
Evading Airport Security - Garbage
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/evading_airport.html
======
pkfrank
I fundamentally don't understand the danger of "traditional" (box cutters,
etc.) weapons getting through airport security. I understand that we need to
continue testing for bombs and anything that can actually bring a plane down.

It would obviously be tragic and damaging for someone to attack "defenseless"
passengers with "traditional" weapons, but -- in my eyes -- it's not terribly
different from a random attack in the street or a shopping mall.

Airline personnel and the typical cohort of passengers would simply never let
a terrorist take the cockpit, which effectively removes that entire element of
danger. The only super-substantial potential damage stems from an explosive of
some sort, not a box-cutter, knife, or anything of the sort.

The cost of TSA (direct and indirect through delays, etc.) is immense, and
truly does feel like security theater at this point. I'd be all-for doubling
down on bomb-sniffing dogs, behavior analysts, and all that; but this apparent
focus on "traditional" weapons seems totally asymmetric to the risk it
presents.

~~~
tokenadult
The original 9/11 attack showed how simple traditional weapons could be used
to leverage using four whole airplanes as nontraditional weapons, three of
them with devastating effect, all of them with lethal effect. I think
Schneier's point is correct that spending the same amount of money on
intelligence, investigations, and emergency response would keep us safer than
screening what innocent passengers bring on to airplanes, but current
procedures for airport security are still a reaction to 9/11 as it happened
then. I look forward to the day when we dial back airport security procedures
to the new reality of reinforced cockpit doors and passengers who will fight
would-be hijackers to save their lives.

~~~
aestra
9/11 was different. People cooperated because that was protocol at the time
for a plane hijacking. Nobody expected them to use the plane as a weapon with
no regard to their own lives. This was an unprecedented attack.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aircraft_hijacking](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aircraft_hijacking)

"Before the September 11, 2001 attacks, most hijackings involved the plane
landing at a certain destination, followed by the hijackers making negotiable
demands. Pilots and flight attendants were trained to adopt the "Common
Strategy" tactic, which was approved by the FAA. It taught crew members to
comply with the hijackers' demands, get the plane to land safely and then let
the security forces handle the situation. Crew members advised passengers to
sit quietly in order to increase their chances of survival. They were also
trained not to make any 'heroic' moves that could endanger themselves or other
people. The FAA realized that the longer a hijacking persisted, the more
likely it would end peacefully with the hijackers reaching their goal.[12] The
September 11 attacks presented an unprecedented threat because it involved
suicide hijackers who could fly an aircraft and use it to delibrately crash
the airplane into buildings for the sole purpose to cause massive casualties
with no warning, no demands or negotiations, and no regard for human life. The
"Common Strategy" approach was not designed to handle suicide hijackings, and
the hijackers were able to exploit a weakness in the civil aviation security
system. Since then, the "Common Strategy" policy in the USA and the rest of
the world to deal with airplane hijackings has no longer been used."

There was also a change in protocol after the Columbine High School massacre.
In that attack the two were able to shoot victims while the police were
outside setting up a perimeter. Now as a direct result of that attack police
actively charge an active shooter, this is called Immediate Action Rapid
Deployment. This is said to have saved dozens of lives in Virgina Tech alone.

~~~
Crito
Remember that _half_ of 9/11/2001 was different. By 10:03AM, the solution was
designed/implemented/ _successfully tested_.

~~~
khuey
well, 25% really.

~~~
Crito
I was thinking roughly in terms of hours in the day, but yes.

------
logfromblammo
It may be my libertarded paranoia, but I think airport security screening in
the last decade has been largely about diverting public money into private
hands.

Metal detectors are so cheap now that they can be placed in urban public
schools, and every airport already has plenty of them. Pass-through x-ray
luggage scanners are likewise already nearly ubiquitous. Automated gas
chromatographs, microwave passenger scanners, and x-ray backscatter passenger
scanners--those things are new, big, and shiny, and no one responsible for
budgeting knows how much they should cost.

Meanwhile, Schneier repeatedly and convincingly argues that the measures that
we are paying through the nose for them to use are worthless to increase the
physical security of the airplanes and their passengers. But the TSA already
bought them. It doesn't matter if they work. They have them: they use them.

All that remains now is to justify the budget for the labor force. The ID
checker, that's a job. The pat-down guy, that's a job. The guys that stand in
front of the tablet app that digitally flips a coin to see if you get your
hands swabbed and chromatographed, apparently that's three jobs. The guy who
stands at the exit to make sure no wrong-way traffic gets through, that's a
job for every exit.

Except they're proposing that the exit guard jobs be replaced with expensive
machines now, too. Give it another few years and you'll have DNA sequencers
and single-use biological test chips involved somehow. Perhaps after the next
airborne pathogen scare, they will be introduced to reassure passengers that
no one on their plane has ebolaria or influengue or tubercuningitis or
whatever.

Conspiracy hypotheses are easy if you just follow the money.

