
Cockpit voice recorder of Lion Air jet depicts pilots' frantic search for fix - petethomas
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-crash-exclusive/exclusive-cockpit-voice-recorder-of-doomed-lion-air-jet-depicts-pilots-frantic-search-for-fix-sources-idUSKCN1R10FB
======
cjbprime
This appears to answer the question of why, given that there is a "memory
item" for dealing with runaway trim that would have helped, it wasn't followed
by the crew:

> “They didn’t seem to know the trim was moving down,” the third source said.
> “They thought only about airspeed and altitude. That was the only thing they
> talked about.”

If this is true, not only did the pilots not realize the trim was the cause of
the dive and try to fix it, it seems that they didn't even realize the trim
wheel was moving.

"Runaway trim" would be something they trained for, but has a presentation so
vastly different (of a visibly spinning trim wheel causing quick descent) as
to not be recognizably the same emergency to these pilots.

Of course, this crew had no way of knowing that there was a system on the
plane that could slowly make erroneous trim changes over a long period with
autopilot off, and it makes sense that they might miss it happening while
focusing on their stall alerts and speeds and trying to come up with an
explanation and also trying to retain control.

~~~
RidingPegasus
Was the trim wheel not visibly spinning out of their control? Simply because
the symptoms are different should mean that stopping it via taking manual
control is a recurring option.

~~~
verytrivial
The Lion Air directive has instructions on page 41 of their preliminary report
that include:

5\. If the runaway continues after the autopilot is disengaged:

    
    
       STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches (both)  ... CUTOUT
       If the runaway continues:
          Stabilizer trim wheel  .... *Grasp and hold*
    

This may be an overabundance of caution, or to cover other runaway events, but
it reads like "you may need to physically fight the computer even when it has
been disabled". Not exactly heartening.

EDIT: A comment below points out haptic feedback to disengage as a reason to
grab-and-hold.

[https://reports.aviation-
safety.net/2018/20181029-0_B38M_PK-...](https://reports.aviation-
safety.net/2018/20181029-0_B38M_PK-LQP_PRELIMINARY.pdf)

~~~
mlindner
That's incorrect, these have haptic feedback, once you grasp it, it's not
going to fight you. It looks for resistance and if it sees the resistance it
doesn't continue.

~~~
userbinator
Really? Here's a video of someone doing it, and it certainly looks like it
tries to fight you (and the trim motor continues running) but there's a clutch
that starts slipping:

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cQirIH_DuAs](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cQirIH_DuAs)

------
zaroth
The previous flight had exactly the same issue. This is what that pilot wrote
in the logs;

 _After parking, the PIC informed the engineer about the aircraft problem and
entered IAS (Indicated Air Speed) and ALT (altitude) Disagree and FEEL DIFF
PRESS (Feel Differential Pressure) light problem on the Aircraft Flight
Maintenance Log (AFML).

The PIC also reported the flight condition through the electronic reporting
system of the company A-SHOR. The event was reported as follows:

Airspeed unreliable and ALT disagree shown after takeoff, _STS also running to
the wrong direction _, suspected because of speed difference, identified that
CAPT instrument was unreliable and handover control to FO. Continue NNC of
Airspeed Unreliable and ALT disagree. Decide to continue flying to CGK at
FL280, landed safely runway 25L._

STS is the speed trim system. The pilot didn’t explicitly note that they set
STAB TRIM to CUT OUT to correct the problem, perhaps because he thought it was
obvious?

But then reading the log of the previous flight;

 _After three automatic AND trim occurrences, the SIC commented that the
control column was too heavy to hold back.

At 14:25:46 UTC, the PIC declared “PAN PAN” to the Denpasar Approach
controller due to instrument failure and requested to maintain runway heading.

