
Why Many People Perceive the Study of Human Behavior as Unscientific (2011) [pdf] - tokenadult
http://web.missouri.edu/~segerti/capstone/LilienfieldPublicSckepticism.pdf
======
josu
18 pages of pure bullshit. I devoted 10 minutes to reading parts of it; I
couldn't find anything of value.

It goes as far as to compare the "highly probabilistic predictions" of
psychology to those of quantum physics, and it even cites Richard Feynman.
It's just laughable.

In one instance it uses the word "stochastological".

~~~
afafsd
Thanks for saving me the trouble of reading it.

I'd also suggest that one of the reasons people perceive the study of human
behaviour as unscientific is that it so frequently _is_.

Studies of human behaviour are inextricably bound up in politics. Many studies
are designed, whether consciously or unconsciously on the part of the authors,
to advance the authors' own political or social agenda.

Even if you avoid that problem, many studies are just plain statistically
lousy, and employ deeply non-random samples.

And finally you've got the annoying problem that people know they're being
studied and may modify their behaviour accordingly.

~~~
enord
What's with the resentment towards psychology on YC?[Insert Freudian joke
here]

------
droopyEyelids
Here is an interesting excerpt.

> “Psychology Does Not Yield Repeatable Results” How replicable (repeatable)
> are the results of psychology compared with those of the hard sciences?
> Larry Hedges (1987) decided to find out. He compared the replicability of
> findings in particle physics, ostensibly one of the most rigorous domains of
> physics, with those of several areas in psychology, including the effect of
> teacher expectations on students’ IQ scores, gender differences in verbal
> and spatial ability, the effects of desegregation on educational achieve-
> ment, and the validity of student course evaluations. Using various
> statistical metrics of consistency, Hedges found that the results of
> particle physics studies aimed at estimating the mass or lifetime of stable
> subatomic particles (e.g., the muon) were in general no more consistent that
> those of psychology. Hedges’s findings suggest that the claim that
> psychology’s results are far less dependable than those of physics are not
> supported by data.

> Still, we should not overstate the implications of Hedges’s (1987) findings.
> As Hedges acknowledged, he did not sample randomly within either physics or
> psychol- ogy, so his results may be unrepresentative of the domains within
> these broad fields. Nevertheless, Hedges observed that the results of
> studies in several other domains of physics, including the estimation of
> chemical and thermo- dynamic constants, appear to be about equally
> consistent (or inconsistent, depending on whether one chooses to view the
> glass as half full or half empty) as those within many domains of
> psychology.

~~~
lutusp
These quotes fail to notice that, notwithstanding all the non-repeatable
results in physics that come and go, physicists eventually settle on a few
extremely reliable theoretical precepts, precepts that lead to new technology.
A classic example is quantum physics, the most successful and reliable
scientific theory we have, a theory that makes numerical predictions about
nature that prove accurate to better than ten decimal places:

[http://scienceblogs.com/principles/2011/05/05/the-most-
preci...](http://scienceblogs.com/principles/2011/05/05/the-most-precisely-
tested-theo/)

Psychologists have many non-repeatable results but don't shape reliable
theories about their subject. Physicists have many non-repeatable results but
_do_ shape reliable theories about their subject. The computer I'm sitting at
is proof of that.

------
bsdshepherd
"In a larger sense, I see the AS chapter as part of a long-term program to
pathologize normal behavior, one that hopefully will backfire and destroy
unscientific psychology." \- Paul Lutus

From: The Trouble with Psychology
[http://www.arachnoid.com/trouble_with_psychology/index.html](http://www.arachnoid.com/trouble_with_psychology/index.html)

Mr. Lutus has many articles on psychology. Asperger's By Proxy
([http://www.arachnoid.com/psychology/aspergers.php](http://www.arachnoid.com/psychology/aspergers.php))
is extremely relevant to the software industry.

~~~
lutusp
Thank you! As it happens, I just published a new article today entitled
"Science of Mind":

HTML:
[http://arachnoid.com/science_of_mind/index.html](http://arachnoid.com/science_of_mind/index.html)