~~~
dmix
This is neoliberalism 101, you don't even have to bring up "military-
industrial complex". The state is increasingly working with industry (pseudo-
privatization), in return the industry increasingly influences state policy.
The system keeps working as long as contracts keep going to a small group of
big companies (the only ones capable of "working the system") and as long as
the big companies can keep influencing politics.

It's simple math considering the "state" is just a collection of politicians
easily influenced by fear-driven populism, media, money, nepotism, and their
old private school friends. And on the other side there are extremely powerful
billion-dollar defense contractors.

------
chimeracoder
I mentioned this as a comment on the original HN discussion about Booth's
article
([https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6742780](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6742780)).

The _TSA itself_ has admitted that terrorist threats to aviation are
nonexistent: [http://tsaoutofourpants.wordpress.com/2013/10/17/tsa-
admits-...](http://tsaoutofourpants.wordpress.com/2013/10/17/tsa-admits-in-
leaked-doc-no-evidence-of-terrorist-plots-against-aviation-in-us/)

Even if we ignore the independent investigations from third parties, what more
evidence could we ask for that the TSA is ineffective and superfluous, if not
its own admission?

------
swalkergibson
The irony is that the majority of the terrorist attacks on planes in recent
memory have been stopped by vigilant passengers on the plane itself. Since
9/11, using the plane as the weapon is no longer an option. The passengers are
going to fight back, without question, a la Flight 93. Additionally,
reinforcing and locking the cockpit doors post 9/11 has put a stop to physical
takeover of the aircraft, along with an expanded air marshal program. Bag
through an x-ray and walk through a metal detector should be more than
sufficient. At the airport in Jakarta, Indonesia, that is how it works.

Of course, the problem is that we now live in a fear driven society where the
bad people are literally around every corner and each time we step onto an
airplane we are taking our own life into our hands.

------
twoodfin
I typically think Schneier is too cavalier about "security theater", but in
this case I agree completely. On the other hand, I don't think that means
airport security should be drastically scaled back: There are probably 10x as
many dumb potential attackers as smart ones, and it makes sense to be
eliminate the easy avenues for the dumb ones while you concentrate other
resources on the smart ones. It's also important not to ignore both the
intelligence value of security checks as well as their potential forensic
value in the event of a successful attack.

TSA actually seems to be making an effort to get smarter about its screening.
Trusted passenger programs are expanding dramatically, and I expect the
overall burden on the traveling public to decline over time.

~~~
wtvanhest
> There are probably 10x as many dumb potential attackers as smart ones, and
> it makes sense to be eliminate the easy avenues for the dumb ones while you
> concentrate other resources on the smart ones. It's also important not to
> ignore both the intelligence value of security checks as well as their
> potential forensic value in the event of a successful attack.

This is the point that is always missed when talking about "security theater".

Smart and practiced people can make anything look easy. An attack on an
airplane is simply too challenging for the vast majority of people to execute.
Is it impossible? No, but almost nothing is impossible.

Making an attack difficult on a plane also eliminates the majority of
severally mentally unstable from carrying it out. You can kill 300+ people in
one instant, it is impossible to stop the truly motivated and capable (ultra
tail risk) attacker, but it is crucial to stop the rest of the tail from
casually taking down an airliner.

~~~
Amadou
_An attack on an airplane is simply too challenging for the vast majority of
people to execute. Is it impossible? No, but almost nothing is impossible._

I don't think you are making the point you intend to make - the very fact that
pulling off a successful attack is inherently difficult is what stops those
people, not any security agency.

Same thing with attacks anywhere else. For example: The Times Square bomber
couldn't even build a working bomb despite two college degrees and the 2007
London & Glasgow Airport bombers couldn't figure it out either, for their swan
song they put propane tanks in their jeep cherokee, lit themselves on fire and
drove into a barricade in front of the airport, despite one of them having a
doctor's education.