At 14:28:28 UTC, the PIC moved the STAB TRIM switches to CUT OUT. The PIC re-
engaged the STAB TRIM switches to NORMAL, but almost immediately the problem
re-appeared. The PIC then moved the STAB TRIM switches back to CUT OUT and
continued with manual trim without auto-pilot until the end of the flight._

This implies it took almost three minutes for the previous crew to figure out
the STAB TRIM needed to be CUT OUT after finding the trim is so wrong that
they can’t hold the stick back.

Clearly this is not a _memory item_ for these pilots.

[1] - [https://reports.aviation-
safety.net/2018/20181029-0_B38M_PK-...](https://reports.aviation-
safety.net/2018/20181029-0_B38M_PK-LQP_PRELIMINARY.pdf)

~~~
Someone1234
MCAS problems weren't a memory item for any pilot, the memory item is Runaway
Stabilizer and exhibits different behaviour to MCAS.

Which is to say that they'll be receiving sim training for Runaway Stabilizer,
learn what to expect (wheel moves continuously, hard nose down, etc), and then
in real life have MCAS cause the same issue but in a substantively different
way (change, delay, change, delay, etc).

Without the benefit of hindsight why not try the Memory Item: Engine Surge /
Stall or Uncommanded Roll? Both of which could exhibit as an uncommanded nose
down.

The reality of the situation is that some pilots immediately went straight for
Runaway Stabilizer whereas others did not. That's a problem. That's a TRAINING
problem. The type rating should have included additional training against the
Runaway Stabilizer Memory Item for MCAS so "I've seen this before" is second
nature.

~~~
dmix
> That's a problem. That's a TRAINING problem.

Isn't the root problem still related to the fact that the AoA sensors were
returning wrong information and the MCAS was simply reacting to that in a
dangerous and non-obvious way?

I guess the pilots should be aware of this type of system reaction but still
it seems like something that should be fixed at a higher level than training
(indicators, backup AoA sensors, detecting dangerous descent after trigging
nose down, etc).

~~~
jandrese
There's never just one cause of an airline accident. That was one of the
causes, but alone it wouldn't have been sufficient. Fixing the problems at all
levels is how you achieve high reliability.

~~~
itronitron
Seems like it would have been sufficient to cause the crash, or are you saying
that if the pilots let MCAS do its thing that the plane would not have
crashed?

~~~
jandrese
Crash causes:

1\. Faulty MCAS

2\. Insufficient pilot training

3\. Boeing design changes (MCAS used to be disabled automatically if the pilot
applied sufficient counter-input, this feature was removed in the -MAX series,
requiring the pilot to explicitly disable the system using a separate button)

Take away any 1 of those causes and the plane doesn't crash. They all had to
happen at the same time for these two tragedies to occur.

~~~
flappysquirrel
>MCAS used to be disabled automatically if the pilot applied sufficient
counter-input, this feature was removed in the -MAX series

What was the reasoning behind this change?

~~~
itronitron
Presumably so that the pilot can be blamed for not knowing the procedure to
manually disable the automatic system that is flying the plane into the
ground.

------
jve
In the other news, on the previous day on the same plane there was a retired
pilot flying in cockpit who correctly diagnosed problem & told how to disable
malfunctioning system:
[https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-19/how-an-
ex...](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-19/how-an-extra-man-in-
cockpit-saved-a-737-max-that-later-crashed)

~~~
gojomo
That's the most amazing revelation to me so far. The same plane had an
identical uncontrolled-dive problem the day before, which required an
emergency power cut to the improperly-engaged motor, and somehow that incident
didn't ground the plane or even result in any effective advisory to the next
crew.

Further, the Bloomberg story reports:

"The Indonesia safety committee report said the plane had had multiple
failures on previous flights and hadn’t been properly repaired."

Lots of blame to go around here.

~~~
michaelt

      The same plane had an identical uncontrolled-dive problem
      the day before, [...] and somehow that incident didn't
      ground the plane or even result in any effective advisory
      to the next crew.
    

This is the problem with the Boeing blame-the-pilots-for-not-switching-the-
stab-trim-cutout-switches approach.

If the pilots fear near misses will be called pilot error, and they'll be
called incompetent/dangerous or punished for endangering passengers, that
would do a lot to discourage near miss reporting.