PDF:
[http://arachnoid.com/science_of_mind/resources/science_of_mi...](http://arachnoid.com/science_of_mind/resources/science_of_mind.pdf)

~~~
bsdshepherd
I am several months from adequately responding to this article due to delayed
neural development(1). Until I can properly respond, please(2) consider the
following:

You seem to be overlooking inflammation. If only for fun, run your web
backwards - starting from dementia (e.g. Alzheimer's), then sleep disorders,
then anxiety.

Appropriate diet, moderate exercise, and a good night's sleep are vital as a
foundation for good health.

Acceptance that normal behavior is pathologized leads to the understanding
that "mental illness" is legislated.

Thank you for making your research publicly available, and open to review and
criticism.

\---

1) For over five decades I had been 'locked in'. Comedy at it's finest - I
cannot contribute, as being misdiagnosed (word needed for profit motivated
diagnosis - prodiagnosed?) prevented the ability to communicate that I could
not communicate.

2) Tens of millions suffer needlessly. A few months away from improper
'medicine' and glowing rectangles would provide much needed data points.

------
pdkl95
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gfZWyUXn3So#t=37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gfZWyUXn3So#t=37)

Tom Lehrer's recent(-ish) song "Sociology" seems very relevant here.

------
otakucode
How about: human behavior is a complex system exhibiting chaotic behavior and
is mathematically proven to be unpredictable? And don't even get me started on
the absurd over-reach of the conclusions of almost all social science papers.
They'll study Westerners and proclaim to have discovered something about
humans - ignoring the monumental variable of culture. They also project their
own values on research constantly. How many times have you seen research
reported as "health benefits of sex"? And how many times have you seen the
same research reported as "health dangers of abstinence"? They're the exact
same thing, but a matter of cultural perspective. If you view sexuality as a
normative part of human life, then observing that those who have fewer orgasms
develop prostate cancer is a health danger of abstinence. But if you view
sexuality as an aberration, something that's not a normal part of everyday
life, then you report it as a benefit of increased sexual activity -
establishing that you think the current level is 'normal' rather than 'so low
as to present actual biological danger'(which is the truth).

~~~
HelloMcFly
That it is seemingly chaotic doesn't make it chaotic, and I'm interested in
the mathematical proof that behavior can't be predicted. Don't confuse limited
ability to predict with impossibility. We can make many confident statements
about the likelihood of certain behaviors/reactions/response, in the
aggregate, under given real-world circumstances.

You are correct in that much research, especially research older than 10 years
ago, tended to ignore culture. I know my field of study (I/O Psychology)
references cultural frequently, either through overt study when possible
(desirable given the publication potential) or at least remarking on the
limitations of any findings. I don't read much outside I/O research though, so
maybe it hasn't progressed much on the whole and the global nature of I/O work
for businesses rewards more recognition of culture. It's hard though -
accessing globally-relevant datasets for studies of human behavior is often
impossible. That doesn't make all studies meaningless, or unscientific.

And yes, you're correct about value-laden framing of results. That doesn't
invalidate the science of the results, it just makes it more necessary to
think critically when interpreting them rather than relying on abstracts and
headlines alone.

~~~
lutusp
> That it is seemingly chaotic doesn't make it chaotic,

Very true. A chaotic system has specific properties that we would be very
pressed to identify in human behavior.

> ... and I'm interested in the mathematical proof that behavior can't be
> predicted.

Think abut what you're saying. Proof that behavior _cannot_ be predicted would
require proof of a negative. Proof of a negative, or (the same thing) an
evidentiary burden requiring evidence of absence, is a logical error. So this
is a non-starter.

Let's say I believe in Bigfoot, and I think others are obliged to dissuade me
from by belief. The problem is that this also requires proof of a negative,
and Bigfoot could be hiding under a rock somewhere on a distant planet.
_Bigfoot cannot be proven not to exist_ , so I'm secure in my evidence-free
belief.

This is why scientists adopt the _null hypothesis_ precept, the idea that an
idea is assumed to be false until evidence supports it -- it's a simple way to
avoid logical pitfalls like believing in Bigfoot.

> We can make many confident statements about the likelihood of certain
> behaviors/reactions/response, in the aggregate, under given real-world
> circumstances.

Yes, true, but until those observations lead to a falsifiable theory of human
behavior, it's not science. Until then, we can only describe, we can't
explain. Testable explanations are the threshold of science.

> And yes, you're correct about value-laden framing of results. That doesn't
> invalidate the science of the results ...

No, of course not -- thee reason is that such results aren't science. An
observation without an explanation isn't science. Here's an example -- if I
sit under a clear nighttime sky, then report that I saw many tiny points of
light, I've made an observation of very little scientific usefulness, and one
that can't meaningfully be falsified by repeated observation. But if I claim
those points of light are actually distant thermonuclear furnaces like our
sun, my assertion can be tested and possibly falsified. By moving beyond
observation, by offering a tentative explanation, I've crossed the threshold
of science.

~~~
HelloMcFly
> Think abut what you're saying. Proof that behavior cannot be predicted would
> require proof of a negative. Proof of a negative, or (the same thing) an
> evidentiary burden requiring evidence of absence, is a logical error. So
> this is a non-starter.

Yes, I know. That was the point of the comment in response to the parent's
statement: "[human behavior] is mathematically proven to be unpredictable."
But thank you for the lecture.

> Yes, true, but until those observations lead to a falsifiable theory of
> human behavior, it's not science.

There are plenty of theories. They are typically considered theories on
motivation and behavior rather than behavior itself. It's a notable
difference, but a sensible distinction. Many of these theories are
falsifiable, and in fact have been falsified (e.g., expectations-based models,
for example). But they are typically piecemeal, as the complexity of human
motivation and behavior currently requires. If the key requirement to be
considered "science" is for The One Great Unified Theory, then I agree that it
will never be considered a science in my lifetime.