In all of its existence, the TSA has never detained someone who was later
convicted on terrorism charges, despite the _vast_ lowering of the standard of
evidence for such charges since 9/11\. The fact that we've seen so few attacks
on "softer" targets (roughly 3 civilians have been killed in islamic-extremist
attacks on US soil since 9/11) means that the size of the actual threat is
practically zero - including the fools.

~~~
wtvanhest
There was a shooting at LA just weeks ago. Lots of less than spectacular
events have occurred on soft targets over the past 10 years. Each of those may
have easily converted in to a more spectacular attack.

The marathon bombers were targeting the marathon for the message. They may
have choosen to use an airliner to make that message had it not been for TSA.
We don't know. There just isn't quality enough data on either side to remove
airport security.

~~~
Amadou
_There was a shooting at LA just weeks ago._

You mean Paul Anthony Ciancia who was pissed off about all the excessive
security and deliberately targeted TSA agents hoping to commit suicide-by-cop?

 _Lots of less than spectacular events have occurred on soft targets over the
past 10 years. Each of those may have easily converted in to a more
spectacular attack._

Citing all attacks anywhere as justification for the TSA is a recipe for the
unlimited ratcheting up of security. It is an enormous leap in logic to assume
somebody with a semi-auto rifle or a crock-pot bomb is capable of getting them
past pre-911 airport security and also doing something effective with it once
they have. An attack on an airplane is simply too challenging for the vast
majority of people to execute.

------
pinaceae
airport security is not built to prevent evil geniuses to act out a brilliant
act of terror macguyver style.

airport security is there to prevent someone to walk onto a plane carrying a
boxcutter knife - which they failed to prevent at 9/11.

it's to weed out the idiots, mentally unstable, etc. the times square bomber
types.

it relies on underpaid, undereducated personnel. because it exists in reality,
which means it is constrained by cost. it also relies on chance and
probability. for every post here about sneaking stuff through you have posts
of people being held in interrogation or even denied flying triggered by minor
details.

and yeah, how many security researchers would post if they got caught?
survivorship bias at play.

~~~
mikeash
Boxcutters are no longer effective tools of terror on airliners. They ceased
to be so on the morning of 9/11/2001\. Why try to stop them now?

~~~
twoodfin
I think you're underestimating the havoc that a group of well-trained
individuals armed with knives could cause in the middle of a transcontinental
flight even with a locked, reinforced cabin door.

I agree it's not as clear cut as a ban on firearms or explosives, but it seems
like a sensible restriction to me, worth enforcing as best we can.

~~~
mikeash
Maybe I am. The way I envision such an attack, they pull out their knives and
start threatening or cutting people. Then the rest of the passengers, knowing
that they will die if they don't stop this, dogpile on the attackers and
subdue them. They then tie them to their seats with whatever is handy and hand
them over to the police when they land. Where does that go wrong?

~~~
ugexe
When they pull their knives but immediately grab a child and threaten their
life. Who is going to be the one to start this dog pile but also cause the
demise of a child?

~~~
mikeash
Passengers today know that everyone on the airplane is going to die if they
don't act. That child is already dead if they don't act. People with nothing
to lose are extremely dangerous, and that's what any hijacked passenger is
now. Sun Tzu says never to back your enemy into a corner with no way out. 9/11
only worked because the passengers thought they had a way out. Nobody thinks
that now.

------
Ryoku
At this point, airport security is there to make people feel safe. That's it.

Do you really think a plane full of people who know they will die unless they
do something about it, will let a terrorist get away with it? On the other
hand, do you really think so many people would have continued to fly as often
as they did before 9/11 without some sort of reassurance that something is
being done to prevent highjacks?

Terrorism can be anywhere, and it does not need an airplane to happen. Now, if
terrorists are not going to use planes to cause terror then you should be
thinking on the next thing that's going to be used. There are many uses for
perceived security and not all of them involve keeping people safe.

------
jheriko
"I think the answer is simple: airplane terrorism isn't a big risk. There are
very few actual terrorists, and..."

This is very true. Terrorism isn't a very serious problem or threat - it just
got disproportionate attention from a combination of 9/11 and ignorance of the
American public. I almost hate to say it, but it is sadly true.

I've 'evaded' airport security a few times - and they give me extra hassle for
being an arab. I have nothing against profiling - even if it wastes my time it
is /sensible/ and not racist at all.

By far the worst case is the one time I turned up at an airport suited and
booted and looking especially white. They found the liquids in my hand luggage
that I accidentally left there, and let me keep them.

Its all for show, the idea that a government is in control and secure when
they make 101 security fuckups like meeting in the same place regularly (!).

If I was in anyway inclined to be a terrorist the result would be devastating
- I'm glad the people we are dealing with in that regard are exceptionally
rare and stupid (stupid enough to try what they do... as well as stupid enough
to not have anything like an organised or well prepared strategy).

------
hawkharris
Trying to stop a terrorist plot with TSA security checks is like trying to
prevent a divorce by hiding your wife's car keys.

It's indicative of a shortsighted, reactionary way of thinking that glosses
over the nuances of the problem.

