
Consciousness as a State of Matter - evanb
http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.1219
======
jblow
I am glad this paper has been written, but already by page 3 there are serious
problems with it.

For example: It is an easily observable phenomenon (e.g. by anyone who
meditates) that you can be conscious without remembering anything. In other
words, consciousness is independent of something like memory.

Yet Max's list on page 3 has stuff like "independence", "utility",
"integration" which have nothing to do with observations of what consciousness
is actually like. Rather, they are more like high-level ideas of what human
beings are like.

But we don't need to explain human beings (complex biological organisms that
walk around and do stuff). Science has got that covered already, at least kind
of. So if you are going to clearly think about consciousness, you need to
factor out what consciousness really is and look at the properties of that.

This is supposed to be a foundational principle of science: that your
hypotheses are attempts to explain things that are actually observed. The
first step is to observe things carefully! You don't just go making up
hypotheses.

So it's a giant red flag any time a scientist writes a paper about
consciousness where they conflate it with memory in some way (which is almost
every time). It's a red flag because it indicates that the scientist has not
actually spent any time observing consciousness, because they aren't noticing
things that are obvious to people who have done that.

(You might think that because we are all walking around conscious every day,
there would be no need to observe consciousness, but this isn't true. We walk
around in a space governed by Newtonian physics, but it took until Newton to
figure out this thing called inertia and that a frictional force is required
to make things stop, etc, because if you don't look carefully and make careful
measurements, most of the everyday world doesn't appear that way at all. Same
thing with consciousness.)

~~~
mullingitover
> For example: It is an easily observable phenomenon (e.g. by anyone who
> meditates) that you can be conscious without remembering anything. In other
> words, consciousness is independent of something like memory.

If you're meditating, how do you know that you're meditating without having,
at minimum, a working short-term memory? If meditating actually disabled your
memory, wouldn't you immediately forget that you were meditating and stop?

~~~
webwanderings
The ultimate of meditation is to stay in here-now, be present in a present. So
technically and logically speaking, you don't need a memory in such state.

~~~
mej10
Now the question is, do meditators just hallucinate a feeling that gets
processed into a memory of having achieved such a state?

~~~
webwanderings
By hallucinate you mean, not knowing what/where you are or doing, in that
particular moment? Then yes, one can use that word. The simplest analogy of
here-now is when you are watching an exceptional movie (as per your taste) and
you get lost in those moments of watching. The same phenomenon is apparent in
observing other forms of arts (songs, paintings etc).

So, are such states hallucination? Every person (human being) knows for sure
that they are real.

------
Aardwolf
Given the amount of different seemingly unrelated terms in there:

    
    
      quantum factorization
      Hilbert & Fourier space
      tensor factorization of matrices
      Hilbert-Schmidt superoperators
      neural-network-based consciousness
      error-correcting codes
      condensed matter criticality
      Quantum Darwinism program
      ...
    

I have to ask just to be certain: This paper is the real deal, and not auto-
generated, right?

~~~
mqzaidi
quantom factorization, hilbert spaces, fourier transforms and error correcting
codes, all of these would be found in any quantum mechanics 101 course,
definitely far from unrelated.

~~~
thearn4
I'm not sure I agree with this, after skimming the paper. For instance, the
author does not seem to be using terms like _quantum factorization_ in the
usual way (In the sense of a problem tackled by Shor's algorithm).

~~~
gjm11
I've only glanced at the paper, but it looks to me as if he's using it in
_another_ perfectly usual way, namely referring to situations where the
wavefunction and/or the Hilbert space it lives in can be written exactly or
approximately as a product over simpler things. There's nothing wrong with
that.

------
suprgeek
As soon as I saw the Title of this paper, there were two ideas that sprung up:

1)"Sokal Hoax"

2)David Deutsch, Max Tegmark, Some Other trouble-maker

Max Tegmark has done similar things before:[1]. He is also related to the FQXi
which is funded by an organization that has sometimes promoted explicit
religious agendas in a scientific context. However we should be judging every
paper by its merits alone & the rigor of its arguments. The only problem is
that work of this nature is very interdisciplinary, so who is qualified?

[1][http://discovermagazine.com/2008/jul/16-is-the-universe-
actu...](http://discovermagazine.com/2008/jul/16-is-the-universe-actually-
made-of-math)

------
JonnieCache
That crunching, gasping sound you can hear is Luboš Motl choking on his
cornflakes.

