
Explanation of the Asiana SF crash by a former UAL captain - rikelmens
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-63.html#post7931852
======
SilasX
To save you from looking up the more obscure acronyms like I did (summaries
where given are my own words):

RTO: Rejected take-off, when you have to abort a take-off (though it seems in
the context of the post, the exercise described involved an edge case when you
should go ahead with the take-off)

AGL: Above ground level

CAVOK: Ceiling and Visibility are OK: no clouds < 5000 ft AGL, with >10 km
visibility

VOR approach: VHF omnidirectional radio range: navigating based on a radio
signal, considered "non-precision"

IAF: Initial approach fix
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Initial_approach_fix](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Initial_approach_fix)

LNAV/VNAV: lateral/vertical navigation
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LNAV](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LNAV)

FAF: Final approach fix

UNSAT: unsatisfactory rating (paperwork)

FCOM: Flight crew operating manual

CRM/CLR: Cockpit resource management, a set of NASA-originating practices to
limit and contain human error
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crew_Resource_Management](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crew_Resource_Management)

~~~
rdl
I was unclear on his example -- their manual says to ignore "aft cargo door"
cautions during takeoff? Are those known to be false-positives, or just not
that important? I thought the cargo doors were structural parts of the
aircraft, and thus having them open would cause both structural and
aerodynamic problems. Maybe they just continue takeoff and land again?

~~~
omegant
In modern planes there is a filter on the warning computer that doesn´t allow
to show certain non vital failures between 80 knots (or 100 depending the
plane) and V1. For example an engine fire is going to trigger the alarm, but
not an engine EGT (exhaust gas temp) over limit. But the list of warnings not
shown, and the ones shown but that must be ignored, are different from plane
to plane. That´s why this instructor was doing this test, to make them learn
that the 777 had a different list and requirements from the previous one. Mind
you that after you´ve been in 2 or 3 different planes it´s easy to react
automatically but with the previous plane list.

It´s known that pilots are oversensitive to warnings during take off. A
rejected take off is a dangerous maneuver that must be avoided if unnecessary,
and is trained in each simulator session. This is more important in wide body
airliners like the 747, 777, A340 or A380, as their take off weight is so high
that a RTO (rejected take off) will blowout some tires (of the main landing
gear) due to the stress or the temperature increase inside the tire created by
the brakes. Once the plane is stopped, it has to wait isolated at the taxiway
because there are temperature plugs at the tires that may blow out, nobody can
get close during that time. If the weight is too high they will even burn as
the brakes will be white hot. Look at youtube for a certification RTO of a big
plane to see it, or some brake energy absorption test at the laboratory, to
see how much energy they have to mannage.

In this case(the simulator story) a after cargo door is one of those warnings
that you have to ignore as the plane will flight without problems, then you
may turn around and make a landing after dumping some fuel(to decrease the
weight).

Hope this helps

Edit: some clarification

Below 80 it is possible to RTO without problems as the speed is still low.
Once you reach V1 you will NEVER RTO! as this speed is calculated taking in to
account the runway length, and in such a manner that if you RTO at V1, the
runway remaining once you have stopped is just a couple dozen of meters. The
V1 is so high because that way, when you become airborne, you´ll have a better
climb gradient even with an engine fail. All this stuff is calculated with an
engine fail, after all it is the most important and probable fail you will
encounter (the reverse deployment on take-off is much more severe but
thankfully very very rare), and that will affect your climb capability.

Edit 2: added-improved some punctuation.

~~~
lifeisstillgood
[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wXpjBxD0Rhg](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wXpjBxD0Rhg)

An example of the braking test - stopping a 288 tonne 777 travelling at
200mph. The disc brakes were on fire, and they then had to taxi around on
wheels at a temp of 3000 deg for five minutes to simulate the time it took for
fire trucks to arrive.

Cool

~~~
trimbo
The entire 5 hour documentary I think this is from about the 777 is awesome
and definitely worth the watch.

