
The Myths of Enlightenment - diodorus
http://bostonreview.net/philosophy-religion/marta-figlerowicz-myths-enlightenment
======
claudiawerner
A good view on the involvement of myth in the Enlightenment and the
Enlightenment's unconscious project to simply replace the form of myth with
thinking disguised as scientific, I'd recommend Horkheimer and Adorno's _The
Dialectic of Enlightenment_ [0].

[0] The book was re-published as late as 1965. Here's a summary before you
read: [https://frankfurtschool.wordpress.com/2008/02/28/summary-
dia...](https://frankfurtschool.wordpress.com/2008/02/28/summary-dialectic-of-
enlightenment/)

~~~
bladedtoys
Fascinating summary.

But I would suggest that the current rationalist claim is "reason and
empiricism tell us the most reasonable thing to believe at a given moment" and
is almost a-priori true. This is not to claim it is the final truth or that
following it will be catastrophe free: The polio vaccine will fail sometimes.
But it is better than any non-rational non-fact based alternative.

The old claim "reason leads to ultimate truth" is difficult for a number of
reasons. One relates to the ultimate know-ability of reality through our
senses. Another is the almost absurd level of over confidence in a given
theory.

I would also contest the claim that we are more violent and barbaric now than
in the past. I believe that is factually incorrect or at least controversial.
At any rate, science could be accused of the technical advances that make
killing more efficient but not of starting wars or worsening the base
instincts and gullibility that underlying the causes of cruelty and barbarism.

And I would point out one significant social change reason did bring about.
Rationality requires judging people by relevant criterion rather than
irrelevant criterion. This leads, after apparently continuous struggle, to
increased racial, ethnic etc tolerance.

I think we should also distinguish between genuine rational-empiricism and
pseudo-science. For example, many of the worst atrocities in the 20th century
were justified through a knowingly false and twisted reading of Darwin. These
are not rational ideas, they are, in fact, irrational ideas cloaking
themselves in an undeserved respectability.

I think we should also make another more subtle distinction. There are those
who have a preconceived notion and then, through omissions, intentional or
otherwise, argue eloquently for it. This contrasts with being genuinely
curious and following the facts and thinking where-ever they lead without
prejudice. The former is obviously not going to lead to usable reality based
ideas.

~~~
yters
GK Chesterton makes the good point that rigorous rationalism is only valid if
you start from true premises. Regardless of how valid one's syllogisms are, if
they are based on false premises, then you'll end up insane. That is why GKE
insists the insane man tends to be the most consistently rational, but
starting from incorrect premises. The notion of "mystery" is that we can
apprehend truths that are not always within our ability to rationally dissect,
but that does not mean these truths are at odds with what we also rationally
understand. A prime example is consciousness. There is no coherent rational
explanation of consciousness within our physicalist worldview, since
consciousness must be inherently non physical. Hence when rational
physicalists try to take their viewpoint to its logical conclusion they must
make the incoherent claim, as Daniel Dennett does, that consciousness is an
"illusion." If consciousness is an illusion, then what is having the illusion?
The self contradiction is because illusion itself presupposes a consciousness
that be deceived.

~~~
naasking
> GK Chesterton makes the good point that rigorous rationalism is only valid
> if you start from true premises.

Rationalism permits us to examine even our premises, so your conclusion
doesn't follow.

> Hence when rational physicalists try to take their viewpoint to its logical
> conclusion they must make the incoherent claim, as Daniel Dennett does, that
> consciousness is an "illusion."

Oh boy.

> If consciousness is an illusion, then what is having the illusion? The self
> contradiction is because illusion itself presupposes a consciousness that be
> deceived.

No, the "self-contradiction" is that you seem to think an illusion requires a
subject. "What" is having the illusion is the system that mistakenly concludes
that its perceptions entail consciousness.

Here's a subject-free definition of "illusion" so you don't fall into this
trap again: an illusion is a perception that entails an obvious/immediate, but
false, conclusion.

~~~
yters
Perception assumes a perceiver.

~~~
naasking
No it doesn't! At least, not in the metaphysical sense that necessitates
irreducible subjectivity, which is what Dennett is talking about.

~~~
vasistha
irreducibility of subjectivity?

subjectivity is subjective. its axiomatic. no one argues that everything is
reducible or reductive. ever heard of the explanatory gap? no, we have axioms,
which are self-evident, that subsequent truths are based on. axioms are the
epistemic grounds of reason, and consciousness is the epistemic ground of all
knowledge and experience. no consciousness - no knowledge. and just because we
can't prove it objectively doesn't mean it doesn't exist! how absurd!

Dennett's arguments are not taken seriously in many academic philosophical
circles. There is a joke about the title of his book, ever so humbly titled
"Consciousness Explained", that is should be retitled: "Consciousness
Explained Away".

~~~
naasking
> irreducibility of subjectivity?

If that means nothing to you, then I suggest you read some more philosophy of
mind to understand why subjectivity is a real problem for eliminativist
theories.

> consciousness is the epistemic ground of all knowledge and experience

Fortunately not!

> Dennett's arguments are not taken seriously in many academic philosophical
> circles.

Haha, I don't know what bubble you live in, but the majority of philosophers
are physicalists. See the survey done a few years ago:

[https://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl](https://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl)

In fact, nearly every single one of Dennett's positions are held by the
majority of philosophers, ie. physicalism, Compatibilism, realism. So much for
Dennett not being taken seriously.

~~~
yters
Philosophers should use modus ponens more often.

If physicalism implies consciousness is an illusion, and that is an absurd
conclusion, then a better hypothesis is physicalism is false.

It doesn't seem the survey takers are big on logical consistency. Physicalism
is inconsistent with Platonism, yet both are majority positions.

------
macando
"Learning does not infinitely increase our awareness and autonomy. Sometimes
it only contours out our blind spots and inarticulacies."

We just get better at defending our own misconceptions.

