
The Dream of Enlightenment by Anthony Gottlieb review - pepys
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/oct/05/dream-enlightenment-anthony-gottlieb-review
======
pmoriarty
This article has little to do with the clickbait title of philosophy being
over. It's mostly just a review of a book of revisionist history of
Enlightenment-era Western philosophy.

~~~
sverige
The book apparently attacks the popular idea that philosophy is over.

And that word "revisionist," used so frequently to dismiss what one thinks
they already know -- how useful is that word in advancing anything but
maintenance of the status quo?

------
bobthechef
Very clickbaity. I agree, of course, that philosophy isn't dead, though people
may have become dead to it, and that's the problem. Philosophical questions
always surface, regardless of whether the person who forms the question or
makes a claim in that regard is aware that he is treading on philosophical
ground. Of course, without the awareness and without the education, his
philosophy is bound to be mediocre and, if it isn't blatant bullshit, a rehash
of something previously explored. Those who do not study philosophy are bound
to repeat its mistakes.

I haven't read these books, but if the article is correct, then I find the
grandiose claims that everyone's gotten all of these major philosophers wrong
over the lat 2500 years (not just one or two) and that Gottlieb has properly
comprehended all of them is suspect, at the very least. Worth noting is that
people debate over what a given philosopher means by X all the time. While
it's fine to say that a philosopher has been misunderstood in some way for
centuries (and here, Aquinas stands as an example; the existential Thomists of
the early 20th century made just that claim about the so-called principle of
existence), the kind of broad claims being made here raise eyebrows. To
understand just one philosopher thoroughly (not counting the research that
goes into expanding their theories) can occupy a philosopher for a lifetime.
There was one quite well known philosopher who said that he only truly "got"
Aristotle in his 50s.

------
calpaterson
I read the original book about 8 years ago (which is still 6 years after it
was published). Highly recommend it as a very readable but still fairly deep
introduction to philosophy in antiquity.

Bit blown away that he's finally published the second part.

------
misotaur
"where Socrates postulates an ideal world of which our own reality is but a
shadow" I think he means Plato.

~~~
SnakePlissken
It's an understandable mistake (if it was one), as Plato wrote most of his
works as dialogues between Socrates and other Athenians (including Republic,
where the Allegory of the Cave originates).

From another angle, the paragraph in reference is a summary of what the
article's author believes the author of the book being reviewed alleges is the
macro-narrative in regards to philosophy as presented today and understood by
philosophy-averse intellectuals. As the article-author explicitly mentions
Plato later in the article (in reference to an earlier work by the book-author
extolling Ancient Greek philosophy) and distinguishes between the ideas of
Plato and Aristotle, it seems impossible that either author doesn't realize
the Cave isn't Socrates' idea. Although sloppy, it seems that the article-
author is simply implying that there is so little familiarity with the full
breadth and depth of philosophy that the average individual with passing
knowledge of the ancients might know of the Allegory of the Cave/theory of the
Forms/etc but would wrongly attribute it to Socrates as he is the mouthpiece
in Republic.

~~~
sverige
Well, wait a minute. The Eleusinian mysteries were ancient by the time that
Socrates was mentoring Plato. Plato was just the first to write this stuff
down. How do we know that Plato wasn't reporting what Socrates taught him?
And, if true, how can we be sure that Socrates didn't get the idea from
someone else?

[1]
[https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eleusinian_Mysteries](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eleusinian_Mysteries)

~~~
hyperpape
There is a lot of work that traces developments in Plato's ideas, and a rough
consensus that some dialogues are more Socratic and others reflect Plato more
([http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato/#HisSocEarMidLatDia](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato/#HisSocEarMidLatDia)).
There's a mixture of stylometrics, contemporary accounts, and other arguments
that are used to try and assign responsibility. It's an inherently imprecise
project, and I didn't do much ancient philosophy so I can't tell you much
about it, but it seemed sensible when I took courses on Plato.

