
FAA faces dilemma over 737 Max wiring flaw that Boeing missed - rbanffy
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faa-faces-dilemma-over-737-max-wiring-flaw-that-boeing-missed/
======
ChuckMcM
Such are the externalities of taking the opinion "It isn't illegal if you
don't get caught."[1] It is interesting that had Boeing not pushed the edge on
the re-training re-classification rules they would not have had the crashes,
nor the spotlight on them, nor this "new" problem.

As a result I have no empathy for managers who are not getting their bonuses
this year, or executives who get fired, or corporations who have to take loans
on unfavorable terms in order to weather the storm of consequences brought on
by trying to avoid following the rules and incurring the expense such rules
incur in their execution.

I do feel bad for the engineers who were fired or moved out of the company by
pointing out that management wasn't following the rules. I do feel badly for
the employees whose livelihood depends on their working on building these
amazing machines being put out of work because the consequences are playing
out. And I feel a little bit bad for the airlines suffering from carrying a
bunch of planes they can't fly. Hopefully people are learning life lessons in
this process and the pendulum will swing back into a safer mode of rule
following from the current risk taking behavior.

[1] This philosophy, sadly way too common in my opinion, is that "rules" are
for idiots, and since we're not idiots we need only concern ourselves with the
risks _as we understand them_ of why the rule should be followed, and ignore
said rules when we believe we have no risk of both getting caught nor having
the "bad thing" the rule prevents happening (at least on our watch while it
would reflect on us.).

~~~
Zenbit_UX
> It isn't illegal if you don't get caught.

Illegal seems like the wrong word for this sentiment as it's legal status does
not depend on being caught. If I were to rob a bank, it would be an illegal
act whether or not I'm caught.

Problem seems like an apt substitute.

~~~
manicdee
The phrase reflects on “illegal” being an act for which you are punished by a
court or regulatory authority. There is never any question that laws or
regulations are actually being broken. View the phrase as exercising poetic
licence and using “illegal” as a shorthand for “leading to a conviction and
causing the actor to face punitive action.” The backwards logic is that _I
didn’t face punitive measures therefore what I did is not illegal_.

Thus in your example robbing the bank is technically illegal but you aren’t
going to court if you don’t get caught.

------
rootusrootus
For once, I think Boeing does have a point here. This is the same wiring used
on the 737NG, which AFAIK is considered the safest (or one of the safest, at
least) airliner ever. The point about rerouting existing wiring introducing
it's own potential hazard also seems like an entirely reasonable
consideration.

I know it's automatic that we assume Boeing is either nefarious or retarded in
everything they do, but it's hard to see this as _that_ big a deal when
considering the bigger picture.

~~~
kunai
Not to be pedantic but I believe the Airbus A340 is actually regarded as the
safest airliner ever, with zero fatalities over the course of its nearly
30-year operational history.

~~~
rootusrootus
There are several airliners, including models from Boeing and Airbus, that
have had no fatalities. But they are low production models like the A340. It's
arguably impossible to come up with a "safest" if you don't have some way to
account for the fact that 20 times as many 737NGs have been produced as A340s.

------
alkonaut
Put it another way: do I rather fly with the wiring that was tested for 200M
hours in the NG, or do I want the configuration that is retrofitted in a hurry
to meet the standard? It’s not obvious that trying to “fix” this defect is a
good idea.

~~~
noncoml
False dilemma.

~~~
teh_infallible
“Do we do our jobs and regulate Boeing, even if it means we can’t get cushy
jobs there later?”

The dilemma is real.

------
generatorguy
I’m seriously impressed that the distance between the source conductor,
command conductors, and presumably return conductors is considered.

As a power systems and controls engineer we make Some effort to separate wires
carrying different voltages eg 24v and 480v, but positive and negative run in
the same cables or conductors in the same raceway all the time with nary a
second thought.

~~~
myself248
The FAA and its sister agencies around the globe are very good at root-cause
analysis. Where a single fault could cost many lives, there's strong incentive
to follow any failure all the way back.

I'm guessing that your systems don't experience anything like airplane levels
of vibration, or have anything like airplane numbers of fatalities if the
controls fail, yeah?

