
Wall Street Profits by Putting Investors in the Slow Lane - chollida1
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/18/opinion/wall-street-brokers-rebates-kickbacks.html
======
nostrademons
Heh. My second project at my first employer out of college (back in 2006) was
building a system to detect violations of this rule (Reg NMS, if you're
curious). We found that there were trade-throughs happening on a daily basis,
it was so common that it appeared to be just how the markets worked.

Tried to sell it to the SEC and they weren't interested.

Then we pivoted to try to sell to traders, so they could prove to clients that
they were getting the best execution possible (or occasionally better than the
best possible, but that gets washed out of the aggregate stats). They were
_very_ interested, until the data showed that most of the ones who don't
already have a proprietary version of this were actually doing terribly on
their trade executions. Then they weren't interested at all.

I ended up leaving the company - and the financial industry - at that point.
My take-away from the whole experience is that the game really is rigged. I
remember reading a non-mainstream economics paper in college that modeled the
world not in terms of price equilibria or value-add, but assumed that all
actors were basically bandits who would try to take whatever they could by
force or deceit. It was horribly depressing at the time, but it actually seems
like a more accurate model of how the world really works, the remarkable part
being that democratic capitalism has managed to channel the impulses of those
bandits (while still being utterly crooked) into a system that on a macro-
level basically kinda/sorta works.

~~~
justadeveloper2
I disagree that it works--it's just that it hasn't utterly failed yet. Big
difference. If you look at failed states, the bandits won. Argentina comes to
mind, maybe Venezuela. Brazil is headed there.

~~~
nostrademons
Having "not utterly failed" for 240 years is a fairly big accomplishment,
precisely because the lifespan of many other societal organizing principles is
about equal to a human lifespan (~80 years).

~~~
jerrylives
Uh it kinda failed big time in the '20s and '30s

~~~
r00fus
The results were War, big ones at that. So a pretty bad failure mode for
millions.

------
osrec
I think this is well known. The real problem is that the traders are much
smarter than the regulators, and their ability to obscure far exceeds the
regulators' ability to untangle. Incentivise your regulators better and you
might end up attracting some real talent who can unearth the tricks the crafty
traders pull every day (I am an ex trader, from a bulge bracket IB, and trust
me, what some of these guys do is not at all kosher).

~~~
eli_gottlieb
Or we can just ban anything insufficiently transparent and be done with it.
After all, the point of a market transaction for pricing is its ability to
convey transparent, accurate information to other market participants --
_right?_

~~~
rosser
In theory, sure.

How's that working out for us?

EDIT: Meta, I will never tire of hearing people be all, "But _markets_!" as if
they aren't just as corruptible as any other human institution — if not more
so.

~~~
eli_gottlieb
Well, I agree that it's not working out very ideally for us. This is why I
think all those hyper-complicated trades don't necessarily have much real
economic value, and banning them is unlikely to be very harmful.

------
Pxtl
Remember when Sanders proposed a small fee on every trade on Wall Street to
discourage high frequency trading and to recoup some value from the market?
Remember how he was widely pronounced deranged for suggesting that there
should be a fee associated with trades? How it would destroy the market?

Funny, that.

~~~
harryh
Fees on trading would not meaningfully discourage high frequency trading and
would just be passed on to buyers and sellers of stock in the form of larger
bid/ask spreads.

~~~
minimax
I think that's about half right. A 0.5% tax on all equities trades, which is
what Bernie was proposing, would put a bunch of HFTs out of business basically
overnight and at the same time dramatically increase costs for investors via
1) the tax (obviously) 2) wider spreads 3) reduced liquidity.

~~~
rramdin
4) increased volatility 5) less efficient price discovery

The HFT shops put millions of dollars into research to attempt to ascertain
correct prices (e.g. ETF pricing, derivatives pricing, etc). If they are
disincentivized from trading in the equities markets, they will no longer be a
conduit of relevant pricing information from other global markets into the
equities markets. That means investors (big Wall Street firms catered to by
IEX) and retail (you and me in our individual accounts) are more likely to be
trading mis-priced markets.

~~~
stouset
What is the value of trading at increasingly marginally more accurate prices?
And more importantly, what is the _cost_?

You seem to take it at face value that trading at accurate prices is an
unalloyed good. But for the extremely overwhelming majority of retail
investors — whose only sane strategy is buy and hold — buying at a few tenths
of a percentage points closer to the most-accurate possible price is worth
nearly nothing (and has negative worth half of the time, practically by
definition).

On the other hand, Wall Street has been raking in tens if not hundreds of
billions in profits from this service. What value we get from more accurate
pricing may very easily be offset by these costs a hundredfold.

