
Are Cellphones a Flight Danger? They Are on These Boeing Jets - cmurf
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-18/are-cellphones-a-flight-danger-they-are-on-these-boeing-jets
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btown
The FAA safety bulletin:
[http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf/...](http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf/0/c2bcf2b2a4ea336886257d64006136e5/$FILE/2014-20-06.pdf)

> The cause of the unsafe condition stated in the Discussion section of this
> AD [airworthiness directive] is a known susceptibility of the [Honeywell]
> Phase 3 DUs [display units] to RF transmissions inside and outside of the
> airplane. This susceptibility has been verified to exist in a range of RF
> spectrum (mobile satellite communications, cell phones, air surveillance and
> weather radar, and other systems), and is not limited to WiFi transmissions.

> The phase 3 DUs provide primary flight information including airspeed,
> altitude, pitch and roll attitude, heading, and navigation information to
> the flightcrew. The NPRM proposed to require replacing the existing phase 3
> DUs with new phase 3A DUs and installing new DU database software. We are
> issuing this AD to prevent loss of flightcritical information displayed to
> the flightcrew during a critical phase of flight, such as an approach or
> takeoff, which could result in loss of airplane control at an altitude
> insufficient for recovery, or controlled flight into terrain.

And in response to a list of various airlines saying they were unable to
replicate the issue, the FAA wrote:

> We do not agree with the commenters' requests. We do not agree to share the
> underlying data in the AD. An AD is not an appropriate vehicle for sharing
> proprietary data. The susceptibility of phase 3 DUs to RF transmissions was
> initially identified during a WiFi STC installation by an operator and a
> WiFi vendor and reported to the FAA. As a result of this discovery, we
> performed a risk assessment for in-service airplanes equipped with phase 3
> DUs using our established COS process, which determined that an AD action
> was warranted for this issue. In 6 addition, Boeing did an independent
> safety review and also determined that the DU blanking was a safety issue
> using its own risk assessment process.

This is pretty ridiculous - and scary - stuff. It's 2019 and Airplane Mode
still might be necessary.

