
Belgian police forced to stop using facial recognition (Dutch) - Tharkun
https://www.hln.be/nieuws/binnenland/federale-politie-moet-gezichtsherkenning-op-zaventem-stopzetten-project-is-in-strijd-met-wet~aeaa5daa/
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Ambroos
For clarity, this is a general surveillance facial recognition project that
was started only a few months ago (with security cameras).

The automated passport gates (for Belgian eIDs and EU biometric passports) are
not included or affected and will keep working (when they're not broken or
closed).

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Insanity
It works quite well but it does always make me feel uncomfortable. I wouldn't
mind waiting in line longer just to skip it. (And I do when I can).

Edit: also don't bother translating or reading the comments on that website.
They are youtube-comment quality.

~~~
itcrowd
I think the banned cameras are general surveillance cameras, not the ones used
for check-in or boarding.

edit: the cameras aren't being banned, the facial recognition software must be
disabled

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jhncls
The article at the Flemish tv [0] has a little more background (also in Dutch,
but often they create specific English versions for this kind of articles,
which can take some time [1]). They mention 4 reasons for the forced stop:

\- There was no prior study about possible the privacy implications.

\- No approval was asked before the project started although such an approval
is mandatory under GDPR.

\- Some changes in law are needed to allow to keep such a database. Current
laws only permit licence plate databases.

\- There were too many false positives.

[0] [https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2019/09/20/politie-mag-geen-
aut...](https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2019/09/20/politie-mag-geen-automatische-
gezichtsherkenning-gebruiken-op-de.app/)

[1] [https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/en/](https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/en/)

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lacampbell
What's Zaventem? Is that a town?

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the_svd_doctor
Yes. That's also where the national airport is.

~~~
rejschaap
The article is about the airport, not about the town. The airport is often
called Zaventem because of its location. International travelers will know it
by the name Brussels airport.

~~~
lacampbell
Yeah I can't really read Dutch. I enjoy attempting it though, like a crossword
puzzle.

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jszymborski
Here's a translated version I ran on DeepL.com

[https://hastebin.com/raw/wiwerobayi](https://hastebin.com/raw/wiwerobayi)

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mytailorisrich
Here in the UK we have cameras that will automatically scan car number plates
to check for insurance and road tax.

In principle I would see nothing wrong with having the same with facial
recognition for wanted people (frankly, why would this not exist if technology
is available?), though I'm guessing that people on the run would quickly learn
to avoid them.

I feel we are in a phase of facial recognition development in which some
people reject it as a matter of principle or because they only see the worst
that might be done with it. I'm hoping for a more balanced approach (not
holding my breath...).

~~~
1984_beckons
Car number plates have a consistent, mandated font with a set of regular
formats on high-contrast backgrounds that makes it almost trivially easy for
computer vision to extract a number plate from an image of a car.

Cars are licenced transport. You are required to a) tax and maintain your
vehicle b) identify who was driving the vehicle if you are the registered
owner and requested to do so by the police and c) not obscure or obfuscate
your number plate.

Faces are not licenced, are uniquely identifiable personal data - ignoring the
enormous false positive detection rate from current technology - and everyone
has one. Consider the implications for a supposedly free society (of which the
United Kingdom no longer is one) where the state can draw arbitrary inferences
from the presence of someone with a face that matches pattern X in location Y
on date Z.

~~~
mytailorisrich
Your reply illustrates my comment that some people only see the worst or try
to imagine only the worst.

If a facial recognition system is only linked to a database of wanted people
then it won't be able to ID people not on that database. I.e. if it is no
worse than a normal CCTV for everyone who is not wanted by the police.

Therefore, in principle there is no negative impacts in terms of privacy or
liberty compared to existing CCTVs.

The only issue is technical: False positives (which I'm not sure the numbers
would be 'enormous' at the moment). This is bound to improve over time and can
be mitigated with the appropriate police procedures on how to respond to an
alert by such a system.

> _for a supposedly free society (of which the United Kingdom no longer is
> one)_

Of course if that's your opinion we're not going to be able to have a
discussion on the topic...

~~~
tolien
Your assumption that the system throws away everything but the images of
flagged people and number plates, and expires even those after some period of
time, flies completely in the face of reality (e.g. the New York State Police
were keeping all their collected ANPR data indefinitely [0]). A number of US
states are making legal provisions to restrict how long ANPR data is retained
for [2] - are they just tech pessimists too?

> False positives (which I'm not sure the numbers would be 'enormous' at the
> moment)

A 98% false positive rate [1] seems quite enormous.

> The Metropolitan Police’s system has produced 104 alerts of which only two
> were later confirmed to be positive matches

In another deployment:

> overall only 234 alerts – fewer than 10 per cent – were correct matches.

At least in the UK you're not going to be stopped by a police officer with a
gun drawn on the basis of a failed read [3].

0: [https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/09/your-car-
tracked...](https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/09/your-car-tracked-the-
rapid-rise-of-license-plate-readers/)

1: [https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/met-
police-f...](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/met-police-
facial-recognition-success-south-wales-trial-home-office-false-
positive-a8345036.html)

2: [https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/03/virginia-
passes-...](https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/03/virginia-passes-
shortest-limit-in-us-on-keeping-license-plate-reader-data/)

3: [https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/04/due-to-
license-p...](https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/04/due-to-license-
plate-reader-error-cop-approaches-innocent-man-weapon-in-hand/)

~~~
itcrowd
In addition to false positives, the false negative rate must also be given.
For example: if 100 "suspect cars" pass by, but only 5 are identified as
suspect, then 95% of the suspects are still on the loose and the system is
again much less effective.

~~~
tolien
This FOIA response [1] reckons that there was a test where the false-negative
rate was 20%, but there's also this report [2] of a 30% false negative rate at
the Notting Hill carnival. So to continue your example, out of 100 known
wanted people walking past the system 20-30 got through without being flagged.

1:
[https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/cy/request/use_of_automated_f...](https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/cy/request/use_of_automated_facial_recognit_2)

2: [https://theconversation.com/why-regulating-facial-
recognitio...](https://theconversation.com/why-regulating-facial-recognition-
technology-is-so-problematic-and-necessary-107284)

