
Testing Free Will with Single-Neuron Measurements of Pre-Conscious Activity - fortepianissimo
http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/528136/searching-for-the-free-will-neuron/
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aschampion
Sensationalist, neuroscience vs. philosophy drivel from the author. There's
nothing extreme about reductionist physical determinism in philosophy of mind
literature. This methodology, besides being grossly inadequate at the
experimental goals as portrayed in the article, doesn't add substantial
evidence to the philosophical debate. Supervenience, epiphenomenalism, etc.,
all allow for fully deterministic physics of mind with various mechanisms of
free will available (even if only as an explanatory agent in some). And I say
this as someone who shares a similar metaphysical outlook as Kreiman.

Luckily Kreiman's work isn't about free will, but neural mechanisms of
decision making. And it's quite interesting in that context. He (and Bok and
Boyden) say as much in the article, but for some reason scientific journalism
has to create equivocal contexts for everything because they're convinced
whatever they're reporting on isn't interesting enough for what it is. And
apparently it works, because it ends up here.

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vectorpush
I will never understand this obsession with the concept of "free will". What
the hell does the term "free will" even mean? In my non-expert opinion,
_apparent_ free will is indistinguishable from any other description of "free
will".

I am thrown into existence, then I absorb information about how the
environment works, then I make decisions based on that information. How else
could it be? If my locus of control exists outside my physical brain, how
useful could it possibly be since the data I use to make _ALL_ decisions is
stored in my physical brain? If we propose that information is also stored in
some type of cosmic non-corporeal spirit-brain, nothing really changes, the
same questions of agency simply move from the physical brain to the realm of
the inexplicable spirit-brain.

~~~
chrisdevereux
> What the hell does the term "free will" even mean?

Great question. You've more or less just articulated the philosophical problem
of free will.

Why do we care what the term 'free will' means? Mainly because the concept
features heavily in the way we think about (and judge) human behaviour.

If I fail to save a drowning person because I can't swim or am tied to a tree,
most people would not judge me as morally responsible for them drowning. If I
could have saved them, but didn't, most people would judge me as morally
responsible. A theory that explains what "could have saved them" means in that
context is a theory of free will.

Accepting that we have free will means that "could have done otherwise"
explanations have a legitimate place in our moral thought. Rejecting it means
that we need to find alternative explanations for the moral difference between
the two situations I described (or just deny that there's a relevant
difference). Which is certainly possible, but counterintuitive to many
(/most?) people.

~~~
vectorpush
_Accepting that we have free will means that "could have done otherwise"
explanations have a legitimate place in our moral thought._

I don't think it makes a difference. "Free will" or not, the validity of
"could have done otherwise" explanations remain unchanged. As long as physics
permits, indeed, they "could have done otherwise", but ultimately, the stream
of bytes that steer our machinations (be they predetermined or divinely
inspired) result in some action being taken based on input from the
environment. I also disagree that human morality is capable of responding to
the absolute nature of our choices, regardless of their fundamental
constituents (see my answer to sapient)

 _A theory that explains what "could have saved them" means in that context is
a theory of free will._

What could have saved them is a different set of input or a different
algorithm processing that input. If you can even conceive of a situation in
which you would not save them, but then another one in which you would, you've
implicitly acknowledged a state change in the private instance variables that
underpin your decision making process, even if it's a change as subtle as "I
just felt like it".

~~~
chrisdevereux
> I don't think it makes a difference. "Free will" or not, the validity of
> "could have done otherwise" explanations remain unchanged

You misunderstand. I am defining "free will" as the property that makes people
moral agents --- ie. able to do otherwise in such a way that features in (some
peoples') moral judgements. I am not claiming that we in fact possess this
property (I think that's an open question).

It isn't a substantial account of what free will is. It's a bit more meta: an
account of what a substantial account of free will is. Which is important,
because as you said yourself: what the hell does 'free will' even mean?

Imagine you're trying to understand a codebase with as much legacy baggage as
human thought. You do so by identifying modules, finding out what depends on
each one and what it depends on, testing and later maybe improving on it, or
discarding it. Free will is one of those modules and before we try to 'fix'
it, we need to know what it does.

