
No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals - pseudolus
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-boeing-analysis/no-call-for-simulators-in-new-boeing-737-max-training-proposals-idUSKCN1RA006
======
Declanomous
I'd highly recommend anyone who wants to see what an MCAS runaway looks like
and the steps needed to correct it watch the following video by Mentour
Pilot.[1] He's a 737 pilot for a European budget carrier, and I believe he is
qualified to certify other pilots.

In the video he goes over what an MCAS failure/runaway stabilizer would feel
like to the pilots, the troubleshooting steps, and at the end of the video he
shows a simulated runaway MCAS failure in a sim.

He also has a few other videos on the MCAS accidents. I'd highly recommend
watching all of them; he does a very good job at putting everything into
perspective in a way that the news does not.

[1] [https://youtu.be/xixM_cwSLcQ](https://youtu.be/xixM_cwSLcQ)

~~~
poof131
Great video, thanks for sharing. That simulator work at the end was a
fantastic demonstration of team work. Crew Resource Management.[1] I still
remember DAM CLAS from the Navy.[2] Numerous examples in the video. Sad and
terrifying thinking about what it must have been like for the pilots and
passengers of the crashed airlines. If the issue was MCAS, the slowly
worsening situation, never disabling the trim, just one step to remedy the
situation that’s never taken, and the intuitive solution of pulling back hard
on the yoke not working, because Boeing removed it in the latest version--a
sad example of awful decision making on the ground.[3]

1\.
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crew_resource_management](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crew_resource_management)

2\. [https://quizlet.com/45297265/crew-resource-management-crm-
th...](https://quizlet.com/45297265/crew-resource-management-crm-
th-57-contact-fti-flash-cards/)

3\. [https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-
aerospace/u-s-p...](https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-
aerospace/u-s-pilots-flying-737-max-werent-told-about-new-automatic-systems-
change-linked-to-lion-air-crash/)

~~~
VBprogrammer
I'll need to check for relevant sources, but I'm fairly sure that the idea
that boeing removed the "trim brake" is wrong. It's simply that the MCAS
doesn't respect it. I think this is consistent with the Speed trim system
which may be trimming opposite the pilot in normal operations.

~~~
mhandley
And the reason MCAS doesn't respect it is because MCAS is designed to activate
in high AoA situations. You get into a high AoA situation because you're
already pulling back hard on the yoke, likely in an attempt to avoid something
bad happening such as avoiding a collision. If MCAS did cutout when the yoke
was pulled back hard, it would disable itself at precisely the time it is
actually needed. This design decision does make sense. The real problem is not
telling the pilots about it.

~~~
dsfyu404ed
And the obvious solution is "tell pilots about it" which is going to piss off
the public because a procedural change (training), a new UI to make it more
obvious (like IIRC Southwest implemented) and a minor code fix (comparing the
AOA sensors) will not satisfy everyone who's out for blood.

~~~
magduf
>will not satisfy everyone who's out for blood.

People are right to be out for blood. This mistake cost _hundreds_ of lives,
and was clearly a case of _criminally negligent_ behavior.

------
nxc18
Boeing's actions are absolutely mind boggling. All consumers want is _some_,
_any_ evidence that they take passenger safety seriously.

Pilots have to take less training to operate a proven deadly aircraft, with
software patch on top, than I have to take to work in an office job... that's
fucking insane.

How can we make Boeing feel some pain for this? You know, actually enough for
them to start taking this seriously.

~~~
ReptileMan
Nothing mind boggling. Boeing are trying desperately to avoid new type rating.
That would leave them in the same business position where they were before
developing MAX and with a bad image to boot.

Not saying they are right, but they just don't have many good moves.

Doing the Right thing leaves them years behind. It will also limit airline
expansion. Airbus cannot pick up slack and there are no other players in the
market.

It is a clusterfuck but like it or not 737 MAX is too big to fall(pun
intended) .

~~~
salawat
Doing the Right Thing would put them _on schedule_.

This isn't some stupid race. This is making a machine that can safely be
flown.

The market doesn't need a risk profile that drops plane loads out of the
bloody sky Because a company pushed their people into hiding things from their
customers.

I'm normally all for free market optimization when it makes sense, and all
actors act in reasonably good faith concomitant with the magnitude of lives
they are endangering. That didn't happen here, and the regulatory agency
responsible for making it happen was powerless to do it's job to stop or raise
a red flag on it either.

By no definition of sound risk assessment should this plane have flown without
training. Period. Boeing failed its job at being a trustworthy corporate
citizen in a high-impact infrastructural industrial vertical.

Honestly, I'm not sure how to get over this one. I don't believe some sort of
fine and move on is really sufficient in terms of contrition. It won't bring
those people back, and it seems a bit too "cost of doing business"-like to
successfully act as a deterrent to future malfeasance.

Breaking up maybe? Clearly competition in the sector seems to have devolved
into a duopoly to some degree.

