

CALEA requires telecoms to install surveillance equipment in their datacenters - sxp
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communications_Assistance_for_Law_Enforcement_Act

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rdtsc
What is shocking about CALEA is what hasn't happened yet -- the requirement to
integrate back-doors in servers providing VOIP services. Notice that VOIP
services don't necessarily have to be sending traffic to a central server, it
could be peer to peer like WebRTC so now CALEA gets updated and ... well I
don't know what happens.

Companies would need to install back-doors on user's machine directly to
divert copy of a stream of a audio, get fined or end up moving overseas.

~~~
j2d3
But it _has_ already happened... nearly 15 years ago it got pretty bad, and it
continues to get worse. Anyway these "backdoors" already do exist in routers.

None of the big companies with statements (denials) about PRISM say _anything_
about protecting data that _flows through_ its networking equipment, only that
they do not provide access to "stored" data on "servers" (without a warrant).

Here's how to configure a Cisco 7600's LI (Lawful Intercept) "feature":

[http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/routers/7600/ios/12.2SR/conf...](http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/routers/7600/ios/12.2SR/configuration/lawful_intercept/76LIch2.html)

* Note the cute assumption in the naming of this "feature" \- it almost implies that the _use_ of "Lawful Intercept" is necessarily lawful as the feature itself has the word "lawful" right there in the name!

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Karunamon
Also, CALEA doesn't require any kind of backdoor or automated access, it
merely requires that you have the ability to transparently log traffic
("lawful intercept" being the official term).

Any ISP-grade gear will have this function.

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j2d3
What is it about PRISM that is so shocking to people?

This (knowing the NSA/CIA _can and may actually_ listen to, record, and data-
mine ALL electronically mediated communications) has been the default
condition since the late 90's when CALEA came about.

[https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5858538](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5858538)

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gridmaths
Setting aside the issue of surveillance... the following clause seems a good
way to ensure government contractors get plenty of work :

'Carriers are permitted to meet their CALEA obligations through the services
of “Trusted Third Parties (TTP)” -- that is, they can hire outside companies,
which meet security requirements outlined in CALEA, to perform all of the
required functions.'

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j2d3
Nothing stated in the Rackspace or other ISPs posts says anything about the
routers in place at these facilities. They're all quite careful to say how
secure the customer's "stored data" is safe on the "servers" \- nothing is
said about data flows through routers.

