
Delays in Boeing Max Return Began with Near-Crash in Simulator - pseudolus
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-08/delays-in-boeing-max-return-began-with-near-crash-in-simulator
======
danso
FWIW, the near-crash in the simulator was apparently not directly related to
MCAS, but occurred when Boeing "simulated what would happen if gamma rays from
space scrambled data in the plane’s flight-control computers."

> _In one scenario, the plane aggressively dove in a way that mimicked what
> happened in the crashes on the grounded jetliner, the people said. While
> such a failure had never occurred in the 737’s history, it was at least
> theoretically possible._

> _Because at least one of the pilots who flew the scenario in a simulator
> found it difficult to respond in time to maintain control of the plane, it
> needed to be fixed, according to two people familiar with the results._

However, the next sentence seems to belie the implication that this was just
an edge case:

> _The answer was to modernize what was a relatively antiquated design on the
> 737._

So, of all the things that caused Boeing/FAA to realize and the accept the 737
needed to modernize its decades-old design, it was a simulated edge case
involving "gamma rays from space"? Hate to be overly cynical, but that sounds
like the kind of CYA thing you'd say when you don't want to admit it you made
a huge mistake by deferring modernization in the first place, of which the
MCAS concept was a major and disastrous symptom.

~~~
Havoc
>at least one of the pilots who flew the scenario in a simulator found it
difficult to respond

And I'm guessing their not using pilots of average skill here...

~~~
Operyl
According to [0] the FAA was looking for numerous candidates to get a good
range of experience, so I would think that you might’ve had at least a few
average pilots.

[0]: [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-faa-
boe...](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-faa-boeing/faa-
says-it-will-invite-global-boeing-737-max-pilots-to-simulator-tests-
idUSKCN1VC28R)

~~~
Havoc
Yeah there is a push for using more avg pilots.

...but on mission critical testing with billion dollar implications. You want
to tell me they're pulling that name out of a hat?

------
zaroth
The can of worms has been officially opened, and this may turn out to be a
case study in how bad software and outsourcing your centers of excellence can
bankrupt a company.

If TFA is to believed, Boeing has embarked on a project to take what is
currently a master-slave failover design and jury-rig it into a master-master
real-time system. This is based on bad performance in the simulator—not
because of MCAS—but while testing errant memory errors from a simulated gamma
ray strike!

The obvious question of how can dual-master ever work when they disagree if
there isn’t a 3rd source of truth to vote out the failure? This means the
software running in both computers has to somehow agree which one is wrong,
while one of them is in a potential failure state. This... isn’t how flight
control systems are designed from first principals.

I’m not a flight system designer, but there must be hundreds of physical,
electrical, and architectural considerations taken at every point in the
design process which enable multi-master controllers with the ability to vote
out a failure. Everything from the particular sensor suite, the number of
sensors, the way they are wired, the way data is acquired and bused through
the system, the timing and synchronization of the system clocks, the way that
control outputs are calculated, queued, and ultimately issued to downstream
controllers... none of the necessary pieces will be in place in a system which
up until now makes you select a single master controller before embarking on
your flight.

The only conclusion I can reach is that Boeing has lost its mind, and this
project is absolutely doomed to fail. The architecture that Boeing has
apparently committed itself to now is extremely difficult to design from first
principals and a blank slate. I just don’t see how it’s something that can
realistically be papered onto a legacy dual-computer system after the fact.

The part in TFA about “adding a wire” practically made me spit out my coffee.
The sheer level of arrogance that Boeing management must have to think this
would be possible - is just a classic example of an elitist MBA management
group totally disconnected from any technical domain expertise. Boeing said
they would have this ready for certification _by the end of this year_?!

~~~
chkaloon
That, or this article missed the boat somehow. I find it hard to believe that
a total redesign is happening and that they expect to be done by the end of
the year. Either this article is wrong, or something is terribly wrong at
Boeing.

~~~
dboreham
I'm a huge MAX skeptic, but this article just has to be wrong. Someone who had
dropped out of a CS degree would know not to do what the article says they're
doing.

~~~
SQueeeeeL
You would be surprised, if managament is broken to it's core, the situation is
"Do this unethical thing or we'll find someone who will!"