It was on PBS, called "21st Century Jet"

~~~
rdl
As amazing as the 777 is, the 787 seems to be even better (and there's talk of
updating the 777 with 787 technology).

I really hope next time they go shopping for Air Force One they take budget
into consideration, and the end of the cold war, and ETOPS, and seriously
consider a twin engine (ideally a 787 with a reduction in passengers, but
probably they'd go with a 777 and continue taking way too many people.)
Outside of cargo and the military, four engine passenger jets seem to be a
dying species. (and obviously the A380 and other airbus products aren't in the
running for AF1. I still haven't gotten a chance to fly on an A380.)

------
marze
I find air disasters a strangely compelling topic, so I've read all 82 pages
of comments on that site. Lots of very experienced pilots post wide range of
views.

Here is a list of the likely factors that contributed to the crash, based on
my reading of the comments at pprune.com:

poor piloting skills, specifically not monitoring speed during landing, a very
basic skill

recent switchover of flight pilot from Airbus to Boeing (Boeing planes have
throttles that physically move when the thottle setting is changed by
automatic systems, Airbus doesn't)

misunderstanding of details of automatic thrust control

inexperience of pilot conducting the training (new to being trainer, 1st
flight apparently)

glide slope system on the runway was inoperable, otherwise would have possibly
been used and the crash wouldn't have occurred

possible crew social status issues, a known flight-deck issue in some
cultures, where those of lower status are hesitant to correct those of high
status, but it doesn't seem likely a big factor here

FLCH 'trap', where if you use a certain type of autopilot setting, you might
expect the thrust to keep the speed at or above a certain level with automatic
throttle adjustments, but it doesn't happen

To summarize, it appears the two pilots at the control thought the jet was in
a mode where it automatic thrust control would maintain an approach speed, but
when they increased angle of attack just before landing (basically gliding
decent up until then), the speed fell off and the throttles did not move
automatically, and they failed to note the falling speed until it was too late
to avoid crashing. (once you command full throttle from idle, it takes five
seconds for the engines to spin back up.)

If they had actually had the plane in the mode they thought it was in, they
would have had a perfect landing of the most routine kind.

~~~
jsnk
There are dozens of compelling hypotheses as to why this happened. But op
chose to submit this and people are up voting it and following the narrative
that it is something about pilots being Korean and their training. I find it
unsettling that the crowd of people whom I have thought to be more intelligent
than the masses isn't all that better than the majority.

~~~
tankenmate
Personally I think the Korea angle is a red herring. The issue seems to me to
be training and policy. Various air safety bodies around the world had
complained to the safety body in Korea about the levels of training (including
practice) of pilots. Foreign trainers were brought to Korea to up the quality
and level of pilot training _but the training policies themselves don 't seem
to have changed_. This seems to be a case of changing the/some of employees
but not the corporate culture; I'd expect similar problems in other companies
and countries, I don't think it is unique to Korea / Korean culture.

~~~
mikehotel
I think the forum poster also tried to indicate some of these problems are not
unique to Koreans. The part at the end about inflated logbooks due to
autopilot was interesting to me. Quote from cached page on google:

 _Finally, I 'll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they
claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that
I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them
friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not
the norm.

Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight
concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US
or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff,
in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged after
takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might
fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800 ft
after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then
he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real flight time or real
experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, its the same
only they get more inflated logbooks.

So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a
17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises
the hair on the back of my neck._

------
HarryHirsch
You encounter _a lot_ of this behaviour in students when they show up in a
research lab for the first time, having taken only lab classes and lectures
before, and it isn't at all confined to East Asians. It's always a shock to
see that your experiments don't turn out as intended and to recognize that all
the class exercises have some bearing in real life, so to speak.

Some people never make the transition to independent work, and those are
handed their ass fairly quickly, at least in a working lab. If what the fellow
writes in this article is true, KAL and friends have some work to do.

~~~
hkmurakami
makes sense, both the head and copilot on this flight were relatively
inexperienced on the 777.

I wonder if the Airline had laid off their veteran (and hence high earning)
pilots earlier (which would have exacerbated such a situation with
inexperienced pilots); it's certainly not unheard of in the industry.

Lastly, apparently the Asiana Air CEO has been quoted as saying that all
responsibility lies with the pilots and that he and/or the company are not
responsible. Great to know that your boss has your back >_>

~~~
kryptiskt
> Lastly, apparently the Asiana Air CEO has been quoted as saying that all
> responsibility lies with the pilots and that he and/or the company are not
> responsible. Great to know that your boss has your back

So who is responsible for hiring good pilots?

~~~
badclient
So who is responsible for hiring a good CEO?

So who is responsible for hiring a good board?

So who is responsible for getting good owners?

So where does the buck stop?

------
ghshephard
An interesting thought experiment is speculate as to when the state of the art
in automated flight control and supervision (AFC&S) advances to the point at
which human intervention in the flight process causes more harm than good.

I'm guessing it will be about the same time that human surgeons are
significantly less effective than fully automated systems.

30 years? 50 years?

It's probably already reached the case that for the non-corner case scenario
(cross winds, flight emergency, exceptions) - that a fully automated system
probably meets the performance of a human pilot, and the human pilot's major
contribution is the ability to exercise executive judgement in the event of
exception cases.