~~~
harryh
You are drastically overestimating how much money HFT market makers earn.
Virtu Financial (one of the biggest firms in this area) earns about 100
million a year.

I think you are also underestimating the costs to retail investors to not
getting accurate pricing. Shaving a few tents of a point off of every trade
will have a huge effect on the lifetime earnings of an individuals.

~~~
snark42
> earns about 100 million a year.

They made 147M in the first quarter of this year. 197M in the first quarter of
last year. They might only make 100M/year after costs, but that doesn't
represent the 600-900M they take from the market.

~~~
dsacco
That's not the point. The point is that the industry is vanishingly small
compared to Wall Street proper, yet it has an outsize target on its head due
to FUD and emotional appeals like the ones presented in the article.

Furthermore, in exchange for "taking" that money from the market, they enhance
liquidity, which is _directly_ helpful for price discovery and facilitating
trading among both retail _and_ institutional investors.

People are continually moving the goalposts in this thread and others like it.
If you're going to talk about Wall Street and fraud, _high frequency trading
is not the place to start._ All of the _legitimate_ arguments against high
frequency trading _have nothing_ to do with fraud, they have to do with the
dangers of runaway algorithmic trading that coalesces into the same market
movements.

But we can't reason about _that_ issue while half the people talking about HFT
(almost none of whom actually have experience with trading whatsoever) still
think it's front running, or believe it constitutes some sort of fraudulent
con over "the little guy."

~~~
concede_pluto
Liquidity is willingness to make a trade others aren't. To be useful, it has
to linger in the order book for a long time. If you're winning a race by
_milliseconds_ , you are trying to interpose yourself into a trade that was
already going to happen that day.

~~~
dsacco
_> If you're winning a race by milliseconds, you are trying to interpose
yourself into a trade that was already going to happen that day._

This is an inaccurate framing of how high frequency trading propagates
liquidity in an otherwise illiquid (or strictly _less liquid_ ) market. The
claim is not that liquidity is contributed on a strictly trade by trade basis,
but rather than the low-latency activity has meta-reactive effects owing to
enhanced price discovery that increase overall participation by drawing in
other traders at different time resolutions. For example, where there may a
stagnant order book on one equity (and consequently, few human traders able to
fulfill orders without significant pricing penalties), the same order book may
draw in competing market makers. They attempt to predict the next price
movement - some win and some lose on the immediate sequence of trades, but the
consequent activity narrows the bid/ask spread by heightening local
participation in the order book and improving the pricing confidence. This has
practical ramifications for "human" time resolutions, because the human
traders now have a better opportunity to fulfill orders without overpaying.
This in turn reduces overcautious traders from participating, and so on and so
forth.

For what it's worth, your line of argument has been rehashed for years now on
Hacker News, going back to when Chris Stucchio wrote his HFT apologia. Instead
of lazily linking to that thread, I'll do one better by walking through
research on the subject. Fortunately there is a handy paper that explicitly
examines the question, "how does the interaction of these traders in the
millisecond environment impact the quality of markets that human investors can
observe?"[1] The data is constructed using NASDAQ TotalView with equities in
the S&P500 in periods of varying volatility. Both reactive and periodic
trading algorithms are reviewed.

Here are a few critical passages:

 _By tracking submissions, cancellations, and executions that can be
associated with each other, we create a measure of low-latency activity. We
use a simultaneous equation framework to examine how the intensity of low
latency activity affects market quality measures. We find that an increase in
low-latency activity lowers short-term volatility, reduces quoted spreads and
the total price impact of trades, and increases depth in the limit order
book._

 _IV.B. Results Panel A of Table 4 presents the estimated coefficients of the
pooled system side-by-side for the 2007 and 2008 sample periods. First we note
that the two instruments have the 25 expected signs and are highly
significant. Specifically, the coefficient a2 indicates that when liquidity
off NASDAQ is higher, our NASDAQ market quality measures show higher liquidity
and lower volatility. Similarly, the coefficient b2 is positive in all
specifications, indicating that higher low-latency activity in a specific
stock in an interval is associated with higher low-latency activity in other
stocks on the NASDAQ system. Second, the estimated b1 coefficients tell us
that low-latency activity is attracted to more liquid and less volatile
stocks._