You seem to think psychology is all observation with no attempt at
explanation, much less construction of logical theories supporting those
explanations. That is not the case in my little fiefdom (though I have no
doubt it is true in some disciplines, or acceptable in some journals). Much
work has gone into proposing, testing, and refining many theories on
motivation and behavior (e.g., reinforcement theory, goal-setting theory,
social-cognitive theory or workplace behavior, job design theory, motivated
action theory, etc.).

It's not perfect, and it's got a long way to go, but it's also come a long
way. Yet it's hardly just observing the stars and making claims, and it's
certainly shown utility in helping design systems to influence behavior.

But there, I've said my piece. I've usually got the discipline to stay out
this pet topic for the HN crowd.

~~~
lutusp
> There are plenty of theories. They are typically considered theories on
> motivation and behavior rather than behavior itself.

Those aren't theories as science defines the term. Among other things, they
aren't falsifiable and they don't make predictions about unobserved phenomena,
both hallmarks of scientific theories.

> You seem to think psychology is all observation with no attempt at
> explanation ...

Wait -- that's not my idea. That's the reason the NIMH gave for abandoning the
DSM -- it's all symptoms (descriptions) and no search for causes
(explanations/theories):

[http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/director/2013/transforming-
dia...](http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/director/2013/transforming-
diagnosis.shtml)

Quote: "While DSM has been described as a “Bible” for the field, it is, at
best, a dictionary, creating a set of labels and defining each. The strength
of each of the editions of DSM has been “reliability” – each edition has
ensured that clinicians use the same terms in the same ways. The weakness is
its lack of validity."

"Unlike our definitions of ischemic heart disease, lymphoma, or AIDS, the DSM
diagnoses are based on a consensus about clusters of clinical symptoms, not
any objective laboratory measure. In the rest of medicine, this would be
equivalent to creating diagnostic systems based on the nature of chest pain or
the quality of fever. Indeed, symptom-based diagnosis, once common in other
areas of medicine, has been largely replaced in the past half century as we
have understood that symptoms alone rarely indicate the best choice of
treatment. Patients with mental disorders deserve better."

> Much work has gone into proposing, testing, and refining many theories on
> motivation and behavior ...

You aren't using the scientific meaning of theory -- a formalization of
observations using empirical evidence, that generalizes specific observations,
that predicts things not yet observed, and that is falsifiable.

> Yet it's hardly just observing the stars and making claims, and it's
> certainly shown utility in helping design systems to influence behavior.

There are many ideas that meet this description, but they aren't scientific
theories as that term is defined.

Prove me wrong. Point to a theory in the class you describe that has been used
to conclusively falsify someone else's theory in the same field, a case in
which the defender of the falsified theory acknowledges that his theory can
been proven false and has no further utility. I say it this way because it
happens all the time in science, and it never happens in psychology.

Consider the example of Asperger Syndrome. It was thrown out over a year ago
by the editors of DSM-5, described as an unscientific and meaningless term,
but I am still getting emails from parents whose children are being assigned
the diagnosis.

Consider recovered memory therapy. Many people have been accused of imaginary
crimes based on it, and many studies prove the unreliability of this therapy,
but it's still offered to anyone foolish enough to ask for it.

Falsifiability is a big issue with respect to psychological theories, for the
reason that it doesn't exist.

> But there, I've said my piece. I've usually got the discipline to stay out
> this pet topic for the HN crowd.

This isn't a contentless, rambling argument in which people say their piece --
at least, I hope not. It should be a discussion of ground truth, with the
possibility of a conclusive outcome, like in science, in which someone says,
"My position has been falsified". The fact that this never happens within
psychology doesn't mean it can't happen here -- in principle.

I hope you see the degree of self-reference that's present here.

~~~
HelloMcFly
My hesitance to continue this debate is that I find places like HN and reddit
to be pretty hostile audiences, and engaging in the conversation occupies more
of my thoughts than I find it should. It's a form a self-regulation to know
when I should stop, particularly given the audience.

And I want to make one thing clear about psychology which just never seems to
be clear: psychology is way, way bigger than clinical psychology, yet clinical
psychology (and stories from it) seem to be the only thing that is ever
brought up in these conversations. I can't speak to clinical psychology. There
are 50 divisions of the APA, some significantly better than others. My
division is #14.

> Among other things, they aren't falsifiable and they don't make predictions
> about unobserved phenomena, both hallmarks of scientific theories.

Almost all of those theories are falsifiable, elements of them have been
falsified, and they make predictions for unobserved circumstances.

> That's the reason the NIMH gave for abandoning the DSM

The DSM is a diagnostic tool from a branch of psychology I know little about.
It is not the singular representative of the social sciences, or even halfway
related to much work being done in behavioral prediction. It's not theory-
based, as I understand it it is not meant to be, and I've no interest or
ability to defend it.