~~~
gojomo
Not sure that follows, either theoretically or practically. Non-reporting of
any observed aircraft issues puts their fellow pilots, and all other
passengers, in grave risk.

A tiny shred of mutual respect for other flight crews, or for human life of
passengers in general, should easily overwhelm any concern an anomaly report
will harm their record.

In this case, the prior crew could've reported the problem, _and_ their
successful resolution. There's little risk of an _actual malfunction requiring
the emergency disengagement of normal systems_ being mislabeled "pilot error",
especially when they made a proper recovery according to trained procedures.

For all I know, the crew did make this report, but the report failed to have
the necessary impacts, in either grounding/fixing the plane or reminding
followup crews of relevant emergency procedures. If that incident or prior
failures weren't reported, or were reported but not acted upon, then the fault
for that lies with some mix of the crews, the airline, and relevant regulators
– in addition to any other failures by Boeing.

------
bookofjoe
Best book I've ever read on the root cause ("tight coupling") of accidents:
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normal_Accidents](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normal_Accidents)
From its Wikipedia entry: >"Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk
Technologies" is a 1984 book by Yale sociologist Charles Perrow, which
provides a detailed analysis of complex systems from a sociological
perspective. It was the first to "propose a framework for characterizing
complex technological systems such as air traffic, marine traffic, chemical
plants, dams, and especially nuclear power plants according to their
riskiness." Perrow argues that multiple and unexpected failures are built into
society's complex and tightly coupled systems. Such accidents are unavoidable
and cannot be designed around.

His analysis also applies to anesthesia disasters, I learned the hard way
during my 38 years in the O.R. Highly recommended.

~~~
mjburgess
I think this perspective on accidents needs far more emphasis.

Many accidents are unavoidable and not the result of some person failing to do
some thing.

The world isn't a story, people don't have much agency, and events do not
happen because people want them to.

These "narrative explanations" are mythological just-so stories that attribute
the complex interaction of systems to individuals, organizations, etc. in
naive agency-based ways.

~~~
cal5k
This is the issue I have with the media - moreso than any particular bias,
media loves to paint a narrative when, in truth, random events are more likely
to blame (though in fairness this is a human flaw borne from the heuristic
value of narrative). Accidents happen in complex systems - rather than burning
the people involved at the stake, we should recognize the inherent complexity
of safety hurtling an aluminum tube full of humans through the air at just
below the speed of sound, review the accident in a calm and sober fashion, and
make the necessary changes to prevent a similar accident in the future

~~~
kayfox
The HN discussion of this issue is fairly revealing in that it points towards
the people on this site wanting a simple explanation with a short list of
people to punish, when it is more likely a long list of small details with
many people who might have made relatively minor mistakes or simply not
foreseen the issue in question. Working in IT (and also formerly at Boeing, so
there's some crossover in experience), I find this unsurprising, as IT systems
become more and more complex the answers are not "theres a bug in Vendor X's
product" or "system Y was misconfigured" but a long litany of small errors,
oversights or unforeseen issues that culminated in some larger issue. It does
not help that many of these people are unwilling to adjust their conclusions
based on emerging evidence. Fortunately in aviation there is a culture of
understanding all the details of accidents, identifying all the possible
improvements and implementing them. I suspect that the IT industry is on the
verge of a crisis as I don't see this sort of attitude prevalent in it, which
is funny because lots of the terminology and some of the techniques are
common, just not the culture.

~~~
cal5k
For context, I'm a licensed pilot and my father spent most of his career
working at Transport Canada, basically Canada's FAA. So this is one of those
topics I probably know more than the average HNer about.

What I've noticed more broadly is that there are lots of people on HN with
high general intelligence who believe it automatically translates to specific
domain knowledge in aviation, medicine, etc., when if quizzed they would
likely know far less than they believe they do.

