
Unpublished and Untenured, a Philosopher Inspired a Cult Following - diodorus
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/books/review/irad-kimhi-thinking-and-being.html
======
gumby
What I've seen of kimhi's drafts has been pretty dense, harder to read than
Kripke(!), but important. In particular (IMHO) he ties a common thread from
hermeneutics, continental deconstruction[+] and, for me, modern computational
semantics, without the rigid and, IMHO, artificial platonism of American
analytical philosophy.

Why do I think it's important? When your cars have hand-built planners you
can't really call them (except metaphorically) "self-driving" no matter how
many CNNs you put in their vision system and to do so fakes you out to the
point where you end up running over women pushing bikes because nobody thought
to put in a handler for that case.

[+] I mean the point of early Derrida, not the fatuousnes of most
deconstructionist writing.

~~~
hyperpape
"IMHO, artificial platonism of American analytical philosophy"

Platonism has a meaning (or maybe more than one), and none of them describe
any shared assumptions of 20th century/contemporary American philosophy.
Please find a different term of abuse.

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jhedwards
"It is raining, but I don't believe it is raining" is certainly valid if I
propose it as one possible thing happening in the world, and yet if I make
that statement with the added context of "[I am asserting that right now] it
is raining..." then it is clearly contradictory. Stripping away context makes
the statement naturally ambiguous, and yet some decision is being made about
what kind of context is "correct" or "logical"? Am I missing something here?

~~~
masswerk
I think, this is really an everyday phenomenon. There are a number of
scenarios where this may apply:

Suspension of disbelief: I'm collaboratively participating in a narrative and
asserting certain truths is a premise to this collaboration, which is the very
act of making meaning. At the same time, I do not believe in the reality of
what is actually my psychological reality. This is a certainly a matter of
context switching, which is not reserved to art, but may also be observed in
real life.

In certain cases, the narrative which is the description of the real world,
which we wholeheartedly assert, becomes complex to an extent, where, while we
still acknowledge the correctness of this description, we find it increasingly
difficult to believe in, even on the basis of a working model, while still
working in and with it. Compare quantum physics, certain aspects of cosmology,
etc.

Parallel acknowledgement of contesting messages regarding the state of the
world or facts therein, especially in politics or systems of belief. I do know
that the regime I was asserting did this and this, but still I do not believe
that the leaders would have done so. (Compare German citizens guided through
concentration camps after WW II; I see it, I do know it to be true, but I do
not believe it.) Or, by the example of current SCOTUS hearings, I may believe
a certain witness (i.e., assert the content to be true), but still do not
believe that the other person would have committed the incriminated act,
still, I assert the testament of the witness as truth, which implies that the
act has been committed by this person, etc. (All kind of distortions arise
from this, some are even part of what we regard as objective history.)

~~~
sjg007
It’s not reality and it’s a logical contradiction. The question is to reason
about how to reason things you do not have a direct experience with.

~~~
masswerk
No proposition -- with the notable exception of a priori statements, which are
about constitutive elements of our internal reality -- is about reality, but
about our notion of reality – compare Kant. Reasoning is about synthetic
propositions, which are necessarily only as conceived and represented in our
internal reality. Logic is about what may be generalized in this, i.e., about
forming synthetic judgements based on a posteriori data. Regarding this data,
there is no chance to relate directly to reality, since nothing in our
experience relates directly to reality, but is formed by our inner and outer
senses. The same is true for any shared experience, commonly related to as
'reality' or 'truth'.

Since the truth of a proposition relates to a state of the world (reality),
the notion of a contradiction relates to this as well. Hence, we have to shift
our attention to the very nature of this world/reality and its representation,
when facing a contradiction. A contradiction just refers to an ambiguous
state, expressed as a non-exclusive duality of logical values. Now, we may
ask, is it the world, which is ambiguous, (we may never know), or is it our
representation, or, is there possibly more than a single
representation/context at once?