~~~
vectorpush
_You misunderstand. I am defining "free will" as the property that makes
people moral agents --- ie. able to do otherwise in such a way that features
in (some peoples') moral judgements. I am not claiming that we in fact possess
this property (I think that's an open question)._

My point is that all conceivable systems of human morality are equally
incapable of distinguishing between humans that possess "the property that
makes them moral agents" and those that do not. If the universe is
deterministic, then human morality is just another link in the chain. Morality
cannot address the fundamental nature of our choices because it exists in a
system where the only available input are the consequences of and the
perceived motivations for human behaviors. Hitler didn't accidentally
slaughter European Jews, his hateful feelings and aspirations for power drove
him to towards those actions, even if he didn't _choose_ to be hateful and
power hungry. The state of determinism does not modify the criteria for moral
judgement.

 _Imagine you 're trying to understand a codebase with as much legacy baggage
as human thought. You do so by identifying modules, finding out what depends
on each one and what it depends on, testing and later maybe improving on it,
or discarding it. Free will is one of those modules and before we try to 'fix'
it, we need to know what it does._

In that analogy, I don't think you can describe free will as a module,
contemplating free will is more like asking "is the x86 instruction set etched
into the processor or is there a homunculus living in the chip that reads
incoming instructions and executes them appropriately". The answer to that
question has no bearing on whether or not we judge the "human thought program"
to be malware (e.g. for corrupting the memory space of another program), what
we do is first decide "what was the intention of this program?" and then
assess if the memory corruption is a bug or the program's intentionally
destructive payload. The absolute nature of the instruction execution
mechanism doesn't really matter with regard to how we form judgments about
which programs we can all agree are damaging to benign programs and thus a
threat to the stability of the system as a whole.

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stickperson
I had a professor in college who was adamant that we do not have free will.
His argument basically boiled down to this: we are who we are because of our
genes, our environment, and random events that go on in the brain. We can't
control any of them. Sure, you may be able to control your environment, but
how we choose to do so is influenced by everything in the past. We think the
way we do because of events we couldn't control.

Here's an interesting paper he wrote on the subject:
[http://www.pnas.org/content/107/10/4499.full](http://www.pnas.org/content/107/10/4499.full)

~~~
warble
A powerful point, but it relies on the idea that a single set of initial
conditions can only result in one outcome. I'm not sure that's true?

~~~
Sapient
No, thats not accurate, not having free will means we dont consciously choose
what we do next - not that there is only one choice we will make in any given
circumstance.

For example, I chose to ride a boat today, but it was raining, so I read a
book instead.

~~~
warble
I understand the definition. Unless I misinterpreted, the suggestion was that
due to circumstance, you can only be expected to ever make one choice.
Therefore set of initial conditions = predictable outcome.

That was what I was questioning, as the poster above noted, this isn't
something you can assume. It's not really an argument for or against free
will, just that particular explanation of why we don't have free will.

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amalag
Trying to figure out where electricity comes from by changing the color of
light bulbs.

~~~
randallsquared
Do you have some testable evidence that there's something outside the room (in
your analogy)?

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amalag
Where is your testable evidence that you are not actually dreaming right now?
Can you "prove" it?

The point is that certain things are logically axiomatic, I could give you
many more examples. So the logical axiom that we exist is used in modern
society. To suggest that is is untrue and that science cannot proceed while
accepting the existence of the self will only backfire and scientific
endeavors in that direction will prove increasingly futile.

~~~
goblin89
> Where is your testable evidence that you are not actually dreaming right
> now? Can you "prove" it?

Isn't science about doing one thing, but doing it well? I thought if it can't
be tested and disproved (as the dream possibility), then it's ‘out of scope’.

> the logical axiom that we exist is used in modern society.

By the above, this axiom would not in any way involve science—another
framework would've to deal with it.

(IANAS, though.)

~~~
amalag
So is the existence of free will in the scope of science? Are you suggesting
that science cannot help us determine if reality actually exists but it can
tell us if free will exists?

EDIT: I think it cannot for the simple reason that the so called individual is
trying to figure out if there is scientific evidence of his own existence.

~~~
goblin89
I think I see your point. No, whether free will exists does not seem like a
proper question that science could ask (again, IANAS though).