So when it comes to quality improvement, for example, they likely haven't
spent time at a car factory, or at a Boeing plant, and understand it via
bastardized analogies (i.e. Kaizen in software development really isn't the
same as in manufacturing) rather than domain expertise. Deep domain expertise
is difficult to obtain unless you're really immersed in an industry.

The desire to "make someone pay" when errors happen is antithetical to a
culture of quality improvement. The accident report for the Lion Air incident
actually paints a picture of a complex failure rather than simply being the
fault of the software, but that doesn't really get reported on.

Hence my issue with the media. Inflammatory headlines and speculation cause
people to believe they know more than they actually do about something, and
the public pressure drives action that may be totally inappropriate.

------
zw123456
The thing I don't understand about that MCAS system is why it would continue
to drive the nose of the plane down even when the pilot is reefing on the
stick to pull up. The cruise control in my car automatically disengages when I
hit the brakes, it doesn't continue to accelerate to keep the car going 60
while I am jamming on the brakes, in an emergency, I don't have time to find
the off switch. Similarly, I would think that in an emergency, it should
automatically disengage if the pilot pulls hard on the stick, in an emergency,
the pilot doesn't have time to read the manual to find the off switch for the
thing. It seems crazy to me that they wouldn't have a safety override like
that.

~~~
t0mas88
The same applies to the trim in a 737 and any other transport class aircraft.
If you move the control column in the opposite direction of trim, the electric
trim and autopilot trim will cut out. The same applies to the autopilot in all
types I've flown, it disconnects if you override it manually (except for CWS
mode, but that's known and expected)

I don't fly the 737, so I haven't read the aircraft specific books and systems
overviews, but I expect this override behavior is very confusing in the MCAS
scenario. Because any pilot would counteract a nose-down force by pulling on
the yoke. The MCAS would then stop moving the trim, and the pilot would think
(as would be true in any other situation) that the override worked. But MCAS
didn't stop because of the override, it stops because it always does that
after a few seconds and will re-activate 10 seconds later (or 20, didn't read
a definitive number on this).

The confusing thing is that 95% of the unwanted trim movements are caused by
the autopilot, so at this point the pilot would think the situation is under
control and probably disconnect the autopilot if the movement didn't already,

The other 5% (or probably less) of unwanted trim movements are trim runaway,
which is either a stuck switch (2 actually, you depress two switches at once
to make it move, pressing 1 does nothing) or an electrical problem.

In both cases pulling back works and stops it. If it stays "stopped" you think
autopilot and leave it disconnected. If it keeps moving continuously you think
trim runaway and flip the trim cutout switches or pull the circuit breaker
(this one is usually marked bright orange so you can find it quickly in planes
without cutout switches)

But in the MCAS case, and without MCAS knowledge (which apparently nobody had)
you would not expect it to start moving again later. You would have concluded
"autopilot" of the above two scenarios, and after disconnect would think
you're safe. So now when it starts moving again, your first idea is that the
autopilot did not disconnect which leads to even more confusion in the
cockpit.

The LionAir flight that was saved by the jumpseater got lucky in the sense
that this guy was not flying, not debugging the autopilot, and did see the
trim move because he has no instruments to scan and the trim is right in front
of his face (in the middle between the two pilots). If you conclude that the
issue is the trim, then any pilot would decide to go for the cut-out switches.
It's just that concluding the trim is the issue, without knowing MCAS, under
high pressure and with the wrong (autopilot) conclusion already on your mind
is not very likely.

~~~
mlindner
Why didn't the pilots adjust the trim manually? I don't understand how any
pilot would consider increasing control pressure to be normal and not
automatically respond by manually adjusting the trim.

~~~
baq
i don't want to sound condescending but it's all there in the parent comment.

------
mikejb
I'm trying to imagine the horror the pilots (and passengers) were feeling.
Imagine your car slowly starting to shift sideways into incoming traffic, and
no matter how hard you pull the steering wheel, you can't get it back.
Horrifying.