> Point to a theory in the class you describe that has been used to
> conclusively falsify someone else's theory in the same field, a case in
> which the defender of the falsified theory acknowledges that his theory can
> been proven false and has no further utility.

The last part of your request is unreasonable - proving that there is no
utility whatsoever in old theories is unnecessary. Elements of older theories
can have utility. And as for the original theory's proponent abandoning it? I
don't see that often, nor see it as a requirement. Journals I read don't
publish mea culpas from those who were ultimately proven wrong, they just
publish the evidence proving them wrong.

I pointed out one specifically already in my previous comment (edit: my
mistake, I took that out just referenced expectancy theories more generally).
Victor Vroom introduced the VIE expectancy model for explaining and predicting
behavior in 1964. Over 20 years the research indicated that the theory as
proposed did not jive with the observed evidence, and the model transition
from one based on "psychological force" to "outcome attractiveness" as
chronicled by Pinder in 1984. Van Erde and Thiery, in 1996, that the
preponderance of evidence on the model, revised or otherwise, demonstrated
that even the revised theory was inadequate. The individual elements had
predictive power, but as a model it just didn't work. Did Victor Vroom abandon
it? Who knows? The field certainly did. But did the field note that nothing in
theory had any utility? No, certainly not. Locke and Latham had integrated
some of the elements into explaining goal commitment, a critical component of
goal-setting theory.

There was also the feedback theory of workplace behavior popularized by Komaki
in the 80s and early 90s, and was effectively dismantled as a stand-alone
theory both logically and empirically Locke and Latham in the mid-to-late 90s.
I have no idea whether Komaki acknowledged they were wrong publicly, but the
field moved on. Even something so basic as goal-setting theory has wholesale
change in just the past 5 years with the measurement and observation of
subconscious goals, and how they don't work with traditional goal-setting
theory.

Deci and colleagues outlined and empirically supported Cognitive Evaluation
Theory in the 90s and early 00s. Among others, Rynes dismantled the bulk of it
in the mid-to-late 00s, and as far as I know it's essentially dead.

Another one is job characteristics theory, which I don't recall the whole
story of off the top of my head. It came, it didn't prove to be reliable, it
was abandoned. Again elements have found their way to better homes (i.e.,
links of autonomy to workplace behavior patterns) but on the whole it didn't
cut it.

If that is too old, a more modern one is the debate between Social Cognitive
Theory in the workplace (from Wood and Bandura, at some point). It's a theory,
lots of testable hypothesis, and great empirical support. A pillar of
explaining aspects of workplace behavior! A professor named Vancouver out of
Michigan State has demonstrated empirically multiple times that the model's
predicted outcomes are often at odds with reality. There's been some back-and-
forth on this one, and I'm not up to date on it. But it became clear the
theory as proposed was not adequate.

> Consider the example of Asperger Syndrome... recovered memory therapy.

They are not my domain of psychology. Psychology, and social science in
general, are very broad terms. There are bad examples. I cannot and will not
defend those things, but you should not accept those as archetypal
representations of all psychological and social science research.

EDIT: One more thing to add. These things tend to have longer timescales than
in other harder sciences because of the nature of the subjects. One or two
empirical studies may be enough to definitively disprove ideas elsewhere, but
because getting large numbers of people across adequate contexts is so
onerous, particularly with non-student, non-US samples, the lag-time for
debate can be large.

~~~
lutusp
> ... psychology is way, way bigger than clinical psychology, yet clinical
> psychology (and stories from it) seem to be the only thing that is ever
> brought up in these conversations.

Yes, and there's a reason. The ground truth about the medical field is what
happens in clinics. If clinicians are shaking dried gourds over patients, that
tells us about medicine itself, from top to bottom -- the only way something
unscientific could happen in a clinical setting is if there's no reliable
science anywhere in medicine.

In the same way, if someone builds a bridge by guess and by golly, without any
consideration of loading and stresses, this calls into question the scientific
basis of civil engineering.

So when I hear a psychologist complain that clinical psychology isn't
representative of the entire field, I have to say that kind of
compartmentalizing doesn't work anywhere else -- it suggests that psychology
isn't unified by a respect for science, or by reliable, falsifiable theory.

>> Consider the example of Asperger Syndrome... recovered memory therapy.

> They are not my domain of psychology.

This sounds increasingly like one of those joke conversations about which kind
of Southern Baptist you are. Religion works that way, science doesn't. In
science, evidence and tested theories forge a consensus that unifies all
legitimate fields, at least until someone produces a better theory, then the
process repeats.

Do you suppose that a doctor could say, "I don't care what biologists are
doing, it doesn't affect me of my practice"? Do you suppose that a geologist
could say, "I don't care what the physicists are doing in Earth Science, that
has nothing to do with my work"?

This is not realistic, because the example fields are united by a common
respect for the primary role of evidence and the scientific method. I say this
to remind you how you sound then you try to describe psychology as though it's
a bunch of disconnected pieces. Not that that isn't so, but it provides us
with a measure of the significance of science in psychology.

> ... but you should not accept those as archetypal representations of all
> psychological and social science research.

If that's true, then psychologists lose the right to describe themselves as
scientists, or to receive funds earmarked for scientific activities. Taxpayers
are willing to contribute to physics because (a) it's a science with an
enviable track record, and (b) physicists are on the same page -- they don't
say things like, "Don't listen to the particle physicists, they're not the
real thing." Only psychologists say things like that.

> The last part of your request is unreasonable - proving that there is no
> utility whatsoever in old theories is unnecessary.

Then you do not understand science. When the existence of the ether was
disproven, to save limited resources the falsification was accepted by
everyone -- opinion played no part. When the Phlogiston theory was disproven,
it was disproven for everyone, everywhere. This kind of certainty and
consensus is what makes science science.

