
How to build companies that matter - teej
http://radar.oreilly.com/2009/03/lean-startup.html
======
euroclydon
"And here's where working on something that matters to you more than money is
critical. When you're committed to something larger than yourself, every
minute counts."

"our business plan: that we could get people to pay real money for virtual
clothes"

Virtual clothes??? THAT really matters? THAT is larger than yourself?

~~~
eries
If your question is sincere, read <http://bit.ly/q2Sp>

~~~
idontgetit
By selling "virtual clothes", you're going to reverse "America's declining
social capital" and revive democracy?

~~~
eries
I'm sorry you can't see the connection. It does require more than reading the
subtitle, though. If anyone is interested in a serious conversation on this
topic, feel free to get in touch. There's a lot more at stake than virtual
clothes.

~~~
idontgetit
Sorry, I don't have the time to read an entire book to understand the master
plan behind a bubbly-looking startup. Surely you can give us a brief summary
of what's "at stake" beyond virtual clothes.

------
jwilliams
I think this is one area where the economic crisis can work for startups.

Previously, the market was so hot it was difficult to grow organically. There
was so much competition and so much heat that you felt compelled to "go big"
as quickly as possible. You had to launch bigger, quicker and with more
features or somebody else was going to come along with millions in
technology/marketing/etc and stomp on you.

Right now we have a market that favours growly organically and slowly...
Perhaps towards something that is a more refined end result. You can grow your
customer base slowly, and listen more to what your customers want and need.

All just my conjecture really - But I hope this will turn up some really
interesting results over the next 12-24 months.

~~~
akeefer
The company I'm with was founded literally right after September 11th, then
funded in early 2002; basically at the nadir of the original tech bubble. But
it had exactly the effect that you've described; there was no hurry to make a
land grab, and far less pressure to try to get big quick to score a fast exit
for the VCs. Starting in a down market gave us time to actually build
something real and valuable and to build the company for the long haul instead
of having to worry about the short term. It also let us hire an all-star team
that would have been hard to assemble in boom years (and, incidentally, the
most recent downturn has again made hiring easier for us).

The downside is that you'll get a comparatively lower valuation for the same
amount of funding, meaning the founders will retain less of the company, but
that company will probably have a higher probability of being worth something
significant. So as a founder, it's still a net win.

------
martythemaniak
Maybe I'm in an extra-cynical mood today, but its hard to take advice about
building companies that matter from someone that makes a cut-down version of
Second Life.

~~~
snitko
I agree. I'd also say, that all these advices about building companies that
matter apply to you only if you care about it. We all know businesses that
sell crap successfully. It's just that they can't proudly say "We love what
we've built". But, well, at least they've got rich. Maybe they are working on
what they really love now, having all those money.

------
rokhayakebe
How come all this has to lead to "at IMVU....". I keep seeing this pattern
from the company.

~~~
tonystubblebine
In order to sell, offer value first. There's nothing wrong with that. He's
doing a good job too, because I went from never having heard of him to having
heard about him from four trusted sources in the matter of a month. All the
sources were passing on the material he was providing rather than his company.

------
rohitkhare
The scariest/most exhilirating challenge is one he plucked right from the
running monologue in my head: "is our company vision really the path to a
brave new world, or just a delusion?" <http://bit.ly/bdS0>

------
ericlavigne
"In fact, it wasn't the risky part of our original vision that had to change.
It turns out that people really will pay good money for virtual goods. By
discovering the other problems with our concept early, we were able to
preserve our larger long-term vision. And, most importantly, we were then able
to prove that it could work."

This was a big cliffhanger. I was very disappointed that the article ended
without discussing "the other problems" and how they were discovered.

------
dpnewman
very succinct ... brings together a lot of current thinking in tight read. i
think it's well said - must've been a great experience also to see adaptations
finally work to bring vision to life.

