (using a physical
barrier/limiter)?

~~~
eppp
That assumes that you do not need high deflection for low speed maneuvering. I
would think you would in fact need that much for taxiing and landing/takeoff
in a crosswind.

------
spiznnx
This news cycle is surreal... just a few months ago my opinion of US aviation
safety couldn't have been higher, and now that view is totally shattered.

~~~
js2
Don't pay attention to the news. It reports statistically rare events that are
unlikely to affect you. Pay attention to the statistics[0,1,2]. US aviation is
still remarkably safe[3]. Just don't be this guy[4].

[0] [http://ipa-world.org/society-
resources/code/images/95b1494-L...](http://ipa-world.org/society-
resources/code/images/95b1494-Lozano%20Mortality%20GBD2010.pdf)

[1] [https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/leading-causes-of-
death.htm](https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/leading-causes-of-death.htm)

[2]
[https://www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfoi1.htm](https://www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfoi1.htm)

[3]
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aviation_safety](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aviation_safety)

[4] [https://www.xkcd.com/795/](https://www.xkcd.com/795/)

~~~
spiznnx
I'm not worried personally about flying on this plane, I wouldn't change my
plans to avoid it. I just had held a very high opinion of the engineering
discipline and regulatory practices that has been suddenly re-evaluated.

~~~
js2
We've come a long way though and I'd still rather take my chances with today's
engineering discipline and regulatory practices than say, a saber toothed
tiger.

I think these sorts of missteps always have and always will occur, and yet in
the grand scheme of things, we build remarkably safe systems. If you look at
any man-made disaster, you're almost always going to find the same sorts of
things that led to the Boeing rudder issue. I'm sure you're familiar with the
Citicorp Tower story:

[http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_eye/2014/04/17/the_citicorp_t...](http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_eye/2014/04/17/the_citicorp_tower_design_flaw_that_could_have_wiped_out_the_skyscraper.html)

[https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Professionalism/William_LeMess...](https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Professionalism/William_LeMessurier_and_the_CitiCorp_Building)

------
arisAlexis
I don't understand the logistics but designing a new valve was so difficult
that they decided to put their brand name on the line for years?

------
geofffox
I wonder if this was the inspiration for Michael Chricton's book "Airframe?"
It seems so similar.

------
agumonkey
I forgot why there are no parachutes on planes ? weight ?

I'd pay a premium to have my own emergency wingsuit..

~~~
outworlder
> I forgot why there are no parachutes on planes ? weight ?

There are parachutes on planes, as in whole airframe parachutes. Just not
airliners. See Cirrus aircraft.

However, even in a Cirrus, you can only open the parachute within very
specific parameters (altitude, airspeed and so on). Exceed these, and your
parachute is worthless.

For obvious reasons, a whole frame parachute in a 737 is a crazy proposition.
It is ridiculously heavy. Also, the plane flies much higher and much faster,
so even if you COULD fit one made of some form of unobtanium, it would likely
be useful only under very specific scenarios.

The other option would be to provide individual parachutes. Much like life
vests.

Ok great. Let's assume they are small and can be stowed under the seat. How
long would it take for a non-trained individual to put one of these on
properly? Do they even have enough space to do it? How would they exit the
plane? Most airliners don't have cargo-bay style doors. Exiting through the
side doors is a bad idea. Who would inspect and repack hundreds of parachutes
per plane?

The plane would have to be under controlled flight and slow enough for this to
even have a chance to save any passengers. If you are in a slow and controlled
flight, what use is this? Just land somewhere.

For ethiopian and lion air, it all happened so fast after takeoff that it is
unlikely the pilots even had time to run their checklists. And we want to don
parachutes on 100+ people and have them jump from an out of control plane?

It just doesn't make sense from any angle.

~~~
avar
> For obvious reasons, a whole frame parachute in a 737 is a crazy
> proposition. It is ridiculously heavy[...]

It's still crazy and impractical, but for what it's worth I think that's
nobody's suggestion of how something like the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System
would work on the scale of an airliner.

The mockups I could find of such proposed systems (e.g. [1] and [2]) all
involve just the tube that forms the passenger cabin somehow ejecting as a
whole and then parachuting to earth with some system similar to what was used
for the Space Shuttle's solid rocket boosters[3], maybe with added retro-
rockets for the landing.

You could also imagine a system where each passenger is sitting in an ejection
seat taken from a B-2 or F-35. The cost would be insane, but it could be done.

