
Does More Security at Airports Make Us Safer or Just Move the Targets? - dankohn1
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/07/01/world/airport-security-around-the-world.html
======
raldi
The primary way overly-intrusive TSA measures just move the danger around is
by making flying unpleasant.

If a new indignity -- like making people take their shoes off or wait in a 20%
longer line -- pushes even a small percentage of travelers to drive instead of
fly (and it does) the increased human risk from the added driving easily
outweighs the tiny risk mitigation gained by the new airport rule.

~~~
dmoy
Does it? What's the growth of flights compared to population?

Edit: for at least last year, I'm seeing ~5% air travel growth compared to <1%
population growth. So I don't know if your premise has taken effect yet...

~~~
clarkmoody
Considering that driving is -- by far -- the most dangerous activity that most
undertake on a daily basis...

<Insert appropriate discussion of how people are very bad at estimating risk,
especially when those risks involve death>

<Also insert something about (risk of occurring) * (consequence of
occurrence)>

I would say the GP's point is true to first order.

~~~
dmoy
But what if TSA actually causes people to fly more, because they're bad at
estimating risk and it gives them a false sense of security?

~~~
Nullabillity
There are other variables in play as well. The TSA and its equivalents can
retard growth without managing to turn it around.

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heartsucker
I'm not convinced the TSA is the best solution, but I still think bag checks
helps. Let's say we "move the target" from on board a plane to the people
clustered at the security check itself. A bomb goes off and kills 100 in the
airport. That's bad. A smaller bomb goes off on the plane, decompresses the
cabin of an international flight, and 600 people die. You get more bang for
your buck if you take out the plane, so maybe some of this makes sense?

Someone correct me if I'm wrong.

~~~
Retric
Number of deaths are fairly irrelevant to terrorists. 100 people or 500 don't
really make a different to public precipitation which is what they care about.

However, box cutters where the weapon of choice for 9/11 you could make spears
on board the aircraft and manually kill everyone except the pilots with a few
burley and well trained people. Which is the real problem, defensive safety
measures cost a lot and switching targets is really cheap for terrorists.

~~~
wmeredith
I can't remember the source, it may have been a stand up comedian, but he
said, "Hey, TSA, if I can hijack a plane with nail clippers. I can hijack one
without them."

~~~
Retric
Yea, I thought an interesting plot point would be to have an attack carried
out like that with peoples bare hands. So, now people are debating if
tranquilizing strong passengers is enough or if we need to tranquilizes
everyone.

~~~
stcredzero
Maybe if the risk of death is small enough and it's cheaper than in-flight
WiFi.

------
jackhack
Neither. It neither changes safety nor moves targets. It is worse -- a
distraction that leads away from solving the underlying problem in the same
way as the Gun Control/Knife Control issue obscures and redirects passions.

Machines and locations of queues are not to blame. The real problem is
(multi)cultural -- hate in people's hearts and evil plus incompatibility of
cultures & religions. That is the root of the problem and moving a queue to a
new location on the sidewalk won't solve it.

We are distracted and quibbling about irrelevant details. I refuse to accept
the premise. Cutting to the root of the issue as best I can, civilizations
must determine whether to abandon multiculturalism and insist on a homogeneous
culture or continue down the current path.

~~~
callalex
I'm not sure I quite understand what you're saying. Are you arguing that
increased isolation between cultures will create less conflict and hate
between them?

~~~
tamana
"homogenous culture" is a modern racist dog whistle. It can only be achieved
via the genocide+isolationism.

The original Afghan-West battle wasn't about multiculturalist conflict, it was
about imperialism.

------
paulsutter
The problem is the /length/ of the line at security. Apparently they plan for
average rate not the peak rate. Capacity for peak rate would mean a small
line, and a lousy target.

It's easy to fix by establishing metrics, and any budget could easily be
covered by adding fees to tickets. Then you start firing TSA managers that
allow the lines to get long.

EDIT: Budget can be solved with ticket fees, I'm happy to pay more to get a
predictable wait at security. in Japan I never, ever had to wait in line for
security so it's definitely possible.

~~~
Spooky23
>It's easy to fix by establishing metrics, and any budget could easily be
covered by adding fees to tickets.

It's actually a really hard problem. You have to balance dollars, demand and
shifts. Demand varies based on flights departing from different terminals. You
can't schedule people to come in for two hours, and reassigning staff
introduces wastage as they redeploy from one place to another.

That said, TSA manages it poorly, but the root issue is not enough money for
the task at hand.

~~~
Zigurd
I'm not convinced it is a very hard problem. The catering services manage to
deliver the right number of meals based on the load the airlines estimate
based on their reservations systems. Maybe the TSA could deliver enough TSOs.

~~~
Spooky23
I would agree. All labor related problems are solvable given sufficient
dollars and people.

