
The TSA Is Bad Because We Demand That It Be Bad - ourmandave
http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/the-tsa-is-bad-because-we-demand-that-it-be-bad-1781974113
======
ortusdux
I am in no way an expert on the subject, but a bulk of the TSA/Flyer friction
seems to come from bad customer service. The TSA basically only needs to work
hard enough to not get fired. They have a 95% failure rate when it comes to
their 'primary' job [1]. Recently, Delta airlines designed and built, in only
2 months, a new style of TSA screening points that moves 30% faster [2].

It would be interesting to give them some competition. Imagine if the
department was split into the TSA and the TSB. Give them equal funding and
presence in the airport. Flyers pay a screening fee and pick A or B, and then
are screened by that agency. I bet they would shape up overnight.

[1] [http://www.latimes.com/opinion/topoftheticket/la-na-tt-
tsa-a...](http://www.latimes.com/opinion/topoftheticket/la-na-tt-tsa-airport-
security-charade-20150608-story.html)

[2] [http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/06/11/481694459/...](http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/06/11/481694459/new-airport-security-lanes-in-atlanta-are-30-more-
efficient-tsa-chief-says)

~~~
mattkrause
I dislike waiting in line (obviously), but I really _hate_ that the wait times
are wildly unpredictable. Sometimes it's five minutes, sometimes it's an hour,
and the only way to be sure is to arrive at the airport far ahead of time.

This has always struck me as weird since they know almost exactly how many
people will be passing through a checkpoint at any given time: the vast
majority of tickets are bought >1 week in advance and I'm pretty sure airlines
share passenger data with the TSA already. Given this, they should be able to
adjust the staffing accordingly to make the wait times incredibly predictable
--at least when I fly, all of the lines are rarely open.

Heck, you could even make things slightly better by texting passengers a
"security forecast" the night before: "Screening lines are expected to be
{short,typical,long} tomorrow. Please arrive {1 hr, 90 min, 2+hr} before your
flight.

~~~
newman314
Think about what you just proposed.

A "security forecast" would _completely_ defeat the purpose of the security
line in the first place. Who would "attack" if it's a high security day?

~~~
aianus
You misunderstood him. He meant 'low wait time', 'medium wait time', 'high
wait time'. Everyone would still be going through the same screening process
as usual.

~~~
mattkrause
Thanks--I thought that was pretty clear, but I guess not....

~~~
newman314
My bad. Misinterpreted the "security forecast".

------
X86BSD
The most glaring idiotic point I never see raised about the TSA, other than
being an abject failure, is that whatever idiot thought up the TSA didn't even
attempt to think like a terrorist.

Look since it's inception to stop terrorists getting on board planes with
water bottles and nail clippers, and box cutters... if I am a terrorist.. you
just made my job 1000 times easier. I don't even need to get on a plane. You
just corralled dozens of people into a single slow moving line. Why wouldn't I
just strap symtex to my self and ball bearings, go through the security line
and as soon as I am the next person to go through the scanners blow myself up.
Taking out the TSA agents, the scanners, the security personnel at the
checkpoint, the 20 or thirty people standing behind me and those in front
putting their shoes on. I mean you just made my job a cake walk. No one who
passed legislation creating the worthless TSA even tried to think about how
much easier this would make terrorism. Seriously, didn't. even. try. to.
think.

~~~
Retra
The TSA was created to stop people from flying planes into buildings. Whatever
damage you think you'd do with a bomb at an airport is not much next to what
you could do with a plane in the sky.

Additionally, you've just blown up an airport without ever receiving full
access to the country. It's easy to attack a country's borders, but that's not
where the heart is.

~~~
X86BSD
I was talking about someone inside the US with a departure ticket outside the
US. It is also easy to attack it inside. Timothy McVey, Oklahoma city. The TSA
does not magically improve if you are leaving the country.

~~~
Retra
I have no love for the TSA, but it seems ridiculous to believe that threats
outside the US are somehow not relevant just because threats inside the US
exist.

------
TheLarch
The article doesn't mention that Israeli screeners are highly trained. There's
a term of art in law enforcement, "hinky", which denotes the red flag that
LEO's develop with experience. To fly in Israel, one stops in a bombproof room
and is merely questioned by professionals, who will pull you aside if you are
hinky.

The underwear bomber's father was worried that he was violent and crazy. He
CONTACTED THE US STATE DEPT about his son, out of concern. His son the bomber
traveled internationally to the US, without any suitcases. He was as hinky as
you could hope to find.

Our relatively untrained TSA is nearly useless; at best it is security
theater. I would be heavily against the underwear bomber sneaking by
professionals successfully.

