
Three months at Y Combinator: what it’s like and how to get in - l_perrin
http://blog.frontapp.com/three-months-at-y-combinator-what-its-like-and-how-to-get-in/
======
ryanSrich
> It helps you answer the only question that matters: is your product
> something people want?

I've probably read that sentence at least 1000 times in a number of different
books and articles. Having gone through a lean startup accelerator a few years
ago when they were en vogue we focused on this aspect more than anything else.

The thing I never hear is how people actually figured that out. Cold calling,
cold emailing, going to meetups, getting intros, pitching ideas and gathering
feedback is never discussed. I want to hear _how_ you found a product market
fit. It's obvious that you need to do this.

As an example. A startup that I co-founded my sophomore year in college was
accepted into a school run summer business accelerator. They emphasized
talking with customers/users more than anything else. The problem was we
didn't really know any of our potential customers or users (grade school
teachers/public schools). So we had to essentially cold call schools, find
teachers/admins emails online, and fish around our personal network for
intros. To say it didn't go well is an understatement. Our success rate, of
even a phone call, was nearly 1% (roughly one answer per 100 or so
emails/calls). We eventually locked down a core group of users simply by
contacting so many people. Aside from other bureaucratic factors in the public
schooling system we failed simply because we couldn't establish a growing user
base.

So, if anyone wants to tell their story with nitty gitty details of not only
how they found and retained their users but how they found what they wanted
would be greatly appreciated.

~~~
akbar501
The following was our road to P/M fit. Sorry for the long post...

0.) Identify market The short version is that one of our co-founders had very
deep domain expertise in education and I had been developing a series of
education apps for my daughter. We used this domain expertise to formulate our
general understanding of the market. Then we spoke with customer after
customer about our ideas, their current initiatives, budgets, problems, what
excited them, and so on.

1.) Before trying to get P/M fit we created a way to measure P/M fit for our
business. As we're a B2B company, we used the following as our top-line P/M
fit metrics (a,b are quant, while c is a qual measure):

a. Length of sales cycle (shorter = closer to P/M fit)

b. Number of objections (fewer = closer to P/M fit)

c. Intensity of objections (weaker = closer to P/M fit)

2.) Building on #0, we eventually found an idea that resonated with the
majority of customers. So, we built a first MVP. Bluntly, it was a complete
piece of shit...and I'm the one who developed it.

However, there were customers who paid for this pile. So we started to try to
sell more, but our P/M fit metrics were not good. Cycles were too long,
objections were intense and numerous.

3.) Based on #2, we discussed what we thought would be the solution to finding
P/M fit. There were two core directions, but we did not know which one would
work.

So, we built a 2nd MVP that addressed the problems in our 1st MVP by adding
the two groups of features we thought customers would want. We developed both
ideas in the same MVP b/c it was a hell of a lot faster than doing two MVPs
back to back.

One of the two ideas yielded substantial improvement in our revenue and P/M
fit metrics. So, we pushed on this idea by emphasizing and selling only the
features that looked promising.

However, we hit a point where our P/M fit metrics were better, but were not
improving and were not good enough.

4.) We did not build a new MVP at this point. What we did was modify our sales
collateral, our pitch, our emphasis to highlight the features and value prop
that most resonated with our customers, while eliminating the areas that
caused the most friction in the sales cycle. We kept tweaking the sales pitch
until we found one that improved our metrics. Literally, we knew we were ready
for our 3rd iteration of the product when customers were pushing us to deliver
the product that we had sold them on, but that was not yet developed.

5.) Develop first release of product that a segment of the market clearly
wants and is willing to pay for without wasting time or objecting too much.

6.) We continue to do all of the above, but in tighter/faster iterations. We
are also using usage metrics to increasingly guide some decision making, but
ultimately our P/M fit metrics are still working for us, so we continue to
hone/improve them.

~~~
gregpilling
>>> Literally, we knew we were ready for our 3rd iteration of the product when
customers were pushing us to deliver the product that we had sold them on, but
that was not yet developed.

Good for you. I have found similar experiences , you know you have a hit
product when people are complaining that you arent taking their money fast
enough.

