
Judge Orders Navy to Release USS Thresher Disaster Documents - protomyth
https://news.usni.org/2020/02/11/judge-orders-navy-to-release-uss-thresher-disaster-documents
======
MurMan
I was a nuclear-trained operator on a boat of the same vintage as the
Thresher. I joined it in 1970 just after it had been retrofitted with SubSafe
systems and better operational procedures that came directly from the loss of
the Thresher.

I'm convinced that the loss of the Thresher, as tragic as it was, saved a lot
of lives.

As for the documents, you need to know that Rickover classified almost
everything about the nuclear program. I suspect that kind of thinking still
exists and is responsible for the slow release of the document.

~~~
frankharv
I was involved with Level1 and SubSafe parts as a Machinist in the 80's. First
on a Sub Tender then at a Naval Shipyard. I served as Controlled Materials
Petty Officer and learned the nuances of material classification. All laymen
need to know is that every part of a submarine is engraved with a number that
can be traced back to the site where the minerals were mined. This includes
every bolt, nut and washer. A very impressive level of accountability. I have
dealt with alot of green tags in my day. Generated quite a few as well from
manufactured parts. What I wonder is how much the price of a sub increased
after SubSafe program was started. From a material point of view the cost was
around 3X for roundstock.

~~~
frankharv
The Iwo Jima incident was really horrible and preventable.
[https://www.nationalboard.org/Index.aspx?pageID=164&ID=226](https://www.nationalboard.org/Index.aspx?pageID=164&ID=226)

Brass Nuts on a 600 pound steam system. What were they thinking.

~~~
jacquesm
Conspiracy nuts? You'd almost think they were purposefully replaced. If it was
designed that way than that's incompetence on a level that I'm not comfortable
with, you'd imagine _someone_ would have looked at that and said 'that's
stupid'.

~~~
thaumasiotes
The report is pretty interesting. The ship was not designed that way. The nuts
were installed as part of routine maintenance:

> By mid October, the _Iwo Jima_ had been operating in the Persian Gulf for
> approximately two months and had developed some leaks and other repair needs
> in the ship's 600 psi steam propulsion plant.

> The ship was granted permission to dock in Manama, Bahrain (a country on a
> group of islands in the Persian Gulf, between Qatar and Saudi Arabia) and
> conduct repairs. A variety of maintenance items were planned, including
> overhauling the main steam valve that supplies steam to one of the ship's
> turbine-driven electrical generators. This valve, incidentally, could also
> be considered a boiler-boundary stop valve. The overhaul of this large,
> rising-stem, bolted-bonnet gate valve was contracted to a local ship repair
> company, under the supervision of U.S. Government inspectors.

The mechanic conducting the repairs didn't know the requirements:

> Ultimately, what was found was that a series of mistakes and
> misunderstandings led to this accident.

> First, the mechanic wanted to replace the fasteners, but he did not have
> any. He also did not speak English very well. Allegedly, the mechanic asked
> one of the boiler room personnel for new nuts and bolts, and was given
> permission to look through the boiler room's spare parts bins. He selected
> parts that he thought would work.

And an inspection that might have caused the problem got lost in the shuffle:

> Secondly, with the case of the authorized inspection agency, it must be
> taken into consideration that there was a massive build-up of troops and
> ships in the Persian Gulf. It was assumed that the office was not staffed
> for the increased workload. Consequently, many inspections were not being
> conducted.

> And finally, the boiler room supervisor thought that one of his subordinates
> had conducted an inspection. Sadly, it was never concluded that an
> inspection had been made. If someone had conducted an inspection, possibly
> he was not familiar with fastener markings, nor the job specifications.

> The end result was that incorrect fasteners were chosen, and controlled
> inspections and testing were not fully accomplished.

Really, what surprises me the most about this is that the Navy apparently
doesn't repair its own ships!

~~~
rwmurrayVT
Even today there is a big push by the government for "checkpoints" to be
reduced. The government pushed repair and overhaul contracts to FFP. The
overhaul periods are going over schedule and they are trying to get ships out
of the yards "on-time".

I see it every day. I do critical alignment work that involves very tight
tolerances on the order of single digit arcseconds and single thousandths of
an inch. Do you think when MARMC or SWRMC comes out to check the work item
that they're verifying the alignment? That takes specialized equipment and
knowledge.

If they reduce 25% of the checkpoints, but alert the shipyard of which
checkpoints they are discarding don't you think that could cause some perverse
incentives? They'd be better off sending out a list of checkpoints and then
performing 50% of them without telling the shipyard.

Also of course the Navy doesn't repair all of it's own ships :) US Navy,
including MSC, and the CG have the majority of their repair work done at
General Dynamics, BAE Systems, Colanna's, and a whole slew of smaller
shipyards around the country.

