
Maryland Voters Test New Cryptographic Voting System - phsr
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/11/scantegrity/
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imp
I really like this type of innovation, but I don't understand this defense
against "vote buying." Can't the vote purchaser require the voter to take a
picture of the completed ballot with their camera? That's a pretty easy way to
verify if they followed through on their vote. I do like all of the other
transparency issues and checking your voting results online though.

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seanc
Well, a vote buyer can do this under current systems as well.

However, it's a little more tricky than that, because a voter could snap the
photo, and then spoil the ballot, and the buyer would never know. That's why
ballots are filled out in private.

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imp
Good point. I hadn't thought about getting a second ballot.

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seanc
Well, the voter doesn't have a second ballot. In a well run system, ballots
are very secure, one per voter, observed into the booth, out of the booth, and
into the box.

In the scenario I described the voter takes the money and turns in a spoiled
ballot. So the buyer only gets a spoiled ballot, instead of a vote in favour
of his candidate.

All vote buying scams are vulnerable to this tactic, even the Reel.

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humbledrone
I've been hoping for a cryptographic solution to the question of vote-counting
integrity for a long time. This looks really promising (and, possibly,
affordable). Hopefully we'll see wide adoption of systems like this, and can
toss Diebold machines like the trash that they are.

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sweis
Check out Ben Adida's posts about the audit process: <http://benlog.com>

