
Bruce Schneier debates former TSA boss - DiabloD3
https://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/822
======
jonnathanson
First: this "Economist Debates" format is a wonderful idea, but questionably
executed. Its layout could use quite a bit of rethinking, focusing on
improving usability for those who've only stumbled onto the debate after its
conclusion (as I assume most of us have). I'm guessing that the format felt
more natural and threadlike to those who were along for the ride from the get-
go. But there's real value in being able to read the debate, after the fact,
from start to finish in an intuitive and easy-to-follow fashion.

As for the content of the debate: I've been following Schneier's commentary on
airport security for at least a few months now. What he's saying is no
surprise to me. He's preaching to a choir of which I am a fast and firm
member. On the other hand, I'm actually amazed at the willingness of his
opponent (Kip Hawley) to concede some points that I would have thought were
held as unshakable dogma amongst the TSA-apologist set. To me, genuine
progress was made in this debate. This was not a case of two people's arguing
pre-fixed talking points in circles around each other. This felt more like a
real discussion, with give and take.

Kudos to The Economist for hosting this debate, and for attempting to innovate
on the printed-debate format. To date, it's a format that nobody's quite
nailed. (Nor, for that matter, has The Economist here). But it's an
interesting step forward.

~~~
ahi
I suspect it is significant that Kip Hawley is former administrator. He is no
longer being paid to stick to the party line in the face of reason and fact. A
debate with the current administrator would be a display of colossal
stupidity.

~~~
streptomycin
Schneier previously interviewed him back when he was still with the TSA:
<http://www.schneier.com/interview-hawley.html>

------
davidw
Please don't editorialize in the titles. Also, there's a lot of material
there, what are you referring to, exactly?

From the guidelines:

"You can make up a new title if you want, but if you put gratuitous editorial
spin on it, the editors may rewrite it."

~~~
visural
I would assume this - "I have made two basic arguments about post-9/11 airport
security. One, we are not doing the right things. And two, the things we are
doing are wrong."

~~~
davidw
There's also the moderator stating that Schneier won. The derrier handoff is
not obvious at a glance. I think a more neutral title would be better; this is
an important debate, not cheering for your favorite sports team.

~~~
ktizo
However, it is also worth considering that a more neutral title may not have
made it onto the front page.

~~~
ktizo
I wasn't aware that I was making that contentious a statement.

Was just meaning that the titles on a news site are effectively headlines and
that the style of how they are written can massively effect how much attention
they are given.

~~~
goostavos
>massively effect how much attention they are given.

This is very true. And is also a massive problem with news sites. You didn't
post a accurate, descriptive title, you posted an editorialized opinion.

Yes, you get lots of views if you distort the article (18% do NOT agree that
he lost the debate), but catchy title does not good journalism make.

I think HN should shy away from this sort of thing. We'll all complain about
Fox, MSNBC and the Drudge Report for their ridiculous headlines (This just in,
Obama sacrificed a child! Click for story!!), lets apply the same set of
critical standards here.

Otherwise we'll become /r/politics..

~~~
ktizo
I didn't post any title, accurate, descriptive or otherwise.

I'm not the OP, I was just commenting is all.

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galaktor
I went to this site 3 times now and still have no idea how to use it. What
should I be reading here? Usability FAIL.

~~~
djKianoosh
I think the problem is the original link doesn't really go to the beginning or
the 'home', as it were.

Here's the start: <https://www.economist.com/debate/overview/225>

then it starts to make sense IMO.

in the end, yes, a bit of a usability hiccup.

~~~
galaktor
Thanks. The fact that it needed explaining says it all, though. Nonetheless,
the debate format is interesting.

------
randlet
"More than 6 billion consecutive safe arrivals of airline passengers since the
attacks on America on September 11th 2001 mean that whatever the annoying and
seemingly obtuse airport-security measures may have been, they have been
ultimately successful."

The first paragraph of Hawley's opening statement is a complete non-sequitur
and doesn't bode well for the rest of his arguments.

~~~
DamnYuppie
The question left unanswered was how many safe arrivals were there before
9/11? There statement in no way proves or even correlates save arrivals.

The Sun has risen every day since I was born, you are all welcome!

------
willvarfar
So the TSA guy is trying at every turn to say there has been some value and
success in the current procedures, whereas Schneier says there have been none.

But both agree on a picture of airport security going forward that is much
more pre-911.

So its the TSA guy trying to CYA and not be held accountable for the cost
carried so far, but conceding it has to end.

~~~
viraptor
> "is trying at every turn to say there has been some value"

And failing to provide one well documented example. No, just saying there were
some cases is not fine. We've had very detailed examples of issues from people
who experienced them, we looked at videos taken on cameras, we've heard
multiple analysis of the failures. From the other side I've heard only "there
were some successes, really". They completely fail to validate this point...

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marcamillion
How does one read this debate? I don't think starting at the top and reading
down makes sense....but am I wrong?

------
astine
So I read the entire debate and while I generally agree Schneier on this topic
one of Mr Hawley's arguments gave me a few second thoughts about the efficacy
of reactive security.