~~~
venomsnake
If you want to really worry - think about all the Iraqui and Afgani insurgents
that for the last 10 years have waged war against US and survived. They have
worldclass IED making capabilities and it is not that hard to smuggle them in
US to begin ground warfare.

------
yeukhon
Security is hard. Physical security is hard too. Just a thought: you can stuff
anything you want in your big suitcase. So if someone wants to set an alarm
bomb with some destructive chemical it is possible, no? Though I am in favor
of airport security - even if false sense is better than zero. If it can
prevent idiots or unstable from carrying a steel knife we should. Yes, you
can't prevent more major terrorist attack easily - one could just drive a van
full of gas and explode in the lobby if one wishes to do so - but we still
need that basic security if it is doable.

The truth is we as a civilization tends to blame all the time. When we fear
danger we blame the government not doing enough and when we find inconvenience
we ask for less protection. I see no one has yet attempt to provide a better
solution - only complaint.

Is TSA making people waiting? I often get to the airport two hours early so I
think the waiting is fine. Is it embarrasing when someone stops you and scans
you? I have been stopped before for carrying a coin in my pocket before going
through the scanner. It's okay. Everyone is too busy to get through.

The last point is last time when Schneier talked about the dry ice bomb he was
wrong it being harmless. He just won't admit he is wrong.

~~~
darkarmani
> If it can prevent idiots or unstable from carrying a steel knife we should.

Should we spend hundreds of millions and molest millions of passengers to
prevent this?

> Is TSA making people waiting? I often get to the airport two hours early so
> I think the waiting is fine.

What is the cost in lost productivity of this? We are spending money to lost
productivity to prevent a knives on planes??

~~~
yeukhon
> Should we spend hundreds of millions and molest millions of passengers to
> prevent this?

And talk about job creation too. Maybe. Often we use statistics. Well, we
don't have good statistics or can't do experiment on whether or not the chance
of surviving is higher or lower with/out the TSA screening. Can you?

> What is the cost in lost productivity of this? We are spending money to lost
> productivity to prevent a knives on planes??

Losing how much time? An extra 10-20 minutes on average? You understand why
terrorists like to plot terrorism on airplane right? Because we can't control
an airplane once it is flying. On the ground you can run away or hope a rescue
unit come to you in 5 minutes. So losing 20 minutes on average (which you
should plan ahead for any air travel ANYWAY), versus keeping a sharp knife
away from the mentally unstable passenger next to you is probably a good
thing.

Maybe the chance is very low, near zero. When that comes, your life might be
over and that 20 minutes is negligible.

Some people are happy to trade 20 minutes away but I am not.

~~~
Xylakant
> Some people are happy to trade 20 minutes away but I am not.

Do you step out of your flat each day, take a cab, bus, walk short distances?
Cross the road?

The death risk in all of theses activities is many times higher than dying on
an airplane because a mentally unstable passenger manages to stabs you with a
knife he deliberately brought on board.

~~~
yeukhon
I already said the risk is nearly zero. Read it carefully.

Yet, if there is a risk, even if it is at 0.1%, precaution is required. And
when this impacts the lives of hundreds of passengers, the risk is more than
just me dying on the street tomorrow.

