
Encrypted E-Mail Company Hushmail Spills to Feds (2007) - computer
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/11/encrypted-e-mai/
======
16s
Use OpenPGP software on your local device (GnuPG). Never copy your private key
into the could. Set a super strong password on the private key. You now can
have point to point encryption that is "military grade" (per Bruce Schneier)
and no one but you has access to the private key.

It's not that hard to do either. Nice point and click convenient web interface
or true privacy. Pick one.

~~~
DanBC
Go to prison (US: Contempt of court? UK: RIPA) unless you hand over your key.

~~~
mpyne
In the U.S. I believe at least one court circuit has ruled that you cannot be
compelled to give up an encryption key if doing so would involve self-
incrimination [1].

The 'catch' is that if the government already knows generically what
incriminating data you have they can order you to produce it (as it's not any
further incriminating). Or something like that? Recent decision though, so
things can still change.

[http://yro.slashdot.org/story/13/04/24/1458203/federal-
magis...](http://yro.slashdot.org/story/13/04/24/1458203/federal-magistrate-
rules-that-fifth-amendment-applies-to-encryption-keys)

~~~
kansface
You don't have to give up the key, just decrypt the data upon request...

~~~
mpyne
Unless decrypting it would force you to incriminate yourself...

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betterunix
What is really bizarre is that Hushmail still has a lot of loyal users
following that incident.

~~~
rsingel
Well, there are lots of people whose threat model doesn't include the police.

Say for instance you are a psychiatrist who wants to offer patients a fairly
secure method of talking to you. Or you are a small business doing work in
China.

~~~
dragonwriter
> Well, there are lots of people whose threat model doesn't include the
> police.

> Say for instance you are a psychiatrist who wants to offer patients a fairly
> secure method of talking to you.

If you are a psychiatrist, your threat model _ought_ to include the police.

------
jarrett
This reinforces the point that web-based cryptography (particularly when the
JS is provided by a server) is not adequately secure. This vulnerability--
sniffing the plaintext prior to server-side encryption--is one of the two most
commonly-citied reasons to avoid web-based crypto. (The other reason concerns
client-side, JavaScript crypto. In that architecture, a compromised server can
just send a backdoored version of the JS crypto code.)

~~~
unethical_ban
the vuln was not that the JS was bad or untrustworthy, but that the passphrase
was sent to the server.

If the entire connection to the server is secure, and the JS is loaded from
the secure server and is auditable/checksummed, then the risk is minimal. You
either trust the code or you get out.

~~~
DanBC
You cannot trust the code. You cannot trust the code because the supplier
could be forced to include a backdoor, and thus you have to audit the code
before every session.

~~~
nthj
Hence the checksum.

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MichaelGG
Gonna name drop: I spoke to Phil Zimmerman about this yesterday. He says
Hushmail had no choice, and they didn't willingly do anything. They had a
well-known insecure access method which meant they had access to the content.
The government simply required them to hand over content they had access to.
So slamming them for this is not really appropriate.

~~~
grecy
> He says Hushmail had no choice

As Snowden, Manning, Assange and now the guy behind Lavabit are demonstrating,
there is always a choice.

Hushmail could easily have just shutdown.

~~~
BlackDeath3
Right. "No choice" and "difficult choice" are not the same thing.

~~~
davorak
The case for hushmail is different then lavabit. Hushmail had some piece of
information, legally they were required to hand that piece of information
over. They may have had the option to shutdown shop after handing that over
however.

For lavabit for all appearances did not have access to any information the
government wanted and was not ordered to hand anything over. It seems like
they were probably ordered to implement a method for the government to gain
access to future communications. They choose to close up shop rather then
implement this access and lie to their customers about the security of the
service.

~~~
rsingel
Well, not exactly.

HushMail strongly suggested that when given a court order and the targeted
user was using the client-side Java applet, that Hushmail sent a backdoored
applet. That technically _could_ be detecting by checking hashes, but in
practice...

It's an open question whether companies can be forced to build backdoor, but
that sure looks like what happened to Hushmail and Lavabits.

(just noting that I'm the author of this more than 5 year old story).

~~~
davorak
Thanks for pointing that out. I was relying on a source that said otherwise,
so for the future I will not trust it as much.

> can be forced to build backdoor,

It seems like they have the option of shutting down as an alternative to
implementing a backdoor and lying to their customers about the level of
security. If you know of examples of business forced to stay open and the
owners forced to continue to work at a company for the purpose of government
investigation I would be interested in learning more.

------
stkrzysiak
That's why I switched to gmail and rot13.

~~~
Osaka
Could you explain how rot13 helps?

"The algorithm provides virtually no cryptographic security..." \-
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ROT13](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ROT13)

~~~
MartinCron
Once you explain a joke, it's not funny anymore.

~~~
ars
A joke, maybe. But explaining terminology doesn't [usually] hurt a joke.

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swehner
Just to make sure, that article is from 2007. Ages ago. S