Also, I don't see how airplanes are not such a rich target any more. Killing a
lot of people without access to the cockpit is challenging (they are sealed in
the US now). A McDonald's employee could fare much better with a slow poison I
suppose.

Credit where due: a great deal of this post is gleaned from Bruce Schneier
writings.

~~~
linkregister
Thanks for bringing up these points. I think these are common misconceptions
among educated people. Mentioning them shows that you exercise a good amount
of critical thinking.

1\. Israeli security. While passengers wait in security lines, Israeli
security officers ask questions to each individual about their journey.
However, these checks only occur at Israeli airports. Board El Al from
Amsterdam, and you'll find the same checks as other airlines to non-Israeli
destinations. Another point: the "hinky" factor. Ethnic and religious
profiling is practiced regularly and overtly in Israel [1]; U.S. law protects
travelers from this method of profiling. I do agree that we should increase
the amount of specialist investigators available to perform interviews while
passengers are in line. I don't agree that Israel is a relevant model for the
U.S., which is full of small airports and is less politically centralized. I
compare this to the one major airport in Israel (yes there are 5 int'l
airports but Ben Gurion in Tel Aviv gets the lion's share of flights).

2\. TSA's uselessness. TSA is an effective deterrent. It increases the risk of
getting caught to a nonzero factor. The amount of airplane hijackings has
reduced to zero in the United States since the creation of the TSA. Hijackings
in other countries' airspace still occurs. Is TSA doing a horrible job?
Objectively yes. Is it useless? No.

3\. Airplanes as enticing targets. Airplane crashes target middle and upper
class people who politicians care about. The Malaysian Airlines crashes
dominated airwaves for weeks. Airplane crashes are sensational and can spur
politicians into a course of action (overreaction) favorable to terrorists'
agendas. A McDonald's poisoning is difficult to attribute to malice. ISIL
might have claimed responsibility for the Chipotle e. coli outbreak, but would
that have been credible?

4\. Schneier. Mr. Schneier is a brilliant cryptographer who does not have
credible expertise outside that realm. His blog is popular and he is vocal
about computer security. However, several outstanding security professionals
(Thomas Ptacek, on this site) have noted that many of his statements and
predictions regarding computer security are plain wrong, and belie a lack of
understanding of software vulnerability analysis. That said, his opinion of
the TSA and Israeli security is as valid as any other layperson social
commentator; he just doesn't have any expertise in the domain.

[1] [http://www.haaretz.com/in-israel-racial-profiling-doesn-t-
wa...](http://www.haaretz.com/in-israel-racial-profiling-doesn-t-warrant-
debate-or-apologies-1.261075)

~~~
dragonwriter
> TSA is an effective deterrent.

Compared to what existed before? The evidence on that is...scant.

> It increases the risk of getting caught to a nonzero factor.

The risk was nonzero before.

> The amount of airplane hijackings has reduced to zero in the United States
> since the creation of the TSA.

There were no passenger aircraft hijackings in the US for about 18 years
_prior_ to 9/11/2001\. So, its really not all that convincing that the TSA has
done anything better than what went before by keeping the number to 0 in the
less than 15 since it was established.

> Is it useless? No.

Compared to _no_ security, its not useless. But is it meaningful better than
what it replaced (which was not "no security")?

~~~
linkregister
> "Compared to what existed before? The evidence is...scant."

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_hijackings](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_hijackings)
look at the number in the U.S. before TSA. Look at the number after.

> It increases the risk of getting caught to a nonzero factor.

The risk of getting caught with box cutters at that time was actually zero.

> There were no passenger aircraft hijackings in the US for about 18 years
> prior to 9/11/2001\. So, its really not all that convincing that the TSA has
> done anything better than what went before by keeping the number to 0 in the
> less than 15 since it was established.

It's interesting that you had to qualify it with "passenger aircraft
hijackings" to avoid mentioning the 1994 hijacking from Memphis. Also, as
mentioned elsewhere in this thread, airport security improved at many airports
in the 1990s. TSA was implemented with the intention to standardize this. The
public was incensed (rightly or wrongly) at the failure of the airport
security to stop the 9/11 hijackers.

> Compared to no security, its not useless. But is it meaningful better than
> what it replaced (which was not "no security")?

Did I dispute this? Please don't attempt to inject meaning in my position that
isn't there.

~~~
dragonwriter
>
> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_hijackings](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_hijackings)
> look at the number in the U.S. before TSA.

The last passenger aircraft hijacking one on that list before 9/11 was in 1987
(there are others in that period with US, along with other, flags on that
webpage, because the plane was either flown to the US or was a plane of a US
carrier -- I actually missed the 1987 one in the earlier report, which makes
it only 14 years before 9/11 without an attack.)