Computer Scientists aren't usually taught engineering ethics and definitely
get fired all the time for arbitrary reasons.

~~~
uxp100
Is that true that CS students don't take an ethics course? I have a 10 year
old SE degree and I took 3, only 1 of which was engineering specific. (I took
a philosophy ethics course, which really isn't that relevant to issues like
these anyway, but also a course that was specific to ethical issues in
computing.)

OTOH, I'm skeptical those courses change behavior, and in this particular case
others in comments are saying this is a common architecture in the space, so
how could anyone solve this ethical conundrum if getting to the base level of
whether this is an ethical conundrum to begin with is difficult?

~~~
MFLoon
SE = structural engineering? That's cool, I'm glad your discipline is
receiving some ethical training. I've never heard of any CS program including
any sort of engineering or general ethics courses in their curricula.

~~~
tofof
Every single CS baccalaureate degree from the University of Illinois has
required from at least 2005[1] a mandatory engineering ethics course (CS 210).

Note that the UofI has always been in the top ten nationally for CS; its 2020
rank is #6 (behind MIT, CMU, UCBerkeley, Georgia Inst. of Tech, and Stanford).

1: 2005:
[https://web.archive.org/web/20050321215749/http://courses.ui...](https://web.archive.org/web/20050321215749/http://courses.uiuc.edu/cis/programs/urbana/2004/fall/undergrad/engin/comp_sci.html)

2: 2019: [https://cs.illinois.edu/academics/undergraduate/degree-
progr...](https://cs.illinois.edu/academics/undergraduate/degree-program-
options/bs-computer-science)

------
chkaloon
They're redesigning the architecture and expect to be done by the end of the
year? That is insane. The MCAS change was a patch of one fairly isolated
system as I understand it. Redesigning the entire architecture of the flight
controls seems like a years long process. Is this article correct? If so, I
don't think I'll be riding on a MAX any time soon.

------
akersten
These should not fly for a decade. They're rewriting the avionics from
scratch. This should require a years-long process of testing, external
auditing, and approvals. I'd even go so far as to say in flight, we should
require competitor review. That's right, no trade secrets. If you want your
Hello World up in the air, you better let your competitor vet the source code.

This is an engineering boondoggle and an embarrassment for Boeing. Software
does not need to be this complicated. Design a damned airframe that's
airworthy without needing stabilization hacks.

~~~
jackhack
>>Software does not need to be this complicated. >>Design a damned airframe
that's airworthy without needing stabilization hacks.

In effect you are stating that you understand better than the hundreds of
engineers involved with this project why these design trade-offs were made.
Careful with that line of thinking. You're nearly guaranteed to be wrong.

There are a host of reasons for the design in place: Efficiency, ease of
implementation, familiarity with the components/technology, reliabilty of
subsystems, availability of components, cost, maintenance complexity, etc.
etc. etc.

And, don't forget, efficiency standards. As the whole world freaks out about
CO2 and global climate change/cooling/warming, and the insta-crowd 'air travel
shames' those who use these magnificent machines, it's important to realize
that some of these design decisions maximizing efficiency are the hereditary
descendants of cultural pressures, too.

Not to excuse any engineering f-ups, but there's a lot more to it than just
'build a simple tube with wings and an engine.'

~~~
Rooster61
> ...why these design trade-offs were made.

While your line of reasoning is sound in most scenarios, in this case, the why
is pretty obviously written on the wall. The overriding reason why this hacky-
hack software solution was slapped into the airframe was to keep from having
to reclass the plane following the addition of too-large engines. Your reasons
listed played into the design decisions that became MCAS, but the underlying
reason as to why any of this nonsense was needed in the first place is because
non-engineers forced a shitty situation on the people who actually implement
these airframes.

Hacker News is frequented by engineers from multiple disciplines, including
software engineering, and many of those engineers know the kinds of terrible
design decisions forced by management that come about to make a quick buck.
People are pissed about it due to this fact, and rightly so.

~~~
ethbro
I get the impression half of HN is pissed at Boeing because they understand
terrible management-driven engineering decisions.

The other half just think we're "pissed off at Boeing" and makes claims like
"well, they should have just built the plane right."