~~~
SmellyGeekBoy
This is why I refuse to listen to these things when they're released. The
thought of eavesdropping in on someone's frantic hopeless fight for survival
just doesn't sit right with me.

~~~
isolli
Agreed. It reminds me of the final scene of Grizzly Man, when Herzog listens
to the audio recording of the bear enthusiast and his girlfriend being mauled
to death. Herzog puts the headphones down, visibly shaken, and comments
(paraphrasing): nobody should have to listen to that.

~~~
Darthy
He actually says to the mother: Jewel, you must never listen to this.

~~~
aeorgnoieang
Wasn't it the girlfriend?

~~~
mikejb
The girlfriend was on location and apparently the one who turned on the camera
(but did not remove the lens cap, making it an audio-only recording). She was
killed and partially eaten together with Treadwell.

Edit: The tape is actually owned by Jewel Palovak who this scene is also with;
She's a former girlfriend of Treadwell, not his (or his girlfriends) mother.

------
programmer_dude
What I don't understand whenever I read anything related to the MCAS system is
why does it not check if the plane is in a dangerous nose dive using other
sensors the plane might have? Does the average plane not have a gyroscope? My
sub 500 dollar phone has both a gyroscope and an inertial measurement unit
(accelerometer).

~~~
Tepix
Gyroscopes by themselves can not sense the orientation of a body moving
through three dimensions.

~~~
ethelward
What is that[0] then?

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attitude_indicator](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attitude_indicator)

~~~
mlindner
Attitude != Angle of Attack.

~~~
ethelward
Orientation = attitude ≠ AoA

------
YeGoblynQueenne
>> On the same aircraft the evening before the crash, a captain at Lion Air’s
full-service sister carrier, Batik Air, was riding along in the cockpit and
solved the similar flight control problems, two of the sources said. His
presence on that flight, first reported by Bloomberg, was not disclosed in the
preliminary report.

Like that bug that there's only one person in the company who knows about and
how to fix it, but she's always working on something else? That's just awful.

------
petilon
This is the most revelatory news for me:

 _The MAX has larger engines than previous 737s, and they are in a slightly
different position. As a result, the plane has a tendency to pitch its nose
up. To keep that from getting out of control if pilots flying manually aren’t
attentive, MCAS automatically pushes the nose down if the sensor says the nose
is too high._

See: [https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-you-need-to-know-about-
fly...](https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-you-need-to-know-about-flying-on-a-
boeing-737-max-11552334508)

In other words, Boeing fixed a hardware flaw with software. I am no
aeronautical engineer, but this seems wrong to me. The hardware needs to be
correct in and of itself. The software layer should be for enhancing the
capabilities of the hardware, not for fixing fundamental flaws in hardware.

~~~
achandlerwhite
Not a really a hardware flaw--a design choice/hardware compromise so that
existing 737 infrastructure could be used. The low ground clearance of a 737
is one of its main selling points. It's customers have a large investment in
infrastructure around this capability--Think of things like loading ramps,
luggage carts, servicing vehicles, etc.

~~~
petilon
So in other words they designed it this way in order to make the 737 MAX is
cheaper to operate, and therefore easier to sell. That's terrible. Boeing
traded off safety for profits.

~~~
achandlerwhite
Yes cost is a factor. The alternative might not be feasible economically. I
don't think the failure here was reusing the 737 design, but the downstream
due diligence of implying no significant changes. I also think airline
training is a factor--both Boeing for the new systems and the airliners
because runaway stabilizer trim has been in the aircraft emergency checklist
for over 50 years and every pilot should know it. That same procedure would
have saved these planes.

~~~
msbarnett
> I also think airline training is a factor--both Boeing for the new systems
> and the airliners because runaway stabilizer trim has been in the aircraft
> emergency checklist for over 50 years and every pilot should know it. That
> same procedure would have saved these planes.