~~~
kordless
I have to say, if we're the things rendering this universe, it would be a
helluva lot easier to code something similar up over coding up string theory.

~~~
yeahbutbut
Sorry, we just kind of threw that together in Perl to meet the deadline! ;;

------
shmerl
Information is not matter, it's spiritual by its essence. Information can be
stored in matter (physical medium), but in itself it's not matter at all.
Consciousness lies in the realm of information, or how it's traditionally
called a spiritual world. In essence however there is a metaphysical view that
there is no conceptual separation between spiritual and physical (or putting
it in other terms, physical world is also defined with information). The
separation is only that of perception. That can bridge the two approaches.

~~~
hackinthebochs
How would you define information?

~~~
shmerl
That's not easy. It's the definitive essence of things. To give an example,
when you know something, and write that down. The written words are physical,
but the essence they convey (the concept, the information) is not physical at
all. When others read that, they don't consume the physical words (though they
use them as a medium). They consume information which they contain.

Here is a good article on this subject:
[http://philpapers.org/rec/MATBEA](http://philpapers.org/rec/MATBEA)

~~~
hackinthebochs
But information is intimately tied to matter, no? Information is capable of
having an affect on matter: when I store information on a CD, that information
is capable of having an "interesting" affect on a CD player to produce music,
or words on a page have an "interesting" affect on the reader. Information is
abstract, but I can't call it "spiritual".

What is the difference between a random string of bits and, say, a huffman
coded string of audio? Both have seemingly random distributions. The
informational aspect comes with its ability to cause an "interesting" affect
in an information-coupled hunk of matter. It seems wrong to call the random
string information when it cannot produce a low-probability, surprising
outcome when it interacts with a specific hunk of matter. But the encoded
audio stream does exactly that!

Independent of a hunk of matter capable of decoding it, can a string of bits
be said to carry information?

~~~
shmerl
_> But information is intimately tied to matter, no?_

Rather it's other way around. Matter is tied to information. The matter is the
medium for it, but information can be in itself. It's commonly expressed with
the metaphor of a vessel. Matter is a vessel which is filled with essence
(which thus binds it). But the filling itself is unbound until it's expressed
through the vessel (medium).

 _> Information is capable of having an affect on matter_

Definitely, as I said above, there is an approach which says they aren't
conceptually separated (but only perceptually).

 _> Information is abstract, but I can't call it "spiritual"._

How do you define "spiritual"? According to R' Boruch of Kosov for example,
spiritual can be understood as abstract, or information-type. It was
understood similarly by Tsiolkovsky.

~~~
hackinthebochs
I think we're mostly in agreement as far as matter being the medium for
information. But can information exist independent of matter? If not then does
it make sense to reify information as if it is its own entity? Is it really
helpful to decouple the two concepts?

~~~
shmerl
According to the view which puts information as primary, it not only can exist
independent of matter, it defines the matter.

~~~
hackinthebochs
That may be true from a quantum physics perspective, but it's not very useful
to us at the scale we live on (analogous to relativity vs quantum mechanics).
I'm asking so many questions because I've been trying to come up with a useful
working definition of information. It's surprisingly hard.

~~~
shmerl
It surely is hard.

According to mystics it's very useful practically for our relation and
interaction with the world and spiritual elevation. I.e. it can be put out of
the abstract theory into very practical humane terms.

------
robmclarty
Wow. That's a lot of words.

How exactly does consciousness "emerge" from matter? Are there some kind of
psychophysical bits that aren't currently accounted for in physics? Surely
it's not merely epiphenomenal. How do intentions affect the physical world as
seems to be happening when our minds move our bodies? What is the solution,
here, to the mind-body problem?

I just finished reading Thomas Nagel's "Mind and Cosmos" which highlights some
of the salient issues with reductionist explanations of consciousness,
cognition, and value. I don't think these things are _just_ a state of matter.

[http://www.amazon.ca/Mind-Cosmos-Materialist-Neo-
Darwinian-C...](http://www.amazon.ca/Mind-Cosmos-Materialist-Neo-Darwinian-
Conception/dp/0199919755)

