
Why the Navy Needs Disruption Now - Luc
https://steveblank.com/2016/07/29/why-the-navy-needs-disruption-now-part-2-of-2/
======
labrador
Former sub-sailor here: An important point is made:

 _For the Navy, a Horizon 3 conversation would not be about better carriers
and aircraft. Instead it would focus on the core reasons the Navy deploys a
carrier strike group: to show the flag for deterrence, or to control part of
the sea to protect shipping, or to protect a Marine amphibious force, or to
project offensive power against any adversary in well-defended areas._

Carriers are vulnerable and probably cannot be protected enough to survive an
all out war. Too often the conversation gets side-tracked by this debate.
However, carriers are very useful outside of war for projecting power and
influence around the globe, so they are still very useful.

~~~
Benjammer
At what point did the appearance of military power diverge from actual
military effectiveness? Guerilla warfare in the 18th century?

It seems like the modern militaries are probably already well aware of these
two separate things, to the point where there are probably two different
conversations about Horizon 1/2/3, one for projecting the appearance of power
for diplomatic leverage, and the other for wartime efficacy.

~~~
foota
Projecting power isn't just about appearance, it's about being able to use
your military even in small conflicts to enforce your policy.

~~~
douche
The biggest problem in recent decades seems to be the reticence to actually
pull the gloves off and really fight a war. War is one of those things you
have to actually do, and not dick around with, to be successful. All that
artificial "Rules of Engagement" provide is a framework for the enemy to hide
behind.

~~~
Teever
> The biggest problem in recent decades seems to be the reticence to actually
> pull the gloves off and really fight a war.

I guess that's probably true if your objective is to wage war and kill.

If your objective is to prevent or minimize those things than it's probably
not your biggest problem at all and is actually your biggest accomplishment.

~~~
douche
If you aren't willing to actually fight a war, then maybe you shouldn't fuck
around and waste people's lives on a half-hearted adventure.

~~~
Teever
So you're arguing that we should kill _more_ people to save people?

~~~
douche
That is not in any way what I'm proposing.

I'm saying that if you're going to fight a war in Vietnam, you should land the
Marines at Haiphong and capture Hanoi, rather than idle away ten years and
tens of thousands of American lives on a failed adventure, not to mention the
hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians that died along
the way.

If you're going to topple the government of a middle eastern country, you need
to actually stick out the occupation and build a structure that will stand on
it's own, rather than descending into anarchy when you pull out. If you're not
willing to invest in that, then perhaps you shouldn't invest in the initial
"Shock and Awe" portion of the campaign.

Moreover, 3000 years of history should be enough to convince anyone that
invading Afghanistan is a terrible idea, maybe one step down from "launch an
invasion of Russia in late summer."

~~~
slv77
US rules of engagement were partially to prevent Chinese intervention in the
Vietnam War. The Chinese already had 100,000 advisors in the country in an
anti-aircraft role and a full scale invasion of Hanoi by US Marines would have
almost certainly resulted in a response by the PLA.

Even though the Chinese troops were poorly armed and poorly trained relative
to US troops they had undergone some degree of moderization since the Korean
War where they had fought the UN to a standstill. Given the logistical
advantages of the Chinese to mass men and material (it was on their border vs
half the world away) it isn't obvious the US would have prevailed in a
escalated conflict. China was also a nuclear power by 1965 which was not true
during the Korean War.

But I don't think any of this disagrees with the main point of your comment
which is don't intervene where the rules of engagement prevent you from
winning.

------
atemerev
You want disruption? Here are some ideas.

Build drone carriers. Who needs brave pilots in fighter seats when you can get
the same results with slightly less brave drone operators? You can pack a lot
more than 44 drones in each carrier.

Repurpose container ships. If Russians can launch cruise missiles directly
from shipping containers (4 missiles per standard 40-feet container), the same
can be done with drones. Imagine how much of them can be packed in
1000-container container ship, which looks like any other civilian cargo ship
until the need arises.

