
Undermining strategic stability: The burst-height compensating super-fuze (2017) - Nokinside
https://thebulletin.org/2017/03/how-us-nuclear-force-modernization-is-undermining-strategic-stability-the-burst-height-compensating-super-fuze/
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time0ut
I'm not a nuclear policy expert, but it is interesting to read about. My
impression is that a lot of the improvements the Bulletin casts as
destabilizing could also be viewed as deterrents against some escalation
scenarios. For example, Russia has stated that it reserves the right to use
battlefield nuclear weapons if it is losing a conventional conflict that
threatens it's sovereignty. If our only response to that is to nuke their
cities, then they may reasonably calculate that they can safely escalate to
tactical nuclear options. On the other hand, if we can respond in kind or with
other effective counterforce options, they will have to think twice. It sucks,
but deterrence is still the only thing we have.

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Someone
Undermining, possibly, but I don’t see how it can be even close to the point
of collapse.

Even if the USA could launch an attack that takes out all Russia’s ground
based ICBMs, Russia still would have those 500-ish submarine-based ones,
wouldn’t it? If those ignore military targets, and manage to hit the top 100
largest population centers in the USA, everything larger than Spokane
(population: 220k) would be hit
([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_cities_b...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_cities_by_population#United_States))

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mandevil
Russia's strategic submarine fleet is not the same as the US FBM force. USN
boomers are deploying _constantly_ , to the point where they have literally
two different crews (Blue and Gold) to minimize the time the actual hulls stay
in port (allowing them to spend roughly 2/3 of their service life at sea, an
incredibly high utilization rate for a warship). Russian ballistic missile
submarines generally average 1-2 sorties _a year_.

Now, the Soviet (and then Russian) solution to this was to eventually develop
missiles that could reach the US from port, but guess what? That means that
instead of a survivable, highly dispersed and hidden missile force, the vast
majority of your missiles are massed together where a single warhead could
take them out.

Russian strategic bombing forces are also pretty small (36 Tu-160's built,
maybe half operational, and something like 60 Tu-95MS operational), so most of
their nuclear deterrent comes from land based ICBMs. Note, however, that
Soviets understood this and so built the SS-25 Topol, and there are about 100
of these road-mobile ICBMs operational today. (Along with ~130 silo launched
missiles.)

The Bulletin kinda glosses over the road-mobile survivability. It isn't what
America did, so people who are experts in American systems often don't pay
sufficient attention to the advantages of such systems, in my experience.

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Tuna-Fish
> Because of the new kill capabilities of US submarine-launched ballistic
> missiles (SLBMs), the United States would be able to target huge portions of
> its nuclear force against non-hardened targets, the destruction of which
> would be crucial to a “successful” first strike. One such mission would
> likely involve the destruction of road-mobile ICBMs that had left their
> garrisons to hide in Russia’s vast forests in anticipation of attack. The
> garrisons and their support facilities would probably be destroyed quickly,
> and some of the dispersed road-mobile launchers would also be quickly
> destroyed as they were in the process of dispersing. To destroy or expose
> the remaining launchers, United States planners would have the nuclear
> forces needed to undertake truly scorched-earth tactics: Just 125 US
> Minuteman III warheads could set fire to some 8,000 square miles of forest
> area where the road-mobile missiles are most likely to be deployed. This
> would be the equivalent of a circular area with a diameter of 100 miles.

> Such an attack would be potentially aimed at destroying all road-mobile
> launchers either as they disperse or after they have taken up position some
> short distance from roads that give them access to forested areas.

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kingbirdy
> Just 125 US Minuteman III warheads could set fire to some 8,000 square miles
> of forest area where the road-mobile missiles are most likely to be deployed

Russia has over 3 million square miles of forest, and is over 6 million square
miles total. 8,000/3,000,000 seems like pretty poor odds to get all the ICBMs
hiding in the woods.

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yborg
Road mobile systems deploy onto a set of prebuilt roads connected to their
bases, they don't cross-country the impassable taiga since it's ...
impassable. These are ballistic missile launchers, they don't fit under
bridges, etc. so they can't just drive them around the Siberian interstate.

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mandevil
The MKZT-79221 that is the basis for both the Yars and Topol-M TEL is rated
for driving off-road, and both TELs are even considered capable of launching
off-road.

About half of the Russian mobile ICBM force are based in the Volga plain, and
the Siberia based half are in mixed forest-steppe zones, because the Russians
know their own geography.

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sailfast
This seems like a great way to increase the capability of your nuclear arsenal
without adding more nuclear material / missiles. While I understand this tips
the balance a bit in terms of lethality, I would consider it much less
destabilizing than full-on development - not to mention much more friendly to
the national budget.

A fascinating article. Thanks for posting. Currently reading "The making of
the hydrogen bomb" by Richard Rhodes (a great follow-up to the Making of the
Atomic Bomb, and these discussions are all super interesting.

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gumby
As an undergrad back in the 80s I took a few classes on geo strategic
planning, MAD and game theory etc. A few years later came to see that stuff as
time wasted on useless classes.

But with a recent trend of undoing various interlocking systems designed to
promote safety I wonder if we have a set of policy makers world wide who have
forgotten or never knew the point of those complicated systems (e.g.
overflights)

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marcus_holmes
See, now, this is proper scary. A US pre-emptive nuclear first strike that
could happen at any moment is something that really worries me.

The fact that the US appears to be optimising its nuclear arsenal to do this
is frightening. And giving the Russians/Chinese less and less room to do the
same is frightening. And then the US giving the keys to this decision to
someone as egotistical, narcissistic and unstable as Trump, is really
frightening. I can totally see him deciding to launch as a hissy-fit reaction
to being impeached.

I think I'm going to rejoin the CND, if it's still a thing...

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snagglegaggle
You assume the US undertaking a first strike is more likely than some kind of
retaliation for some perceived slight by some other nuclear power, like Russia
or China? That's... strange.

Historically those forgoing weapons were subjugated. If you want to be
nonviolent to a fault, fine, but leave me out of it.

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marcus_holmes
TFA is saying that the USA is optimising its nuclear arsenal for a surprise
first strike capability.

Surprise first strikes work best if unexpected. So encouraging the President
to throw a hissy fit and press the button is the best strategy if you're a
nuclear general with rockets to launch. First strikes aren't retaliation. This
is not escalation of a conventional conflict. This is out-of-the-blue, kill
the other guy's ability to hit you. Think Pearl Harbour but with nukes.

If "having a fight" means we both die, then non-violence is the only answer. A
nuclear war has no "winners". Being "subjugated" or "not-subjugated" is the
same: generations of radioactive hell. Losing a conventional war is better
than winning a nuclear war. So yes, non-violence please.

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PaulHoule
Russia and China are developing missiles that are a major improvement on what
they had? How does this not threaten stability? Is the bulletin afraid of
President Xi?

