
Computation in Physical Systems - lainon
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-physicalsystems/
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strainer
I have had thoughts about how we attach meaning to symbols in computers (our
designed computational systems), and how a physical system like a landslide,
or accretion disk or something could accidentally assume forms and
computation-like behaviours which we could attach symbolic meaning to, yet
mostly do not /can not as we are not watching.

With such a vision there is strong ambiguity in the world over what is
potentially symbolically meaningful to someone, the meanings things can carry,
and the stories their symbols can follow. I think that essential ambiguity of
interpretation, of the apparent orders and symbols in the world, makes
nonsense of the popular idea that we may ourselves be certain sophisticated
symbolic constructs in an advanced simulation.

Sorry for this but I am in the middle of doing something else and have only
skimmed this paper but it looks tantalisingly relevant...

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empath75
What you are thinking of is semiotics, the study of how we attach meanings to
things. If a landslide assumes a form to which we attach a meaning, Augustine
would say that's a natural sign.

For example, when something burns, a natural sign forms which we call smoke,
and the meaning we attach to the sign is that there is a fire.

~~~
glbrew
I don't thing that is what he is referring to. He is talking amount symbols as
in computational manipulation of symbols to achieve information processing,
not symbols as in a deeper meaning for something.

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strainer
Shame I missed this thread. I do wonder about all aspects of symbols, how to
differentiate shallow, deep or even consciously 'realised' symbols. Im
wondering how things can be accidentally symbolic, with or without someone to
observe the apparent symbolism. I feel there is something special about
conciousness and there seems to be a popular view that conciousness is an
accident of the universe or of any sufficiently detailed symulation.

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100ideas
Have often wondered how philosphers treat the apparent "dualism" of logicial
or theoretical computational systems and their physical embodiments - thanks
for posting!

~~~
100ideas
Hypercomputers:

 _" Perhaps the best known proposal for a hypercomputer is due to Mark Hogarth
(1994, 2004), who developed an idea of Itamar Pitowsky (1990). Relativistic
hypercomputers exploit the properties of a special kind of spacetime called
Malament-Hogarth spacetime, which is physically possible in the sense of
constituting a solution to Einstein's field equations for General Relativity.
Malament-Hogarth spacetimes contain regions with an infinite time-like
trajectory λ that can be circumvented by a finite time-like trajectory γ. In
other words, λ and γ have a common origin, and there is a spacetime point p on
γ such that λ, even though it is infinite, lies entirely in p's chronological
past. If an observer launches a Turing machine along λ and then travels along
γ she may, within finite time, find herself in the future of an infinitely
long computation performed by the Turing machine. If the Turing machine is
able to send signals to the observer, the observer would be able to know the
outcome of a potentially infinitely long computation, thereby having
computational means more powerful than (ordinary) Turing machines. For
instance, an observer may be able to obtain the results of an arbitrary
instance of the halting function for Turing machines.

Constructing and using a relativistic hypercomputer is a nontrivial affair."_

~~~
smaddox
This of course ignores the problem of energy and entropy. Computation takes
energy and generates entropy. An infinity long computation would require
infinite energy and would generate an infinite amount of entropy.

Interesting concept, though.

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rwnspace
Relevant XKCD: [https://xkcd.com/505/](https://xkcd.com/505/)