While training is absolutely one (of many) factors in these crashes, it's
worth noting that while the runaway stabilizer _checklist response_ would save
this plane, the _symptoms_ of this runaway MCAS issue _DO NOT MATCH_ those of
a "normal" runaway stabilizer as pilots train on it in simulator.

Essentially, pilots are being called upon to recall a trained response based
on input which is significantly different from any that they've seen in
training. Other flight logs on Lion Air prior to the crash show that even when
the pilots correctly hit upon flipping the stabilizer trim cut out, it took
them _minutes_ to realize that was the solution, and they only fully confirmed
that when they tried turning it back on, experienced another pushover, and
then cut it out for good.

Boeing's assertion that there was no need for additional simulator training
for the Max series is clearly incorrect -- even in non-fatal incidents pilots
have demonstrably and in multiple cases not been able to correctly recognize
the MCAS runaway as a kind of Stabilizer Runaway without spending time
searching for and running multiple checklists.

------
linsomniac
AvE over on youtube has some speculation about what caused these crashes, and
sums it up with: This was clearly a training issue, but now everyone is
talking about it and every pilot is going to have this at the top of their
mind. Would I hesitate to get on a Max 8 right now? Not for a second, pardner.

It's like how right after a bad health dept report is probably one of the
safest times to go to a particular restaurant.

[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1XCU__OEftU](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1XCU__OEftU)

------
vgoh1
Wow. This is a failure from so many parties. The pilots for not knowing the
correct procedure. Boeing (who should bear the majority of the blame) for
allowing sensors that are not properly redundant, purchasing sensors that
appear to fault on a regular basis, not properly training, and not making sure
that a problem that was well understood can never happen again, the airline
for not informing the next crew of problems from previous flights, the
regulators of the United States and Ethiopia for allowing these mistakes to
happen.

~~~
mtw
We should look at the root cause, which is Boeing installing much more
powerful engines on an old frame that wasn't designed for it. They haven't
properly done it.

------
binarnosp
The book "Aviation Psychology: Practice and Research" by Klaus-Martin Goeters
is an eye opener on the problems that the architects of complex control
systems that interface with humans must take into account.

And the kind of problem that MCAS exhibited is clearly explained in the book.

The book doesn't talk only about control system design, but also about
training, hiring, etc.

------
Trisell
Again we are seeing a more systematic issue that commercial pilots don’t have
stick and rudder skills. Automation has taken over 95% of the job. They push
the throttles up to take off power, pull back on the stick, and then punch the
auto-pilot and sit back and enjoy the ride. Then they don’t fly or input
anything into flying until landing where they again fly the plane for the last
3-5 minutes of the flight. I would be interested to see the experience
level/age of the pilots. As I think the retiring generation of pilot was much
more equipped to deal with this type of issue. Then the new generation of
pilot. I included an article lamenting this decreased skill we are seeing.
It’s refering to the Miracle on the Hudson. But I think it applies here as
well. [1]

[1][https://nymag.com/news/features/53788/index1.html](https://nymag.com/news/features/53788/index1.html)

~~~
_s
This is rather inflammatory at best, and pretty derogatory to the vast
majority of pilots who spend upwards of $100,000 to gain the skills necessary
for an ATPL, spending anywhere from 1000-2500 hours flying aircraft older than
yourself using technology that predates WW2, and even WW1 in some cases. Stick
and rudder skills is all you have to get through the first 100 or so hours of
your flying career.

What you're seeing is a consequence of companies willing to skimp on training
and certifications, pressuring authorities and manufacturers to find
workarounds, and keeping the folks actually flying the thing in the dark about
it.

------
mclightning
Why is it kept in a water-filled box in the image on the news article?

Feels freaky like it is a living animal kept alive in an aquarium.

edit> [https://www.quora.com/Why-are-black-boxes-put-into-water-
aft...](https://www.quora.com/Why-are-black-boxes-put-into-water-after-they-
are-rescued-from-the-accident-site)

~~~
lawlessone
once it has been submerged taking it back out of the water will cause it to
rust in the air.

------
lawlessone
>The manufacturer has said there is a documented procedure to handle the
situation. A different crew on the same plane the evening before encountered
the same problem but solved it after running through three checklists,
according to the November report.

They shouldn't have to do this routinely.