Drone operators can control entire formations of combat drones (no need to
actually fly these things — point and click interface should be enough with
modern tech). Autonomous refueling, sensor fusion, battlespace mapping — the
only need for humans in the loop is giving "go / no go" for kill requests.

Use large coordinated battlegroups with numerous uniform modular cheaper
vessels instead of a few big expensive carriers surrounded by combat support.
Every ship can (and should) be fitted with ECC and offensive electronic
warfare options, which prevents attacking electronic support first. Try to jam
200 small ships simultaneously while they are constantly on the move in the
large area — nearly impossible. No designated C&C ships — all battlegroup
members can take multiple roles as needed, including command and control.

Fail-deadly "nuclear options" — if battlegroup communications are jammed
beyond repair, drones can be programmed to proceed with their missions fully
autonomously, until kill switch signal arrives. Looks harsh, but better than
actual nuclear option.

Etc etc.

~~~
cgearhart
These aren't disruptive ideas, they're just bad ideas.

> _Build drone carriers._

You mean like regular carriers will be with N-UCLASS
([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northrop_Grumman_X-47B](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northrop_Grumman_X-47B))
or the optionally-manned F/A-XX
([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F/A-XX_Program](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F/A-XX_Program))?

> _looks like any other civilian cargo ship until the need arises._

This is called Perfidy. It's a war crime.
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfidy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfidy)

> _Drone operators can control entire formations of combat drones_

They have a hard enough time controlling _one_ \-- bandwidth requirements and
ensuring reliable communication are _hard_.

> _point and click interface should be enough with modern tech_

Right up until your adversary degrades your access to all that _modern tech_.
Military tech needs to be _literally_ bullet-proof.

> _programmed to proceed with their missions fully autonomously_

The UN disagrees. [https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/apr/09/un-urged-
to-...](https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/apr/09/un-urged-to-ban-
killer-robots-before-they-can-be-developed)

~~~
mrec
> This is called Perfidy. It's a war crime.
> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfidy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfidy)

Maybe, but it looks like a bit of a grey area. The WP article you link states
that "Ruses of war are not prohibited", and
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ruse_de_guerre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ruse_de_guerre)
includes this:

 _disguising a warship to appear to be a neutral merchant vessel, or a
merchant vessel on your opponent 's side, has traditionally been considered a
legitimate ruse de guerre, provided the belligerent raises their own flag to
break the deception, prior to firing their guns. This was called sailing under
false colors. Both sides during the world wars used this tactic, most famously
the Royal Navy's Q ships._

and also this:

 _German commando Otto Skorzeny led his troops wearing American uniforms to
infiltrate American lines in Operation Greif during the Battle of the Bulge.
Skorzeny later reported that he was told by experts in military law that
wearing American uniforms was a defensible ruse de guerre, provided his troops
took off their American uniforms, and put on German uniforms, prior to firing
their weapons. Skorzeny was acquitted by a United States military court in
Dachau in 1947, after his defense counsel argued that the "wearing of American
uniforms was a legitimate ruse of war for espionage and sabotage" as described
by The New York Times._

~~~
cgearhart
It would be different to design our fleet to "sail under false colors" during
peacetime; and the US would be reticent about launching a fleet of ships that
make civilian ships into targets. We don't have to rely on ruse to project
power -- even if our carriers are vulnerable.

