
Click Trajectories: End-To-End Analysis of the Spam Value Chain [pdf] - feross
https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~savage/papers/Oakland11.pdf
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snaky
> To wit, if U.S. issuing banks (i.e., banks that provide credit cards to U.S.
> consumers) were to refuse to settle certain transactions (e.g., card-not-
> present transactions for a subset of Merchant Category Codes) with the banks
> identified as supporting spam-advertised goods, then the underlying
> enterprise would be dramatically de-monetized.

> Furthermore, it appears plausible that such a “financial blacklist” could be
> updated very quickly (driven by modest numbers of undercover buys, as in our
> study) and far more rapidly than the turn-around time to acquire new banking
> resources—a rare asymmetry favoring the anti-spam community.

