
Kill Whitey- It’s the right thing to do. - e1ven
http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2010/09/kill-whitey-its-the-right-thing-to-do/
======
dusklight
I think it's important to point out that the names chosen are not only
denotations of race, they are denotations of class. Maybe instead of the
liberals feeling better about killing the white guy to save the black guys,
they feel better about killing the rich guy to save the poor guys.

There is a tendency to conflate class issues with race issues in America, and
I think that really muddles the debate somewhat.

~~~
trjordan
There is a tendency to conflate the two because they are strongly correlated.
It's not a mistake to assume that Tyrone is poor and black and Chip is rich
and white -- it's a best guess based on observations about reality in the US.

Does it make it absolutely moral to make that assumption? Of course not,
people should be treated without regard to previous biases, etc. But it
doesn't mean the statistical inference is invalid.

~~~
ryanpetrich
Chip Ellsworth III sounds distinctly aristocratic. Another "white-sounding"
name could be chosen that doesn't have that quality.

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lukev
Key quote from the article (IMHO):

"The idea is not that people are or are not utilitarian; it’s that they will
cite being utilitarian when it behooves them. People are aren’t using these
principles and then applying them. They arrive at a judgement and seek a
principle."

~~~
philwelch
The real joke is that philosophers do this, too. If your ethical theory
doesn't quite fit with people's moral intuitions, most philosophers will argue
that, in itself, is a problem with the theory.

This is why I don't put much stock in ethical theory--if intuition is a good
enough moral guide that we use it to refute ethical theories, why do we need a
theory? More damningly, on what _other_ grounds can we possibly criticize an
ethical theory?

~~~
lukev
Well, I think the search for an ethical theory is still valid. That's one of
the main exercises of philosophy, taking a lot of particular data points (in
this case, moral intuitions) and trying to find some overarching pattern or
system. Just because we haven't found a consistent one yet (or even if such a
system does not exist) it doesn't mean the search isn't worthwhile.

------
iuyhgtfvgbhjn
That explains the behavior of all the drivers as I cycle to work. They are all
moral philosophers and believe that by killing me they provide donor organs to
save 6 others.

Maybe I need a cycling top that says "I don't carry a donor card"

~~~
logicalmind
No offense, I was a successful bmx racer for a number of years so I used to be
a hardcore bicyclist, but I really have a problem with bicyclists riding on
roads on which they have no ability to maintain the posted speed limit.

I experience this nearly every day on a road I drive to/from work. This is a
four-lane highway with a posted speed limit of 45mph. It is a favorite of
bicyclists for some reason so there are a lot of riders on the road, even
during rush hour. There are a handful of stoplights on this road over about a
5 mile stretch.

I have yet to see an bicyclist able to maintain a speed of 45mph nor do I see
them have the ability to accelerate away from a stoplight with the same
ability as an automobile. This leads to many traffic issues and numerous
dangerous situations. The issue is only barely related to the bicyclists. It
is mostly related to their abilities relative to other motorists. A
car/motorcycle that was driving on the same road with the same acceleration
and speed capabilities would be a nearly equivalent danger.

While I would never endanger a cyclist, I have seen many drivers put in danger
by the habits of cyclists. And in my personal opinion, there should be a law
that states that a cyclist should only be able to ride on roads for which they
can maintain the proper speed.

~~~
jrockway
I agree 100%. 45mph is way too fast; the speed limit should be a more
reasonable 15mph, and then everyone is on equal footing. (There are a lot less
serious injuries when cars collide at 15mph as opposed to 45mph. So even the
car drivers are safer!)

If you want to get to work fast, take the train.

~~~
statictype
I think the speed limit should be 45. If you want to go to work safely, take a
train. Just saying.

------
btilly
Here is what I think is going on.

First, you're putting people in a position where they are on the boundaries of
what they consider acceptable. Anything that affects those boundaries, will
affect their choice.

Conservatives in general have no problem with tribalism. In the abstract any
life is equal to any other life, but it is only reasonable that I should
personally protect the lives of my tribe (be that ethnic group, social class,
country) more diligently than I do another tribe. So conservatives tilt
towards protecting their tribe.

Liberals are not only not comfortable with overt tribalism, they are sensitive
to accusations of racism. So when pushed to the boundary, they won't tell the
interviewer that they'll kill the black guy - that could be seen as racist.
But the white guy doesn't have that protection, so off he goes.

Liberals no more want to off the white guy than conservatives do the black.
But silly things like "my tribe" or "I don't want to be seen as racist" affect
choices on the boundary.

