
The case of Chinese LinkedIn spy recruitment [pdf] - 9nGQluzmnq3M
https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/bp267_geostrategically_motivated_co-option_of_social-media.pdf
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duxup
If another country can use LinkedIn to identify targets... so can the local
target's country. They can identify weak points, address them.

Also it occurs to me China's social credit system would do the same, both
ways.

It might even make it easier to setup a double agent who is so tempting based
on their profile the other country is sure to contact them and work with them.

~~~
devoply
Might be fun to troll LinkedIn with such a profile.

~~~
duxup
Jim DisgruntledClassifiedSecretsGuy is open to new opportunities!

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throwawaywego
Got an invite from a fake account claiming to be a professor at my alma mater.
The name only exists on LinkedIn and has currently a handful of connections. I
reported the account, but it remains up as of today. I do not have a public
account.

Made me paranoid enough to stop accepting invites (~1000+ pending) and drop
all usage of LinkedIn. Very discomforting to know you are a target. LinkedIn
will have to visibly move on this for me to change my outlook and regain
trust.

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9nGQluzmnq3M
TL;DR: LinkedIn makes it really easy for Chinese spy agencies to identify
suitable targets at companies or government orgs of interest and contact them
innocuously in the form of recruiters. While this much is by design, a
LinkedIn profile also often has enough information to let them deduce that a
person's career is not going well or they're in financial trouble, making them
particularly susceptible to bribery or blackmail:

> _For example, Kevin Mallory, a former CIA officer, was sentenced to 20 years
> in prison for handing over secret documents and confidential information to
> Chinese intelligence. His career was floundering and he was in dire
> financial straits when he received a message from a fake account on LinkedIn
> in 2017. This fake contact claimed to be working for a think tank that was
> looking for foreign policy expertise. The targeted ex-CIA officer travelled
> to China twice and was given money and equipment to maintain his
> communications with the Chinese._

One point _not_ raised by the article is that two can play at this game:
LinkedIn is allowed to operate in China and has some 41 million users, and
there's a local unicorn called Maimai (脉脉) that's increasingly popular as
well.

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C1sc0cat
Why would you have a real linkedin account if worked at such a sensitive job.

As Bob Howard says in the laundry files HE and MO have a fake FB profile.

~~~
michaelt

      Why would you have a real
      linkedin account if worked
      at such a sensitive job.
    

Perhaps he made it to apply for one of the 194 jobs the CIA currently
advertises on LinkedIn [1] for jobs like "Cyber Threat Analyst", "Polygraph
Examiner", and "Targeting Officer" or to connect with the 1,110 other CIA
employees LinkedIn lists.

[1]
[https://www.linkedin.com/jobs/search?locationId=OTHERS%2Ewor...](https://www.linkedin.com/jobs/search?locationId=OTHERS%2Eworldwide&f_C=14068&trk=companyTopCard_top-
card-button)