~~~
kazagistar
There is no "mind emerging from matter" in the same way a hand does not
"emerge" from fingers and a palm. This is because the label we apply is only
in our heads. Reality is perfectly ok just being a bunch of quantum
interactions; it is humans who have to label things "chair" "hand"
"conciousness". Reality is reductionistic.

~~~
robmclarty
I don't agree that conscious experience is necessarily reducible. When I put a
piece of cheesecake in my mouth, certain electrical signals will likely be
firing in my brain, but those signals don't mean what it's like to consciously
experience cheesecake in my mouth. That is, the signals themselves aren't
indicative of the quality of my experience that only I, myself, can have in my
conscious existence. The signals are only a physical correlate to my
experience. I don't _experience_ electrical signals in my brain. My experience
is different than them.

My point is, there is other stuff out there in the universe (mental stuff)
that is different than physical stuff, that seems almost impossible to be
explained _as_ physical stuff. I believe in the physical sciences, evolution,
and mathematics, but I don't think that they _fully_ encapsulate all that
there is, nor can they definitively explain things like consciousness (they at
least need a little more added to them).

~~~
hcarvalhoalves
> My point is, there is other stuff out there in the universe (mental stuff)
> that is different than physical stuff, that seems almost impossible to be
> explained as physical stuff. I believe in the physical sciences, evolution,
> and mathematics, but I don't think that they fully encapsulate all that
> there is, nor can they definitively explain things like consciousness (they
> at least need a little more added to them).

See, physics _has_ explained the mechanics of what happens when you put
cheesecake in your mouth. You _do_ experience electrical signals in your
brain. It _is_ reproducible.

You're just refusing to correlate that phenomena to what you _feel_ , which is
okay, because it's not entirely obvious, feeling is an internal feedback
process. But consider this mental experiment: if I blindfold you and stimulate
your brain the same way as cheesecake in your mouth by the use of electrodes,
would you be able to discern?

~~~
RivieraKid
Let's put it another way. I feel pain when the atoms in my brain are in
certain configurations. Why is that?

You simply can't explain that with physics. You can explain the physical
symptoms of pain - like crying or sweaing. But not the feeling of pain. And
the reason for that is that you won't be able to define the feeling of pain.
Crying or sweating is definable (or reducible), it's just a complex motion of
physical particles. But what's the feeling of pain (not the physical
symptoms)?

~~~
hcarvalhoalves
> I feel pain when the atoms in my brain are in certain configurations. Why is
> that?

That's tautological.

You feel pain when your brain is in a particular set of states. Your brain is
in one of those particular states. You feel pain.

There's no underlying "why", it's the definition of pain itself.

> You simply can't explain that with physics.

You can explain the _mechanism_ with physics. What I think you mean is that
you can't describe, subjectively, how you feel with it.

------
dekhn
I'm a physical scientist, work in biology and computer science, but cannot
understand this paper for the life of me. Can somebody sum it up? It seems to
start from a premise that makes no sense ("computronium" as a form of physical
matter distinct from other forms of matter) which strongly contradicts the
current mainstream understanding of vitalism and dualism.

~~~
hcarvalhoalves
I find it really strange that it is necessary to talk about quantum physics or
the nature of time to explore the concept of consciousness. I thought it was
pretty clear by now that consciousness is a macroscopic, emergent feature,
seeing what very very simple neural networks models are able to do.

~~~
yk
> consciousness is a macroscopic, emergent feature

So far everybody agrees, but if you try to define emergent you get into
trouble. So is consciousness weakly or strongly emerging? Is there something
special about qualia? So far, to the best of my knowledge, nobody has given a
good definition, let alone a really good argument for either side.

------
brudgers
Renaming metaphysical dualism doesn't change the fact that it's metaphysical
dualism. It's just a new label on the same old can of worms. How do we tell
conscious matter from non-conscious matter? By finding or failing to find the
non-material property of consciousness. It's perhaps a bit more scientific
than relying on souls, but only by virtue of not positing life after death or
an immortal being or some other manifold of meta-physics.

Being a materialist is all well and good, so long as one takes it seriously,
and there are only two serious materialist positions: Deny the idea that
mental constructs have any reality [and ignore the paradox required for denial
to have any meaning] or posit mind as an inherent property of all matter and
live with the consequences of universal animism. Any other form of materialism
is a weak waffling half measure.

~~~
fernly
Within my very limited grasp of the paper, it seems to me it is asserting
precisely the opposite of your second claim. Tegmark seems to me to be
proposing a limited set of properties that an assemblage of matter must have
in order to exhibit, or perhaps to implement, consciousness. So he is denying
a "universal animism" (because the properties are not univerally present), and
attributing consciousness to operations of matter, so not presuming "mental
constructs" apart from matter either.

------
atratus
Paul Adams (macarthur fellow 1986) teaches a class on self organization of the
brain, and he begins with similar physics analogies involving phase changes.
You can check out his stuff here:
[http://www.syndar.org/](http://www.syndar.org/)

~~~
X4
thank you !!