~~~
dredmorbius
It'll be interesting to see which runs out: hands-on pilot skills, or cheap
petroleum to fuel commercial aviation.

Given the pretty resounding lack of positive news from biofuel replacement
projects (where _is_ that MASBI report that's due out this year). Ah, here we
go:
[http://www.masbi.org/content/assets/MASBI_Report.pdf](http://www.masbi.org/content/assets/MASBI_Report.pdf)

US commercial and military aviation consumes 20 billion gallons of jet fuel
annually.

Best biofuel generation from crop seeds (canola) runs 80-120
gallons/acre/year. Let's call it 100 gallons even.

Replacing that fuel would require 200 million acres of land. The US has 409
acres of arable land.

Would you prefer to eat as much as you are now, and stick to ground (or
airship) transport, or go on a 50% calorie reduction but retain the ability to
fly at speeds over 130 MPH?

~~~
enko
> which runs out: hands-on pilot skills, or cheap petroleum to fuel commercial
> aviation

Are you kidding? Have you seen the numbers for fracking and methane hydrates?
The age of cheap hydrocarbon fuel seems to be _beginning_ , not ending.

What that means for the environment I don't know, but the numbers, if they
bear out (and they certainly are for fracking) are stunning.

~~~
stcredzero
Methane being a much more potent greenhouse gas is worrying, especially with
regards to hydrates.

~~~
enko
Definitely. If the methane thing pans out .. well, in 10 years time we'll
probably be totally desensitised to news headlines that read something like
"Reflective cloud seeding program starting over Pacific basin" or "Mirror
assembly nearing completion at LaGrange Point".

I just don't think we have the ability to stop ourselves huffing at that
hydrocarbon crack pipe so I think we'll have to switch to management rather
than prevention in this generation.

------
nikcub
_Original forum post was deleted. A mirror:_

Low-down on Korean pilots, (From a friend).

After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the -400, I got a job as a
simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When
I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting
skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal
progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One
big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and
progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade
fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By
the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found
them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and
airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the
people to be very pleasant, it is a minefield of a work environment ... for
them and for us expats.

One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and
reported on every training session. I dont think this was officially
sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database
was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the
sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example; I
used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to initiate an RTO and
I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was on the B-737 NG and
many of the captains were coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the
Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days
after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden
they all got it; and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals).
The word had gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training
program.

We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents
(most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the
outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport
Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or
face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and
Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has
another. When I was there (2003-2008) we had about 60 expats conducting
training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA,
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia.
Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire
some instructors from there.

This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained
resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified
instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce normal
standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to
master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt
crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that
requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with
good reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didnt compute that you needed to be a
1000 AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5
years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training
and sometimes if I just couldnt pass someone on a check, I had no choice but
to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance
against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned
out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on
the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL
was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and
continued a fly while talking about how unfair Captain so-and-so was.

Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe
these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By
the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered
them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the
approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested Radar Vectors to
final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have
cleared him to the IAF and then Cleared for the approach and he could have
selected Exit Hold and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So,
I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed
to Extend the FAF and he couldnt understand why it would not intercept the
LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and
missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was Hold at
XYZ. Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just
like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their
own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major
errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY
aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was
dictated by KAL).

This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not
more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the
future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are already required to hire
a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in
them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best
trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in
the USA) who flew C-141s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea
and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on
the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual
PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with
trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce some sort of
duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and
JAILED!

The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability
to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour
before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with
the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But,
putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind
landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it
out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess.
First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the
first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of
learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge
authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it
still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just cant change 3000
years of culture.

The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there is
virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. Its actually illegal to own a
Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are
Ok. I guess they dont trust the people to not start WW III by flying 35 miles
north of Inchon into North Korea. But, they dont get the kids who grew up
flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do
recruit some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get
them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the
ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval
Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would
get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible
pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!

Finally, I'll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim.
I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met
and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends.
They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the
norm.

Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight
concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US
or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff,
in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged after
takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might
fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800 ft
after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then
he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real flight time or real
experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, its the same
only they get more inflated logbooks.

So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a
17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises
the hair on the back of my neck.