~~~
vonmoltke
If it is an American ship flying American colors it is not sailing under false
colors. Also, civilian merchants of the belligerents have been legitimate
targets of the enemy since the dawn of naval warfare. Whether or not they are
armed is irrelevant.

~~~
douche
Most American merchant vessels are not American-flagged... Liberia, I believe,
is the most common flag for US shipping.

------
ChuckMcM
After manually magnifying the size by 8x :-) that is a pretty good overview of
the defense department strategy for developing the warfighting capabilities.
It also demonstrates why you start every war with equipment that would have
been great for the last one but sucks for this one. The thing about war is
that innovation is tolerated because _people are dying_. It is sad but
ultimately true. When there isn't anyone dying the tolerance for risk of
failure is extremely low.

Even with that bias though things like rail guns and theater defense with
lasers is continuing. If I were in a H-3 think tank I would be seriously
thinking about what it means to have computers and sensors to be "free".
Consider what it would mean if in addition to a tracer round in CIWS you fired
a sensor round. A bullet with a cpu, a network, an a 9dof inertia sensor and
one bit optical sensor. All sensor bullets in flight sending back telemetry
about position and optical transits on their sensors above the horizon. Now
your anti-ship missile has to be stealthy and invisible.

That is just off the cuff but such sets of sensors are cheaper to deploy than
some of these bullets.

------
Animats
For a better discussion of the future of aircraft carriers, see this Naval War
College paper.[1] Especially the section on the various uses of carriers.
They're vulnerable to an opponent with a major anti-ship missile capability,
but most of the US's opponents don't have that.

[1]
[https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/87bcd2ff-c7b6-4715-b2ed-...](https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/87bcd2ff-c7b6-4715-b2ed-05df6e416b3b/The-
Future-of-Aircraft-Carriers)

------
niftich
The article was a good analysis of both the down-and-dirty mission of an
aircraft carrier, (i.e. actual combat, actual support), and the strategic,
big-picture role of an aircraft carrier (e.g. force projection). So far so
good.

But I was hopelessly lost when it tried to draw an analogue between the 'need
for disruption' and the larger, big-picture view of why we have aircraft
carriers in the first place.

Perhaps I'm misunderstanding the point, but I certainly _don 't_ want any sort
of disruptive, mavericky thinking applied to how, why, when a Navy (any Navy,
not just "ours") deploys force projection. This does not sound like an
appealing recipe for responsible use of force and for limiting provocation of
other parties to just below the level that they're willing to retaliate, and
the like. So, in short, I don't understand the point the author's trying to
make.

~~~
L_Rahman
I believe you may have misunderstood the point. The author of the post
suggests that why and when remain the same - to show the flag for deterrence,
or to control part of the sea to protect shipping, or to protect a Marine
amphibious force, or to project offensive power against any adversary in well-
defended areas.

Today, the way we do this carrier strike groups. The author is arguing that
the carrier strike model for achieving these goals is now ~50 years old. If
you were to start today from a blank slate to achieve those goals, you'd
construct something very different from a strike force. This is where he's
suggesting mavericky thinking ought to be applied - in coming up with those
blank slate solutions.

------
cgearhart
Let's talk _real_ disruption: money. DoD wastes money like you can't believe
because they're _required_ to.

* Contracting takes _forever_ \-- actual times measured in months to years. We haven't had proper planning and budgeting from congress for almost a decade, so funds that expire are released late, forcing the services to take a bad deal signed quickly over a good deal that would come too late.

* No flexibility. Projects are funded as "Programs of Record" (or not at all) and funded for their life-cycle in the budget. Services fight endlessly to keep PoRs no matter how they turn out because it is so damn hard to start new programs.

* The system is designed to allow bad deals. It's legal (and not uncommon) for a prime contractor to subcontract work through a middle-man corporation that contracts back to a subsidiary of the prime to perform the work. DoD acquisition contracts include a negotiated profit fee with the prime, but often have no insight into the structure of their lower-level deals, allowing the primes to take a profit straight off the top, then an additional cut at the working level.

* All new acquisitions are driven "top-down" by resource sponsors distilling warfighter needs into "requirements" that are then solved with a materiel solution.

* We spend a lot of money on this stuff, and we can't make new programs, so we end up supporting things _long_ after their planned EOL. Check out B-52s, A-10s, F/A-18s, weapons, etc. It costs a lot of money to keep supporting this stuff.

* PoRs usually require a competitive tech development phase where you pay _two_ prime contractors to build solutions before doing a competitive down-select.

So... Make it easier to contract. Easier to spend small amounts of money to
test solutions. PoRs should grow out of successful products, not the BS we do
now. Be a bully in contract negotiations, and put some teeth in the
regulations on contractors playing shell games. We don't see much innovation
because the services can't move quickly, and they can't adapt to changing
requirements.