And so you get engineers taking umbrage (IMHO, rightly so) for the ridiculous
simplification being made by the second half.

~~~
Rooster61
The lovely thing about HN is that that first half is probably indeed half of
the people reading; whereas this same conversation on reddit might be 10%
engineers, 90% echo chamber. That's at least my experience.

------
throw7
Master-Master setups are notoriously complex. You don't just "spin one up" and
things "just work".

------
situational87
Are the simulators run by Boeing or the FAA? Are the test pilots employed by
Boeing?

What changes have been made to the regulatory framework to prevent Boeing from
signing off on their own safety tests? What changes has the FAA made to bring
more public transparency to the flight certification process?

When is the sentencing date for Boeing executives? They are not getting a plea
deal I hope?

I'm not worried about the overly complicated flight control software or MCAS,
I'm worried about the next system that will fail because nobody at this
company seems to care about engineering any more.

~~~
macspoofing
I'm not sure the FAA is at fault here. From a big-picture perspective, the
industry has never been safer.

Obviously, continuous improvement is a core part of quality, and the FAA can
always learn and improve their processes, but you can't expect a regulator to
shoulder the core responsibility of certifying a plane. The primary
responsibility is always going to be on the manufacturer because no regulator
will ever have the manpower to test and verify everything nor the deep
visibility into to R&D process that a manufacturer would.

~~~
salawat
They absolutely can with the right amount of funding to maintain
attractiveness.

The regulator should be adversarial; period. A well-meaning adversary, but
adversarial never the less. Cutting manufacturers as much slack as has been is
exactly what got us to the point we're at; a regulator that collected rubber
stamped reports and only heard about things going wrong after tragedy has
already struck.

It is better to have an active regulator able to intercede than to have the
manufacturer coordinating everything internally, and asking for help when
needed simply out of interest for removing the possibility to hide a problem
discovery by never opening the floor to being questioned by the regulator.

If you tie the regulator's hands, then it isn't a regulator anymore. It's a
postmortem service.

~~~
macspoofing
I didn't argue a regulator should be rubber stamping anything. What's with the
strawman?

~~~
salawat
Sorry for the delay, but I reject the assertion that you're making here:

>but you can't expect a regulator to shoulder the core responsibility of
certifying a plane. The primary responsibility is always going to be on the
manufacturer because no regulator will ever have the manpower to test and
verify everything nor the deep visibility into to R&D process that a
manufacturer would.

In a financially incentivized market-based system where a fiduciary
responsibility is built into the very underlying fabric of the corporate
calculus, you cannot afford to be blind to the fact that a market actor has
every reason and opportunity to stuff off every cost they can to improve their
bottom line. This is why we need regulators in the first place, due to
opposing optimizations between the interests of shareholders/executives, and
the public.

The FAA as a regulator must be capable of requesting and having delivered any
piece of information relevant to the goal of airframe certification. It is the
job of the manufacturer to satisfy the regulator as to the objective safety of
the plane, and it is the regulator's job to ensure nothing is left out for
expediency sake. When regulator's start talking about streamlining things for
the regulated, I start to get worried.

To go into more detail, no; I do not see the FAA adopting the actual physical
task or logistics of testing a plane; however, I do see them as the final
authority in terms of "Is the design complete" and "is your testing
sufficient?"

This means that an Engineer, free of the inherent bias that comes from being
dependent on the manufacturer for their paycheck, and acting in the public's
interest as an external agent, needs to be as fully briefed on the entirety of
the operating and physical details of every plane. It doesn't need to be the
same person with it all; but the point is between the FAA as an external
agency, and the manufacturer, there should be two independent agencies with
enough understanding of the product that it can be demonstrated the
manufacturer has done their due disclosure in informing the flying public of
every facet of the aircraft's behavior that nothing like the MAX boondoggle
should ever even be considered as being a reasonable course of action ever
again.

You had people inside Bboeing who couldn't understand why MCAS was the way it
was. Given that, it is evident that the most important stakeholders in being
fully informed (buyers and operators) as a consequence were also not informed
before regulators cut Boeing loose to sell on the market.

In 2018, legislation was passed that made it even more difficult for the FAA
to exercise it's purported authority so long as a corporate representative
assured them the issue was being handled internally.

I _do_ expect anyone in an oversight position to be capable of observing
things within their purview; and in terms of evaluating designs, the tangible
nature of the principles and forces involved with aviation should be conducive
to clear communication and reproducibility between the manufacturer and the
regulator. The difference to a business in a functioning regulatory regime is
that the manufacturer should see it's job as revealing new ground to a
regulator, and leveraging the regulator as the source of of friction that
peels away any uncertainty from the design. This can only happen in an
environment where a "no more secrets" approach to business is maintained.

------
ergothus
Abstracting out of planes to software on general - this is what happens when
your testing surface dramatically expands. You can have a product that has
been working just fine, generally, but when you start adding tests for new
situations, you can suddenly get a LOT more tests....with most of them
failing.

TDD advocates (and I'm a fan) will be feeling smug, be that doesnt apply here
- the issue is not the initial tests, but explicitly tests after the fact, on
criteria that werent in the initial tests. Be it by oversight or deliberate
choice, TDD is in the same boat here.

All of which underlines how hard complex software can be. Boeing made lots of
mistakes, and many of us might recall happier examples from our past (new
criteria, but a well-written suite passes it all with minimal effort), but
such examples are selection bias - if we exclude the code we know is a mess,
the remaining mix of did-well and did-poorly code looked GOOD before. (Here
I'm generalizing from my experience and the war stories I've heard)

Which brings us back to the Waterfall vs Agile issue. We know that we
generally stink at anticipating all the requirements. We also know that the
better we do at anticipating those requirements the less likely we are to have
a sudden spec change derail us (not because we can prevent the spec change,
but because our code tends to work)

Anyone asserting that such problems are simple to resolve hasn't worked on
enough such problems. We are learning, but this field is still in its infancy
and we've not even finished understanding some of the earliest principles the
pioneers in the industry laid out.

------
tus88
They say the MAX issues might delay the introduction of the 797, which I find
rather strange. The 797 is the plane Boeing should have made instead of
butchering the design of the 737...it's the right size and has the ground
clearance necessary for the large efficient engines they jammed onto the
737...in other words it's perfect for mid-capacity long range point to point
flights between secondary cities.

I say get the 797 out ASAP.

------
MobileVet
Considering that MCAS is an added ‘feature’ to avoid stall, you would think
they could just remove it and be done. After all, it wasn’t part of the
original 737.

Sadly, from my limited understanding, due to the engine location change on the
airframe, the plane naturally pitches up... making it necessary.

One thing seems clear to the external observer, this is a 737 in name only.