------
M_Grey
The only lasting source of enlightenment seems to come from science, and “The
philosophy of science is as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds.”
-Feynman

~~~
pmoriarty
I would be very interested to know how much Feynman actually knew about the
philosophy of science. My guess would be not very much at all.

Feynman, like some other famous scientists, gave in to the temptation of
pontificating on subjects he knew very little about. Philosophy in general was
something he seemed to have contempt for, without knowing much about it. I'd
take his pronouncements on it with a huge grain of salt.

~~~
tim333
Feynman was pretty sophisticated philosophically when it came to scientific
matters. I'm not sure he studied the philosophical literature much partly
because a lot of it is kind of bad.

See him on why questions for example -
[http://lesswrong.com/lw/99c/transcript_richard_feynman_on_wh...](http://lesswrong.com/lw/99c/transcript_richard_feynman_on_why_questions/)

Or his talk on cargo cult science -
[http://calteches.library.caltech.edu/51/2/CargoCult.htm](http://calteches.library.caltech.edu/51/2/CargoCult.htm)

Or the discussion of quantum mechanics in QED.

I've yet to see similar clarity from a philosopher of science. I think the
philosophers annoyed him because they weren't very good but self important in
spite of that.

~~~
pmoriarty
Thank you for these.

On the "why questions" video from the first link, which I've seen before,
Feynman's answer only shows that he's used to answering the kind of question
asked of him, regarding why magnets repel, and similar questions involving
physics.

Yes, he realizes that there are larger issues involved in such questions and
their answers, but he steers all the answers and questions back to physics,
which to him are the more interesting answers and questions.

Nowhere is there any evidence that his own answers are informed by any kind of
reading of philosophical literature or familiarity with the world of
philosophy.

Regarding the "Cargo Cult Science" essay. In it Feynman states _" even today I
meet lots of people who sooner or later get me into a conversation about
UFO’s, or astrology, or some form of mysticism, expanded consciousness, new
types of awareness, ESP, and so forth. And I’ve concluded that it’s not a
scientific world."_

His interest in the question of what is and isn't science, and his answer to
it are some of the central things that philosophy of science studies. No
amount of physics experiments are going to give you any insight in to that
question. To attempt to answer it, as Feynman did, is to practice philosophy
of science, which Feynman himself in the original quote which started this
thread decries as useless.

The whole essay is really an attempt to engage in philosophy of science, but
without any evidence that Feynman is familiar with the field. The result is
interesting both because Feynman is an entertaining and capable writer, and
because of his obvious familiarity with the practice of science and its
ideals. But it's not nearly as insightful as it could have been had he
actually undertaken to study the subject academically. It's really an opinion
piece aimed at explaining in very general ways some of the practices and
ideals of science as Feynman sees them to laymen and other scientists, and
almost a polemic on scientific integrity.

Also, it should be pointed out that the philosophy of science studies a lot
more than just the questions addressed in this essay. They are important
questions, but there's a lot more about science that is philosophically
interesting.

Regarding your point about the clarity of Feynman's writing compared to those
of philosophers: it's sadly all too true that way too many of them are very
poor and obscure writers compared to Feynman. On the other hand, many others
are very clear (if usually pretty dry).

When there is lack of clarity, some of it is due to lack of writing ability or
interest in clarity (or even wilful obscurity), but in other cases it's due to
the specialized knowledge or terminology that is required to understand it --
much like that which would be required to understand a paper in an academic
physics journal. If you attempt to tackle such a paper without a great deal of
academic physics under your belt, you are likely to be confused. So it is with
philosophy, where you'd be a lot better off with some philosophy courses under
your belt before you try to make sense of much of it.

~~~
tim333
>But it's not nearly as insightful as it could have been had he actually
undertaken to study the subject academically.