 _The fact that low-latency trading decreases short-term volatility and
contributes to depth in the 2008 sample period where the market is
relentlessly going down and there is heightened uncertainty in the economic
environment is particularly noteworthy. It seems to suggest that PA activity
creates a positive externality in the market at the time that the market needs
it the most. Panel B of Table 4 presents roughly similar results from the
estimation of the system with SpreadNotNasi as the instrument for market
liquidity._

 _It is possible, however, that the impact of low-latency trading on market
quality would differ for stocks that are somehow fundamentally dissimilar,
like small versus large market capitalization stocks. Table 5 presents system
estimates in subsamples consisting of four quartiles ranked by the average
market capitalization over the sample period.22 There is not much pattern
across the quartiles in the manner low-latency activity affects short-term
volatility in the 2007 sample period. The picture in the 2008 sample is
different: It appears that during more stressful times, low-latency activity
helps reduce volatility in smaller stocks more than it does in larger stocks._

 _Lastly, Table 6 shows summary statistics for the stock-by-stock estimations.
The results suggest similar conclusions concerning the effect of low-latency
trading on market quality. In particular, an increase in low-latency activity
decreases short-term volatility, decreases quoted spreads, and increases
displayed depth in the limit order book. This is true both in the 2007 and
2008 sample periods._

_______________

1\.
[http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jhasbrou/Research/Working%20Pape...](http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jhasbrou/Research/Working%20Papers/HS10-11-10.pdf)

------
chollida1
Someone will call this a submarine article for IEX but I don't think this is
far, it was written as an oped by Dave Swensen, the famous head of Yale's
endowment fund.

Just so the issue is clear, almost all hedge funds don't do active/passive
also called maker/taker, but rather they pay a flat fee per share traded to
their sell side broker.

The sell side broker will then collect/pay the exchange fees. This means that
the sell side broker has an incentive to post the order to a market that pays
them the largest rebate rather than the market with the shorted queue.

The buy side clients are not getting worse prices necessarily as you still
need to fill orders at the NBBO.

So the argument would be, why not post on the exchange with the shortest queue
always. And the response would be that

1) markets move fast, and what is the shorted queue when the order is
dispatched may not be the shortest queue when the order arrives.

2) Other markets may be more active, ie more orders routed to them first so
the shortest queue may not be the best place to route at all.

To be fair its not a consensus that the IEX approach is better than maker
taker, there is no clear consensus as to what the correct approach is even
when you take out the HFT opinions.

In case anyone wants to see here's a link to the BATS cash equities execution
quality page.

[https://www.bats.com/us/equities/market_statistics/execution...](https://www.bats.com/us/equities/market_statistics/execution_quality/)

~~~
harryh
Worth noting that the head of Yale's endowment fund and IEX's interests are
aligned. The business model of IEX is to convince naive investors that high
frequency trading is somehow screwing them and that they should choose to
route their orders to IEX in order to avoid it. They then facilitate trading
between these naive investors and large institutional investors (like Yale)
who want to move large blocks of shares before the market moves against them.

~~~
wbl
Parent is correct. Uninformed order flow is what HFT wants to trade against:
people buying because they have cash and selling because they need it. HFT
doesn't want to trade with people moving prices at the old prices.

------
harryh
The problem with this essay is that it conflates the needs of a large
institutional investors like Yale with the needs of small investors (like you
and me). In many cases these needs can be inverted.

Yale wants to buy and sell large blocks of stock without the price moving away
from them.

I want to buy and sell stock at the best possible price with all of the latest
information transmitted to the market as fast as possible.

This is why Yale would prefer to trade in "darker" exchanges like IEX and most
retail investors should prefer other exchanges.

~~~
pm90
> small investors (like you and me)

Uhmm, maybe you, but definitely not me. Most people I know (I agree though, I
live outside NYC or any big financial center) don't give a rat's ass about
where the market is going, which stocks are good and which are bad. We invest
a lot into our 401(k)'s and the rest we put in index funds. So my interests
are definitely aligned more with large institutional investors.

BTW my personal investment strategy is not to get some kind of windfall during
retirement. The only thing I really look for is that if I saved well, I will
have enough to retire on (i.e. not ask for others for monetary help). I just
want my funds to not fail.