------
henryaj
Tegmark also featured yesterday on HuffPo live:
[http://live.huffingtonpost.com/r/segment/math-our-
universe/5...](http://live.huffingtonpost.com/r/segment/math-our-
universe/52bc659a2b8c2a24c500092d)

------
myrrh
"How We Became Posthuman" by N. Katherine Hayles - really interesting book
that traces the trajectory of how (among other trhings) information came to be
considered (im)material essence of consciousness, a "thing" that exists
independent of our embodied experience - she succinctly (and briefly) covers
ground from turing to norbert weiner to the macy conferences , systems theory,
Hans Moravec and so on. The book was published in 1999 I think and makes
frequent reference to Francisco Varela's book "The Embodied Mind: Cognitive
Science and Human Experience", which I think touches on a lot of the subjects
discussed in this thread (ie, creating a dialogue between cognitive science
and Buddhist meditative psychology) - I think both these books are very well
written and may provide valuable context to those who are interested:

[http://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/H/bo376...](http://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/H/bo3769963.html)

[http://mitpress.mit.edu/books/embodied-
mind](http://mitpress.mit.edu/books/embodied-mind)

------
samtimalsina
Ok. Can anyone explain how Consciousness could be a state of Matter in _Plain
English_? Because quantum mechanics voodoo?

~~~
simonh
Are you made of matter? Are you concious?

If so then the matter you are made of is concious; it is matter that is in a
state of conciousness.

~~~
sliverstorm
That's an odd statement. Is there precedent for attributing emergent
phenomenon to the pieces? Because that is what seems to be happening here. To
my eyes, if a system is conscious, that does not mean the pieces that make the
system are conscious. Consciousness is an emergent property of the system.

Snowflakes are pretty. The water molecules in the snowflake do not inherent
this; they are not themselves pretty as a result of being in the pretty
snowflake. (Although you could consider them beautiful for other reasons. From
a life-sciences and/or chemistry point of view, water is pretty beautiful)

But then again, I'm an engineer with a passing interest in chemistry, not a
quantum physicist, so of course I see everything as systems. To me nothing
they talk about makes sense anyway.

~~~
tlb
States of matter are emergent. A single atom cannot be said to be a gas,
liquid or solid, only a sufficiently large group of them.

~~~
sliverstorm
Still, a snowflake is not a state of matter. You cannot say "Oh if we increase
the pressure it will enter phase X and thus the snowflake state of matter". It
is built upon a state of matter (crystaline solid), no?

~~~
saraid216
A snowflake is second-tier emergence (this is a made-up term). Hydrogen and
oxygen atoms do not have states of matter. Water molecules, as collections of
H and O atoms in specific arrangements, have states of matter. Snowflakes are
collections of water molecules in specific arrangements and in specific states
of matter. A snowman. A family of snowmen. The general practice of creating
snowmen. And so on and so on.

~~~
sliverstorm
Right, so the ice is not a snowflake, but the snowflake is made of ice.
Similarly, organic chemicals are not a consciousness, but a consciousness
emerges (we think) in a lump of organic chemicals. Do you disagree?

P.S. A snowman isn't exactly an emergent property. Now, an avalanche system
might be...

------
bfe
So if we come to discover that time is fundamental instead of emergent, it
could disprove his hypothesis of how consciousness is emergent.

That's at least one way in which he makes his hypothesis testable.

Just, please, no one forward this article to any Republican legislators and
draw their attention to the NSF grants that supported the research.

------
grondilu
Rred the abstract, was about to call it BS, then I realized this was written
by Max Tegmark!

So definitely worth reading carefully.

