
There Is No Reliable Way to Detect Hacked Ballot-Marking Devices - infodocket
https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.08144
======
ddingus
About fucking time. I have been preaching about this since 2000. Actually
started research a bit prior.

Here is the core of the matter:

One, validating code that is actually running requires forensic level
investigation. Non trivial and definitely not cost effective.

This is why;

[https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=358210](https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=358210)

More importantly, anonymous voting presents a machine trust problem that does
not come up often.

Imagine the computer is a person in a secure room alone. You approach them and
say your vote, or press a button. Whatever.

They say and or show you your vote through a window, and then they make a
private record outside the view of anyone.

That private record determines the election.

You, the voter are forced to trust your intent was duly recorded.

With a paper ballot, the chain of trust between voter intent and the record to
be used in the election is intact. You the voter know your intent is captured.

We have no solutions to this, that do not also involve personally identifiable
votes.