~~~
harryh
That makes you like me. You aren't buying and selling based on proprietary
information about where you think the market is going, but because of your
cash flow situation (You save $1000 a month now, and hope to withdraw $5000 a
month in retirement or whatever).

------
bradleyjg
I realize this in the op-ed section of the paper, but where the issues are
complex and most people are totally unfamiliar with them, printing one side of
the story feels a lot like endorsement.

When Flash Boys came out there was extensive discussion here on HN about IEX's
claims. I was convinced that Lewis at the very least exaggerated the benefits
of thier speedbump model.

On the issue of rebates, I'd keep on eye out for other takes (especially from
Matt Levine at Bloomberg) before forming any firm opinions.

------
aphextron
More generally, consumers have been fleeced and left out to dry over the past
10 year economic cycle. Take a look at a graph of the S&P500 from 2009-2017,
then look at consumer interest rates of 0.5% (in a 'high yield' savings or CD
account). It simply makes no sense. We simply cannot build wealth any longer.
Baby boomers had _CD_ rates of >10% [0]. Think about that for a moment.

[0] [http://www.forecast-chart.com/rate-cd-interest.html](http://www.forecast-
chart.com/rate-cd-interest.html)

~~~
usefulcat
> Baby boomers had CD rates of >10% [0]. Think about that for a moment.

My aunt and uncle (who happen to be baby boomers) bought their first house in
the early '80s when inflation was rampant. Their first mortgage had something
like an 18% rate. It should be obvious that a 10% CD rate is worthless if
inflation is nearly as high or higher.

~~~
dragonwriter
> It should be obvious that a 10% CD rate is worthless if inflation is nearly
> as high or higher.

Well, yes, that would be useless, but that's not what happened for most of the
time with high CD ratee. The period of CD rates ranging from just under 10% to
over 17% in the 1978-1984, saw inflation peak at 14.8% and spend much of the
time below 5%.

 _Recently_ CD interest rates are not only low but for many years below
inflation most of the time; in the period of high interest rates and high
inflation, CD rates were still above inflation.

------
kcorbitt
> Although the harm suffered on each trade is minuscule — fractions of a cent
> per share — the aggregate kickbacks amount to billions of dollars a year.

That's the money quote. 99% of retail investors should be buying stock
infrequently, maybe once a month when the paycheck comes in. Ideally you're
buying one or a few index funds, so the total number of transactions is small.
If you're in that boat, this order-of-fulfillment tax really doesn't affect
you and can be entirely ignored.

Your returns are really only in danger of being dragged down by this thing if
you're executing many trades per day. But if you're doing that, you had better
be a sophisticated investor anyway, or else you're definitely losing money.

~~~
havella
This is true, but incomplete. Such unsophisticated investor has to control his
frequency of trading, and also the frequency of trading of his etf or mutual
fund. Any fund needs to do trading, re balancing, etc. So there's a double
layer where ppl get charged 'the vig'.

------
rramdin
Whenever I see these IEX articles, I think it is useful to point out that they
generally describe 3 types of traders: 1) Retail - you and me, who make money
through asset appreciation 2) Institutional (IEX's client-base) - big Wall
Street firms, big money managers, big pensions, who make money by charging
fees 3) HFT - small technology firms, who make money through trading

------
Pxtl
Reading further: this really feels like PR for IEX.

------
abhi3
I see no social benefit that accrues from allowing trading (vs. investing) in
the stock market. The usual arguments that traders make in its favor are just
a plain attempt at legitimizing their stealing from market participants who
are less sophisticated and resourceful.

1) Efficient price discovery - Individual stock prices often move 20,30,50%+
in short periods of time, prices can't be efficient with such high volatility.
Trading more likely causes inefficient pricing due to speculations, margin
calls, trigger orders.

2) Liquidity - Sure they do increase liquidity in the market but as long as
sellers can find buyers I don't see any benefit from increased liquidity other
than (3)

3) Bid/ask spread - I'll admit that lower spreads are desirable and traders to
play a vital role in keeping it so, but I'll question how important it is for
a long term investor if has to cover a spread of an extra 0.1% and then weigh
that against the social cost of tens of billions of dollars worth of wealth
transfers from retail traders to some HFT shops in New York.

------
netcan
This is a quasi-inevitable side issue. Generally, investors eat transaction
costs and aren’t party to decisions that affect them. There are related issues
in many 3-party systems. In medicine, doctors, insurers and other people tend
to decide on (prescribe) products and services. The consumer eats the costs
(sometimes it’s a 4th party) and decision makers have an incentive to take
kickbacks.

The regulator could do stricter rules/policing, for a partial fix.

------
bko
Every article I read on the topic has a plug for IEX, an exchange that
"refuses to pay kickbacks" which make me think that these peices are basically
advertisements. Either kick backs serve no purpose and IEX will thrive
especially in this environment where where investors are clamoring for yield.
Or it does have some purpose or is not significant. Putting in regulations
would likely lead to more complexity and regulatory capture