~~~
thaumasiotes
> Also of course the Navy doesn't repair all of it's own ships :)

I can think of two systems with obvious benefits:

1\. The Navy repairs its own ships. The big benefits here are that you don't
have to let anyone else access -- or see -- the ships, and you can perform
repairs in the field to the extent that's possible. (For replacing nuts, it's
certainly possible.) This requires two types of training: knowledge of the
ship's specifications, and skill in performing repairs.

2\. The manufacturer repairs the ships. This makes it a lot more difficult to
receive repair, but it has similar secrecy benefits, and the manufacturer is
well positioned to know how to repair the ship and what is or isn't important.
You don't need to train anybody in anything as long as you have perfect, total
confidence in the manufacturer.

The Navy here picked the option of having the ship repaired in random foreign
shipyards where nobody knew the specs. That's a compromise that advantages
ease of getting repairs -- but you lose out on the idea that the person
performing repairs knows what constitutes good working order and what doesn't.
I struggle to see the advantages; you get more ease of repair _and_ more
reliability by doing it yourself.

~~~
rwmurrayVT
The Navy does do minor repairs at sea and pier-side at Naval Stations. The
majority of the work pier side is a continuation of an availability that
overran time. It's very common these days unfortunately..

When the ship comes into a commercial yard for availability it is stripped
down of confidential equipment. All of the radar/sonar/fire control/damage
control equipment comes off. The work done in the yard is primarily
mechanical. Deck inserts, foundation repair, lube oil system, oily waste, etc.
I will install the foundation for a SPQ-9b antenna, but I will never see the
antenna. At the end of the availability the combat systems engineers from
MARMC/SWRMC will come out, install the equipment, record all "installed"
alignment information, and program the systems.

The major new shipbuilders are rarely in the business of ship repair. They're
too busy building new ships. General Dynamics is probably one of the few in
the new build and repair business. When the ships come into a commercial
shipyard the work items are all specced out by the planning yard. That's
typically Huntington Ingalls in Mississippi or Bath Ironworks.

The days of foreign shipyards is all but over as far as I know. They brought
the USS Cole all the way back to the USA on the Blue Marlin. In fact, she went
to Pascagoula, but I don't know if it was to Huntington Ingalls or VT Halter.
I'd imagine HI.

------
vosper
I'm currently reading "Blind Man's Bluff" [0], which I think I found in an HN
comment, which, in addition to Thresher, also discusses the loss of the
Scorpion. The authors come pretty close to claiming that during the
investigation into Scorpion the Naval Ordnance Department covered up a known
problem that could cause a torpedo to explode inside the vessel. This
information may not have saved the boat (the problem was discovered just days
before the accident) but seems to have been deliberately withheld from the
investigation (and the documents have mysteriously been destroyed, somehow
without leaving an audit trail like they should have).

It's an interesting book, so far.

[0]
[https://smile.amazon.com/gp/product/B0089EMLGK](https://smile.amazon.com/gp/product/B0089EMLGK)

------
nkoren
Oh boy oh boy, I look forward to seeing this. The sinking of the Thresher has
been of interest to me ever since a party I attended 25 years ago, where a
very inebriated nuclear engineer apparently mistook my security clearance
(none whatsoever) or my identity (absolutely nobody), and randomly decided to
tell me the _real_ reason why the Thresher (which I'd barely even heard of,
previously) sunk.

The real reason, per his telling, was actually very close to the official
reason: the welds on the coolant intake failed. The coverup, however, was
this: the welds had actually been made using a new, then-highly-classified
technique (some variation of electron-beam welding, I think), which the grunts
doing weld inspection didn't have clearance to know about. So they were told
to skip the inspection on those particular welds. Which yielded predictable
results

I've spent the last 25 years wondering whether I'd accidentally stumbled
across something classified, or was just being bullshitted by a drunk at a
party. I look forward to finding out!