~~~
drunken-serval
In the US, the NTSB does root-cause analysis and makes recommendations to the
FAA.

There’s a separation of concerns. The NTSB is solely concerned with finding
out what happened. The FBI handles criminal investigations. The FAA is
concerned with running air traffic control, regulations, and research.

------
pdonis
Since the wiring standard under discussion here was only introduced in 2009,
an obvious question is: how many _other_ aircraft models currently in service,
besides the 737 (and not just the MAX), have a similar issue that has not been
caught simply because no updated analysis of their certification was done
after 2009?

------
jojo2000
> “There are 205 million flight hours in the 737 fleet with this wiring type,”
> a Boeing official said. “There have been 16 failures in service, none of
> which were applicable to this scenario. We’ve had no hot shorts.”

This is appalling as this company exhibits the same excuses as before "there
was no problem yet". Persistence in unfit behaviour at its best.

~~~
pdonis
_> This is appalling as this company exhibits the same excuses as before
"there was no problem yet"._

Saying "there was no problem yet" about something that's only been in service
for a relatively short time, yes.

Saying "there was no problem yet" about something that has been in service
_since the 1960s_ , not so much. If the FAA were to force Boeing to change
this wiring on the 737 MAX, to be consistent, they would also have to change
it on _every single 737 of every model that is still in service_ \--including
many airplanes that have been in service for decades with no problem.

That's a very different argument from "the FAA skimped on the MAX before, so
we shouldn't let them skimp on it again".

~~~
rbanffy
Those 16 failures happened with the NG. It was fortunate they didn't happen in
a way this standard was created to prevent.

------
cmurf
_potential for an electrical short to move the jet’s horizontal tail
uncommanded_

I think this is a reference to the stabilizer, because the elevators are
controlled by cable connected to the yoke and are hydraulically powered. Since
stabilizer (trim) can overpower elevator force, uncommanded changes in this
control surface could be really bad, depending on how a short manifests into
control surface movements.

I can't assess the relative probabilities: a short happening vs the fix
inducing some other problem. But I do wonder whether there's another way to
mitigate it.

~~~
Gwypaas
Today it's mitigated by the pilot. Runaway Stabilizer is a memory-item. [1]

This is the same memory item Boeing thought would mitigate MCAS, since that is
essentially a runaway stabilizer trim, although in retrospect behaving in a
very different manner making it much harder to diagnose.

[1]:
[http://www.b737.org.uk/runawaystab.htm](http://www.b737.org.uk/runawaystab.htm)

~~~
kds3
Runaway Stabilizer / MCAS cases can be mitigated by the pilots (they can use
cutoff switches and do manual trim), but not this kind of electrical short:

> Furthermore, the electrical power in that wire could circumvent the cutoff
> switches in the cockpit that, in the event of such a stabilizer runaway, are
> used to kill electrical power to the tail. Theoretically, the pilots could
> be unable to shut it off.

~~~
mlyle
It's not a great mitigation, but the last thing on runaway stabilizer's memory
list is to "grasp and firmly hold" the stab trim wheel.

~~~
SAI_Peregrinus
The electric motors can apply more power than a human can resist. So that's
not exactly helpful.

~~~
mlyle
The system is engineered so that an operator holding the trim wheel wins, via
a clutch mechanism.

------
LorenPechtel
Since Boeing has taken the path of seeing what they can get away with the only
appropriate response from the regulators is not to allow them the slightest
deviation.

If the 737 Maxes can't be adequately fixed then send them back, refund the
purchase price.

~~~
pdonis
It's not enough to just regulate this on the 737 MAX. This wiring is the same
on _every single 737, of any model, that is in service_. That includes
airplanes that have been flying for decades with no incidents. Do you want to
ground them all?

~~~
Zenbit_UX
You're point is addressed already in the article when they stated that the
original 737s were grandfathered in before the new regulation came into
effect. So no, they've successfully gotten away with it on older models but I
do agree with the GP that regulatory agencies need to set a firm precedent to
deter other manufacturers from playi g fast and loose with the rules.