~~~
speeder
Well, it IS a 737, that is part of the problem.

The 737 has a feature almost no other new plane have: you can order it with a
internal staircase so people can leave the plane without a specialized airport
terminal.

This feature requires the plane to keep its current overall shape, otherwise
the staircase thingy would not work.

So to keep this feature, while putting a bigger engine on the plane, they had
to move the engine forward, and change its shape too, otherwise the engine
wouldn't fit between the wing and the ground.

Then THAT caused the necessity of MCAS.

So long story short: wanting to keep backward compatiblity with the 737
staircase, led to the engine hack, that then to maintain backward compatiblity
with the handling led to the MCAS hack...

So, it IS a 737, in the sense they kept the staircase and to do that ended
needing the MCAS...

The other option would have been abandon the staircase entirely and make a
taller plane, this would allow a bigger engine with no handling changes, but
although this would remain a 737 from handling perspective, it would not be a
737 from the airports perspective: it would need to remodel the airports to
install bridges or purchase of ladder trucks.

~~~
nradov
The 737 MAX 10 has taller (extending) landing gear. Not sure if the airstairs
will still be an option.

[https://www.boeing.com/features/2018/08/737max10-landing-
gea...](https://www.boeing.com/features/2018/08/737max10-landing-
gear-08-18.page)

~~~
burfog
That landing gear only extends when the nose gear is off the ground. It's
really just to prevent a tail strike. An alternate choice would be a little
extra wheel up on the tail, as was done with the Concorde.

------
Yizahi
If I understand correctly "fixing" MCAS would be quick but audit found out
more problems and Boeing started basically a refactoring of their computer
architecture (including hardware changes) which itself takes a lot of time and
didn't pass new audit yet.

~~~
thisisnico
Didn't I read from another hacker news poster that the software engineering
and design was outsourced? Anyone know?