~~~
ScottBurson
The problem here is clearly political. Somebody made the decision to fire
these instructors; that decision was surely supported by senior management and
then the government.

What should happen here is that the FAA, EU, and other countries that were
originally involved in getting the Koreans to hire these expat instructors in
the first place -- these countries should demand final say over all instructor
personnel decisions.

This will mean the Koreans basically giving up control of their training
program, which will be a huge piece of humble pie for them to eat. But there
is no other solution. Either the pilots will be trained properly or they will
continue making entirely preventable mistakes and killing people.

EDITED to add clarification: I know nothing about flying planes. My comment is
about organizational dysfunction.

OH, and another thought: I don't know anything about this forum except that it
calls itself a "Rumour Network". The fact that this post was deleted makes me
wonder -- who is keeping issues like this from being aired? It's clear that
the author has nothing against Koreans per se -- he just doesn't like to see
incompetent pilots flying aircraft.

~~~
davepage
[http://www.flyertalk.com/forum/british-airways-executive-
clu...](http://www.flyertalk.com/forum/british-airways-executive-
club/416219-ot-ryanair-sues-balpa-pprune-pilots-website-posted-
complaints.html)

It is very easy to sue under UK libel law, and pprune has been compelled to
identify OPs before.

------
lawnchair_larry
For anyone as confused as me, the post that this linked to was deleted from
the conversation.

~~~
Piskvorrr
Still mirrored in various web caches, such as Google's:
[http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:R5Q2LM3...](http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:R5Q2LM3XCXkJ:www.pprune.org/rumours-
news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-
francisco-63.html+http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-
crash-san-francisco-63.html%23post7931852&client=opera&hl=cs&gl=cz&strip=1)

~~~
pvdm
Now also deleted.

------
kaptain
One interesting aspect that the poster brought up was attributing some of the
deficiencies to culture. Cultures which emphasize rote memorization in their
education are usually maligned by western cultures because they result in
individuals who lack the ability to improvise and adapt. Does anyone have any
examples that go the other way (i.e. cultural aspects of western education
that result in an individual being poorly suited for an occupation...even to
the point of causing fatalities like being an airplane pilot)?

~~~
texuf
Specifically, I think teaching k-12 is an occupation that requires a great
deal of knowledge acquired via route memorization.

Anecdotally, my third grade teacher didn't understand long division, my eighth
grade history teacher didn't know what an annotated bibliography was, and my
9th grade geometry teacher was debilitatingly dyslexic. While this didn't kill
me, millions of Americans graduating college are crippled by debt - perhaps
because they couldn't do the simple math required to make a budget and
understand what would be required to pay it back?

~~~
rwallace
My experience is that it's not a problem when a teacher doesn't know some
particular fact from memory as long as he can say "I'll get back to you on
that," and subsequently go and look it up.

I suspect the people falling into the college debt trap are by and large not
doing so because they couldn't do the math. I suspect they are doing so
because they didn't realize in the first place that they should make the
decision with the part of their brain that does math calculations rather than
the part that does social status calculations.

------
brettnak
Since a lot of this has been coming up I thought many people might like to
know the basics of how the auto-thrust system is used. Some of this
information could be slightly inaccurate so if a real pilot wants to correct
anything here, that would be great. The auto-pilot setting for autothrust ( _A
/T_) has a lot of modes. You don’t specifically set the mode so much as a
combination of settings can affect the mode that it’s in. The modes are the
following (this is fairly generic and probably not exactly how the 777 system
works):

 _A /T_ by itself will simply hold a specified airspeed by adjusting the
Thrust Levers.

 _A /T_ \+ _FL /CH_ \+ _V /S_ \+ _Alititude Hold_ : (Auto-Thrust + Flight
Level Change + Vertical Speed + Altitude Hold) climb or descend to the set
altitude by the set vertical speed at the specified airspeed. The thrust
levers are maniplated by the system. Generally once the altitude is attained,
V/S and FL/CH will turn off.

 _A /T_ \+ “V/S”: The same as the above but with no set altitude.

 _A /T_ \+ _Thrust Hold_ : I looked at the 777 main control panel and I
couldn’t find the setting for Thrust Hold, however it seems to be referred to
in various things on the internet and I just don’t know what to look for. This
setting is normally used for takeoff (maybe landing?) where the pilot sets an
airspeed and a thrust (via the thrust levers) and the airspeed is regulated by
pitching the aircraft up or down.

 _A /T_ \+ _Thrust Hold_ \+ _FL /CH_ \+ _Altitude Hold_ : This setting is
similar to the one above, but without setting a vertical speed. The indicated
airspeed is controlled via pitching the aircraft up or down until the
specified altitude is reached. I believe once the altitude is reached FL/CH
mode is switched off as well as Thrust Hold.

This is my best guess as to what the 5 modes the NTSB says the 777 has. If any
pilots could correct anything I’m missing or that is simply wrong, that would
be great.

Switching between modes is really not intuitive because you’re fiddling with
settings and it’s hard to know what button press is actually going to tell the
system to do something. If you’re interested in how confusing it can actually
be, I’d recommend installing the x-plane trial and trying to mess with these
settings.

If you want to give it a go, the beginner’s tutorial for x-plane & the 777 has
you do a visual landing on 28L @ KSFO

[http://wiki.x-plane.com/777_beginners_tutorial#Landing_the_7...](http://wiki.x-plane.com/777_beginners_tutorial#Landing_the_777_at_KSFO)

------
arjn
I'm curious about what the other pilot was doing. According to news articles,
the second pilot was more experienced and qualified for that aircraft.
Shouldn't he/she have been monitoring the approach ?

