

Your Android phone, now with NSA-grade security - vqc
http://venturebeat.com/2014/06/05/your-android-phone-now-with-nsa-grade-security/

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danbruc
_Your Android phone, now with NSA-grade security_

The strength of the encryption is and was never a problem.

 _One of the biggest hurdles for widespread adoption in the private sector is
that encryption is perceived to cause friction between users [...] With that
in mind, Vitru has managed to keep friction to a minimum._

Key management is indeed the main problem but the article has nothing to say
how they attacked the problem.

 _Virtru’s Android encryption enables users to control access to email
messages and files and can be “revoked” at any time. Users can also set
expiration dates for sensitive email._

No, that does not work. Screenshot. Revoking may work within a specific client
but to become really successful you will most likely have to open the protocol
to alternative clients and that's the definite end of revoking or expiring
messages.

~~~
hackcasual
They say how they've attacked the problem. And its as stupid as you would
imagine: [https://www.virtru.com/how-virtru-works](https://www.virtru.com/how-
virtru-works)

I'm guessing the system works by sending the encrypted item out-of-band.
Revocation could be done by the key server. Though there's nothing to prevent
designing a client that automatically grabbed the key material when an
encrypted message was sent.

------
hackcasual
Found this in their blog post on Google's OpenPGP plugin support:

"…is so easy to install and use that anyone, regardless of technical
sophistication or ability can use. There is no need to understand PGP or
exchange keys with the people you’re sharing information with."

I get that PGP is hard, and keyex is a huge UX problem, but that's because it
breaks immediately as soon as you try to simplify it. In the case of Virtru,
they're requiring you to rely on a trusted third-party.

About the only charitable thing that could be said about this is there might
be a practical improvement in security, provided the key and document are sent
separately.

------
beloch
Virtru claimed, in a blog post in January, that they would release the source
for components of their software.

[http://blog.virtru.com/2014/01/virtrus-open-source-
strategy/](http://blog.virtru.com/2014/01/virtrus-open-source-strategy/)

Assuming they do eventually release these components, are they enough for the
software to be trusted? Why wait to release the source anyways? I'm not
comfortable (at all) with installing closed-source software developed by "ex-
NSA employees".

~~~
hackcasual
There's enough in their service description to not trust them.

The way the system is described, you encrypt a file on your device, upload
both the key and the file to the cloud, then the receiver downloads both the
file and the key.

Look at the diagrams here: [https://www.virtru.com/how-virtru-
works](https://www.virtru.com/how-virtru-works)

The "encryption key storage" is central to how the whole thing works. It's
also a dumb idea. The only thing I can think is that it allows a file to be
delivered out-of-band, but the inescapable fact is that decryption material is
available to at least one other party.

~~~
sil3ntmac
I assumed it was asymmetric like pgp, but you're right they dont mention it
anywhere. That is rather puzzling. wtf.

~~~
rakoo
Actually they seem to mention it's symmetric:

    
    
        Each email or file has its own unique key, which is stored
        in and protected by a keystore in my butt. By default, 
        the Virtru keystore is used, but advanced users will be 
        able to operate their own key stores.

~~~
DHowitzer
Our base case is indeed symmetric for each message (the key distribution is
over Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman Ephemeral).

The number one reason why we allow for symmetric message keys is to allow you
to send an encrypted message to anyone, even if they don't have public keys
somewhere. Distributing and using private/public keys in a trusted AND easy to
use way is a problem we're currently working to solve, and will add as soon as
we get that done in a way that doesn't make our software so hard to use that
people stop using it.

~~~
rakoo
We don't have a problem with symmetric encryption. We have a problem with the
key being stored on your servers, effectively nullifying encryption.

Now, I'm not saying it's an easy problem; kudos to you for tackling it. It's
just that

\- if you have the keys to the payload

\- if you don't provide open-source client code

then no one can honestly trust your service. Don't forget that what you're
primarily doing with is trust.

------
david_shaw
_> Ackerly spent eight years at the NSA, where he specialized in cloud
analytic architecture — specifically, protecting the agency’s in-house data
transfers._

1.) Former NSA analyst does not mean "NSA-grade security."

2.) Didn't the NSA have their most secret documents leaked? I think "NSA-
Proof" security would be more impressive.

------
PeterWhittaker
NSA-grade?

Which of the two alternatives does this mean? One, proof against all foreign
intercepts, 'coz it uses NSA-strong safeguards, or two, all your comms are
automagically pwned, 'coz it uses NSA-approved addons?

I could go with either, I just want to know what I'm buyin'.

------
jonloldrup
My suggestion would be that keys were exchanged by physically bumping two
devices together. In this way the authenticity relies on people looking each
other in the eyes which through millennia has been a quite successful method
for identifying one another.

------
gcb0
"former NSA" sadly is today slang for "no technical backing, so i'm going to
dump that on you and try to impress". Some years ago random ivy league phd
departments where used for that.

~~~
richardwhiuk
I'm not convinced that's new. I think it now comes with potential that they
might have actually stopped working for their former employer.

~~~
gcb0
what? pretty sure the use of the term exploded. here is some data to back it
up
[http://www.google.com/trends/explore#q=former%20nsa&cmpt=q](http://www.google.com/trends/explore#q=former%20nsa&cmpt=q)

everyone is trying to cash in the fact that they can offer 'former NSA'
employees in hopes that clients think "hey, he knows the stuff NSA does, he
will help me protect against it"... which is total bullshit.

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1ris
One can't run trust code on a untrused platform. And I'd say smartphones are
the least trustworthy platform out there.

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hadoukenio
With NSLs, your Android phone is one legal step away from Google being coerced
into pushing an NSA-laden update to you.

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parkaboy
Must. Refrain. From posting. Cynical comment.