------
frandroid
Two pop-ups on that page (one at the start, one at the end) is way too
aggressive. Cut me some slack, will ya? I especially hate the "Subscribe to
our mailing list before you've even read content on our page!" load-time pop-
up that everyone's featuring nowadays. If there was a browser plugin to wipe
them all, I would pay money for it.

~~~
computerjunkie
Its an ugly trend and an invasive one. The fact that you need to reassure me
that your content is good makes me question if your all you just want is my
email and become unnecessary email notifications. Its needy, demanding and
somewhat attention seeking.

Usually websites that insist with these subscription popups have mediocre to
poor content.

If your work is good enough, people will subscribe because they like it. Don't
force it.

~~~
graeme
For anyone running a business: Do not listen to these complaints. These
commentors are not your target market.

I use an email popup. It's greatly increased email list signups. No one's
comaplained, time on page did not decline. Nothing bad happened.

You should always test a chance like this, but net-savvy hackers are a poor
representation of most demographics.

~~~
adbge
+1.

I've been experimenting _aggressively_ with different techniques for email
capture (e.g. [1]) and, looking at my analytics, the exit-intent popup
accounts for 47.27% of all emails.

[1]: [http://rs.io/behavior-modification-techniques-if-then-
rules/](http://rs.io/behavior-modification-techniques-if-then-rules/)

~~~
frandroid
When you say exit-intent, do you mean the pop-up at the beginning of the page,
or the bottom of the page one? I'm much less bothered by the latter because
it's less counter-intuitive to me, and it doesn't get in the way of me reading
the content. If that's what you meant, what's your take on the former?

That said, I know that pop-ups work. That does not make them less irritating
to all of those people who like to know what they sign up for before actually
writing their email address there (the pop-upon-loading one). 42% more of 2%
still annoys a large chunk of the 97% left.

~~~
graeme
I'm not OP, but neither.

    
    
      1. Open the page in incognito
      2. Read for a moment.
      3. Move your mouse outside the tab. Something should pop-up.
    

It means the system is designed to notice you are leaving, and prompt you.

~~~
computerjunkie
Don't you find that obstructive? Halfway through the article I am reading
(still deciding if its good or not) and I scroll down to read more then a
faded dark background popup comes up asking me for my email when I'm not even
finished reading. Putting a subscription box at the bottom of the page after
the article is fine, but distracting a user when reading an article halfway is
rude and counter productive.

~~~
graeme
This one?

[https://www.dropbox.com/s/ls79ipe0997zfs6/Screenshot%202014-...](https://www.dropbox.com/s/ls79ipe0997zfs6/Screenshot%202014-10-02%2021.41.07.png?dl=0)

That's STILL not the exit intent popup. That only happens when you stop
reading and go to leave.

I personally don't like the forced left column reading of this site. I'd
rather read on the right. I don't like that the email subscribe box follows me
down, it makes me dizzy.

------
nlh
> If relationships are easy to maintain when everything is going well, it’s a
> whole different story when the pressure is on.

This isn't YC-specific, but I want to highlight this piece of advice because
it's extremely important.

This is one of the most important things I've learned through my years of
starting/running small businesses. I'm particularly susceptible to falling in
this trap because I suffer from typical founder syndrome of "perpetual
optimism". (Good for certain things, bad for others.)

It's also an easy trap to fall into as a new founder, because you just don't
yet have the history to see both the ups and downs. But I can't emphasize it
enough: People who are wonderful when things are wonderful can become bitterly
awful when things turn around. Finding partners (both teammates and investors)
who you can sail both the rough and calm waters with is absolutely essential
to the survival of your business.

How to figure this out? There's no secret, but it's a mix of intuition and
asking the right questions. Speak to references and ask specifically: "How was
he/she when things were good? How about when things got tough?"

~~~
ahsanup
"Finding partners (both teammates and investors) who you can sail both the
rough and calm waters with is absolutely essential to the survival of your
business."

Can't agree with this statement enough (the teammates part, at least). From
personal experience, I can say that the work environment becomes toxic when
early team members start losing passion for the product, especially co-
founders. People start questioning each other's commitment, work slows down,
and bickering ensues.

As another piece of advice, it's really important to look for individuals who
are great communicators. People who say it how it is, and share their feelings
w/o hesitation. The last thing you want is a co-worker sharing some important
piece of information (ex. they haven't been motivated for weeks) out of the
blue.

