
From encryption to darknets: As governments snoop, activists fight back - duck
http://arstechnica.com/business/the-networked-society/2012/02/from-encryption-to-darknets-as-governments-snoop-activists-fight-back.ars
======
CWuestefeld
_governments ... are actively trying to find out what is being said and
transmitted over their airwaves and networks._

Ahem... _their_ airwaves and networks? Perhaps part of the problem here is
that the governments believe that they own these communications channels. But
the airwaves and networks are like the seas and the atmosphere: some of it
happens to fall within a government's borders, but it's impossible to "own"
them.

~~~
stinkytaco
_They_ don't own them, but a compelling argument could be made that _we_ do.
We "own" the airwaves and networks because they traverse our property, either
personnel or collective. We use our agents -- the government -- to negotiate
on our behalf for the network's physical location and maintenance (through
right-of-way agreements or leasing of spectrum) and we expect that they are
run with the public interest in mind (free over the air programming, required
news broadcasts, etc.).

This is the reason it _infuriates_ me when telecoms start talking about the
"free market". There's nothing free about it, they are using public
thoroughfare and public airwaves to make money, essentially a state sponsored
monopoly. Their job is to operate in the public's interest.

~~~
CWuestefeld
_We "own" the airwaves and networks because they traverse our property, ... We
use our agents -- the government -- to negotiate on our behalf_

Our current conception of property rights does not recognize any ownership of
these resources. This is very similar to resources such as the atmosphere; and
rivers, lakes, and oceans. All these things are subject to "tragedy of the
commons" issues, as well as market failures due to externalized costs.

You're right that there's nothing free about the market in communications
spectrum. Because there is no recognized ownership, we must rely, as you note,
on the stewardship by our governmental agencies.

The problem with this, of course, is the inherent inefficiencies of
centralized control, as well as the errors created as a result of public
choice economics.

The Coase Theorem [1] demonstrates that if we were to recognize an ownership
interest in these resources, then we could expect that those problems could be
worked out by an actual market, where today there is none in operation.

[1] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coase_theorem>

~~~
wisty
> we could expect that those problems could be worked out by an actual market

Does that mean it's certain that an actual market will sort things out, or
simply that in one specific model (which is a gross simplification of how the
real world works), it's theoretically possible that these problems will be
solved?

------
tptacek
If you want a counterpoint to this, I have one:

<http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1690871>

The article touches on this towards the end.

~~~
etherael
Interesting perspective. If the alternative to pursuing tools in this area is
complete subjugation, perhaps some people are willing to bear the costs of
risking going against that. What use is your life if it's not really yours?
It's a position people at least ought to be able to choose for themselves.

~~~
wladimir
I think his argument is a very bad one. It starts with the usual "Adversaries
have more money and resources so it's better to just give up the fight". That
is no help unless you're already on the winning side and posturing.

While he certainly has a point that badly done circumvention tools give a
false feeling of safety, I don't think completely giving up is a solution
either.

No matter what, activists in such countries are already daring their lives
(through off-line activities). It is important to get some information out
there, through regimes' firewalls, and the only way might be through such
tools.

And only circumvention tools (such as TOR) that are public, open source, and
actively being used can be subject to scrutiny (otherwise it'd be a completely
academic exercise), which improves the security of the tools over the long
run.

Edit: Also, with the recent push for internet censorship even in western
countries it's starting to be pretty clear we need the tools here too.

~~~
tptacek
The response I hear you giving my argument sounds like the one I always hear:
"your argument is wrong because we need circumvention tools".

That's fallacious because our need for circumvention tools is irrelevant. You
are talking about moral imperatives and I'm talking about engineering.

The fact of the matter is, there is no way to build an assuredly secure
messaging system; every attempt to build cryptographically secured messaging
has failed, often multiple times. It isn't unlikely that every fielded
cryptographic system is broken right now, and we're just waiting to find out
how.