~~~
Zigurd
They don't solve air catering by throwing money at it.

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venomsnake
In the last few months we have:

1\. Paris 2\. Brussels 3\. Russian plane back from Egypt 4\. Plane en route to
Egypt 5\. Couple of attacks in Turkey - assorted 6\. Turkey airport 7\.
Orlando 8\. Pakistani attack in the kids playing area 9\. I am sure I forget a
lot more.

Any gathering of people is valid terror target. More security won't help.
Terrorism is here to stay.

We must accept that we won't be safe and we can only do damage control.

~~~
wmeredith
The real story is that we're all safer than ever[1], but there are huge sums
of money being poured into a media structure designed to keep us afraid and
tuned in.

[1] [http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-10-23/world-actually-
safer-e...](http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-10-23/world-actually-safer-ever-
and-heres-data-prove)

~~~
adevine
> but there are huge sums of money being poured into a media structure
> designed to keep us afraid and tuned in.

Perhaps true, but I see this argument a lot by engineering folks, and I think
it misses a major point of human nature. Large, violent, deadly events, in
places where you completely don't expect them, are always going to be a lot
scarier than the random low-lying "background" events, like car accidents.

The fact that the world _is_ so safe only magnifies how unexpected and
terrifying it would be to walk around enjoying the mundane events of modern
life - going to a concert, taking a trip somewhere, dancing in a club - and
suddenly meet a violent death.

------
iredwards
Because global warming is a threat orders of magnitude greater than aviation-
based terrorism, to the extent that the TSA discourages flying it makes us all
safer.

~~~
TheCoelacanth
What if it causes people to drive instead? Wouldn't that make climate change
worse?

~~~
rosser
Per traveler-mile, commercial aviation is radically worse than automobiles,
even if they're all only carrying the driver. Net, it would be a reduction in
emissions for everyone to drive instead.

~~~
vonmoltke
Where are you getting that from? Airbus claims the A380 gets 3L/100km per
passenger when fully loaded[1], which is better than all but the must fuel-
efficient passenger cars. Even the Concorde got ~17L/100km, putting it in line
with large pickups.

[1]
[http://web.archive.org/web/20071214144443/http://www.airbus....](http://web.archive.org/web/20071214144443/http://www.airbus.com/en/myairbus/airbusview/the_a380_the_future_of_flying.html)

~~~
rosser
You're basing your calculation on one of the densest possible configurations
of the aircraft — one denser than almost every production deployment. Only one
_actual_ seat configuration exceeds your Airbus press release's density,
offered by Emirates, and is nearly all economy class. Everyone else's
offerings are from ~5-40% less dense, yielding comparable decreases in
efficiency. [1] So, sure, the largest, most efficient jumbo we currently make
has an absolute passenger-mile emissions rate lower than many cars — when it's
carrying as many people as possible.

You're also ignoring the fact that emissions at altitude have an increased
impact. "For perspective, per passenger a typical economy-class New York to
Los Angeles round trip produces about 715 kg (1574 lb) of CO₂ (but is
equivalent to 1,917 kg (4,230 lb) of CO₂ when the high altitude "climatic
forcing" effect is taken into account)." [2] Even the most fuel-efficient car
isn't dumping tons of NOx at cruising altitude, inducing excess ozone
formation.

[1]
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seat_configurations_of_Airbus_...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seat_configurations_of_Airbus_A380)

[2]
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_impact_of_aviati...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_impact_of_aviation)

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virgil_disgr4ce
I mean, increasing security (or "security" if you want) moves the targets, by
definition. In principal you would want to increase the security of all
potential attack vectors to some acceptable threshold. Increasing vector one
above another vector just makes the other vector an easier target. This is how
it works for all security in any context.

------
saluki
As far as pushing the queue further out I think one solution could be a plinko
style entry at the beginning of the security system. Build it so that
passengers get separated and spread out. Make it out of a blast resistant
material.

You could make it more complex where they are identified by cameras and
biometrics and have the system channel them a secure location/blast proof
holding area if they are flagged as high risk.

I think having passengers in a large mass at the beginning of security at the
airport or at a stadium is a huge target and risk since what happens when a
screener finds a passenger with a suicide vest. I think there should be some
type of screening container that is blast resistant checking someone face to
face for weapons isn't effective. No one gets paid enough for that job.

