
Where to hide your nuclear missile submarine? - infosecrf
https://sattrackcam.blogspot.com/2017/12/where-to-hide-your-nuclear-missile.html
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pps43
If you detect a massive ICBM launch from Russia, you know what to do - nuke
Russia. You have half an hour to launch before Russian missiles take out all
silos.

Now what do you do if you detect SLBM launch from somewhere in the Pacific
Ocean? Who do you nuke?

~~~
avar
The US is peculiar with its nuclear policy in trying to guarantee immediate
response, by contrast say the UK only has nuclear submarines at sea, and it's
expected that there'll be nothing like an immediate response, rather the
captains of those submarines will find out who nuked the UK and respond.

So the answer for deterrence purposes is you don't need to nuke anyone right
away, immediate response is only one layer of the onion when it comes to
nuclear deterrence.

~~~
PhantomGremlin
_The US is peculiar with its nuclear policy in trying to guarantee immediate
response_

This doctrine is called "launch on warning". It hasn't been official US policy
for 20 years[1]: _In 1997, the Clinton administration changed the official
policy away from launch on warning to one of retaliation after withstanding an
initial first strike._

[1]
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Launch_on_warning](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Launch_on_warning)

~~~
avar
I'm referring to the policy of still maintaining the systems necessary to
launch on warning, past promises about how the systems will be used are just
PR.

It's not like in a hypothetical scenario where Russia has launched hundreds of
ICBMs at the US in a first strike scenario Trump (or any other president) is
going to feel beholden to some promise Clinton made in the 90s.

The president has absolute power over when and how to launch nuclear weapons,
and can do so at a moment's notice, as has been covered extensively in the
media in the last year where people seemed shocked that the president had this
power since they didn't like the new person in office, even though the power
itself hasn't changed in more than half a century.

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nugi
I choose to belive this is an amazing disinfo honeypot, and seal teams are
waiting nearby with trained dolphins and magnetic explosives.

Yes, I am serious.
[https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_dolphin](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_dolphin)

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alexhutcheson
> Where would you direct your submarine, and where would you best fire you
> missiles, from the perspective of an as-late-as-possible space-based
> detection of your missile launches?

Honest question - is this the function you'd be optimizing for? What are the
implications of earlier space-based detection of a launch? Presumably fast
detection of a launch plume would help you find and hunt down the sub, but at
that point the missiles are already in the air. I would think that the more
important factor is where to hide to minimize chance of detection prior to the
launch.

~~~
dmurray
It's assumed that a submarine can travel in the ocean for long periods without
detection. I don't know whether this is still considered to be true by
military strategists, but it's a large part of the motivation behind having
nuclear-armed submarines in the first place.

A submarine is at least pretty stealthy, but the heat signature of a missile
launch is impossible to hide.

Another way to look at it: the satellite systems described in the article
(SBIRS and DSP) are optimised for early detection of a launch. So when
considering the deficiencies of those systems, it's correct to consider a
hypothetical adversary who optimises for the opposite.

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shifter
Due to projection distortions, the size of the area was visually misleading.
An area-maintaining projection would be a more accurate way to communicate
this data.

[https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Map_projection#Projections_b...](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Map_projection#Projections_by_preservation_of_a_metric_property)

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anabis
I would guess that it would be exactly the area where hunter submarines will
be roaming.

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drdeadringer
During my DoD days, I worked on the first 4 SBIRS satellites as well as some
nuclear subs earlier on. I'm glad to see some of my DoD work in the news in a
non-negative light.

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fpoling
The title is very misleading. This just talks about Earth coverage of missile
launch detection system according to publicly available information. This has
nothing to do with detecting submarines.

~~~
nyolfen
presumably the reason you would have IR satellites looking for launch plumes
in the middle of the ocean is in fact to detect submarine-based launches

~~~
fpoling
The deployment of submarines is rather orthogonal to the coverage by early
detection warnings. Detection is not helpful if the flight time of missile is
less then reaction time. So one wants to deploy close to US coast line
irrespective of detection coverage. Besides, launching from South Pacific
means US will have plenty of time to detect the warhead with normal radars.

~~~
cocoablazing
Both RF and US operate FBM forces as deterrent second-strike forces. This is
not only the operational reality but also the treaty-regulated deployed
configuration.

Optimizing deployment in the manner you describe is not aligned to the current
mission of these forces / our deterrence relationship.

~~~
cameldrv
That's not necessarily true anymore. The Russians have deployed the Sineva and
the Layner SLBMs which have GLONASS supplemental guidance. This makes no sense
in a second strike scenario. The Trident II is also plenty accurate for a
counterforce first strike and allows less reaction time than ICBMs.

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PhantomGremlin
There is a complementary land based system for detecting ballistic missiles.
It's more limited in coverage and also has more-or-less the same blind spot:
not much coverage of missiles launching from directly south of CONUS.

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solid_State_Phased_Array_Radar...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solid_State_Phased_Array_Radar_System)

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EGreg
Um, it seems to me you'd direct your submarine close to the coast of a city
and your missile launch would not need ICBMs.

In fact, I am worried about TacNukes - like the kind we see in James Bond
movies - being smuggled INTO A CITY!

[https://www.wired.com/2002/11/nukes-2/](https://www.wired.com/2002/11/nukes-2/)

Here is an article about loose nukes.

North Korea has ALREADY given Syria nuclear material to build a functioning
nuclear weapons facility. Google "operation orchard".

I am worried that, as soon as we attack its regime, some sleeper group would
use nukes somewhere.

And what do we do in general with rogue nukes? How exactly are they accounted
for across every country?

~~~
whathaschanged
You're probably down voted because actual discussion would lead to the Samson
Option.

~~~
pavel_lishin
What's the Samson Option?

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linuxlizard
"Asking for a friend."

~~~
smacktoward
In fairness, nothing ruins Christmas faster than the kids stumbling across the
nuclear missile submarine you bought them.

~~~
fuzzfactor
I'll never forget the scale model of one I found under the tree Christmas
morning back in Florida not long after the Cuban missile crisis.

Naturally in school we were rehearsing in case of a strike but very few
fallout shelters existed so we improved our response time for getting in
position safely underneath our desks.

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FLUX-YOU
>"Orange Squeeze"

I am seriously, completely confident that name would fool the person it's
meant to.

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influx
What is the purpose of publishing information like this?

At best, it’s trivia, at worst it provides advantage to a rogue nuclear power
with active concentration camps.

~~~
jlgaddis
You honestly think that such a "rogue nuclear power with active concentration
camps" couldn't figure this out on their own?

~~~
madengr
Yes

~~~
monocasa
Why? It's all public information. And the sense I've gotten is that the North
Korean engineers overall seem competent, they just lack resources.

~~~
nugi
To play devils advocate, their resources being limited is a huge boon to our
reletive superiority. This post does in effect concentrate them into an
actionable plan, with minimal effort. That said, I am pretty sure the dark
zone is only theoretical, due to limited publicly available data on likely
classified access.