~~~
HelloMcFly
> Yes, and there's a reason. The ground truth about the medical field is what
> happens in clinics.

True, but psychology is not the medical field. You've picked the flashiest
"branch" of it to make your archetype, but it's probably the least
representative of the whole (though admittedly perhaps the best funded).
Clinical psychology is more focused not on what is normal, but what is
abnormal, how to diagnose it, and how to respond. Almost all of the rest of
psychology is focused on what is normal, typically within a given context
(childhood, workplace, developmentally, etc.)

> psychology isn't unified by a respect for science, or by reliable,
> falsifiable theory.

Psychology is not unified by a single reliable theory. I have no problem
admitting as much. Maybe someday, but not while I'm alive. Again, if that's
your baseline for what it takes to be considered scientific, I'm fine saying
"then by that definition it's not scientific" and feeling no shame.

> This sounds increasingly like one of those joke conversations about which
> kind of Southern Baptist you are.

Then you're not thinking critically. Your doctor-biologist example doesn't fly
because one's work (biology) directly and materially affects the work of the
other (medicine). What clinical psychologists do, more than almost any other
branch, has no impact on me _presently_ , nor I on them. Our populations are
different, and the goals of our research with respect to our populations are
different. Ridicule the division if you wish, but what do you want me to do?
Do you expect my field to reconfigure itself entirely to become experts on
abnormal behavior and diagnoses? Should I, in my effort to increase workplace
productivity and satisfaction, educate myself on the ins-and-outs of autism or
psychological disorders? Human behavior is so large and complex to support
these various divisions.

Many, many branches are connected in some way. It's a web. I have no ability
to speak beyond the basics of clinical psychology. I can speak to
psychometrics, social personality, experimental, educational and consumer
psychology, and behavioral analysis (all of which are branches of the APA).
Outside of a general interest in human behavior with no regard for context, my
goals are as different from a clinical psychologists as a biologists are from
neurologists. It's hard enough to do good work in specific contexts,
unfortunately. Psychology right now is a bottoms-up field because we're just
too ignorant as a species (despite efforts) to do it top-down right now.

> I say this to remind you how you sound then you try to describe psychology
> as though it's a bunch of disconnected pieces. Not that that isn't so, but
> it provides us with a measure of the significance of science in psychology.

I don't have to _try_ to describe it that way, because it is. It's a pragmatic
response to the complications of understanding people on the whole. The whole
is too disparate, so look at the pieces. That bothers you, but most don't seem
as perturbed. I'm sure you see this as concrete evidence for your point, but
you won't be surprised that I think that's poor criteria. "Psychology" as a
term is almost certainly overly broad, which is why so many divisions exist in
the first place.

> If that's true, then psychologists lose the right to describe themselves as
> scientists

It is true, and I disagree. Bad science is found everywhere. Look at what bad
science has done for vaccines. Do I hold it as an archetype of medical
science? Your argument seems to be "we're not perfect at explaining literally
all cognition and behavior in a Single Unified Theory now, mistakes have been
made in the past, so sod the whole thing."

Physicists are on the same page because their work is infinitely more
provable. Ultimately human cognition and behavior is a much more practically
difficult, nebulous topic at the present time that's going to take longer to
get right on the whole. It's all probably just math itself in some respect,
and maybe we'll know the equation someday à la Hari Seldon in The Foundation.
We're not there yet.

>> The last part of your request is unreasonable - proving that there is no
utility whatsoever in old theories is unnecessary.

> Then you do not understand science.

Then you're not thinking critically. It's this kind of thing that turns me off
these conversations completely. For better-or-worse, many theories in
psychology are not all-or-nothing. While the theory on the whole may prove
false, certain elements of the theory or the direction may prove useful in new
theories. Old, falsified theories are invaluable for paving the way towards
new theories, and not all elements of all falsified theories need be disposed
of whole-hog. You can completely reject and recognize the positive
contributions it has made, and the utility elements of it still possess.

I think we know where each other stand on this now. At the very least, you got
your examples.