In the real world, resources matter. Nothing is perfect, so really we're
talking about a contest between two parties. Will the circumvention tool
authors figure out the flaws (that expose their messages, that allow attackers
to use technical flaws in their tools to mislead users into compromising
themselves, that allow attackers to easily pinpoint circumventing traffic,
&c), or inadvertently fix them by laying more countermeasures into their code?
Or will governments find those flaws first, and use them to turn the tools
against their users.

The governments we're talking --- Iran, Syria, China --- have zero scruples,
unlimited funds, and (if you're under the delusion that dictatorships have a
hard time finding technical talent or that money doesn't simply buy it like
anything else) demonstrated access to research and development skill in this
specific area.

It doesn't matter that we need these tools. I'm betting on the hostile
governments. If you think the dictatorships will win, you need to keep in mind
that the worst case _isn't_ "false sense of security". The worst case is, "run
this tool and a government computer somewhere silently puts your name on a
list".

~~~
wladimir
_I'm betting on the hostile governments._

Yes, that was very clear. I wish I could be amoral like you.

 _The worst case is, "run this tool and a government computer somewhere
silently puts your name on a list"_

Not always a problem. If enough people use the tool (which will be
automatically the case as more ends up in the firewall), it's impossible to
distinguish the people that use it for serious purposes (like anti-govt
activism) or less serious purposes (like trolling anonymously or watching
porn...).

~~~
tptacek
What's amoral is recognizing that dictatorships have a structural advantage in
the contest over circumvention tool vulnerabilities but aggressively papering
over that fact because it doesn't fit a congenial narrative about geeks saving
the world.

Even circumvention tool authors --- I'm guessing I know more of them than you?
--- will tell you that's not an uncommon pathology.

~~~
wladimir
Even with a structural disadvantage it may make sense to fight back. Yes, it's
risky. But whether it's worth it, is everyone's own (moral, not engineering)
choice.

And I don't have any illusion that just geeks can "save the world", but they
can at least provide support in some areas, such as allowing journalists to
communicate with activists.

So you think the world would be a better place without any circumvention
tools?

~~~
tptacek
I think you are militantly avoiding my point. Also, it's amusing that you
think we're going to continue to discuss this after you called me "amoral".

------
bootload
_"... Security experts agree that trying to protect communications on a non-
smartphone is basically a lost cause... I think there's perhaps more anonymity
in a $20 phone. ..."_

Well they'd say that wouldn't they. Old school tradecraft: Using an 'output-
feedback mode stream cipher' (Pontifex) and a cheap phone gives you a secure
and anonymous, 1 to many messaging system. It was designed specifically for
covert 'dead-drops' communication. There are a few caveats, but it's lo-tech &
bruce reckons it works ~ <http://www.schneier.com/solitaire.html>

~~~
pyre
I'm not quite understanding this. I understand what Pontifex/Solitaire is, but
how do they fit together with the cheap phone and dead-drops?

I could see using Pontifex to encrypt text messages, but how do dead-drops fit
into this? Communicating the location of the drops? Dead-dropping the phone
with encrypted messages on it?

~~~
bootload
_"... how do they fit together with the cheap phone and dead-drops? ..."_

If you don't want anyone to know you are sending a message to another person
you encrypt a message & leave it at a specific place with a marker. I assume
you get this. But if you give a call with an an encrypted message on any phone
you potentially give the game away. With a cheap $20 phone used minimally or
once, sending a hand encrypted message using Solitaire you get anonymity and
security.

~~~
pyre
Ok. But,

1\. Where does the one-to-many part come in?

2\. Is there any reason other than plausible deniability to use a cheap
cellphone vs. anything else (piece of paper, memory card, etc)?

------
kijin
> _until late last year, no Android phone offered full-disk encryption._

AFAIK full-disk encryption offers the best protection against offline attacks.
How much good would it do in a mobile phone that is almost always turned on?

~~~
moxie
You have to combine it with online access control protection:
<http://www.whispersys.com/screenlock.html>

But it also makes a data wipe easier to do securely, and gives you an
additional last minute option when you see trouble coming (just turn your
phone off).