~~~
pdonis
_> the original 737s were grandfathered in before the new regulation came into
effect_

Yes, I know that. Presumably the same would apply to other aircraft models
certified before 2009 (when the new wiring regulation was issued) that might
have the same problem (as I posted elsewhere in this discussion, it's quite
possible that other aircraft types certified before 2009 have the same problem
--we don't know because nobody has looked).

However, if we're willing to not do anything to all those planes, even though
we now know they have a potential issue, then we can't just insist on doing
something to 737 MAX planes either, since the cost-benefit calculation in both
cases is the same: we have a bunch of planes already in service, we now know
there's an issue with them, do we fix it or not?

 _> regulatory agencies need to set a firm precedent to deter other
manufacturers from playing fast and loose with the rules_

For any 737 MAX aircraft that have not yet flown, I would agree with you.
However, tearing apart aircraft that have already been flown to fix this issue
might cause more problems than it solves. The teardown would be extensive and
any repair that extensive risks introducing some other issue that didn't exist
before and which could cause problems in the future. That makes it a different
cost-benefit calculation.

I certainly agree that Boeing should not be the ones making that calculation.
It would be nice if the FAA didn't either, but had some other agency such as
the NTSB do the root cause analysis to estimate the relative risk of doing the
repair on already flown planes vs. not doing it.

------
tinus_hn
I’m not sure what the dilemma is here. They made the rules, should they apply
them or not?

~~~
ggambetta
I think the dilemma is "but money". I agree, the situation is ridiculous.

~~~
exmadscientist
It's not just money; there is always risk in any hardware rework. If the
rework is not done correctly and a plane crashes, even if on a test flight,
then your "safety fix" has made the world a worse place.

In this particular case the fact that it is aviation standards for wire
separation at issue, when those are typically stupefyingly conservative, means
that "doing nothing" may well be the safest course. But I am NOT an expert in
this area, so don't trust me!

One way to help make the decision is to try and get money out of the equation.
If the two options are "pay for the rework" or "pay a fine equal to the cost
of the rework", then any company that opts for the fine might actually believe
in that approach.

~~~
ggambetta
> there is always risk in any hardware rework

I get your point, but isn't it ultimately about money anyway? If they can wire
a plane correctly when they're building it, they surely can rewire a plane
later - they might have to remove more stuff, worst case scenario reverting
the plane to the same state it would be for an original rewire, and I suppose
the reason they don't want to do that is money.

I can't understand the decision to "ship" with a potentially catastrophic
failure that would cost many lives otherwise. I don't think this should be a
dilemma. IMHO the two sensible options from a regulator point of view seem to
be _" make the plane safe to fly, and if that's expensive, tough luck"_ and _"
don't fly the plane"_.

~~~
catalogia
It seems to me they could disassemble every Max, re-certify every part as
stringently as they would certify a brand new part, throw away any part that
was out of spec, then build "new" Maxes from those re-certified parts. (Except
doing this would cost huge amounts of money.)

~~~
pdonis
It's not enough to disassemble every Max. This wiring is the same on _every
single 737, of any model, that is in service_. That's a much, much, much
bigger effort, plus you'd be tearing apart airplanes that have been in service
for decades with no incidents.

------
redis_mlc
There's a lot of misunderstandings in the comments here.

When you're dealing with complex wiring harnesses and wiring runs, there are
always problems. For example, the A380 and one of Boeing's new airliners were
delayed because stuffing the wiring harness in the nose didn't work.

In the case of airplanes, things flex and bend, causing wire chafing.

So there's no black and white answer to, "Is the wiring perfect?"

The only good solutions are:

1) When new airplanes are made, improve the wire layout

2) When old airplanes get a heavy maintenance check (D-check), possibly
inspect and redo the wiring then.

3) Consider using conduit for safety-critical runs. Makes it harder to
inspect, though. :)

Anyway, the Swissair 111 fire/crash was because of new gambling screens
igniting flammable materials. Sure that was an electrical fire, but from
adding entertainment equipment.

Swissair 111: "flammable material used in the aircraft's structure"

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swissair_Flight_111](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swissair_Flight_111)

Source: commercially-rated pilot

------
hurricanetc
Boeing is right but the FAA can’t afford to give them a waiver because
reciprocity agreements might go up in flames.

Boeing will pay twice because their incompetence highlighted the incompetence
of the FAA.

Not that I particularly care. I hope Boeing goes bankrupt.