~~~
ReptileMan
Once again - is the strategy boeing doing rational for them? Yes. So it's not
mind boggling. We can call it dishonest, showing disregard, careless,
whatever... but the fact that boeing are trying desperately to save the type
certifications is not somehow beyond grasp of the human mind.

~~~
salawat
Rationality, and specifically the exercise of it, rationalization, is a double
edged sword. Smart people can rationalize their way into horrible things. An
act being rational alone does not magically elevate it to the status of being
correct, or as an . Like an argument, you can have valid reasoning, but if
that reasoning is from a flawed premise, the course of action cannot be deemed
to be _sound_.

The type certification _could_ have been a non-issue with proper
communication. That didn't happen because someone at Boeing made a terrible
call, and persists in asserting they've done nothing wrong, when the fact of
the matter is that the error is so obvious in it's nature, that the rest of
the world is capable of piecing the failure together even without having seen
the actual data, which as it comes out, proves to only be reinforcing the case
against Boeing.

Maybe it isn't enough to stand up in a court of law...yet. Everything that
_has_ been publicized thus far, however, paints a picture where criminal
negligence is looking more and more like a foregone conclusion.

In short, rationality be damned. Someone made the _irrational_ decision that
the upside of getting to market sooner by cutting corners was worth risking
300+ innocent lives. People who put their faith in Boeing that they did their
due diligence as required by law of executive and PE alike.

I agree with you ReptileMan. It isn't somehow beyond the human mind. Only a
human being would put a financial windfall ahead of ensuring the safety of
eventual passengers, have the decision blow up in their faces, then dig in and
insist they did nothing wrong despite evidence to the contrary.

The corporation will be fine if they can manage to maintain goodwill. I don't
envy those involved with approving the MAX however.

------
lisper
“It was the safest way to get around the regulations.”

Manifestly not.

(And why are you trying to "get around the regulations" anyway? Shouldn't you
be _complying_ with the regulations, not getting around them?)

~~~
xmichael999
Considering Boeing already participates or works in tandem with the FAA to
write the rules, it is pretty sick they are trying to work around the rules.
This is all about profit and they are doubling down, likely due to contract
obligations with Southwest and others that this plane will not require a new
type rating or any sim. time. Lets hope EASA actually reviews this rather than
the FAA letting boeing self audit ...

~~~
chopin
My hopes for the EASA are low. They will fear retaliation on Airbus. I am
afraid we will have to hope for the big Asian players.

~~~
magduf
I'd like to see the EASA ban 737max flights over Europe permanently, by
requiring them to have a new type rating for the aircraft, which Boeing won't
do. They should also criminally prosecute Boeing executives, in absentia if
necessary, and seize Boeing assets in Europe.

------
dreamcompiler
The more I read about Boeing's malfeasance here, the more certain I am that I
will refuse to fly in the 737 MAX if and when it's ever recertified, unless
the airframe is substantially redesigned and substantial retraining of pilots
occurs. A software patch is not going to cut it for me to trust the aircraft
going forward.

------
cladari
Licensed nuclear plant control room operators go through 40 hours of training
every 6 week. Generally 5 weeks of operations rotation then 1 week of
training, all year, every year. Twenty hours of classroom and 20 hours of
simulator training, the week includs a written and simulator exam. Failing
either and the operator is taken off shift until his remediation training is
complete and exams passed.

If pilots rotated into training time these changes could be addressed in
simulators on a scheduled basis the airline could plan for.

~~~
duado
A nuclear power plant failure, in the worst case, is much worse than the worst
case pilot error.

~~~
beart
Not if the plane lands on a nuclear power plant

~~~
dotancohen
Actually all western nuclear power plants are designed to withstand a 737
strike, as that was the largest plane flying when the regulations were
written.

~~~
dragonwriter
> Actually all western nuclear power plants are designed to withstand a 737
> strike, as that was the largest plane flying when the regulations were
> written.