------
minimaxir
> _As a startup of the batch, you get high visibility thanks to Demo Day and
> to your own TechCrunch launch. Thanks to that, we were able to get more than
> 300 signups in our first couple weeks (see exactly how we did it here)._

This seems contradictory. 300 signups over a couple of weeks does not imply
"high visibility." Your TechCrunch article
([http://techcrunch.com/2014/06/18/front-is-a-shared-inbox-
app...](http://techcrunch.com/2014/06/18/front-is-a-shared-inbox-app-that-
makes-email-suck-lessfront-is-a-shared-inbox-app-to-make-email-suck-less/))
only received about 229 shares and 154 Tweets (with most of the comments being
from existing users and not prospective users), which makes Front seem more of
a counterexample of TechCrunch visibility instead.

~~~
l_perrin
We blogged about our launch: [http://blog.frontapp.com/hacker-news-techcrunch-
and-product-...](http://blog.frontapp.com/hacker-news-techcrunch-and-product-
hunt-which-is-most-effective-to-launch-your-product-2/)

Following our TC launch, we were featured in other channels, which gave us
more signups. 300 might not seem like a lot, but these figures are very
conservative and we only counted users that really tried the app.

~~~
timjahn
"we only counted users that really tried the app"

...which are the only ones that matter, no? So if only 300 "really" tried the
app and 2,201,302 signed up, you obviously only care about the 300 if that's
the number you're mentioning.

Why try to sound mightier saying "these figures are very conservative" and "we
only counted users that really tried the app"?

~~~
jleader
Probably because they expect to get compared against other startups who are
trumpeting "millions downloaded our app!" like it means something. Saying
"these figures are very conservative" and specifying exactly what they're
counting is a preemptive answer to people asking "how come you only got 300
when Startup X got 3,000,000 after the same amount of time?"

------
findjashua
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identity theft or other abuse.

------
thrush
I love these articles, but what I'd really like to see is a much more detailed
account of the founders' entire lives up until they got in to YC. How did they
meet. When did they hear about YC for the first time. When did they become
interested in technology. What did they eat for breakfast the day of their
interview. The real nitty gritty. And ideally this would be a special on Vice
of course. :)

------
rl3
> _If you don’t get accepted after the interview, you will get the reason why
> and you’ll then be able to improve your product._

This part is a bit ambiguous. Do the YC partners actually tell applicants who
have made it to the interview stage why they were rejected?

~~~
TheMakeA
Yes. At the end of the day one of the partners you met will write a few
sentences about why you weren't accepted via email.

------
rokhayakebe
What is the value of being part of YC's network? Perhaps it matters if your
product/startup is struggling.

You can cold email any YC founder, I think they would be just as likely to
help you (work with you) than a fellow YC founder.

~~~
notastartup
I'm curious about this as well. Currently bootstrapping in my bedroom. Seems
like you do the same thing in YC as well but with more people and networking
in process but can a network save and solve all of your problems? I think
not...what it boils down to is just grinding and hustling like with any small
business (and not end up like Washington Redskins from South Park)...maybe the
network is important when you need to find the right people for your team or
build partnerships or get an interview with Peter Thiel.

~~~
smeyer
>can a network save and solve all your problems?

Of course not. Nobody here is suggesting that this would solve _all_ of your
problems, just that it would be helpful.

------
akbar501
Nice article. IMO, two of the key points are:

1\. But you still need to figure out things by yourself: YC will never tell
you what people want

2\. If there is one thing that is true about YC partners, it’s that you can’t
expect them to do the work for you.

~~~
ahsanup
These two should be true for an incubator/accelerator or group of
advisors/mentors/investors.

At the end of the day, the founders build the company, not anyone else.
"Outsiders" (those who don't actually work in the company) should offer
guidance and frameworks, but never a definitive solution to the problem you're
having, that's for the founders to figure out and decide for themselves.

------
merrua
I'm not sure who are the users for their product. Small companies? Or are they
trying to compete with Salesforce and Google?

~~~
graeme
I'm a potential use. I run a solo bootstrapped company. I outsource many
things. Have been wanting to outsource email for a while.

It's been hard to find a solution that allows me to manage my personal and
work email, and the different types of both.

Seeing the demo made me think "I need this!". I had been looking around at
helpdesk solutions, but all seemed to cumbersome for my use case.

------
staunch
That actually felt like linkbait content marketing.