~~~
yummyfajitas
A rather simpler explanation is simply that the black guy is a member of the
liberal tribe. A way to test this: replace "Chip" and "Tyrone" with, e.g., a
low income housing or gun rights activist.

~~~
btilly
Simpler, but I think incorrect. Liberals tend to take positions which include
going out of their way to fairly treat people that they very well know don't
agree with them. As exhibit A I would take about half the stuff the ACLU does,
and as exhibit B most of the efforts to support multiculturalism.

That is not to say that there are not liberal tribes - there clearly are - but
the mores that they have push them away from straightforward acceptance of
tribalism.

------
autarch
Another flaw in this sort of study is that there's an enormous disconnect
between what we _say_ we would do, and what we would _actually_ do.

I might say "yes, I would push Chip/Tyrone over the rail", because I really do
believe that's the best thing to do. But if I were actually faced with that
dilemma and had to murder someone, could I do it?

~~~
smallblacksun
There's also the fact that you would be making a complete guess that the man
was large enough to stop the trolley in real life, and if he wasn't you would
simply be adding another victim. Besides, a man large enough to stop a trolley
would be really hard to push.

~~~
Jeema3000
Exactly. There's no way to know if the action of pushing the fat man onto the
tracks would actually stop the train. Worst case scenario, you might end up
killing one extra person.

In the 'switching the track' example, on the other hand, the worst case
scenario is that your actions have no effect on the outcome and no additional
people die than would have died otherwise.

------
DanielBMarkham
This gave me a headache, and here's why: it's assuming a dichotomy where none
may exist.

For instance, I may believe that we should be as consistent as possible in our
moral views because society functions better that way. This is a utilitarian
argument, but it has deontological implications. Likewise I may feel that my
absolute morals requires me always to sacrifice one person for the many. This
is a moralistic position which looks like harsh determinism.

Or -- as implied here -- we can just make it up as we go along, mixing and
matching.

This study did nothing to disentangle these terms, choosing instead to define
them in such broad and contrasting ways as to create a question where none (or
a much deeper one) exists.

In short, you should study what you can clearly separate and identify. To do
otherwise is to waste your time. And ours.

------
Psyonic
I read an interesting paper on this phenomenon years ago (that we use morality
to justify, not reason).

A summary (not written by me): According to Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist
model (SIM), an individual's moral judgment normally arises from automatic
'moral intuitions'. Private moral reasoning—when it occurs—is biased and post
hoc, serving to justify the moral judgment determined by the individual's
intuitions.

[http://www.mc.edu/campus/academics/BIO/emotional%20dog%20rat...](http://www.mc.edu/campus/academics/BIO/emotional%20dog%20rational%20tail.pdf)

------
sprout
I find the bit about Iraqis vs. Americans a bit superficial. As a liberal, I
would consider collateral damage less of a problem when Americans die because
all Americans are responsible for the present situation in Iraq, while most
Iraqis are innocent bystanders. I view this as utilitarian: if people who
start wars have a greater chance of death than people who don't start wars,
this should in theory decrease the incidence of war.

Similarly, when we talk about Tyrone vs. Chip, this is a question of a poor
man vs. a rich man. But more to the point, "Chip Ellsworth III" evokes a
sterotype of the rich Connecticut blueblood, a parasite aristocrat.

A much more interesting study would actually look at people in different
clothes, with different skin tones. This just measures people's reaction to
someone whose father was overly proud of his lineage and is likely a rich
socialite.

Obviously this says something about my politics, but again it doesn't
necessarily say anything vis-a-vis deontology vs. utilitarianism. Again, my
impression of the name "Chip" is that he's a worthless individual who
contributes nothing to society.

However, even if we assume that both are model citizens, it stands to reason
that the death of the hypothetical lower-class black man is going to put his
family through significant hardship, while Chip's family has enough money that
mostly people will be getting a sudden unexpected influx of cash. So the
question really becomes: kill one man, or kill one man and ruin his family's
chance at a decent life.