~~~
peteradio
Outsourcing is a symptom of the real issue. I don't think outsourcing
necessarily causes these problems. Subjugating engineering to a lower class
and elevating politics/accounting doesn't really generate great engineered
products, go figure.

~~~
madengr
As an engineer in the defense/aero industry, this is so true. Legal, HR, and
IT run everything, with the engineering staff shat upon.

------
krn
There are also issues with 737 NG[1]:

> At least three Ryanair Boeing 737s have been grounded due to cracks between
> the wing and fuselage but this was not disclosed to the public, the Guardian
> can reveal.

> The budget Irish airline is the latest to be affected by faults in the
> “pickle fork” structure, which has sparked an urgent grounding of 50 planes
> globally since 3 October.

[1]
[https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/nov/06/boeing-737-...](https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/nov/06/boeing-737-cracks-
ryanair-grounds-three-planes-due-to-cracking-between-wing-and-fuselage)

~~~
eganist
But that's metallurgical failure, not software, and it's something that's
showing up in use almost decades later.

I'm saying this to highlight that what you're pointing out, while not desired,
is kinda expected. That's the point of the routine inspection and maintenance
- to catch these.

It's not the same as the conversation we're having under the OP: catastrophic
failure due to bad assumptions in software (in this case, memory safety)

~~~
krn
> I'm saying this to highlight that what you're pointing out, while not
> desired, is kinda expected.

If it was expected, it wouldn't be newsworthy. And metallurgical issues in
Boeing planes can be as critical as software issues:

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IaWdEtANi-0&t=36m16s](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IaWdEtANi-0&t=36m16s)

~~~
eganist
It's not newsworthy. That's why the recent metallurgical stress topic
regarding Ryanair's jets rapidly died from the news cycle - because to some
extent, it's expected, and it's why maintenance processes exist. A quick
search on Google News yielded exactly one recent result, and that was about
Ryanair's response to the Guardian article:
[https://www.irishtimes.com/business/transport-and-
tourism/ry...](https://www.irishtimes.com/business/transport-and-
tourism/ryanair-in-eye-of-storm-over-newspaper-reports-on-
boeing-737s-1.4074787)

> And metallurgical issues in Boeing planes can be as critical as software
> issues:

This much is obvious, and it's exactly why the maintenance exists. Crashes
happen; the precursors are baked right into new processes and procedures. When
said processes pick up on similar symptoms in the future, it _might_ be in the
news for a day or two, and then it disappears because it's expected.

The precise problem with the MAX is that there's an entire body of knowledge
around the MCAS and other automation included with the plane that was never
shared, which meant that unlike metallurgical issues which in many cases are
largely unforeseen, Boeing's problems here were _entirely_ preventable.