\-- edit --

whoever downvote is probably a kid.

~~~
PeterisP
"a risk exists" does not really imply "precaution is required" \- there is a
risk that you'll be fatally struck by a lightning tomorrow, but it doesn't
imply that you need to stay indoors as a precaution.

"Nearly zero" does not equal other "nearly zero" \- most "nearly zero" effects
are with very, very different nearness to zero. Me dying in a traffic accident
tomorrow is a near-zero chance, and me dying of a lightning strike tomorrow is
a near-zero chance, but they are very different chances.

The sole fact of you mentioning 0.1% indicates a problem with such comparisons
- risk of dying in any terrorist attack is orders of magnitude different than
0.1% and thus deserves uncomparably smaller attention than a real 0.1% risk.

Your short trip from home to airport deserves more precautions than terrorists
on the planes. Even taking into account 'hundreds or passengers', the risk is
uncomparably much smaller than you simply dying on the street tomorrow -
that's how the numbers work out in reality, even if it may feel otherwise
emotionally.

------
thisiswrong
Yup - 9/11 has been used, along with its many other uses, to create fear and
sell 'security'.

Follow the money and you will find that the same 'security' profiteers are
surprisingly linked to events surrounding 9/11:

[http://www.thenewamerican.com/economy/commentary/item/3938-g...](http://www.thenewamerican.com/economy/commentary/item/3938-getting-
rich-from-the-tsa-naked-body-scanners)

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9/11_Truth_movement](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9/11_Truth_movement)

Just look at how easy it is to profit from and sell false 'security' in war-
torn Iraq: [http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/may/02/fake-bomb-
detector...](http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/may/02/fake-bomb-detector-
conman-jailed)

------
scrrr
Don't they also use screening by looking at passengers? Don't know about USA
but in my country there's usually a few security people just looking at the
people who go through the security check. I suppose they are trained to see
nervous people behaving oddly and so forth.

~~~
AlisdairSH
The TSA tried this and failed miserably...
[http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/11/13/21428350-...](http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/11/13/21428350-gao-1-billion-
tsa-behavioral-screening-program-slightly-better-than-chance)

[http://www.alamogordonews.com/alamogordo-
opinion/ci_24584454...](http://www.alamogordonews.com/alamogordo-
opinion/ci_24584454/editorial-tsas-1-billion-program-fails-hike-security)

------
dspeyer
The videos are short on details, and I'm a little sceptical. A lot of it seems
to involve removing Lithium from Lion batteries. I'm told that can be done
with wire cutters, but I don't think you can buy those inside the sterile
zone.

~~~
girvo
Read the links Scheiner posted in the OP; apparently Lithium batteries is a
really new thing, only the last couple of months.

------
kunil
Funnier thing is mall securities, you can't bring a small knife into mall but
you can buy a chainsaw

~~~
derleth
> Funnier thing is mall securities, you can't bring a small knife into mall
> but you can buy a chainsaw

Can you fuel up (or charge up) a chainsaw in a mall? How dangerous is a
chainsaw when it can't be turned on?

And that's assuming small knives really are banned from malls. Do they really
care if you have a pocketknife on your belt? Maybe things are different where
I live (Montana).

------
executive
what happens if a terrorist tries to open the door or an emergency exit window
in-flight?

~~~
BorgHunter
Absolutely nothing, except maybe panicking some passengers. Planes are
pressurized, and the exits all open inward. It's not possible for a human
being to overcome that force.

[http://www.askthepilot.com/questionanswers/exits/](http://www.askthepilot.com/questionanswers/exits/)

~~~
onemanshow33
The odds of someone EVER actually opening the door mid flight are ridiculous.
Plus how many people would stop that from happening once they knew was
occurring - I know I'd be one of the first people up and trying to get on top
of that person to prevent that from happening - and I know I'm not alone on
that thought.

------
willvarfar
Biological and chemical agents are perhaps the big next threat?

------
girvo
Well, guess this guy is now on the No Fly list.

~~~
cheald
Bruce Schneier is and has been one of the most outspoken critics of the TSA
for years. This article isn't going to change any three-letter agency's
opinion of him.

~~~
girvo
Not Scheiner, should've been more clear. I meant the person he is writing
about :)

------
pearjuice
>the answer is simple: airplane terrorism isn't a big risk

It will be a massive wake up call to America (and the rest of the world, too)
when Wikileaks publishes the reports of how 9/11 was a victim simulation[0].
Can't wait.

[0]
[http://septemberclues.info/vicsims.htm](http://septemberclues.info/vicsims.htm)

~~~
aaronem
Yes, a "victim simulation", of course -- carried out at the ultimate behest of
the Reticulans, no doubt.

~~~
pearjuice
Instead of providing such edgy commentary (what even are Reticulans?), care to
explain why they clearly decided to Photoshop pictures of the victims? Why
relatives (which have never spoken up) did not supply the media with better
pictures other than pixelated 80px by 80px frames? How come if there is more
than one picture of a victim, they all look the same? This is are only basic
questions you should be able to answer if you think 9/11 is real, I am not
even taking into account all the other discrepancies encircling 9/11.

I know, it is very hard to cope with the fact that you got tricked into
believing something for years on end and find out that all of it was one big
lie - a set up.