The 737 was a smaller complement for the 707 and 727 when introduced, it was
never the largest plane flying.

~~~
dotancohen
Thank you, I believe that you are correct.

In any case, the 1960's foreign body impact regulation has not been updated so
far as I know, and at the time it was designed for the largest civilian
passenger aircraft then flying. The 737 fits in, the 747 (introduced only two
years later if I'm not mistaken) does not.

------
ReptileMan
Even if this is right from technical point of view (which I am not qualified
to comment on), Boeing being perceived as dragging their feet on safety and
training is very bad for the image of the airplane.

I think that they are still trying to save the type rating, but I feel this
ship has sailed.

------
teh_infallible
Is there anyone who would willingly get on one of these planes, regardless of
software patches and extra training, when we know they have a compromised
airframe, whose design prioritized cost over safety?

~~~
sokoloff
I would get on and/or put my family on a -MAX flown by a US or major European
carrier, where the crew training and experience requirements match my
sensibilities of what should be required for airline transport operations.

That trip would no doubt be statistically safer than the flying we _already_
do in single engine piston aircraft (itself an operation that prioritizes cost
over the safety of flying a twin turboprop or twin jet that we can’t afford to
own and feed).

~~~
magduf
>That trip would no doubt be statistically safer than the flying we already do
in single engine piston aircraft

Maybe, but it'd be statistically less safe than flying on a different model of
aircraft, such as one from Airbus.

------
Waterluvian
Do the non-American regulatory bodies have the power to effectively override
anything the FAA decides is okay by simply saying, "these X remedies are also
mandatory or the 737 MAX is banned from Canadian/EU/Chinese/etc. Airspace"?

I imagine that effectively cripples the value of using the plane without those
remedies.

~~~
cmurf
Each country sets its own rules for their airspace, so they can do whatever
they want. But most have historically deferred to the FAA, but then also
Boeing and airlines, and all the regulatory bodies work with ICAO to try and
be on the same page as much as possible.

There may in fact be some obscure treaties and trade deals, among ICAO
complexities, that complicate sovereignty on this issue.

~~~
noir_lord
I think one of the long term implications of this message is that the European
aviation authorities will defer less to the FAA and another bit of US 'soft'
power is eroded.

Seems to be a trend these days.

~~~
magduf
The US has really been shooting itself in the foot for a couple years now.

------
mark-r
How is it that Boeing doesn't realize how f'ed up they are at this point? They
need to bend over backwards to restore trust in this plane or they'll be
bending over for a different reason.

~~~
magduf
They don't _believe_ they're f'ed up because they have effective control of
the American government and FAA in regards to this issue. The only way this is
really going to hurt them is if foreign air regulators don't go along with the
FAA in rubber-stamping whatever lame fix Boeing comes up with.

------
ocdtrekkie
What they should do, is give some pilots their training course they propose,
then simulate the issue on a simulator. Prove they response appropriately with
the training proposed.

------
cmroanirgo
> _Boeing was able to gain FAA approval for the MCAS system with one angle of
> attack sensor and pilots as backup._

Over the years I've designed/ implemented small scale industrial systems and
whenever there was an _important_ set of data to be read in via sensors,
there'd always be a backup, or ideally triple redundancy. Sensors are cheap &
using multiple can simplify a whole lot of issues.

Even once, I made an uber simple 'level' sensor on a front end loader (using
two slightly rotated Mercury switches). It's only time I didn't consider
redundancy, because it was not important _at all_ if it failed.

What I don't get is how the engineers at Boeing didn't use redundant sensors.
Have I misunderstood something? I just assumed that working on aircraft means
that something like sensor failure should be baked into all decisions and
implementations because of the -ve ramifications of things going wrong: like 2
planes dropping out of the sky!

------
m3kw9
They really should limit the amount of special circumstances a pilot needs to
train for. Each new one adds to a risk esp one like this

~~~
achandlerwhite
Isn’t that what they were trying to do? Reasoning that the MCAS failure mode
was runaway trim and the fact that pilots are trained for runaway trim?
(Obviously in reality this reasoning is flawed)

------
xmichael999
you won't be seeing me on one of them until it gets a new type rating

~~~
RandomBacon
I imagine it would still be more dangerous to drive to the airport than it
would be to fly on a 737 Max.

~~~
tjmc
Note sure about that. Only around 350 737 Max 8's had been delivered by the
time of the second crash.

How many models of car have a 1 in 175 total loss rate?

~~~
Hinrik
Why muddy the waters by comparing apples (airplanes) to oranges (cars)? The
loss rate of other aircraft models is what's relevant.

~~~
RandomBacon
I don't think it's the loss rate of 737 Max vs other models that is what's
relevant either. I said safety of driving to an airport vs flying in a 737
Max. We have to get total number of passenger hours/miles for both methods of
transportation and compare those with deaths. I'm not sure if those numbers
specifically for the 737 Max are available.