> It's interesting that you had to qualify it with "passenger aircraft
> hijackings" to avoid mentioning the 1994 hijacking from Memphis.

Given that the main focus of discussion has generally been on the TSA security
implementation and its application to passenger flights, I think that its an
appropriate limitation. But even if you add that one in, the rate is still so
low that the confidence that there is an reduction in the rate of hijackings
since the TSA was introduced attributable to anything other than chance (much
less one _attributable specifically to the TSA_ ) is not particularly high.

> The risk of getting caught with box cutters at that time was actually zero.

The reports from the planes were that the hijackers had a variety of weapons,
which included box cutters, but also firearms.

> Also, as mentioned elsewhere in this thread, airport security improved at
> many airports in the 1990s.

The federal government set standards for a long time before that, and the
federal standards were enhanced in response to the 1990 gulf crisis, true.

> TSA was implemented with the intention to standardize this.

No, it wasn't. It was implemented specifically to negate future liability from
the airlines for security failures, because the airlines (many of which were
reportedly near bankruptcy) felt that with the need to provide coverage for
potential liability for future security failures made evident by the 9/11
events (for which they also sought specific, after the fact immunity from
Congress) they would no longer be able to operate profitably.

------
Johnny555
From the article:

 _Another reason is that it’s much easier for the TSA to screen checked bags
than carry-ons, and airlines keep discouraging people from checking bags._

Why is it easier to screen checked bags? 90% of the time I fly, no one opens
my checked bag (at least, there's no TSA card inside, and the TSA indicator on
my lock doesn't show it was opened), so if they check it at all, they must use
some kind of scanner -- can't they use that same scanner for carry-on bags?

If screening for banned items makes it too hard to screen carry-on bags, then
maybe they could trim down the list of banned items to a more manageable
level.

~~~
spott
Less rush? More space? Better equipment (enabled because of the previous two)?

I'm not sure.

~~~
pavel_lishin
Probably very parallelizable, too - a bag that needs to be pulled off a line
doesn't prevent a passenger from going on to their gate.

~~~
mattkrause
Definitely. If you watch the baggage screeners, they spent a lot of time
inching the belt forwards and backwards to get a better look at something.
While they're doing this, every other bag is just sitting there trapped in the
queue.

On the other hand, a lot of the checked baggage handling is very automated and
can probably get a good view into most pieces without fiddling around.

------
coldtea
> _which is based on profiling that’s a combination of behavioral and racial
> (the latter of which is rightfully officially prohibited by the TSA, though
> allegations of racial profiling against it continue)_

TSA being crap aside, I don't see what's wrong with racial profiling.

If a predominant number of actual culprits will be of a certain ethnicity or
broader culture (e.g. because the organizations they belong too predominantly
operate in certain countries or with certain religious groups), you should
definitely that to the things you check for as a statistically significant
correlation.

That's a totally different thing from being racist -- which is assuming a
certain demographic are inferior humans.

~~~
bandushrew
Im against it because its insanely stupid, not because its racist.

Lets take Islamic Terrorists as an example, they have a very wide pool of
people to choose from, many of whom do not fit any stereotype you could come
up with.

As soon as its known that security targets specific profiles, it becomes
trivial to bypass security.

~~~
coldtea
> _Lets take Islamic Terrorists as an example, they have a very wide pool of
> people to choose from, many of whom do not fit any stereotype you could come
> up with. As soon as its known that security targets specific profiles, it
> becomes trivial to bypass security._

If the "specific profile" is their ethnicity, then it doesn't become "trivial"
at all.

It puts them through a huge new cost -- having to recruit and convince to send
on missions more people of other nationalities. And while those do exist, they
are far rarer than fundamentalist native Syrians or Iraqis for example.

~~~
bandushrew
[https://www.google.co.nz/search?q=Syrians&safe=active&espv=2...](https://www.google.co.nz/search?q=Syrians&safe=active&espv=2&biw=1277&bih=703&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi94sm_ibXNAhVGG5QKHZylD1IQ_AUIBigB)

Pick out the "true" syrians. Ethnicity is not a good predictor of appearance.

------
rayiner
> Ultimately, the TSA’s airport screening exists as the second-to-last line of
> defense for a threat that is astoundingly rare.

It didn't used to be that rare before the FAA required screening measures to
be implemented:
[http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/world/middleeast/airline-h...](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/world/middleeast/airline-
hijacking-history.html?_r=0) ("By the mid-1970s, at least 150 planes had been
'skyjacked' in the United States alone.") The first U.S. hijacking was in
1961,[1] so we're talking roughly 10 per year in the U.S. before modern
aviation security.

