
The Cross-Examined Life: Socrates Debates the Laws - diodorus
https://www.laphamsquarterly.org/roundtable/cross-examined-life
======
neaden
Keep in mind this is all base don Plato's semi-fictionalized depiction of
Socrates. In real life Socrates may have supported, and was certainly seen as
supporting the Thirty Tyrants who briefly took over Athens, including one of
his former students.

~~~
Nomentatus
You're referring to the thirty tyrants he disobeyed, his apparent sin in the
public mind was staying in the city at that time - but since he also stayed in
the same city after it condemned him to death, this isn't much of a
demonstration of his loyalty to the tyrants.
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thirty_Tyrants#Socrates_and_th...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thirty_Tyrants#Socrates_and_the_Thirty)

~~~
neaden
Well the tyrants killed or exiled everyone they thought were disloyal to them,
and they let Socrates stay. This along with him being Critias teacher meant
that the Tyrants at least considered Socrates to be on their side, even if
Socrates didn't see it the same way. As far as disobeying the Tyrants Socrates
said that he was ordered, along with three others, to bring another citizen to
the tyrants where he would have been killed. Socrates said he disobeyed and
just went home, refusing to help or to warn the man. I'm not aware of anyone
who did corroborate this, and even best case scenario it's still a pretty weak
form of disobedience which wouldn't have won him many friends among the
families and friends of those executed.

~~~
Nomentatus
I don't follow the logic; the tyrants didn't kill the majority of the
population. He didn't start a one-man war with them, that's not proof of
support.

------
glastra
What if the Laws of Athens, as personified in the dialogue, were subject to
change over time, like our social contracts? Would they deserve such treatment
that one would prefer death over harming them?

As I see it, this view of purity and absolute objectivity in law doesn't
conform to our world, at least in its current state.

Edit: To add, the possible change in the Laws is also governed or driven by
entities who are neither objective nor just: powerful individuals,
corporations, parties, lobbies, etc.

~~~
gglitch
As tempting as it is, I don't see it as useful to compare Socrates' Athens to
any of our modern nations. IMO this is what's wonderful and exasperating about
Plato: all of his arguments are based on a bulletproof ideal, a mental
concept, that he himself never actually finds in real life. First principles,
I guess, to reason from. In several of his dialogues, when Socrates himself is
pressed to locate these ideals in real life, he has to recourse to myth or
folklore. This doesn't _invalidate_ them, in my opinion; but it's an important
context for discussion. I guess what I'm saying is, it's a thought experiment;
presumably even Socrates' Athens is not actually Socrates' Athens.

I guess as I sit here writing and thinking these thoughts, I'm coming to see
it as actually kind of a strength. If, like Robert Kegan [0], we see
identification with abstract systems (like laws, principles, constitutions,
etc) as developmentally more sophisticated than identification merely with
tribes, then like him we can also see it as still more developmentally
sophisticated to learn _not_ to restrict one's identity to a tightly-defined
set of abstract principles; we can hopefully learn to adapt our identity to
our circumstances with best intentions and a lightness of spirit. I think
Plato's Socrates, with the occasional recourse to myth and folklore, is a
pretty inspiring example of this.

[0] -
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Kegan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Kegan)

~~~
gt_
I agree with most your grounding points but not with your interpretation. It
sounds too risky of unnecessary apologism to me. I guess I feel I would have
to question myself of fraud. This is in consideration of the incentive to
justify immoral behavior, and the lack of evidence that more tribalism would
have anything to offer society.

So, how do you reconcile with the apparent correlation between a lack of faith
in philosophical ideals and dishonesty, neoliberalism, lack of nuance, late
capitalist culture, etc.? Do you reconcile this with simple unfettered
individualism? It seems to me that this sort of cartooning of Socrates is more
than unnecessary; of course it isn’t provable and would undermine the already
limited value it could otherwise have, and which it seems our society would do
best to use make use of.

~~~
gglitch
Solid questions, thanks for the thoughtful response. I can try to speculate. I
should observe that I haven't studied developmental psychology or philosophy
above an undergrad level, so I'm likely to misstep with both logic and
terminology.

> the incentive to justify immoral behavior, and the lack of evidence that
> more tribalism would have anything to offer

First I can say that I don't think Kegan means that the relaxation of
identification with abstract systems means devolving back into identification
with tribe. I think it refers more to the ability to engage in good faith with
criticisms of one's abstract systems, one's ideologies, and recognize their
weaknesses and inconsistencies much as one did with one's tribe--that is, a
transcendence of the need to associate weaknesses of the system with
weaknesses of the self, with the associated defensiveness. I think anyone who
uses those inconsistencies and weaknesses to justify immoral behavior probably
didn't reach the abstract-system phase to begin with, though it doesn't seem
unlikely that someone would feign that to display tribal identification. I'm
guessing that's what people mean by the term "virtue signaling."

> the apparent correlation between a lack of faith in philosophical ideals and
> dishonesty, neoliberalism, lack of nuance, late capitalist culture, etc.?

I'm with you on this one. I don't think Kegan would advise sacrificing all
faith in abstract systemic thought, and I don't think that's what Socrates is
doing when, e.g., at the end of a long series of questions, he shrugs and
tells a story he heard one time about the gods. I think what's at issue is
whether one can separate oneself from one's ideals well enough to critique
them, to balance conflicting ideas thoughtfully and not feel obliged to defend
your system to the death when it butts up against other systems. I think what
I called "lightness of spirit" above is key here, and we see it all the time
in Socrates - the wisest in Athens not because he knew more, but because he
knew that he didn't know more. I mean, so he says. There's obviously abundant
lightness of spirit there too.

The charge of individualism is a good one. I hope that there's a stage past
the militant adherence to first tribe and then ideology that doesn't
necessarily entail individualism. Maybe it just looks like a relaxed broad
view of the human tragicomedy that takes the good with the bad, sympathizes
with the suffering, and makes choices according to conscience.

As for cartooning Socrates, I hope not. I'm certainly not caricaturing him
mean-spiritedly. I admire his enterprise and methods, including when he has to
set rationality aside and tell a good story. I think those moments make him
more humane, more relatable, more realistic. I realize that my current
representation of him is at odds with the point made in the article, but even
here, choosing death according to conscience, it's still not about making some
grotesque martyr of himself. I think it's admirable.

