

EFF details post-Bilski confusion on what is too "abstract" to patent - grellas
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/09/trio-post-bilski-cases-fail-clearly-define

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cduan
So it seems that the "abstract idea" under Bilski has turned into "does it
look complicated enough."

In Research Techs. Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., from last year, the court said
that a method of halftoning was not abstract, because it involved a process of
comparing pixels. In CyberSource, the court explained that comparing pixels
was not abstract because "the method could not, as a practical matter, be
performed entirely in a human mind."

Similarly, in the Ultramercial case, the court says that the method is not
abstract because "Many of these steps are likely to require intricate and
complex computer programming," and "certain of these steps clearly require
specific application to the Internet."

These words, "as a practical matter," "intricate and complex computer
programming," and "specific application to the Internet," are what throw me
for a loop. As a practical matter, I can compare four numbers on a piece of
paper, but I can't download a million numbers off of the Internet and compare
them. So comparing four numbers on a piece of paper is an abstract idea, but
comparing a million numbers on the Internet is not?

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6ren
> On its face, this all sounds well and good, until one considers the patent’s
> own depiction of its allegedly not abstract invention:

What point are they making? Surely it can't be that the diagram is abstract...
Diagrams are by nature abstract.

IIRC, the key to _CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc._ (about credit
card risk assessment over the internet) was in the precise wording of the
claims - they didn't use the word "internet", even though that was how the
invention was described. The thing is, the description in a patent is just
"one embodiment" of the invention, and it is up to the claims to be clear
about the actual scope of the invention. Claim too much and you're dead.

That's why most inventions have a series of dependent claims of decreasing
scope - if the court finds one is too broad, the next one might be OK. A
ridiculously broad first claim does no harm - provided you confine it later.
From reading several patents, I've formed the impression that the first claim
is often used as a sort of framework "here's the basic idea", and its wording
is more to do with making it convenient to hang the other claims on than
intrinsic merit.

~~~
cduan
> A ridiculously broad first claim does no harm

That might be true other than the fact that each claim gives rise to an
individual legal right. A ridiculously broad first claim can be asserted as in
a cease-and-desist, it can be the basis for a lawsuit, and it can cost those
who are threatened thousands of dollars to invalidate, if it even is
invalidated. So they actually do cause a lot of harm.

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Hyena
Sometimes I get the feeling that SCOTUS thinks they have said something
meaningful when they haven't. It would be a decent study to see if judges are
just re-applying their priors but, of necessity, using the language of Bilski.

That would be better than statements about conclusions, since it would help
build a clear set of criteria the Court can apply to itself when they want
their ruling to have a predictable effect.

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brlewis
Despite the confusing parts of Bilski, is it at least now clear that In re.
Alappat and State Street are no longer considered valid precedent?