It would be fair to point out that most of the decrease happened due to pre-
TSA screening measures. But it would also be fair to point out that it's hard
to separate how much of the delays post-TSA are due to the TSA itself and how
much are due to the massive increase in US passengers and concomitant
overloading of airport capacity.

[1] [http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/20/when-
hijack...](http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/20/when-hijackers-
ruled-the-american-skies.html)

------
newman314
Last two times I've flown, the TSA Pre line was longer than the regular
Premier line.

Also, it's frustrating to see not more people calling out Pre for what it is:
a pay-to-play scheme which I'm very much opposed to. Not to mention the
outstanding record of the government keeping such data secure to date.

------
golergka
They should've also noticed that you always have to get to Ben Gurion at least
3 hours before the flight because of security. I'm not complaining, but it's
probably not what americans would want in a future TSA.

------
bsder
The TSA is bad because its visible arms are all cost (government money,
passenger time, etc.) and no benefit.

The TSA airport checkers are the worst. If you simply removed the checkers and
let the airlines go back to handling security, things would be just fine.

Hijacking and other forms of on plane malfeasance are a solved problem not
because of TSA but because passengers won't sit still for it anymore. Of
course, reinforced cockpit doors now make hijacking by insiders much easier
because the passengers can't fight back through it. Oops.

The problem is that the most effective security measures don't come with
multi-billion dollar project budgets. Matching luggage to passengers to
prevent non-suicide attacks. Cell phone waiting lots so someone circling an
airport is now suspicious behavior. All of these things are relatively cheap
but very effective--thus nobody cares because there is no money in it.

------
ibejoeb
>if Congress funded the TSA enough

>we created the TSA, tasked it with a massive task, and hobbled it with ...,
weak funding, ...

This is a terrible congress, but I'm tired of hearing this nonsense. It's not
true. This is simply mismanagement, blame shifting, and parroting of spin. TSA
has an increased budget but has voluntarily eliminated screeners. They
recognize it and call it a win.

The budget is north of $7.3 B and has increased year over year. Despite this,
TSA has eliminated thousands of positions. These numbers are all publicly
available and verifiable[1][2][3].

In FY 2016, TSA budget increased almost $49 million to a totally of $7.3
billion. Despite this increase, TSA eliminated 2,860 positions from it
workforce. Likewise, the 2017 budget (which is not finalized, of course) has
increased upwards of $70 million. They simply can't spend the money fast
enough.

TSA sees no problem with this. In fact, they think they're doing a great job.
On the elimination of 1,666 screeners, they laud themselves, "[Risk-based
security] methods have proven more efficient in moving people through the
checkpoint than regular screening lanes and require fewer resources than a
traditional screening lane. This reduction reflects TSA’s goal to continue
transitioning to a smaller, more skilled, professional workforce..." [2-p.62]

1\.
[https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY15BIB...](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY15BIB.pdf)

2\.
[https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY_2016...](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY_2016_DHS_Budget_in_Brief.pdf)

3\.
[https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY2017B...](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY2017BIB.pdf)

------
unabst
The TSA does not block terrorists. It blocks idiots. Some terrorists are
idiots, but it has also blocked idiots that were not terrorists. Of course,
not all terrorists are idiots, and not all threats are terrorists. Which begs
the question, who asked for this?

------
nitwit005
Where "we" is a group of politicians who want to be re-elected. If longer
lines don't hurt them politically, then they aren't going to worry too much
about fixing things to make it faster.

There is a premise here that the wait is an issue, but I'm not so sure a long
and bothersome security line is a bad thing from the perspective of our
political leaders. I suspect (with complete seriousness) that if airport
security wasn't a bother, people wouldn't feel safe.

------
dottedmag
What's the underlying difference which causes a typical European security
check to be swift (I don't remember spending more than 5 minutes on a security
control for ages) and the TSA one to be awfully long?

~~~
dasil003
In China they fool you into thinking it's going to go quick by being low-tech
with relatively spartan cordoning, and just a nondescript agent at a metal
table. Then suddenly and unceremoniously they dump all your shit out
everywhere and wave you through while moving onto the next person, leaving you
to spend 10 minutes repacking everything. (Maybe this is only for foreigners
though).

------
glasz
i'm a bit sad because whenever i talk to someone who went in and out the US
they claim to not have had issues with the tsa. it may well be a clustered
problem that mostly doesnt appear but since people are sheep i guess they just
go with the hassle, don't care and then say "nah, no problems.".

my proposal: don't change a damn thing about the tsa. but introduce a tsa-free
line with simple metal detectors. no molesting, no cancer-inducing machinery.

sheep could be free again.

