
The Long-Forgotten Flight That Sent Boeing Off Course - pseudolus
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/how-boeing-lost-its-bearings/602188/
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nrp
Despite all the press around the specifics of MCAS and the 737 MAX, the broken
relationship between Boeing and the FAA, and the poor state of Boeing pilot
training in many developing countries, this article reads as the single most
damning piece about Boeing. The implication is that there isn’t a simple
policy or process fix to get Boeing back on track, but that the company
culture and leadership model is fundamentally broken and has been for the last
20 years. That is a slow and painful thing to recover from, and not many
companies have done it successfully (though Microsoft and IBM come to mind as
ones who made it through to the other side).

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gumby
> and the poor state of Boeing pilot training in many developing countries,

IHTPO that the 737 Max's that crashed were the newest planes operated by
companies with advanced training.

It's no question that random airlines flying clapped-out planes in remote
corners of the earth can be quite scary* (some of the smaller operators in the
OECD countries too) but that isn't really a factor in the two crashes that
grounded the aircraft.

* On two occasions in my life I have been frightened enough not to get on a scheduled flight (I didn't hear that either crashed). These were entirely been due to the physical state of the aircraft.

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bobthepanda
I would not characterize Lion Air as well trained.
[https://www.cnbc.com/amp/2019/10/25/lion-air-737-max-
crash-i...](https://www.cnbc.com/amp/2019/10/25/lion-air-737-max-crash-
indonesia-recommends-redesign-better-training.html)

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filereaper
It always amazes me that culture fit is always applied to the lowly grunt but
not the top exec.

Here we have Boeing, a company built by engineers with the engineering ethos,
and MBA types were given the helm of the company. Why didn't the culture fit
apply to new leadership?

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mooman219
That's a double standard I haven't considered before. If it has been shown to
work on a lower level to the point where companies implement culture fitting,
then why isn't being implemented on all levels?

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rectang
The financialization of Boeing was a "success".

Boeing's stock rose. Executives made their money and cashed out. Somebody else
was left holding the bag.

This is the behavior the current market rules incentivize.

~~~
tpmx
> This is the behavior the current market rules incentivize.

What changed in the "market rules" between then and now? How do you make a
causation from that diff plausible?

Another alternative: A once great company fell apart due the usual factors:
greed, incompetency, entropy, failed succession plans, great people being
unusual, ethically minded technical founders being replaced by MBAs - who then
turn out creating larger profits in the shorter term, etc.

It's highly unusual for great companies to remain great companies over a long
period of time.

Edit: I mean, I agree that it seems like the behavior of large companies has
changed quite a lot; from say 1980 to 2010. But how much of that is cultural,
and how much is legislation? What has driven this change? (Are we talking
about the same thing, using different terminology?)

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marcosdumay
The stock exchanges also changed quite a lot from 1980 to 2010. That's what
brought new rules to the companies.

A great question is why did the stock exchanges changed? I can't find any
single answer, but I think operations optimization and the consequent low
transaction costs played a large part.

~~~
tpmx
Sure, yeah, the democratization of stock exchange "betting" via the internet
may have been a factor.

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Scramblejams
Assuming the conclusions of the article are correct, Boeing is yet another
company driven to disaster by the desire to put someone in charge who isn't an
expert on the product the company sells.

Let's discuss. When does it makes sense to put a non-product-person in charge?
Why, beyond the old stock price pump-n-dump? Any counterexamples where it
worked for a while and then the wheels came off?

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notkaiho
I've quite enjoyed the Atlantic's coverage of Boeing and the 737MAX issues.

And by enjoyed I mean "been fascinated by". It's never a nice thing to read.

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choward
> "When people say I changed the culture of Boeing, that was the intent, so
> that it’s run like a business rather than a great engineering firm."

Wow, why would anyone think this is an okay viewpoint to have? Because
capitalism? When I'm flying I don't care that the aircraft I'm in was made I
by a company that was run like a business. I want to be in an aircraft that is
safe. And the only thing that can make them safe is great engineering.

Clearly this comment was directed at investors and not customers. A business's
goal is to please investors. If that happens to be what's best for customers,
it's just a side-effect. An engineer on the other hand cares about the actual
product they are working on. And it order for that to be successful, customers
have to be satisfied.

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PeterisP
This case is a good illustration to an earlier discussion in HN on how and why
company values and culture actually matter.

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gok
> That, in turn, contributed to the company’s extraordinary decision to move
> its headquarters to Chicago, where it strangely remains—in the historical
> capital of printing, Pullman cars, and meatpacking—to this day.

Yes, yery "strange" for an airplane manufacture to remain headquartered the
same place as the HQ and/or major hub of its largest customer airlines.

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coredog64
Boeing expected to get a lot more defense work. Having headquarters in a major
urban location gave it an additional 2 senators and a couple more reps in the
house that could then champion those sales.

While final 737 assembly was done in Renton, the fuselages were made in
Wichita. Which was also the site of a booming business in remanufacturing
Boeing aircraft for both the civilian and military market. Making it out like
there’s no good reason to have a more central HQ doesn’t ring true.

Finally, it’s not like Boeing didn’t have issues before the merger. They had
to take a billion (with a ‘B’) charge on engineering issues with the 737NG
tail section. A lot of heads rolled for that. I left before DCAC/MRM finished
but I’d find it hard to believe that didn’t go over budget by a similar
amount.

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caf
I'm sort of surprised they haven't spun off the defence and space divisions as
separate companies yet.

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jdkee
When you measure everything by the value of the dollar it is no surprise that
ephemera such as quality and pride evaporate.