Roll Matrix Security Check Point Scene [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cF-
WeswkqXc](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cF-WeswkqXc)

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kowdermeister
Can someone explain what's the purpose of prohibiting taking liquids onboard,
but I can buy highly flammable alcohol in the duty free shops? I could set the
whole plane on fire easily.

~~~
thesimon
Liquid explosives are probably a bit more harmful than the <= 75% alcohol you
can buy at the duty free.

Not saying that the rules make sense, but that seems to be the reasoning
behind them. Dealing with a bit of fire is easier than a hole in the fuselage.

------
dogma1138
I have a bone to pick with this article.

First of all the security at the Istanbul Ataturk Airport did partially stop
the attackers. At least one of them was shot by security before detonating his
suicide vest.

When you have 3 suicide bombers that attack a fixed target like an Airport for
the most part you can only minimize casualties and while it's hard to admit it
41 deaths is low compared to what can happen in these kinds of situations
(Israel in the early 2000's shows you just how many casualties a single
suicide bomber can incur).

The whole idea of layered security (often modeled after the Ben Gurion
Airport) is to reduce lines you have finer and finer security checkpoints at
each layer this increases the attackers being caught while reduces the
population density at the external checkpoints.

Ben Gurion goes further than that and it has incorporated security to how it
was built, there is a hairpinned roads ~5min drive from the external security
checkpoint to the terminal building (preventing anyone from just rushing pass
the checkpoint).

The check in counters and the initial security screening is done over a very
wide area in order to not to create choke points.

Passengers are pre-screened before they enter the security checkpoint which
really doesn't care about liquids, shoes, or nail scissors.

From the passport control to the main lounge you have quite a long walk
through a corridor which has no shops or any thing to gather around just some
photographs this again is an anti-rushing measure if some one passes security
and decides to rush the gates they are pretty much funneled through a tunnel.

The main terminal lounge is fairly small compared to other airports (even of
the size of TLV or smaller) it's round with a large fountain in the middle and
with fairly low density seating.

The gates are clustered over several branches and are separated from the main
terminal lounge again by another fairly long defacto tunnel without any shops
which again gives security the ability to close off any of them and prevents
basically a leap frog rush.

There will always be choke points and clusters in an airport or any other
public area, the airline counters, the check in desks, the information
counter, restaurants, restrooms, the duty free liquor/tobacco store etc and of
course the boarding gates. And of course even the most lax security check that
is intended to do nothing but to ensure you don't have an RPG in your bags
would create them as well.

Good security is built around performing as much checks as possible before the
people are centralized in one place and cluster, good security is about
building the airports in such a manner that would enable security to react
promptly while reducing the effectiveness of both armed assaults and suicide
attacks.

So no security doesn't make you less safe sure intelligence and enforcement is
still better than securing an airport but that's a given you don't need to
analyze anything to come to that conclusion simply because even the most ideal
attack on a target like an airport would have some casualties even if it's the
assailants only.

Claiming that somehow security makes you less safe is moronic, this to some
extent even includes the TSA which isn't an effective security measure but it
doesn't makes you less safe. The lines and clusters would still be there
regardless of security or not they'll just be at different places.

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pyabo
If you put an alarm in your house it means that thieves will choose another,
not that thieves will find a job.

~~~
techthroway443
What happens when all houses have alarms?

~~~
pyabo
It just increase the effort the thieves need to invest. If all houses have
alarms, it may be not worthy to rob houses which reward isn't good enough, so
they would look for houses with more rewards. Of course, some thieves won't be
able to learn this new technology. If all airports had good security it would
be more difficult to have attacks but it isn't the case now.

------
iofj
So at Istanbul airport terrorists attacked the airport screening lanes at the
entrance to the airport. Instead^H^H^H^H^H^H In _addition_ to normal security
screenings, Istanbul also makes people queue at the entrance, and has a
security screening there. A terrorist apparently waited in that line, blew
himself up, about 30 dead.

What happens to security when a bomb goes off ? Well, apparently it is
abandoned, and fails open. So you can walk straight through, unopposed. The 2
remaining terrorists (and hundreds of civilians) did just that, and while a
police officer shot one of them before he could run into a crowd and that bomb
went off in the middle of an open space, apparently without victims [1]. The
other one, however did succeed.

According to this article the solution to this is what Baghdad airport does
... which is to have vehicle screening before the vehicles get near the
airport building. One can only imagine what a nightmare it would be to do this
at a high traffic airport but ...

How about we do the other alternative ? Obviously static defenses with long
queues effectively make it easier, not harder, for terrorists to strike (talk
about obvious). Let's use this opportunity to make sure people don't ever have
to wait in security screening, avoiding creating a vulnerable point, and
making air travel _far_ more attractive for everybody concerned while we're at
it.

[1] (note: VERY graphic violence
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_QKYBK04AmA](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_QKYBK04AmA)
)