~~~
hyperbovine
He/she was the far junior of the two pilots and was reluctant to challenge
authority. Or so the story goes.

~~~
more_original
But we don't actually know for sure that this is what happened, right? At this
point it seems to be just speculation that is being repeated as hearsay.

------
Aloha
I'm going to ask a dumb question.

I have a commercial drivers license, I've driven semi tractors, large straight
trucks, and a wide variety of passenger vehicles.

Is it safe to presume that flying one type of widebody airliner is the same as
flying any other kind of widebody airliner?

I can drive a Pete, Freightliner or International and they all largely drive
in the same broad generalities.

Just as I can drive any full size car, and they all drive the same.

Would two similar classes or aircraft be the same?

~~~
repiret
(In the US) for airplanes with a maximum gross weight over 12,500 lbs, you
require a "type rating" on your license to fly the plane. The type rating is
for a specific make and model (type) of airplane. So if you have an Airline
Transport pilot certificate with a 777 type rating, you cannot legally fly a
757 (unless you have a 757 type rating)

This distinction shows up not just in the law. I have many hours flying a
Cessna 172, but when I recently bought a 182, some insurance quotes required
as much as 10 hours of instruction, even though I could legally fly the 182
without any at all.

(Disclaimer: I haven't actually flown large airplanes or driven tractor
trailers - someone more experienced is welcome correct what comes below)

Tractor trucks are all pretty similar. Hydraulic power steering, air breaks,
unsynchronized transmissions, one engine, 18 wheels. They have similar
stopping distance, similar handling around turns, and nearly identical
controls.

Large planes on the other hand can have very different handling
characteristics and controls. Different approach speeds, different after-
takeoff checklists, different emergency procedures. Different navigation and
autopilot systems. Fly-by-wire systems even change the basic relationship
between control inputs and their effect on the plane.

~~~
chiph
There might be a special case for the 737 & 777\. What I have read is that
Boeing designed the cockpit of the 777 to match that of the 737, and so the
type rating is mostly transferable between the two.

~~~
sokoloff
The 757 and 767 share a common type rating. 737 and 777 do not. (The FAA
doesn't much live in a "mostly" world... :) )

Source: FAA Advisory Circular 61-89E
[http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAdvisor...](http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/list/AC%2061-89E/$FILE/Ac61-89e.pdf)

~~~
chiph
Thank you for spotting that.

------
joshuak
This just made me instantly search for the Malcolm Gladwell Korean air story,
which of course I'm not the first to think of.

[http://www.theatlanticwire.com/national/2013/07/malcolm-
glad...](http://www.theatlanticwire.com/national/2013/07/malcolm-gladwells-
cockpit-culture-theory-everywhere-after-asiana-crash/67058/)

------
lsh123
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3kREPMzMLk](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3kREPMzMLk)

------
ronilan
> "The X are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to
> fly an airplane well"

Turns out to be true for most X as long as: 1\. The speaker does not belong to
group X 2\. Speaker has one data point to support said inability.

Humans error. Humans that program machines error. Machines error.

Buckle your seatbelt.