How bout we disrupt _that_?

------
jorblumesea
Carriers are more of a psychological force projection than a physical one for
adversaries such as China. No nation dare attack a carrier strike group
because of the power behind the response if something were to happen. They are
a "I'm not touching you" kind of a game at that level. A way for American to
claim physical space for awhile and back up diplomatic rhetoric. I don't think
anyone in the pentagon would be foolish enough to pit f/a 18s against modern
missile defenses. For less well equipped armies they are used as a blunt
instrument as in Syria, Iraq etc. Just so we're clear, only the most advanced
countries have ASBM technology, it does not apply to many.

------
fncndhdhc
The author seems to be forgetting that no two first-world, nuclear armed
nations can ever engage eachother ever again without total mutual nuclear
annihilation occuring. He spends the entire time worrying about highly
advanced technologies that are only possessed in sufficient quantities by
nuclear armed states. If that equipment were ever used, it would become
pointless in a matter of hours once the nuclear weapons start flying.

With that in mind we ought to quit pouring all of our money on weapons
designed for enemies that we can never realistically fight. It would make far
more sense to retool for conflicts against insurgencies and developing
nations.

~~~
nostrademons
That's been the thesis every since the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic
bomb in 1949. It didn't stop Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iran/Iraq, or the
two Persian Gulf wars from happening.

What seems to occur instead is that major powers fight via proxy wars, where
they provide arms, training, covert assistance, and sometimes even open troop
commitments on the soil of vassal states. This provides plausible deniability
to the superpowers (neither of which _actually_ want to see the world end in
nuclear annihilation); offloads the human cost of the war onto foreign, less-
developed countries; offloads the political cost onto puppet governments that
can be disposed of when no longer needed; and prevents widespread public
discontent from threatening the ruling government.

Just because the war is likely to happen in the Persian Gulf or Sea of Japan
doesn't mean that the weapons & tactics involved won't be developed by first-
world nations.

~~~
fncndhdhc
>It didn't stop Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iran/Iraq, or the two Persian
Gulf wars from happening.

So why do we need lasers, railguns, and stealth fighter jets to fight bands of
rice farmers and goat herders?

~~~
nostrademons
Because those rice farmers and goat herders are armed with man-portable anti-
aircraft missiles, explosives mines, assault weapons, and in a future
conflict, likely lasers and railguns too.

~~~
fncndhdhc
If they were ill-equipped in Vietnam, ill-equipped in Iraq and Afghanistan,
then why would potential combatants suddenly come into possession of weapon
systems more expensive than their nation's GDP? World powers don't just hand
out state of the art weapon systems all willy nilly, lest they end up falling
to the enemy.

~~~
steve19
They were equipped by the Chinese during Vietnam, and they were very well
equipped by the USA in Afghanistan (the original Russian invasion). Everything
the Iraq army has ended up in the hands of various resistance and terrorist
groups (including ISIS).

~~~
fncndhdhc
The article is about highly advanced anti-aircraft and anti-ship weapons. They
don't even have armored infantry, let alone those.

~~~
nostrademons
It's a stretch to call them "ill-equipped" in Vietnam and Afghanistan,
considering that the insurgents won both campaigns (with generous military
assistance from the opposing superpower). No, they didn't have armored
infantry - but they had surface-to-air missiles, anti-personnel mines, anti-
tank missiles, and automatic submachine guns, all provided by the opposing
superpower. The U.S. lost many aircraft against the North Vietnamese, and the
Soviets lost many tanks and helicopters against the mujahideen in Afghanistan.

steve19 also makes the very good point that these weapons _did_ fall into the
hands of the enemy: most of the Taliban were trained by the CIA, and the
weapons our forces faced in Afghanistan were largely ones we had sold to the
mujahideen in the 80s. Now the weapons left behind in Iraq are largely in the
hands of ISIS.

The point of _this_ article is that the U.S. is likely to face similar
asymmetric threats in any future war, where the opposition doesn't have the
same weapons as us but they do have weapons that are very effective at
countering us.