~~~
achandlerwhite
Agree, if the AoA sensor had been properly maintained and/or the MCAS was able
to better handle a faulty sensor this could be mitigated.

Also pilots should be made aware of the characteristics of the resulting mode
of stabilizer trim runaway.

------
m23khan
I don't get one thing -- why didn't the Lion Air pilots just shut off the
Autopilot and take manual control of the aircraft?

~~~
paulmd
This problem specifically only manifests when the autopilot is off. It's
designed to prevent the pilots from stalling out the airplane without
realizing it, which only happens in manual flight. Enabling the autopilot cuts
out MCAS.

------
peteradio
I'm becoming most curious about these AoA sensors. What is going on with them?
Is there a problem in the manufacturing process?

~~~
achandlerwhite
I believe it was installed incorrectly and poorly maintained by the airline.

------
veryworried
Where can we listen to the recording??

------
pts_
Airline by Michael Crichton played out in real.

~~~
docdeek
*Airframe. I miss Crichton...

------
mlindner
How did the pilots not think about trim controls... This is BASIC piloting. If
you are experiencing pressure on the control stick you adjust trim. How were
the pilots this inept?

~~~
matz1
It's Indonesian and this particular budget airline locally has been famous for
having many issues. But it's cheap.

------
CyberFonic
One of the factors that has been quickly glossed over is the low level of
experience of some of the pilots in both the Indonesian and Ethopian
accidents. In the USA, due to much higher levels of experience pilots have
been correcting for the MCAS actions effectively and complaining about it to
NASA (in order to avoid being branded as whistle-blowers by their airlines).

~~~
matt4077
How would it even be possible for US pilots to sustainably have „much higher
levels of experience“? Do non-US pilots fly only two days a week? Do they all
die before age 40?

This stereotype of dingy third-world airlines with incompetent, untrained
pilots borders on racism. At the very least, one should notice that flying the
world’s newest airliner in significant numbers is incompatible with one‘s
preconceptions.

~~~
oldgradstudent
The first officer in Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 was confirmed to have 350
flight hours, which is much lower then the US standard for the large carriers.

Southwest Airlines, for example requires:

> Flight Experience: 2,500 hours total or 1,500 hours Turbine total.
> Additionally, a minimum of 1,000 hours in Turbine aircraft as the Pilot in
> Command* is preferred. Southwest considers only Pilot time in fixed-wing
> aircraft. This specifically excludes simulator, WSO, RIO, FE, NAV, EWO, etc.
> "Other Time" will not be considered.

[https://swa.pilotcredentials.com/index.php?a=qualifications](https://swa.pilotcredentials.com/index.php?a=qualifications)

Delta requires:

> Minimum of 1,500 hours of total documented flight time.

> Minimum of 1,000 hours of fixed wing turboprop or turbofan time.

> 90% of the flight time logged in powered lift category aircraft (e.g. AV-8B,
> F-35B, and V-22) will be credited to the Delta Air Lines 1,000 hour fixed
> wing turboprop/turbofan requirement.

> Minimum of 250 hours PIC in an aircraft categorized as an airplane.

> The flight time logged in a powered lift category aircraft cannot be
> credited towards PIC aircraft time in accordance with 14 C.F.R. 61.159.

> Minimum of 50 hours of fixed wing multi-engine time.

