
I Denmark you cant trust the intelligence service, whistle blower reveals - stilisstuk
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moksly
I’m Danish, and nothing in the article supports your headline. All it states
is that the head of our Army Intelligence Service and two leading fighters
have been sent home, after an investigation by an independent inspectorate
authority build to keep watch over our intelligence services have found FE
(army intelligence) to withhold information.

The only mention of a whistleblower, is their suggestion that our government
sets up the option for whistleblowers to come forward.

The materials that lead to the original investigation may have come from a
whistleblower, but right now, there is no information available on that
publicly. Likewise, there is no real information on what misdeeds they’ve
done. Maybe they didn’t follow up on reports of espionage, maybe they held
back info from the watchdog, maybe they even build up files on employees in
the watch dog, but nothing is public yet.

FE (army intelligence) isn’t what you would call “the intelligence service”
either, that would be PET. FE handles foreign military threats and
international state-to-state cyber warfare.

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stilisstuk
It's the first line, the heading, of the press release (1).

> PRESS RELEASE The Danish Intelligence Service completes special
> investigation of the Defense Intelligence Service (FE) on the basis of
> material submitted by one or more whistleblowers In November 2019, the
> Danish Intelligence Service came across one or more whistleblowers in
> possession of a significant amount of material concerning FE, which the
> Authority has not had so far. knowledge of or opportunity to provide. The
> material is of such a nature that the Authority decided to focus its control
> of the FE in order to carry out an in-depth investigation of the present
> circumstances. With this announcement, the Authority publishes the
> unclassified results of the investigation. On the basis of the Authority's
> investigation of the submitted material, the Authority submitted an analysis
> in four volumes to the Minister of Defense on 21 August 2020, containing the
> Authority's conclusions and recommendations. Throughout the process of the
> special investigation of FE, the Authority has kept the Minister of Defense
> informed. The Minister of Defense has regularly expressed support for the
> Authority's in-depth examination of the material. The Authority's
> assessments and recommendations deal with matters which are wholly or partly
> assessed to be within the Authority's legality control in accordance with
> the FE Act and rules issued pursuant thereto, as well as matters which the
> Minister in the Authority's opinion should be aware of, cf. section 16 of
> the FE Act. , PCS. 2. Based on a source-critical approach to the study

Conclusions

> That FE has on several occasions since the Authority's establishment in 2014
> and until the summer of 2020 - in connection with, among other things, the
> Authority's specific inspections and meetings with the head of FE - withheld
> key and crucial information for the Authority and provided the Authority
> with incorrect information regarding the service's collection and
> disclosure. of information. It is the opinion of the supervisory authority
> that the statutory duty to provide information is absolutely necessary for a
> functional supervision, and that it rests on the trust of the legislator
> that the FE complies with the obligation in all respects. The result of
> these repeated breaches of the statutory duty to provide information is that
> the legality check which the supervision under the FE Act is required to
> carry out and which contributes to the legitimation of FE's business, does
> not work as intended.  That at central parts of FE's collection capacities
> there are risks that collection can be made unjustifiably against Danish
> citizens.  That the submitted material indicates that FE's management has
> failed to follow up on or further investigate indications of espionage
> within the area of the Ministry of Defense.  That there is an inappropriate
> culture of legality in FE's management and parts of the service, where the
> service's any unjustified activities or inappropriate conditions are sought
> to be shelved, including by failing to inform the supervisor of matters
> relevant to its control.  That the submitted material indicates that FE
> before the supervision was established in 2014 has initiated operational
> activities in violation of Danish law, including by obtaining and passing on
> a significant amount of information about Danish citizens.  That the FE has
> unjustifiably processed information about an employee in the supervision.

(1): [https://www.tet.dk/wp-
content/uploads/2020/08/PRESSEMEDDELEL...](https://www.tet.dk/wp-
content/uploads/2020/08/PRESSEMEDDELELSE.pdf)

