
Mathiness in the Theory of Economic Growth (2015) - vvra
https://paulromer.net/mathiness/
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danielam
Math envy. It affects more than economics and often only obscures the intended
meaning (if there’s any there in the first place) while giving the illusion of
rigor because symbols...and “math”!

~~~
0xcde4c3db
Indeed. One of the more infamous examples comes from the field of _positive
psychology_ [1]. A psychology researcher used fluid dynamics formulas to come
up with ratios of positive to negative experiences that separate _languishing_
from _flourishing_. And then one of those articles [2] got numerous citations
in the literature, helping to establish the idea of this ratio and a whole
little clade of research that took the validity of that ratio for granted. To
be fair, one of the reasons for its infamy is that _the_ Alan Sokal co-
authored an article [3] that ruthlessly criticized the mathematical methods.

[1] This is a surprisingly hard term to really pin down. Loosely speaking, the
idea is that we should be able to characterize the development of
psychological strengths independently of any taxonomy of diseases or
disorders. However, explanations of it often seamlessly bleed over into
concepts more characteristic of virtue ethics, Stoicism, rugged individualism,
and self-help. The more cynical part of me wants to dismiss it as the clinical
psychology equivalent of vitalism, but perhaps that is just a pattern that
characterizes its excesses.

[2]
[https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3126111/](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3126111/)

[3]
[http://www.physics.nyu.edu/sokal/complex_dynamics_final_clea...](http://www.physics.nyu.edu/sokal/complex_dynamics_final_clean.pdf)

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Barrin92
> _" The point of the paper is that if we want economics to be a science, we
> have to recognize that it is not ok for macroeconomists to hole up in
> separate camps, one that supports its version of the geocentric model of the
> solar system and another that supports the heliocentric model. As
> scientists, we have to hold ourselves to a standard that requires us to
> reach a consensus about which model is right, and then to move on to other
> questions."_

I disagree with this. Convergence on one methodology, model or theory is
usually achieved by some process of reductionism, but the complexity of
economics makes it hard to ever come to some straight forward conclusion about
which form of inquiry is superior, or if there even is such a thing.

Even physics is not safe from this. People have questioned the importance of
string theory and its 'mathiness' and difficulty to be empirically verified.
Some people believe in grand unified theories, others think they're not worth
pursuing.

In general I think what ever helps clarifying issues we have or helps solve
problems is worth keeping. I think we ought to science more as a form of
discourse than as some sort of 'model' that needs to converge on anything.
Mathiness has its place and so has non mathiness. Different models may work in
different circumstances.