~~~
javert
> Speaker has one data point

If we trust him, the OP is a flight instructor with many years of experience
training X. So, your dismissal is completely invalid.

> The speaker does not belong to group X

Clearly, your are subtly accusing the instructor of at least some kind of
racial prejudice; otherwise, this point would be completely irrelevant. And
that accusation doesn't seem warranted.

~~~
linohh
I was thinking about prejudice as well here, however this is not a racial
culture thing but a corporate culture thing. If an airline improves training
and quality assurance pro forma due to a formal threat of being shut down,
something is very, very broken. I'm not sure if I'd ever board a KE or OZ
airplane again. If the accusations here are true, both should be shut down
immediately.

~~~
comrade_ogilvy
The fact that the instructor may perhaps (or perhaps not) be mistakenly
attributing to Korean ethnic-culture certain worrying aspects is completely
unimportant. The real cultural problem is that an instructor perceives
pressure to pass students he believes should fail. That simple perception,
regardless of underlying cause, is a problem that sabotages efforts to
improve.

------
jontro
Looks like the pilots were blinded:
[https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6025618](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6025618)

------
tomgirl1
What NTSB has now said is that Auto-throttle has not 2 but 5 modes. Im not a
pilot so all I knew of was 2. That may be a combination of different auto-
pilot modes combined with auto-throttle modes.

But what seems clear is that the moment that the pilot turned off auto-pilot,
the flight was doomed to crash as the auto-throttle was not in the right mode
for landing. As in, a mode that would actually use thrust vs elevators to
maintain airspeed.

NTSB also revealed that course corrections were being done not at the latest
moment of 500 feet, but at 4000 feet 2.5 minutes before landing the plane was
off course, in which case supervision, and correction would have been
appropriate in a training scenario.

I hate to draw conclusions like this, but in today's modern aircraft pilots
only fly about 20-30 mins of a flight, takeoff and landing at most with
autopilot managing most of the rest under normal conditions.

The inability to hand fly an airliner, is a disqualifier to be a professional
pilot.

NTSB revealed that several modes on autopilot and autothrottle were being
cycled in the last 2.5 minutes of the Asiana descent perhaps indicating a
reluctance to hand-fly the plane and an over-reliance on automation.

Any commercial pilot that cant hand-fly a 777 on a perfectly clear day at SFO
should never see a commercial cockpit again.

~~~
InclinedPlane
What I find odd is that with such an increase in the use of simulators most
pilots should find flying an airplane by hand to be second nature.

~~~
cstross
(a) Real flight simulators are expensive (cost is an order of magnitude less
than a real airliner, but still in the millions, and they require skilled
operators to put the pilots through their paces),

(b) _As I understand it_ , commercial pilots get paid on the basis of a rather
paltry salary, topped up to a much higher rate per flying hour. So there's a
strong wage incentive for them to jump in the cockpit of a real plane as fast
as possible and get their experience that way rather than spending lots of
time training in the simulators.

(c) Modern airliners spend a lot, or even most, of their time on autopilot.
Which is not "the plane flies itself" \-- it's more like a very complicated
cruise control system in a car: you still need to observe and monitor what's
going on around you and periodically change some settings governing the
vehicle's behaviour. (Just as cruise control won't save you from a bend in the
road or an idiot on the other side of the highway crossing the central
divider, autopilots need constant supervision.)

But this is not "hand flying". Hand flying mostly comes down to take-off,
landing, and brown-pants moments, which is a small fraction of the time a
long-haul jet spends in operation. And most commercial airlines are going to
take a dim view of pilots who spill the drinks in business class by playing at
being a stick-and-rudder hero.

~~~
mikeash
Spill the drinks, or rip off the rudder and kill 265 people:
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_587](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_587)

Relying on the autopilot there would have avoided the crash. Of course, not
overreacting to minor turbulence would have avoided it too.

------
maxcan
This post was on /r/flying and was thoroughly debunked to be a hoax.

~~~
SilasX
Thanks for not posting the link.

Here was the best I could find:

[http://www.reddit.com/r/flying/comments/1hz2hc/former_ual_pi...](http://www.reddit.com/r/flying/comments/1hz2hc/former_ual_pilot_talks_about_korean_flight/)

Also this:
[http://www.reddit.com/r/aviation/comments/1hyd5b/an_interest...](http://www.reddit.com/r/aviation/comments/1hyd5b/an_interesting_spin_on_asian_flight_training/)

