
Handling of CPU bugs disclosure 'incredibly bad': OpenBSD's de Raadt - bigato
https://www.itwire.com/security/81338-handling-of-cpu-bug-disclosure-incredibly-bad-openbsd-s-de-raadt.html
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peatmoss
Even if you don't run OpenBSD, you almost certainly use code written by the
OpenBSD project—probably in a security-sensitive context.

Given that I rely on the OpenBSD project for things like secure access to
remote systems (OpenSSH), I'd love to think that someone might loop them in on
major vulnerabilities... just in the off chance that I might otherwise be
adversely impacted.

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usernam33
Yeah thx for that OpenBSD, but you patched early when the KRACK ATTACK hit.
There is one important rule to follow when using nda: dont sneak! But ofc they
should get a new chance.

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Paianni
They were given the go-ahead to release the patch by the author of the
vulnerability.

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jjeaff
But isn't the agreement of not releasing early more to do with coordinating
with other vulnerable systems? The person who found the vulnerability wouldn't
care if one OS releases before another. But if I am Ubuntu, I'm pissed if
openbsd released early and publicly reveals a zero day that I'm not ready to
patch yet.

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Paianni
None of that is OpenBSD's responsibility.

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Jeff_Brown
Did Intel really time disclosure of the Meltdown (which is Intel-specific) bug
to coincide with disclosure of Spectre?

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ac29
Intel didn't disclose first, Google did (before the agreed upon embargo date).
Its a great writeup: [https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-
privi...](https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-
memory-with-side.html)