[https://www.deltajobs.net/pilot_qualifications.htm](https://www.deltajobs.net/pilot_qualifications.htm)

United requires:

> Minimum of 1,000 hours of fixed-wing turbine time

[https://www.united.com/ual/en/us/fly/company/career/pilot.ht...](https://www.united.com/ual/en/us/fly/company/career/pilot.html)

The European carriers, on the other hand, do not have such strict
requirements.

~~~
24gttghh
These are all _pilot_ qualifications. The _first officer_ was new and had ~200
flight hours. The _pilot /captain_ had over 8000 flight hours. [0]

Look at Ethiopian Airlines own job postings![1]

    
    
       >Qualifications:
     Must hold a current and valid JAA/FAA or ICAO ATPL/CPL
        A current 777 type rating
        Minimum Flight time
            *3500 hours* jet time
            *2500 hours* Pilot in command on jet aircraft
            Command time in excess of 500 hours on 777
    

[0][https://www.ethiopianairlines.com/corporate/media/media-
rela...](https://www.ethiopianairlines.com/corporate/media/media-
relations/press-release/detail/1080)

[1][https://www.ethiopianairlines.com/corporate/careers/vacancy](https://www.ethiopianairlines.com/corporate/careers/vacancy)

~~~
oldgradstudent
Is this clear enough?

[https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsI...](https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=14838)

These are the minimum FAA requirements. Major airlines have higher
requirements, while regionals have lower requirements.

The US is unique because flying is far more affordable and common, especially
when compared to the alternative of going to a university, even a reasonable
state school.

~~~
24gttghh
They only introduced that rule in 2013 as your link states, and it doesn't
seem like most other places bother with such high requirements.[0]

"On Ethiopian flight 302, the first officer may have had just 200 hours, but
the captain, a 29-year old career Ethiopian Airlines pilot, had a very
respectable 8,000 hours under his belt. There’s no indication, at this point
in the investigation, that crew experience may have been a factor in the
accident."

I still don't see why you are harping on the experience angle when there seems
to be much more evidence that the weird Boeing "secret" anti-stall
system(MCAS) seems to be in play, since Boeing is trying to come up with an
update for it...Also the general maintenance issues that seems to have
occurred before at least one of the flights where the same issue was noted
and/or the faulty sensors were ignored by groundcrew.

[0][https://thepointsguy.com/news/how-much-experience-do-
pilots-...](https://thepointsguy.com/news/how-much-experience-do-pilots-need/)

And FTA this thread is about:

"French air accident investigation agency BEA said on Tuesday the flight data
recorder in the Ethiopian crash that killed 157 people showed “clear
similarities” to the Lion Air disaster. Since the Lion Air crash, Boeing has
been pursuing a software upgrade to change how much authority is given to the
Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS, a new anti-stall
system developed for the 737 MAX.

Some U.S. pilots have complained they were unaware of the new system, which is
mentioned in the index of the aircraft’s full manual but not the text,
according to a version seen by Reuters. Airlines have some discretion to
customize the manuals.

The cause of the Lion Air crash has not been determined, but the preliminary
report mentioned the Boeing system, a faulty, recently replaced sensor and the
airline’s maintenance and training."

So yeah, blame the flight crew... /s

~~~
oldgradstudent
> They only introduced that rule in 2013 as your link states

The major carriers were always stricter. The 2013 rule changed to address a
problem at the regional carriers.

> and it doesn't seem like most other places bother with such high
> requirements.[0]

Which I explicitly stated in my original post:

>>> The European carriers, on the other hand, do not have such strict
requirements.

> I still don't see why you are harping on the experience angle

I weren't. I pointed out a specific misunderstanding in the comment I've
responded to.

>>>> How would it even be possible for US pilots to sustainably have „much
higher levels of experience“? Do non-US pilots fly only two days a week? Do
they all die before age 40?

~~~
24gttghh
Fair enough. Back to the actual issue here:

"When it was rolled out, MCAS took readings from only one sensor on any given
flight, leaving the system vulnerable to a single point of failure. One theory
in the Lion Air crash is that MCAS was receiving faulty data from one of the
sensors, prompting an unrecoverable nose dive.

In the software update that Boeing says is coming soon, MCAS will be modified
to take readings from both sensors. If there is a meaningful disagreement
between the readings, MCAS will be disabled."

[https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/business/boeing-safety-
fe...](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/business/boeing-safety-features-
charge.html)