~~~
harryh
Kickbacks to brokers that are sending out retail flow allow those brokers to
reduce commissions on trading. These reductions have gone all the way to zero
in a lot of places.

~~~
chollida1
> Kickbacks to brokers that are sending out retail flow allow those brokers to
> reduce commissions on trading. These reductions have gone all the way to
> zero in a lot of places.

I think you are wrong here. Most consumer orders are active meaning typically
the broker would pay the maker fee instead of collecting a kick back. I mean,
inverted exchanges are a thing but do very little volume.

Now pay for order flwo from wholesalers like Citadel is a big win for
brokerages and does help to reduce trading fees.

------
andrewla
Some of the underlying data here [1] on the effective spreads of the various
market centers. Bats also publishes the definitions of these metrics [2]. They
seem to be difficult to game, since they're derived from actually executed
trades compared to the midpoint NBBO (that is, the national best bid/offer --
by definition, at that time, cheaper than any exchange to buy, and more
expensive than any exchange to sell).

The low volume numbers make it slightly more difficult to determine
significance, but the effect does appear to be real, which I found slightly
surprising.

[1]
[https://www.bats.com/us/equities/market_statistics/execution...](https://www.bats.com/us/equities/market_statistics/execution_quality/)

[2]
[https://www.bats.com/us/equities/market_statistics/execution...](https://www.bats.com/us/equities/market_statistics/execution_quality/definitions/)

------
hendzen
So lets say they extend Reg NMS to require sending the order to the NMS
exchange with the shortest queue at the BBO?

I can imagine some potential ways that could be gamed as well...

------
dsacco
Articles like this are so mind-numbingly frustrating because they completely
muddle the water for any reasoned debate about the true advantages and
disadvantages of high frequency trading.

 _> Wall Street has developed a new way, clouded in obscurity, to fleece the
hundreds of millions of Americans who have money invested in company pension
plans, mutual funds and insurance policies._

Well, that sure is a _neutral_ way of presenting it, isn't it?

 _> Instead, brokers routinely take kickbacks, euphemistically referred to as
“rebates,” for routing orders to a particular exchange. As a result, the
brokers produce worse outcomes for their institutional investor clients — and
therefore, for individual pension beneficiaries, mutual fund investors and
insurance policy holders — and ill-gotten gains for the brokers._

"Kickbacks"...that's a strategic word to use. Technically true, but more
importantly, _emotionally loaded._ "Kickback" is not often associated with
positive sentiment. "Union leaders receiving kickbacks"..."politicians
receiving kickbacks"...

More importantly, this claim is neither axiomatic nor defended by the article.
How _precisely_ do these rebates harm investors?

 _> The diffuse harm to individuals and the concentrated benefit to Wall
Street create yet another way in which the system is rigged, justifiably
eroding public confidence in the fairness of the financial system._

What the hell? The rhetoric is so heavy-handed - is there no _attempt_ at an
unbiased presentation here? I understand this is an opinion piece but _come
on._

 _> And yet, brokers choose longer queues hundreds of thousands, if not
millions, of times a day. Publicly available trade and quote data show that
the queues to buy or sell stock are considerably longer on exchanges that
offer kickbacks. Even though the queues decrease the likelihood of getting a
trade completed and impair the price performance after the trade is executed,
brokers still direct trades to these places because of the kickbacks they
receive._

Yes, that's interesting. But how does that correlate with the liquidity
available on these exchanges? If you have reduced liquidity, do you want to be
in a smaller queue with less price competition? This isn't even addressed.

 _> One exchange, the IEX, refuses to pay rebates. Created by Brad Katsuyama
(whose odyssey to defy the ethos of Wall Street was told in Michael Lewis’s
“Flash Boys”), IEX has a speed bump that prevents high-frequency traders from
front-running ordinary investors. (Yale University, where we work, has a de
minimis exposure to IEX through an investment by one of the university’s
external managers.)_

Okay, so we have blatant hero worship _and_ the claim that high frequency
trading is front running _in 2017._ And this article has reached the front
page of Hacker News.

 _> BATS (a rival stock exchange founded by a high-frequency trader) posts
data on this measure of execution quality for the major exchanges on its
website. According to our calculations, in the six months before IEX’s
arrival, Nasdaq led the effective spread rankings in the widely used Standard
& Poor’s 500 index, with the number of top ranks ranging from 169 to 216
stocks._

Okay, _where_ are these calculations? What is the point of making the claim if
you don't quantify it whatsoever?!