Bruce's argument is like this: There are two kinds attackers, amateurs and
pros. Amateurs are easily caught because they don't have the time or knowledge
to properly plan an attack and the pros have the resources to work around any
defenses the TSA has set up because the TSA cannot be proactive enough in its
measures. Bruce argues that post-9/11 security measures are both superfluous
and insufficient at the same time.

However, what if the amateurs and pros could work together? What if the pros
developed attacks and published the directions? Amateurs could use those
directions to their hearts content. In that sense, reactive security may not
prevent al Qaeda from attempting new clever attacks, but it will prevent
copycat attacks an the part of sympathizers (or folks with their own agendas)
who have no overt connections to major terrorist networks. Organized criminal
hacker organizations have been known to pull this very same stunt by releasing
easy to use programs which make it possible for dilettantes to pull off
attacks that they would otherwise be unable to do.

In fact, it's a little bit like computer security, where, every time a
vulnerability is discovered, either by a security researcher, or through a
successful zero-day exploit, a patch is developed to plug the hole and
thousands of sysadmins apply the patch as soon as possible. In this way, we
can't prove that say, Apache, has no vulnerabilities, but we can be sure that
it has no known vulnerabilities and all the easy ones to find have been dealt
with long ago.

So it seems to me, that by routinely 'plugging holes' so to speak by
implementing reactive measures, the TSA is increasing the marginal cost of
each attack for al Qaeda significantly, and this hypothetically, does increase
security.

Of course, that doesn't detract from any of the other arguments against the
TSA in it current incarnation, especially the obvious haphazardness of its
measures, the occasional abusiveness of screeners, and its political essence.
It does though, seem to make one of Bruce's arguments seem less strong.

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squozzer
It's not as though the audience were disinterested judges -- they were
partisans, and more anti-TSA partisans showed up to vote. Popularity contest,
that's all.

And nothing will change though the Economist debate, or any other debate. Only
declining profits for the arilines, spurred by declining passenger miles, will
force change.

By then, TSA-esque processes will probably exist for every form of transport,
including automobiles.

~~~
acgourley
I disagree that nothing will change because of this debate.

It's slight, but now there is now a larger crop of people who understand two
viewpoints on an important issue and are armed with better rhetoric for the
view they espouse. That's a win.

------
crusso
You go, Bruce.

Isn't it stunning how long it takes for our elected representatives to even
begin to decide to do the right thing?

Granted, there was an overreaction to security following 9/11. We understand
that the TSA needed to figure out how to do the job the public expected. We
gave them almost a decade.

Concerns started to really amp up at the end of 2010 when those scanners
started to appear. Last year, when so many stories surfaced of children being
trauma-searched, TSA employees misusing the near-naked images, and then the
full-body grope pat-downs -- I fully expected some prompt hearings and action
from our elected representatives.

What did we hear from the people who are supposed to be protecting the
citizenry? Nothing.

Better late than never, I guess.

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d2vid
>"[I]f tomorrow air passengers were offered the option of a 'secure' flight on
which all passengers are subject to security, or a 'non-secure' one where they
could go straight to boarding, hassle-free," he writes, "I promise you that
many travellers would still take the 'secure' option."

I would take the "secure" option because who is left taking the "non-secure"
option? Terrorists.

If all the flights were "non-secure", just like every train ride, then we
spread the terrorists out and my odds are better.

~~~
epo
This quoted argument is moronic, he is saying in effect "either do it our way
or not at all". No one is saying there should be no security at all. In the
rest of the world there was pre-boarding security prior to 9/11, it was pretty
much only the US where there was very little security on domestic flights,
this presented a soft underbelly to attackers which only an idiot would have
ignored.

El Al is the perfect example of how flight security should be achieved, and
yes, it involves profiling to select the people you want to pay most attention
to.

------
ktizo
Does he also hand him a grainy greyscale picture of it too?

------
gregwebs
I wish Bruce Schneier in an otherwise nice essay wouldn't propagate the meme
"the goal of terrorists is to terrorize".

The end goal of terrorists is to fight a war or change government policy
(through acts of violence). They may have a goal of terrorizing, and they may
even enjoy causing harm and terror, but that is still a means to some other
end, not an end in itself. The USA is targeted because of how it exercises its
power in foreign policy. That does not imply that terrorism is deserved, just
that actions have consequences and should be discussed in a more intelligent
way rather than deceiving ourselves with over-simplistic notions.

~~~
mattdeboard
One need only to quote your post to refute it:

> I wish Bruce Schneier in an otherwise nice essay wouldn't propagate the meme
> "the goal of terrorists is to terrorize".

> [Terrorists] may have a goal of terrorizing, and they may even enjoy causing
> harm and terror...

Is it a meme, or is it a fact? The truth is, it's a fact. Terrorists use fear
& intimidation (and yes, terror) to coerce governments, through public
opinion, to change certain policies.

Terror is both the means to an end, and an end in and of itself. You are
unequivocally wrong.