I'm curious to how it could have been improved by insights from academic
philosophy. I'm not expert but glanced at the Wikipedia entry on philosophy of
science and find it hard to see what you'd go with.

~~~
pmoriarty
It's been a while since I took a philosophy of science course myself, so I
can't point you to any specific resources, except to encourage you to take a
course in the subject yourself if you are interested.

Just to give you a taste of what to expect though: imagine a lot of very smart
people considering the sorts of issues Feynman is raising, but devoting whole
books to them, trying to cover these issues from every conceivable angle and
taking in to account all of the other points of view on these issues (not just
those of Feynman himself or some astrologers or psychics, as Feynman did).
Then there are the books in response to those books, trying to be just as
thorough in answering the questions the the first author wrote about, and
seeing if there's something they missed or any other constructive way to think
about them, and so on.

In short, there's an entire academic field that studies these questions and
many other related ones, that isn't going to be covered by a little essay by
any single scientist -- no matter how brilliant he was. He didn't have the
final word, and not even much of a word in the first place, considering his
lack of study of and engagement with the field.

Feynmann's own words in the essay on "Cargo Cult Science" are salient here:

 _" It’s a kind of scientific integrity, a principle of scientific thought
that corresponds to a kind of utter honesty--a kind of leaning over backwards.
For example, if you’re doing an experiment, you should report everything that
you think might make it invalid--not only what you think is right about it"_

It's telling that Feynmann does not apply this principle of integrity to the
views he expresses in his own essay. He does not, even for a moment, write
about what could possibly be wrong with his point of view. But such
questioning is quite common in the philosophy of science. They don't stop with
dogmas and ideals regarding what science ought to be, as Feynman does. They go
further and question them, and much else besides.

~~~
abecedarius
In "Cargo Cult Science" Feynman showed a lot of insight into the current
replication crisis decades before it blew up -- at least, that's how it looks
to me as an outsider. Did any philosopher do better? (Ahead of time, again.)
It wouldn't surprise me, and I'd like to check out their work, but from my own
reading I can't think of anyone.

By "do better" I mean in an equivalent few pages to advise a new graduate
about how to discover things that are true, as a focus sometimes at odds with
advancing their career, because that's what Feynman's graduation speech was
about.

~~~
pmoriarty
_" Did any philosopher do better? ... By "do better" I mean in an equivalent
few pages to advise a new graduate about how to discover things that are
true"_

Philosophy of science is less about telling scientists how to behave than
trying to understand what actually happens when scientists do what they do,
what science accomplishes on a theoretical level, what the difference between
science and non-science is, etc.

It's less of "here's how to get to the truth" and more of "can science get at
the truth at all?" or "to what degree can science get at the truth?" or (much
like Feynman's essay) "what makes these particular actions or beliefs
'scientific'?"

Karl Popper's criterion of "falsifiability"[1] was once a popular one, in
regards to what makes something 'scientific'. But that's fallen out of
fashion[2]:

 _" Sir Karl Popper is not really a participant in the contemporary
professional philosophical dialogue; quite the contrary, he has ruined that
dialogue. If he is on the right track, then the majority of professional
philosophers the world over have wasted or are wasting their intellectual
careers. The gulf between Popper's way of doing philosophy and that of the
bulk of contemporary professional philosophers is as great as that between
astronomy and astrology."_

And so the debate continues...

[1] -
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsifiability](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsifiability)

[2] -
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsifiability#Criticisms](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsifiability#Criticisms)

~~~
eli_gottlieb
>Sir Karl Popper is not really a participant in the contemporary professional
philosophical dialogue; quite the contrary, he has ruined that dialogue. If he
is on the right track, then the majority of professional philosophers the
world over have wasted or are wasting their intellectual careers.

That doesn't really mean Popper is wrong.

~~~
pmoriarty
Let me ask you this, then: can the principle of falsifiability itself ever be
falsified?

If it can't then by its own measure, it's not "scientific". Further, if one
scorns anything "unscientific" as valueless, then the principle of
falsifiability must also be valueless.

~~~
eli_gottlieb
>Let me ask you this, then: can the principle of falsifiability itself ever be
falsified?

In the relevant sense, yes. We switch out conceptual definitions when they
fail to encompass the relevant empirical instances. If falsifiability turned
out to allow, for example, theology to be considered a science, then we would
have to throw out falsifiability. As it is, it's only a coarse-grained
principle for demarcation, hence the arguments about string theory.

