

Fisa court oversight: a look inside a secret and empty process - Titanous
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jun/19/fisa-court-oversight-process-secrecy

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davidcuddeback
> _The NSA expressly claims the right to store and even disseminate such
> domestic communication if: (1) "it is reasonably believed to contain
> significant foreign intelligence information"; (2) "the communication does
> not contain foreign intelligence information but is reasonably believed to
> contain evidence of a crime that has been, is being, or is about to be
> committed"; or (3) "the communication is reasonably believed to contain
> technical data base information, as defined in Section 2(i), or information
> necessary to understand or assess a communications security vulnerability."_

Does #3 say what I think it does? That the NSA thinks it has a right to record
and disseminate my email if I talk to a coworker about our servers' security?

Edit: For context, "domestic" communications in this paragraph is defined as
communications 100% within the US: _" Those guidelines specifically address
what the NSA does with what it calls "domestic communications", defined as
"communications in which the sender and all intended recipients are reasonably
believed to be located in the United States at the time of acquisition."_

Second to last paragraph of the section, _Warrantless interception of
Americans ' communications_.

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discostrings
There's a lot of new information about the Fisa process here!

The highlight:

> When it is time for the NSA to obtain Fisa court approval, the agency does
> not tell the court whose calls and emails it intends to intercept. It
> instead merely provides the general guidelines which it claims are used by
> its analysts to determine which individuals they can target, and the Fisa
> court judge then issues a simple order approving those guidelines. . .Once
> the NSA has this court approval, it can then target anyone chosen by their
> analysts, and can even order telecoms and internet companies to turn over to
> them the emails, chats and calls of those they target. The Fisa court plays
> no role whatsoever in reviewing whether the procedures it approved are
> actually complied with when the NSA starts eavesdropping on calls and
> reading people's emails.

It appears we may have been mistaken to assume the court deliberates on and
grants an order for each request. It appears the court gives a general
approval for guidelines, and then NSA analysts request whatever they want from
companies without meaningful oversight.

~~~
declan
If you look at FAA 702, it's been clear since 2007-2008 that the court does
NOT deliberate on and grant an order for each request.

See my article from 2007: [http://news.cnet.com/FAQ-How-far-does-the-new-
wiretap-law-go...](http://news.cnet.com/FAQ-How-far-does-the-new-wiretap-law-
go/2100-1029_3-6201032.html) "...expands the National Security Agency's power
to eavesdrop on phone calls, e-mail messages and other Internet traffic with
limited court oversight...warrants are not needed for Internet or telephone
"surveillance directed at a person reasonably believed to be located outside
of the United States..."

And 2009:
[http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10143520-38.html](http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10143520-38.html)
..."a secret federal appeals court has ruled that federal agencies can be
authorized to conduct warrantless e-mail and telephone surveillance without
violating the U.S. Constitution"...

~~~
discostrings
Thanks for the citations! It seems this isn't new information then--just that
a lot of the current news hasn't even gotten to this point. In most of what I
read, I see the perception that writers think most orders from the court are
like the Verizon order in that they ask a certain company for certain
information.