Items that stay in the news for a while tend to be the novel things.

~~~
krn
> This much is obvious, and it's exactly why the maintenance exists. Crashes
> happen; the precursors are baked right into new processes and procedures.
> When said processes pick up on similar symptoms in the future, it might be
> in the news for a day or two, and then it disappears because it's expected.

At least on three occasions, multiple people have died or were injured because
737 NG planes developed serious cracks after _exactly 8 years_ in service.
Nothing like this is expected or considered to be normal. Therefore, when 50
planes of the same type are urgently grounded by multiple airlines in a very
short period of time, it's considered to be newsworthy.

> The precise problem with the MAX is that there's an entire body of knowledge
> around the MCAS and other automation included with the plane that was never
> shared, which meant that unlike metallurgical issues which in many cases are
> largely unforeseen, Boeing's problems here were entirely preventable.

The previous metallurgical issues in 737 NG were also entirely preventable:

[https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2010/12/...](https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2010/12/20101214104637901849.html)

That makes the real source of any new issues with 737 NG questionable.

My point is, that MAX and MCAS is not the first instance of Boeing's
negligence. And new things that went wrong with 737 NG might still be
discovered.

------
trashface
I believe the Max will never fly again, at least not outside the US. The FAA
might approve the final "fixed" design based on political pressure, but what
international regulator will do that? So then you have a plane design that
only the US considers safe.

The flying public in the US will naturally start asking questions. I guess
airlines could offer discounts for Max flights. Then we'll see what level of
discount is sufficient to get people on a plane that historically had a strong
predisposition to nose-dive.

------
WooShoa
This may be cynical, but I suspect this issue will be drawn out way longer,
because Airbus (including maybe the nascent Chinese airline industry) will ...
logically ... take any and all advantage of this self-inflicted flesh wound to
keep Boeing on the ropes by at least shining the brightest of bright lights on
any and all flaws they can find.

This will, as the article implies, come in combination with the justified and
rightful concern that Boeing is and will continue and increasingly get more
desperate and frantic to "fix" things (literally and, likely increasingly
figuratively), as far greater testing and auditing requirements are placed on
recertification.

I don't know about everyone else here, but I sure as heck am going to be quite
careful not to fly on any MAX for quite some time if they are even ever re-
certified again. The replacement for the 737, which the MAX was supposed to
delay, was not scheduled to reach market until the 2030 timeframe (which could
mean 2030 or 2039). I think it is anyone's guess whether Boeing has the
resources to drastically accelerate that timeframe or the MAX village fire is
draining all resources and it may delay that 2030 timeframe.

Please convince me otherwise, but I could see this MAX issue essentially
crushing Boeing as it eats away at many different aspects of the enterprise
over time. How long can you keep the concerns at bay and run on inertia? I
think there may be hell to pay next year if this isn't really an "easy" issue
that just takes some time and Boeing can scathe by. Maybe someone with deeper
insight into Boeing's operations can substantiate why I am totally off base or
… hopefully not … validate that my concerns are not unfounded.

------
lisper
This article is incoherent:

> “It’s really complicated,” John Hansman, an aeronautics and astronautics
> professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who is not involved
> in the repair, said of revising aircraft software. “It totally makes sense
> why it’s taking longer.”

But then...

> While the fix became more complex and politically charged after the second
> accident -- the crash of an Ethiopian Airlines jet on March 10 -- the
> changes to MCAS remained self-contained and relatively simple. “I could have
> a bunch of graduate students and rewrite MCAS in a couple of days and be
> done,” Hansman said.

So is it "really complicated" or "relatively simple" to the point where "a
bunch of graduate students [could] rewrite MCAS in a couple of days and be
done"? It can't be both.

~~~
meristem
Read it as patching MCAS would be the grad students over the weekend fix, and
the really hard stuff as redesigning avionics logic.

~~~
lisper
OK, fair enough, but the complete redesign is only necessary because the
simple patch didn't work, so the grad-student-in-a-couple-of-days comment is
vacuous.

------
kyleblarson
Possibly stupid question but will they be able to apply these fixes remotely?
Or will Boeing have to fly engineers / mechanics to every grounded 737 Max in
the world?

~~~
bdavis__
Commercial aircraft have a large support staff that 'touch' the aircraft ever
day (week). Certified mechanics and technicians. A software update is
something they do on a regular (yearly maybe()) basis. By following
instructions provided by the OEM. Upgrading hardware is also done by the
customer. People are trained and qualified to do this work all over the world.

------
ajnin
> Boeing decided to make the two systems monitor each other so that each
> computer can halt an erroneous action by the other

I thought the whole point was that you needed 3 computers monitoring each
other because if you have only two, you can't tell which one is faulty and
which one is correct. How can they make it work here ?

------
rootusrootus
> simulated what would happen if gamma rays ...

So now I am curious. How do other airliners (newer Boeings, Airbus, etc) fare
when subjected to the gamma ray test? I would like some context.

~~~
kejaed
The article could have used the industry term, Single-Event Upset, rather than
use the more eye catching gamma ray term over and over. It's a failure mode
that aircraft and spacecraft have to deal with.

You keep CRCs of data in critical areas of memory and constantly check them to
make sure you are only processing valid data, or use equivalent of ECC memory.

------
SubiculumCode
I'd be fine if they just junked the whole fleet.

------
ummonk
In fairness, it's a good sign that they're catching such potential glitches in
the simulator.

------
gdubs
I’m a rational person who enjoys flying, and I just never want to fly on a
Max.

~~~
EricE
Based on one story from Bloomberg? That might be a tad premature - they never
did address concerns with their "reporting" on the China server spying issue.

~~~
gdubs
It’s not one story — it’s a pattern of stories from numerous outlets for over
a year now.

------
kpU8efre7r
Aircraft should be required to be fully recertified by the FAA.