EDIT: Passovers for grammar.

~~~
lutusp
>> Yes, and there's a reason. The ground truth about the medical field is what
happens in clinics.

> True, but psychology is not the medical field.

This is becoming circular. I say psychology isn't scientific, you say I have
to say which part of psychology I'm referring to, I say the very question
indicts the scientific standing of the field, because scientific fields are
united by consensus on the meaning of evidence. I use medicine as an obvious
example.

Then you reject my comparison with medicine by saying that psychology isn't
medicine. One, psychiatrists would vigorously disagree (their livelihood
depends on an association with medicine), and two, it's a red herring. The
issue is whether a field can call itself scientific if it's not guided by
evidence, and if there's no consensus about the meaning of the theories that
define the field. In the case of psychology, there are no such field-defining
theories, consequently the field is splintered into warring factions like
sects of a religious order.

> For better-or-worse, many theories in psychology are not all-or-nothing.

You're missing the point that there are no scientific psychological theories.
There are no such theories that are open to falsification by empirical
evidence. And there has never been a scientific falsification of any
psychological theory, ever, anywhere. Your use of the word "theory" is
misguided, because it resembles how scientists talk.

>> If that's true, then psychologists lose the right to describe themselves as
scientists

> It is true, and I disagree.

This is not a literature debate and it is not a matter of opinion -- it must
be resolved by evidence. No scientist, when given a chance to present
evidence, instead says, "I disagree".

> Bad science is found everywhere.

Psychology is not bad science, it is non-science. In bad science, theories are
weak and short-lived, but they are falsified, as with astrology, phrenology,
the Phlogiston theory, the N-ray theory, and so forth. In non-science,
theories aren't open to a comparison with empirical evidence, consequently
they cannot be falsified.

No falsifiability, no science.

~~~
HelloMcFly
> This is becoming circular. I say psychology isn't scientific, you say I have
> to say which part of psychology I'm referring to, I say the very question
> indicts the scientific standing of the field, because scientific fields are
> united by consensus on the meaning of evidence. I use medicine as an obvious
> example.

No, that is _not_ what I said. I said I personally cannot speak to certain
branches of psychology, nor defend them, nor think they should be considered
archetypes. I won't speak to something I know little about. I see it doesn't
seem to stop you.

I didn't reject your comparison because psychology isn't medicine, I reject it
because it is a bad comparison. I'll use a more apt one. Different branches of
psychology don't interact much because they don't share populations or, often,
goals. You want to use medicine as a comparator.

I know for a fact that most pediatricians (my wife among them) don't stay up
to date, or much care, what's happening with geriatricians. I know that
radiologists aren't terribly interested in the work of physical therapists.
Ophthalmologists and cardiologists? Probably not reading the same stuff. And
yet they are linked by care and interest in the general human physiology. But
does one's work impact the other? Not really, not much. But biologists can
certainly impact both. For psychology, the cognitive psychologists probably is
the most "upstream." I care what they do like dermatologists care what
biologists do.

> You're missing the point that there are no scientific psychological
> theories. There are no such theories that are open to falsification by
> empirical evidence. And there has never been a scientific falsification of
> any psychological theory, ever, anywhere. Your use of the word "theory" is
> misguided, because it resembles how scientists talk.

I'm only "missing the point" because your insisting that's the critical issue,
and I'm saying you're wrong not in premise but in reviewing the state of
things. If your use of the word "theory" is for a Single Unified Theory of all
Human Behavior and Cognition, then I agree. I don't think that's the baseline
for a scientific psychological theory, and there have been plenty of theories
within psychology that have been falsifiable, have been falsified, and no
longer exist. You even asked for some examples, which I provided. But what you
do then is twist the criteria for what counts to meet only the standard you
set. You'll say "it isn't my criteria" I'm sure, but I'm not seeing anything
that says otherwise.

>>>>> Consider the example of Asperger Syndrome... recovered memory therapy.

>>>> ... but you should not accept those as archetypal representations of all
psychological and social science research.

>>> If that's true, then psychologists lose the right to describe themselves
as scientists

>> It is true, and I disagree.

> This is not a literature debate and it is not a matter of opinion -- it must
> be resolved by evidence.

I'm not entirely sure of your point here. What scientific evidence are you
asking for that some examples of bad practice / science / outcomes should not
stand as the primary representation of all psychological research?

> Psychology is not bad science, it is non-science... No falsifiability, no
> science.

See, this is the issue. You start with it as a non-science and work your way
back. I've already listed several falsified theories in my own line of work.
Outside of that: Skinner's theories? Falsified. Piaget's core theories of
cognitive development? Falsified. McGregor's Theory X and Y? Falsified. Unlike
other branches they don't vanish entirely, but elements remain through new
theories and contributions.