~~~
sitzkrieg
appropriate clearance is a prerequisite, but true need to know is the primary
thing of course. wonder what kind of world of shit they'd get into this day
and age.

stuff like fabrication still in use would likely be redacted anyway but we'll
hopefully see

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kryogen1c
For what its worth, I used to hold a clearance in the US nuclear navy and the
story on wikipedia is what I was always told. Im not sure there is anything of
value in the documents to be released, but im sure curious to find out.

~~~
Alupis
Sure, but a great deal of people hold clearances in and outside of the US
Military (over 1.5 million hold Top Secret according to Wikipedia) - doesn't
mean you were privy to information that was sensitive or you didn't need to
know.

Not saying there's anything more to the USS Thresher itself, just commenting
that a clearance doesn't automatically entitle you to all the information
about everything.

~~~
kryogen1c
Definitely true, but the article is about releasing unclassified documents

~~~
Alupis
> unclassified documents

That part seems odd from the article. If they were not classified, seems the
FOIA request would have had an easier time getting them released... or they
would have been released already. The Navy generates enough paperwork that
it's not reasonable to expect all unclassified documents to be released... but
these seem to have been a little more closely guarded than that. They are
releasing them in batches after they are reviewed too - which is usually part
of a declassification process.

I'd wager they are being unclassified as part of the release here.

~~~
vonmoltke
From the wording of the article

> The requested documents – more than 50 years old – should be unclassified
> and releasable by now under federal declassification rules

...

> “The plaintiff believes this document review is overly complex,” Eatinger
> said during the hearing. “When we filed this case, the records were in an
> automatic 50-year review project. We were told it would be complete in May
> 2019.”

these are (or should be) formerly classified documents. The Navy seems to be
dragging its feet with the mandatory declassification review. As Eatinger
said, it is well past time that the review should have completed and de- or
re-classified as appropriate.

~~~
kryogen1c
Eh. betting on incompetence over malignance is easy money. Could this be a
conspiracy? Sure thing. Subs do all kinds of very secretive things, and select
few subs have singular missions of international importance. More likely two
or three quality assurance & design failures occured and american sailors
died.

------
NegativeLatency
Context:
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Thresher_(SSN-593)#Sinking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Thresher_\(SSN-593\)#Sinking)

------
rdonohue
The article refers to the analysis of Bruce Rule. For those of you interested
in the loss of Thresher, Scorpion and especially the loss of K-129, I really
recommend you read his articles. See

[http://www.iusscaa.org/articles/brucerule/](http://www.iusscaa.org/articles/brucerule/)

The analysis of the loss of K-129 is especially interesting in that he posits
that the SOSUS data shows that it had a "dead mans" capability to launch its
missles.

See

[http://www.iusscaa.org/articles/brucerule/acoustic_detctions...](http://www.iusscaa.org/articles/brucerule/acoustic_detctions_of_the_loss_of_the_golf_class_ii.htm)

------
i_am_proteus
The currently-available reports[0-3] are a worthwhile read for anyone
interested. The evidence (given the silver braze joint failures on Thresher
and other boats) was there before the accident, but nobody connected the dots.

[0][https://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/USS%20THRESH...](https://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/USS%20THRESHER%20PT%201.pdf)

[1][https://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/USS%20THRESH...](https://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/USS%20THRESHER%20PT%202.pdf)

[2][https://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/USS%20THRESH...](https://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/USS%20THRESHER%20PT%203.pdf)

[3][https://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/USS%20THRESH...](https://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/USS%20THRESHER%20PT%204.pdf)

~~~
Someone1234
Assuming the silver braze joints played a role of course:

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Thresher_(SSN-593)#Alterna...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Thresher_\(SSN-593\)#Alternative_theory_of_the_sinking:_electrical_failure)

Pretty legit theory considering the mysterious lack of evidence of very loud
leaking onboard.

PS - Technically it doesn't matter which version of the story is true. The
safety improvements that resulted from the accident would have been the same
in both cases (since the reactor was still scram-ed, with possible steam
restriction, and ballast tanks still faulty).

------
protomyth
I cannot imagine the journey Lieutenant Raymond McCoole must have taken after
the disaster. He truly believe he could have save the ship if he was still on
it.

------
brudgers
Songs of _Thresher_

[http://www.oldsaltblog.com/2013/04/four-ballads-of-the-
uss-t...](http://www.oldsaltblog.com/2013/04/four-ballads-of-the-uss-
thresher/)