~~~
defen
If you're going to play the odds and assume the blueblood is a "parasite",
shouldn't you also assume that the lower-class black man is not present to
support his family anyway?

~~~
sprout
Please finish reading my comment.

~~~
defen
I didn't mean in your response to the hypothetical question ('assume each is a
model citizen') - I meant in real life: "my impression of the name "Chip" is
that he's a worthless individual who contributes nothing to society."

~~~
sprout
I was being honest about my prejudices and examining them. I think yes, from
the finish of my comment, I should assume either the best or the worst of both
of them.

------
ewjordan
Here's one I've always liked, along the same lines, that tends to make even
the most committed utilitarians pause:

You need to build a driveway up to your new house, and there are two possible
routes, each one with a single maple tree in the way. One of the trees is very
old, but quite healthy, standing at least 50 feet high. The other was just
planted a few months ago, so is still quite small.

You're not the one that's going to cut the trees down, and the cost to do so
will be the same in both cases (let's say that the higher cost to cut down the
bigger tree is offset by the fact that the person cutting it down wants the
wood for himself) - which tree do you cut down, and why?

Now, this doesn't seem like a moral issue. Almost everyone would cut down the
smaller tree, for several reasons: it would take less time to grow a new one
of the same size, we wouldn't be destroying as much previous "work", etc. Very
logical, can't really argue with it.

But I lied. When I said "maple tree", what I really meant was "human", and
when I said "you need to build a path to your house," what I _really_ meant
was "we're all in a flimsy lifeboat, there's a nasty shark circling, and it
wants it some tasty human gubbins[1], so we either need to toss overboard the
50 year old award winning medical research doctor with a loving family of six
waiting for him at home, or a newborn baby. Or else we _all_ die!"

[Edit: As I pointed out in response to some of the comments, I probably should
have made the doctor younger, to avoid questions about whether he's already
used up most of his potential. I'd encourage you to think about what age he'd
need to be to change your decision...]

Anyone here _actually_ willing to stand up and say they'd toss the baby?
Because from a pure utilitarian point of view, it's the logical thing to do -
a newborn baby is a roll of the dice, likely to turn out as a completely
average adult, with zero expected value above and beyond any other newborn
baby that the same couple has, so they might as well just make another one.
OTOH the professor has proven himself to be near the top of the usefulness
curve, and the expected value of his remaining years is likely far greater
than that of the newborn, even after we factor in the mother's grief over
losing her baby.

It's a rare person that would actually make the choice to toss the baby - I
certainly don't think I could, but I can't really pin down my logic to
anything more compelling (in a rational sense) than "But it's a _baby_ , for
God's sake, it just feels so _wrong_!"

[1]: A strained extension of the term "gubbins"
(<http://www.thefreedictionary.com/gubbins>) outside its usual meaning?
Perhaps. But screw it, "gubbins" just sound like they would be so damned
tasty, I stand firmly behind my use of the word.

~~~
potatolicious
Key difference: sentience.

We keep the tree around because of its aesthetic or productive value to us -
i.e. the old maple tree is preferable (to us) over the younger. We are
inclined, in this case, to preserve the "work" we've already done to raise the
tree up to this point. We do not perceive the tree as conscious nor sentient.

The human, however, is, at least in our books. We care about the fact that the
child has a lifetime of experiences that it has yet to experience - and we
value said experiences, and most of us I think would agree that every human is
reasonably entitled to experiencing the highs and lows of life.

I'm not sure if it's valid to harp on people for having different logic and/or
morals when it comes to dealing with sentient subjects as opposed to not. It
seems to me entirely logically consistent to treat the two differently.

~~~
CWuestefeld
Sentience is certainly a difference between trees and humans, and probably a
crucial difference.

However, some studies show that, depending on your definition of sentience, a
baby might not fit into the category. There are many things (from memory:
seeing moral consequences; some kinds of _what if_ processes; understanding
analogies) that aren't available to a person until 5-6 years old. Even trivial
concepts such as the idea that an object still exists even when it's out of
sight are not in the toolbox of a baby.