But yet, the DSM exists, so it's all hogwash. We are indeed talking in
circles.

~~~
lutusp
>> I say psychology isn't scientific, you say I have to say which part of
psychology I'm referring to, I say the very question indicts the scientific
standing of the field, because scientific fields are united by consensus on
the meaning of evidence. I use medicine as an obvious example.

> No, that is not what I said. I said I personally cannot speak to certain
> branches of psychology, nor defend them, nor think they should be considered
> archetypes.

Thanks for that clarification, which changed nothing about the exchange or its
meaning.

> See, this is the issue. You start with it as a non-science and work your way
> back.

No, I start with how science is defined, note that psychology cannot meet the
definition, and draw the sole possible conclusion. As did the chairman of the
NIMH as he ruled that the DSM may no longer be used as the basis for
scientific research proposals, on the ground that it has no scientific
content:

[http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/the-rats-of-n-i-
m-h](http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/the-rats-of-n-i-m-h)

> there have been plenty of theories within psychology that have been
> falsifiable, have been falsified, and no longer exist.

This has never happened in a scientific sense. Ideas that become unpopular or
that fall out of clinical use aren't falsified by those circumstances.

> I've already listed several falsified theories in my own line of work.

Nonsense. None of the were falsified as that term is defined in science, by
way of empirical evidence, the kind of evidence not accessible to those who
study the mind.

> Skinner's theories? Falsified. Piaget's core theories of cognitive
> development? Falsified.

Your claim is absolutely false. These ideas weren't stated clearly enough to
be open to scientific falsification, and they were certainly not falsified --
they both have active practitioners who would be surprised to hear your claim.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B._F._Skinner](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B._F._Skinner)

No mention of the falsification you claim exists.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean_Piaget](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean_Piaget)

No mention of the falsification you claim exists.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phlogiston_theory](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phlogiston_theory)

Falsified, with a clearly explained reason, based on empirical evidence.

> Different branches of psychology don't interact much because they don't
> share populations or, often, goals.

Like science? The same might be said about different branches of physics,
except that physics is a science, consequently particle physicists, who study
nature at the smallest scales, and cosmologists, who study science at the
largest scales, productively read each other's literature and attend each
other's conferences. They have science in common.

~~~
HelloMcFly
Alright, this is the end of the road for me.

> Thanks for that clarification, which changed nothing about the exchange or
> its meaning.

It boggles the mind that you'd even say that. The difference between me saying
"you must choose a branch of psychology to call unscientific" and "I do not
personally possess the knowledge or capability to stand up for branches of
psychology I do not know enough about it" seems pretty substantive.

> No, I start with how science is defined, note that psychology cannot meet
> the definition

If you're relying on wikipedia, allow me to do so as well: science is the
systematic enterprise that builds and organizes knowledge in the form of
testable explanations and predictions about the universe. You take issue with
the latter, but many psychological theories do them, no matter how much cotton
you stick in your ears.

I do not argue that the DSM lacks scientific credibility.

> None of the were falsified as that term is defined in science, by way of
> empirical evidence, the kind of evidence not accessible to those who study
> the mind.

No matter how loud you say it, it doesn't make it more true. You demand that
it is true, but it is not. You sit at the armchair, reading no research or
studies whatsoever, and judge me for 1) being unwilling to comment on issues
which I'm ignorant on and 2) not being an expert at all things psychology.

Re: Skinner - you are correct, though he had few "theories" to be wrong about.
I meant E.L. Thorndike, Skinner's predecessor (and the other one with a famous
"box"). His theory of learning was his greatest achievement, but he eventually
repudiated it.

Re: Piaget - that is the person wiki, this is the relevant one:
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piaget%27s_theory_of_cognitive_...](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piaget%27s_theory_of_cognitive_development#Challenges_to_Piagetian_stage_theory)
Nobody is a classic Piaget psychologist anymore. Did they throw it all out and
start over? No, they did not, the iterated and keep testing. If that's the red
flag to you, then there you go.

> Like science?

Sure, like science. Whatever you say. I don't disagree that physics is a more
mature science, where connections between different branches are more clear.