~~~
rbanffy
> Not that I particularly care. I hope Boeing goes bankrupt.

That'd be said. I hope their top 3 or 4 management layers go to jail. For a
long time. They've been criminally negligent.

------
product50
Whenever it is approved, 737 MAX is likely going to be the safest aircraft
that Boeing would have produced. There has been so much scrutiny after the
past 2 crashes that at this point every remote possibility has likely been
considered and taken care of.

~~~
CaptainZapp
On the other hand: There was so much hackery, bad engineering decisions, rush
to market, cover-up and likely a lot more shenanigans that haven't yet come to
light.

The whole engineering approach reeks of management mandating to "just fix it
with gaffer tape", if it costs time or gets expensive.

Boeing's despicable behavior in the whole sordid affair also doesn't exactly
help.

While I'm sure that there's a lot of scrutinity going into the recertification
of the plane, such systems are so immensely complex that it begs the question:
What else was missed?

I, for one, would be extremely reluctant to step into anything 737 after the
NG. Even at the price to forego a direct connection.

~~~
dreamcompiler
Completely agree. Whatever mitigations are applied, this is still ultimately a
plane built by suits and bean counters, not engineers.

------
Waterluvian
Articles like this speak as of thr FAA has the sole authority to bring the Max
back into service.

Doesn't it require other agencies in Europe and China to do the same? How
useful is a fleet that can't fly in large segments of the world?

~~~
bumby
I don’t know about China but there is certain reciprocity between the US and
Europe regarding airworthiness. [1] one of the damaging parts of the 737 MAX
fiasco is it has caused many countries to rethink this agreement

[1]
[https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/repair/media/easa_us_roadshows....](https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/repair/media/easa_us_roadshows.pdf)

------
echelon
I don't know what the point of salvaging this plane is at this point. I'm
never going to get on board one of them.

Could they convert the entire fleet into cargo jets, or does the configuration
not match that role?

~~~
ZeKK14
Passenger planes make many flights per day, thus a lot of attention is made on
the costs of usage (ie, the plane is not cheap to buy but it will be cheap to
operate per flight).

Cargo plane fly mostly twice per day (base to sorting center and back), so
they use older planes. They use more fuel per mile, but acquisition costs are
low.

You can't just repurpose brand new planes for cargo use, it's not economically
viable.

Plus, it would mean the safety of cargo pilots is less important than the
safety of passengers...

~~~
lwf
Sadly, at least in the US, we have lower safety standards for cargo than
passenger aircraft.

For example, crew rest requirements adopted in 2010 don't apply to cargo:
[https://ttd.org/policy/ensure-one-level-of-safety-for-all-
ai...](https://ttd.org/policy/ensure-one-level-of-safety-for-all-air-
operations/)

------
MertsA
What about this is something that's too complicated to retrofit? Why would
they even need to tear into existing wiring harnesses to fix this? Just run
another wire through the new pathway isolated from everything else and
decommission the old circuit by cutting the ends of the wire and slapping a
heat shrink cap over them. Sure, fix the harness on new planes but is there
really too much red tape to come up with a safe retrofit plan that doesn't
involve messing with the existing harness?