~~~
cwkoss
>More importantly, this claim is neither axiomatic nor defended by the
article. How precisely do these rebates harm investors?

The rebates are effectively being taken out of retail investors' money. If the
rebates did not effect brokers' behavior, there would be no point in offering
them. If the rebates do effect brokers' behavior, then it means brokers are
willing to accept a marginally worse price for their investors in order to get
the rebate.

~~~
dsacco
The money you lose in the cost of rebates being passed on is _less_ than the
money you gain through enhanced price discovery (so you overpay for securities
less often) and enhanced liquidity (so you can actually fulfill your trades
more often).

~~~
pishpash
There is no neutral comparison being run. You should be comparing against a
market where every trade is happening on lit exchanges.

------
amelius
Can't practices like these not be considered in the same way as "hacking" and
thus made illegal?

After all, hacking = influencing electronic systems to make them function in
ways they are not intended to function. Replace "electronic" by
"legal/financial" and there you are.

~~~
deong
One immediate problem -- this is how these systems are made to function. It's
not like the kickback is happening behind the back of the operators of the
exchanges. It's not "hacking" to follow the rules as they're laid out.

~~~
amelius
So you are saying these systems are bug-free by design/definition? That's
quite a statement :)

~~~
ghostbrainalpha
That's so crazy far from what he is saying.

If you enter a building through a front door, you are not "hacking", you are
entering the building in the way the designer intended.

If you enter a building through a window, you are "hacking" because you are
exploiting an unintended ability that the designer did not intend to give you.

Just because the comment you replied to said that "kickbacks" are a front door
intentional design, you can't then claim he said that the building has no
windows. He has said nothing about windows. He just said don't call that door
a window, because its not, its a fucking door.

~~~
amelius
Yes, it's a door, but they told the regulators it was a window. That's a bug
in the spec.

------
heptathorp
> IEX has a speed bump that prevents high-frequency traders from front-running
> ordinary investors.

Anyone care to explain, in precise terms, how a high-frequency trader front-
runs ordinary investors on a typical exchange and how putting a delay on all
incoming orders prevents it?

~~~
rramdin
Michael Lewis and Brad Katsuyama misuse the term "front running," either
willfully to stir people up or out out of ignorance. Front-running refers to
the practice of a broker holding customer orders, but trading for their own
accounts at a better price before executing their client's orders (i.e. using
privileged information for their benefit). Katsuyama's uses "front running" to
describe a practice where if an HFT sees a price change happening (i.e. trades
are being reported or a level is going away), they quickly go and remove
liquidity before others have gotten a chance to react to this new information.
An HFT with faster technology will beat an institutional trader in this race
(even though all market participants must always send bona fide orders that
they intend to have filled). IEX solves this problem by slowing down incoming
orders to give special orders on the exchange (D-pegs, which automatically
change prices as the prevailing market price changes) an opportunity to
reprice. The HFT has put millions of dollars into fast technology, whereas the
institutional investment firms have presumably put millions of dollars into
long term research. IEX allows institutional investors to outsource this
technology investment to the exchange, which puts an artificial delay to give
its matching engine time to reprice special orders during market moves.

------
inthewoods
Taking aside the speed bump that IEX provides, how it is meaningfully
different from Liquidnet?

------
NicoJuicy
Don't get me started by putting out warnings of stocks they are shorting for
no reason. It's despicable.

Not only companies, but also countries. While America will always be aaa