~~~
tome
The issue is of sentience in humans and non-sentience in trees -- not of
developed sentience in adults and yet-to-be-developed sentience in babies.

~~~
TheAmazingIdiot
I wouldn't argue that if I were you. Who says trees aren't sentient? They may
be made of fibers of cellulose, but plants and trees both respond to stimulus.
Perhaps they think "slower" and of a different way.

~~~
potatolicious
The general consensus is that trees aren't sentient. They may very well be -
but that's beyond the scope of this particular argument.

The original assertion is that people are being logically inconsistent by
wanting to sacrifice the young tree, yet reluctant to sacrifice the young
child. Based on the premise of tree non-sentience, it is entirely logically
consistent that the two cases be decided differently.

The problem with tree sentience in general is that we have yet to define
"think" in the context you are using it.

------
joe_the_user
Honestly,

From just thinking about such "experiments", I'd say that such an event is so
outside the experience of most people that they simply would not have a
mechanism for making such a decision. The somewhat less painful issues around
"the right to die" are still very distressing when you are actually confronted
with them. For example, consider the unwillingness of soldiers to fire in
combat: [http://www.historynet.com/men-against-fire-how-many-
soldiers...](http://www.historynet.com/men-against-fire-how-many-soldiers-
actually-fired-their-weapons-at-the-enemy-during-the-vietnam-war.htm)

Certainly, some people do make such decisions in times of war or times of
disaster. I doubt, however, that those folks have dealt with such brutal
dilemas would find an evening of exchanging philosophical hypotheticals on the
subject terribly enlightening.

------
hltan
Why is this so hard? The law clearly states, if you do nothing you are free.
If you do something, you have taken the liability of said action. Unless by
doing nothing, you are in violation of your duty. But still I would gladly
accept an administrative slap, than a legal one... 100 people or not.

~~~
JoeAltmaier
...clearly, a utilitarian argument.

~~~
hltan
don't you love it when the rules are so simple?

~~~
jmatthews
Which brings up another issue with the study. If you use the "rational actors"
canard of Econ101. Everyone asked is trying to maximize their economic
utility.

So the opportunity cost of inaction beats action. The study should at least
require some form of action of roughly equal cost(liabilities and pyhsical
action) to occur in order to zero out this input.

I'd also like to rebuff the "action == moral code" statement. There is nothing
more common than action that flies in the face of your moral code. Thus the
"let he who is without sin" truism.

Effecting a utilitarian outcome despite your moral code does not make it moral
in the eyes of the person acting, and it can denote either courage or
cowardice.

------
jdrock
I call BS on the test.

 _Interesting. You state that Casey Jones should divert the train, yet this
will cause the death of the person trapped on the railway siding. This seems
to be inconsistent with your belief that it is always wrong to cause another
person's death. It is somewhat perplexing that you responded this way, since
you do not believe that this course of action is necessiated by any general
moral requirement to maximise the happiness of the greatest number of people.
More of this later. For now, let's see what you make of the scenario below._

Choosing to let 1 person die so that 5 can live does not mean I find that
action moral. It's simply the better of two options.

~~~
CWuestefeld
That _is_ a moral code. The whole point of the question is whether your code
is _absolute_ : can you kill someone if the alternative is worse, or can you
absolutely not kill someone regardless of the alternative?

~~~
JoeAltmaier
Sometimes the thing that has to die, is my moral code. Of course we must save
the most people; of course it is immoral, and my immortal sould will suffer,
but I am only one person and its worth it.

------
reader5000
Xenophobia is a well-known behavioral trait, this study seems to indicate
xenophilia exists as well (i.e., Americans being more accepting of American
causalities than Iraqi).

~~~
amh
It bugs me when stuff like that is described as "xenophobia". It's possible to
dislike something (or have a preference for the alternative) without fearing
it. Even when the basis for the dislike is irrational -- if you prefer
chocolate ice cream does that imply that you fear strawberry?

~~~
MartinCron
The -phobia suffix doesn't indicate fear exclusively, it's also used to
describe profound distaste and dislike. Just like with homophobia, One doesn't
have to be specifically afraid of gay people to be homophobic, though that is
often the case.

------
onan_barbarian
People who choose to not do in Chip Elsworth the 3rd are excessively
discounting the future utility of taking this course of action. To wit, being
undisturbed by whitey in the future and free to go on to find a white woman
wearing a navy blue sweater.