1\.
[https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielreed/2016/01/20/detached-...](https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielreed/2016/01/20/detached-
from-reality-jetliner-with-a-detachable-passenger-cabin-sounds-cool-but-is-
laughable/)

2\. [https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/11/why-your-
plane...](https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/11/why-your-plane-cant-
have-escape-pod/123989/)

3\.
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Solid_Rocket_Boo...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Solid_Rocket_Booster)

------
JoshuaRLi
> A new car built by my company leaves somewhere traveling at 60 mph. The rear
> differential locks up. The car crashes and burns with everyone trapped
> inside. Now, should we initiate a recall? Take the number of vehicles in the
> field, A, multiply by the probable rate of failure, B, multiply by the
> average out-of-court settlement, C. A times B times C equals X. If X is less
> than the cost of a recall, we don't do one.

\- Narrator, Fight Club

~~~
dabbledash
What is the alternative to a cost benefit analysis though? We could spend an
infinite amount on diminishing safety gains.

~~~
caconym_
There is a difference between proactively pursuing safety, which will yield
diminishing returns sooner or later, and acting to correct a _known defect_
that puts human lives at risk via a clearly understood mechanism.

~~~
userbinator
You could say that _everything_ is a known defect. Pilots can make fatal
mistakes or just become suicidal, all the engines could be overwhelmed by
birds, etc.

The argument against that is, succinctly, "life is a risk." Humans do things
all the time with the full knowledge that what they're doing could kill them.

~~~
jetrink
But we attempt to mitigate the risks you cited as well. Engine designs are
subjected to bird ingestion tests. Controls and procedures are designed to
reduce the chance that pilots will make serious errors. Pilots can be ordered
to undergo psychological testing by an FAA-approved physician if they show
signs of mental health issues. Etc.

------
iooi
Take the number of vehicles in the field, A, multiply by the probable rate of
failure, B, multiply by the average out-of-court settlement, C. A times B
times C equals X. If X is less than the cost of a recall, we don't do one.

~~~
reviseddamage
Which movie is this quote from? :)

~~~
karolist
The one that first rule prohibits us talking about it.

------
Not_a_pizza
I'm expecting Boeing to do everything in their power to spin news from "they
were at fault" to "poor little US company is being attacked by incompetent
gang of pilots".

~~~
michaelcampbell
I doubt anyone with the least bit of interest in this story would consider
Boeing "[a] little US company".

------
0xdeadbeefbabe
Can't you just stop buying airplanes from them?

Edit: Do the downvoters also want to throw the executives in jail for life?

~~~
fixermark
Not really. Aerospace is a very tight-knit oligarchy where the devil you know
is entirely too often (historically shown to be) leagues better than the devil
you don't. A company ceasing to be a Boeing customer over an issue like this
runs the risk that the next company they work with is just as bad in different
ways, but now they're ways the company's ground technicians are wholly
unfamiliar with.

~~~
benj111
It may be an oligopoly, but it is in the airlines interests to keep them on
their toes.

If you're an airline of any size it would make sense to have relationships
with multiple manufacturers, for the reasons you describe.

They can decrease their Boeing orders and increase competitors orders, to
maintain relationships and punish Boeing.

If you single source your your fleet, you increase the odds of something like
this grounding your entire fleet, and you don't even have any leverage to
negotiate better terms from Boeing.

~~~
fixermark
I agree with your reasoning and I'm surprised that companies like Southwest
seem to aim for monoculture.

... unless the risk and cost model they're looking at is that having multiple
planes in the fleet increases the risk that spare parts are depleted for a
particular model, ground crews aren't sufficiently cross-trained and errors on
their part make flights less safe on average than in a monoculture, etc.

~~~
notahacker
It's less an operational risk calculation and more an operational cost
calculation.

It's entirely possible (and for airlines operating a wide variety of different
length routes, entirely necessary) to safely operate a wide variety of
airframes, but it does entail paying for a lot more redundancy.

------
gist
Here we go. Someone uploads an image from Jan and all the sudden whatever it
says must be interpreted as fact in some way and true. [1]

We don't know who the poster of this is or even if this is correct:

> Images sourced from The Seattle Times, the NTSB, Boeing, Tails Through Time,
> the Colorado Springs Gazette, The Times of India, Wikipedia, TribLIVE, The
> Flight 427 Air Disaster Support League, and Forbes. Video clips courtesy of
> Cineflix and the Weather Channel. Special thanks to the Seattle Times for
> its series of articles on the subject in 1996, which brought to light many
> of the details referenced here.

[1] This reminds me of emails back from the mid 90's on the internet. Those
were always a version of (at least) my brother is a Harvard trained doctor and
he sent me this!

~~~
fingerlocks
Original Seattle Times post is here:

[http://old.seattletimes.com/news/local/737/part01/](http://old.seattletimes.com/news/local/737/part01/)