~~~
dreamcompiler
> Just run another wire through the new pathway

That's likely a big part of the problem. Fishing a new wire is generally very
difficult, and there are probably rules that say it has to be secured every X
meters. Airplanes generally don't use much conduit, so I suspect they'd have
to at least partially tear apart the plane to do this right.

------
vardump
I think the main dilemma could be a bit different.

It's true that the wiring harness is already proven with 737 NG. And it's
probably true rewiring 737 MAX is a higher risk than doing nothing.

But IF this issue causes an accident without attempt to fix it, Boeing as a
company might never recover. Even one such case could be enough.

So both not doing anything and fixing it carry a huge risk. Not fun to be
Boeing these days...

------
doggydogs94
I suppose Boeing could just cancel the whole 737 series and file for Chapter
11.

~~~
catalogia
A reorganization is possible but I really doubt the American government would
allow Boeing to be truly imperiled. The US Military has thousands of Boeing
aircraft, particularly _all_ of the large tanker jets used for aerial
refueling are made by or supported by Boeing (some were made by McDonnell
Douglas, before Boeing bought them.) Some of America's military aircraft are
even derived from the 737.

------
craftinator
Glad Boeing isn't in charge of anything important.

------
ricw
The situation is pretty clear. They need to fix the wiring issue. Stick to the
regulation or don't regulate...

It's also shocking to me that the MAX may be rectified when depending only on
one angle-of-attack sensor (the one that caused the two prior crashes). They
should mandate that at minimum 2 redundant sensor must exist, at minimum.
Really it should be 3 sensors for flight critical input, as has been the case
for all modern airplanes.

~~~
pdonis
_> They need to fix the wiring issue. Stick to the regulation or don't
regulate..._

Fixing the wiring issue would mean fixing it on _every single 737 in service_
, not just the 737 MAX. Many of those airplanes have been flying for decades
with no incidents. Tearing them apart to rewire them might make things worse
overall, not better, since any repair always has the risk of introducing some
other problem.

~~~
ohmaigad
> Fixing the wiring issue would mean fixing it on every single 737 in service,
> not just the 737 MAX.

No it wouldn't as 737 was certified before the new regulation. It is in the
article:

> That earlier 737 NG model didn’t have to meet the current wiring-separation
> standards because they came into force long after that jet was certified.

Just like with cars - you can drive a car from 70ties without airbags or
crumple zones but you cannot buy a new car without airbags as it won't be able
to pass the latest regulations.

Imo in this case the main issue is not the safety (seeing how the older planes
aren't falling out of the sky) but setting a precedent where the certification
authority has missed an issue which is not according to regulation - do the
manufacturer gets a free pass or it is their responsibility to make the item
according to regulation in the first place and it doesn't matter if it was
missed during the certification process.

~~~
pdonis
_> No it wouldn't_

I know the previous 737 models were grandfathered. What I am questioning is
the argument that, even though we accept this wiring flaw on all grandfathered
737s, it must be fixed on the 737 MAX just because Boeing made a different
mistake (MCAS) on the 737 MAX. (If they hadn't made the MCAS mistake, the FAA
wouldn't be reviewing the certification of the MAX and wouldn't have found the
wiring issue.)

 _> setting a precedent where the certification authority has missed an issue
which is not according to regulation_

Is this the first time the FAA has missed a certification issue? I don't know,
but I doubt it.

If the FAA has missed certification issues before, has the manufacturer always
been forced to rework all affected aircraft when the missed issue is
discovered? Again, I don't know, but I doubt it.

In any case, these certainly seem like relevant questions to ask before coming
to a conclusion.

------
mnm1
Expecting Boeing to regulate itself is like expecting a dog to not eat from
its bowl when hungry. It ignores basic human nature and the incentives
companies have to make profits at any costs, even if those costs are hundreds
of human lives. I'm sure there are plenty of other things overlooked on this
plane and others since the FAA gave up their oversight duties, their major
reason for existence. When a company like this is unaccountable to anyone,
we've seen what happens, yet there is still a question as to whether
regulations should be enforced? How many more people need to die needlessly
before the government steps in and does its job?