A (very simple) example: If we subscribe to the notion of color as a property
of an object, a solid colored object _is_ of a color, meaning, it may be
either blue or red, but not both at once. But, if our description of the world
includes the notion of a spectrum and mixed colors, it may be both blue and
red at once, commonly related to as a shade of violet or purple. The very
context may include the spectral description or not, it may be even ambiguous
about this.

~~~
sjg007
Well this is effectively meaningless. I can see why everyone went over to
analytical philosophy. Color is the absence of light and all that. Anything
you propose willl have some categorical membership grounded in something
measured and observed. The only thing you get in the interpretive weirdness
are rules that may or may not be consistent. Not to mention the more serious
issue of incompleteness and undecideability. I think that’s the whole issue.

~~~
masswerk
However, a proposition, like, "A says she knows it is raining, but A says at
the same time that she does not believe that it is raining", is about a state
of mind and a question regarding its logic is about what may be generalized. I
can't see where analytical philosophy may be of help here, as the proposition
would be just meaningless. (Let's say, Wittgenstein I wouldn't be of help,
Wittgenstein II maybe. But I wouldn't consider the latter as analytical in the
strict sense.)

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biomene
Assuming the article is correctly summarising his argument, this is the same
critique that Hegel put forward of the distinction of Force and Expression:

> It is often said that the nature of Force itself is unknown and only its
> manifestation apprehended. But, in the first place, it may be replied, every
> article in the import of Force is the same as what is specified in the
> Expression: and the explanation of a phenomenon by a Force is a mere
> tautology. What is supposed to remain unknown, therefore, is really nothing
> but the empty form of reflection-into-self, by which alone the Force is
> distinguished from the Expression — and that form too is something familiar.
> It is a form that does not make the slightest addition to the content and to
> the law, which have to be discovered from the phenomenon alone. Another
> assurance always given is that to speak of forces implies no theory as to
> their nature: and that being so, it is impossible to see why the form of
> Force has been introduced into the sciences at all. In the second place the
> nature of Force is undoubtedly unknown: we are still without any necessity
> binding and connecting its content together in itself, as we are without
> necessity in the content, in so far as it is expressly limited and hence has
> its character by means of another thing outside it.

\- G.W.F. Hegel, Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, § 136

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_emacsomancer_
I haven't heard of Kimhi before this article, so my knowledge is only based on
my reading of it, but I don't understand why we would want to collapse logic
and psychology.

Logic involves formal systems. Whether or not these formal systems provide a
sound basis for thinking about actual causation in the world or even for
thinking about our own thinking about causation is a separate issue.

~~~
theaeolist
When is a formal system a logic and when is it not?

~~~
omeid2
Formal Systems can have non-logical axioms, which would make it non-logical?

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jhbadger
But a lot of this dealing with assertions that may or may not be true in logic
has been dealt with in a more rigorous way already as far back as the 1960s:
Fuzzy Logic
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuzzy_logic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuzzy_logic).

A belief like "I think it is raining" can be encoded as a 75% chance of it
raining.

~~~
lou1306
I see your point, but the phrasing is confusing: fuzzy logic is not the same
as probability. "A 75% chance of it raining" typically means that it _either_
rains or _not_.

In a fuzzy setting, "I think it is raining" would be encoded as "the current
weather is partially included in the _Raining_ set, with membership greater
than 0 but smaller than 1".

~~~
sjg007
This probably becomes Shrodeniger-esque. The observed and to act upon.

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bitexploder
Amusingly, the works of Epictetus we have are because one of his students,
Arrian, recorded his teachings.

~~~
gumby
Socrates/Plato as well.

~~~
jboynyc
More contemporarily, George Herbert Mead's influence is based mainly on his
transcribed lectures contained in _Man, Self and Society_. Mead wrote a good
deal during his lifetime, but always relatively short pieces that he never
bothered to compile together into books or programmatic statements of his
philosophical position.

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purplezooey
My leg is being pissed on, therefore it must be raining.

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blueprint
I've been saying this for a decade. A statement contains an implicit statement
of knowledge. But it's funny that this chap is lauded for it. I always get
downvoted hard for it. Maybe because of who I'm saying it to in what context.

~~~
blueprint
haha

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megamindbrian2
Dang, this guy would understand my argument for what IS tested in science
versus what people WANT to test with science. There is a huge gap especially
in medical PRACTICE and drug DEVELOPMENT. I.e. What IS practiced versus what
could be practiced if we (the participants) were safe and capable of
developing. I.e. Often we try to prove something is correct and overlook
proving something is incorrect.