Have a nice weekend.

~~~
lutusp
>> No, I start with how science is defined, note that psychology cannot meet
the definition

> If you're relying on wikipedia ...

No, Wikipedia is not my source. I rely on a much better source, the thousands
of sources that define science in the same way, unambiguously, including many
court rulings, for example those that keep Creationism out of public school
classrooms by defining science as something that requires empirical evidence
and objective falsifiability.

> Alright, this is the end of the road for me.

Of course it is. Before we had this conversation you had no idea what
constituted science and falsification, and now, you still have no idea.

I want to thank you for taking part in this conversation -- I often think it's
not possible for someone not to understand science basics -- it's really
rather simple -- but then I have a conversation like this, and I get it all
over again.

> I don't disagree that physics is a more mature science, where connections
> between different branches are more clear.

What you think, your opinions, _do not matter_. Only evidence matters. And it
occurs to me that you will never get this.

Scientist A says, "There is a largest prime. I don't know which prime it is,
but there is a largest one. Infinity is not a number, it's a concept,
therefore there cannot be an infinity of primes. Therefore there is a largest
prime. Call it p."

Scientist B says, "I will falsify your claim. I agree that we shall call the
largest prime p. Now let q = p factorial, i.e. q = p * (p-1) * (p-2), etc. At
the end of the process, q is either a prime larger than p, which falsifies the
claim, or q is composite, composed of primes, at least one of which is larger
than p, which falsifies the claim. There are no other possibilities. I have
falsified the claim."

Scientist A says, "Yes, you have falsified the claim, my opinion doesn't
matter, how I feel about it doesn't matter, the falsification relies entirely
on incontrovertible, objective evidence, _evidence on which all educated
observers must agree_."

That is science. That is manifestly not psychology.

Another voice on this topic:

[https://www.cfa.harvard.edu/~ejchaisson/cosmic_evolution/doc...](https://www.cfa.harvard.edu/~ejchaisson/cosmic_evolution/docs/fr_1/fr_1_site_summary.html)

Quote: "Today, all natural scientists throughout the world employ the
scientific method. Normally it works like this: First, gather some data by
observing an object or event, then propose an idea to explain the data, and
finally test the idea by experimenting with Nature. Those ideas that pass the
tests are selected, accumulated, and conveyed, while those that don’t are
discarded — a little like the evolutionary events described on this Web site.
In that way, by means of a selective editing or pruning of ideas, scientists
discriminate between sense and nonsense. We gain an ever-better approximation
of reality. Not that science claims to reveal the truth—whatever that is —
just to gain an increasingly accurate model of Nature."

"Despite an emphasis on objectivity, some subjectivity does affect the modern
scientific enterprise, for this is work done by human beings having strong
emotions and personal values. Yet, with the test of time and repeated
observations, objectivity eventually emerges and then dominates, enabling us
to reach conclusions free of the biased viewpoint of any one scientist,
institution, or culture. As a rational investigative approach used to
formulate descriptions of natural phenomena, the scientific method is designed
to _yield a reasonably objective consensus on the nature, contents, and
workings of the Universe_." [emphasis added]

Couldn't have said it better myself.

Have a nice day.

------
seanflyon
The study of human behavior is based primarily on subjective measurements and
double blind studies are generally not feasible. The level of rigor often
expected in hard sciences is generally not possible in the study of human
behavior.

~~~
vacri
This doesn't mean it's not scientific by definition.

If science _required_ double-blind trials, then you'd be throwing out a lot of
physics, too (for example, the study of planetary motion). Science is 'robust
reporting and observation', not 'double-blind trials'. The more robust your
methods, the stronger your case - double-blind trials add a lot of robustness.
Predictive value is also helpful, but again not required to be considered
science (eg dark matter, which we still have no idea about).

~~~
lutusp
> This doesn't mean it's not scientific by definition.

On the contrary, that is exactly what it means. Science requires empirically
testable, falsifiable theories backed up by empirical observations. If we only
have observations, it's not science, because observations are neither
particularly useful nor falsifiable.

> Predictive value is also helpful, but again not required to be considered
> science ...

Many commentators on this issue argue that an empirical, falsifiable theory
that is able to make predictions about things not yet observed is a
requirement for science.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_theory](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_theory)

Quote: "A scientific theory is a well-substantiated explanation of some aspect
of the natural world that is acquired through the scientific method, and
repeatedly confirmed through observation and experimentation.[1][2] As with
most (if not all) forms of scientific knowledge, _scientific theories are
inductive in nature and aim for predictive power and explanatory force_."

"The strength of a scientific theory is related to the diversity of phenomena
it can explain."

Also, very important, observations (descriptions) can only be a preliminary to
shaping an explanation, a testable theory (an explanation). Observations
without a theoretical dimension are indistinguishable from stamp collecting
and are a step toward science, but are not science themselves.

------
dthunt
APA should ditch the Goldwater rule.

~~~
hrktb
It's the first time I heard of this rule, thanks.

As far as I understand, it only limits professional diagnostics, shouldn't it
be OK if it's not done as a practicing psychatrist (i.e. call it an analysis
or interpretation and not a diagnostic)?

~~~
dthunt
The end result is that the public doesn't know about the rule, so they see
psychologists acting a certain way and frequently think it's actually
epistemically bad, or impossible, to reason about the mental states of other
humans based on their actions, writings, and other artifacts.

Imagine if computer security experts couldn't talk, in general, about the
security of a line of products offered by a company, or about the probable
cause of a specific issue that had been observed in a particular product.

The parallels ARE actually there; it's not as strange an analogy as it looks
at first glance.

I understand some of the reasons the rule exists. I think this is probably not
the best solution, in that it creates a public who have very strange ideas
about psychiatry, and that is actually a great harm.

I'm neutral on most of this article, but like, specifically, if public
perception is an issue, finding a better way to resolve the ethical dilemma
that spawned the Goldwater Rule sounds like a pretty good idea to me.