------
Anon84
His whole idea of "consciousness as a state of matter" thing might be taken a
bit more seriously if he could provide a conscious object...

who doesn't want a sentient sword?

~~~
woodchuck64
Easy, but it has to be an object that is processing information in complex
ways. From the first page:

"I have long contended that consciousness is the way information feels when
being processed in certain complex ways "

------
mathgenius
This guy really hates Penrose:

"...Penrose and others have spec- ulated that gravity is crucial for a proper
understanding of quantum mechanics even on small scales relevant to brains and
laboratory experiments, and that it causes non-unitary wavefunction collapse
[35]. Yet the Occam’s razor approach is clearly the commonly held view that
neither relativistic, gravitational nor non-unitary eﬀects are central to
understanding consciousness or how con- scious observers perceive their
immediate surroundings: astronauts appear to still perceive themselves in a
semi- classical 3D space even when they are eﬀectively in a zero- gravity
environment..." Ugh. That is really lame.

People still cite his 1999 article [1] on how the brain can't be quantum, as
if that was the end of the discussion. Meh.

Anyway, now he seems to be saying the opposite of this, while cleverly
avoiding contradicting (or even citing) this earlier work.

[1]
[http://arxiv.org/abs/quantph/9907009](http://arxiv.org/abs/quantph/9907009)

------
RivieraKid
Sigh... they're completely clueless. I'm starting to think that I'm the only
one who understands consciousness and it's not that complicated really. Hint:
the first and most important step is to define "consciousness", specify what
exactly does that word mean. Investigating a very vague word with many
possible meanings is pointless.

~~~
RivieraKid
Reason for the downvote?

------
jpeg_hero
I think Tegmark is a straight up genius. interested in reading this article,,
but, has he crossed the line from genius into madness?

------
MarcusBrutus
There's physics and there's metaphysics. That's known since the times of
Aristotle and Plato. Attempts by physicists to solve the "hard problem of
consciousness" are doomed to fail. Different tools are necessary for each
"magisterium". Philosophers and Theologians are better equipped to address
that problem and write more coherent and logically consistent papers. A
transcendental problem should have a transcendental / fundamental answer and
there's nothing fundamental about a bunch of equations. I lack the ability and
the time to express the last point more eloquently.

------
markbnine
Anyone with ideas on how can I start my "perceptronium mining" business?

------
farinasa
Real, fake, don't care. Reading that abstract was pure joy.

~~~
thearn4
arXiv's "General Physics" and "General Math" categories are great for finding
these kinds of papers.

------
nilaykumar
One might find another one of Tegmark's papers of note:
[http://arxiv.org/abs/quantph/9907009](http://arxiv.org/abs/quantph/9907009).
I've barely skimmed it, but being vaguely familiar with how decoherence a la
Zurek is supposed to work (had a homework on it last year, regrettably), the
timescales he notes seem about right.

------
chb
"perceptronium"?

~~~
henryaj
See also: 'utilitronium'.
[http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Utilitronium](http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Utilitronium)

> Utilitronium is relatively homogeneous matter optimized for maximum utility
> (like computronium is optimized for maximum computing power). For a
> paperclip maximiz[ing artificial intelligence], utilitronium is paperclips.
> For more complex values, no homogeneous organization of matter will have
> optimal utility.

These sorts of terms are popular in the utilitarianism/rationality/friendly AI
communities.

~~~
mbillie1
These sorts of terms are 'dangerous' if you like, because it's very easy to
invent new words or phrases without giving them any actual _meaning_... but
inventing the word is often enough for people to latch on to. The best
argument is from Wittgenstein:

What if the diviner tells us that when he holds the rod he feels that the
water is five feet under the ground? or that he feels that a mixture of copper
and gold is five feet under the ground? Suppose that to our doubts he
answered: "You can estimate a length when you see it. Why shouldn't I have a
different way of estimating it?" If we understand the idea of such an
estimation, we shall get clear about the nature of our doubts about the
statements of the diviner, and of the man who said he felt the visual image
behind the bridge of his nose. There is the statement: "this pencil is five
inches long", and the statement, "I feel that this pencil is five inches
long", and we must get clear about the relation of the grammar of the first
statement to the grammar of the second. To the statement "I feel in my hand
that the water is three feet under the ground" we should like to answer: "I
don't know what this means." But diviner would say: "Surely you know what it
means. You know what 'three feet under the ground' means, and you know what 'I
feel' means!" But I should answer him: I know what a word means in certain
contexts. Thus I understand the phrase "three feet under the ground", say in
the connections "The measurement has shown that the water runs three feet
under the ground", "If we dig three feet deep we are going to strike water",
"The depth of the water is three feet by the eye". But the use of the
expression "a feeling in my hands of water being three feet under the ground"
has yet to be explained to me.
[http://www.geocities.jp/mickindex/wittgenstein/witt_blue_en....](http://www.geocities.jp/mickindex/wittgenstein/witt_blue_en.html)

~~~
simonh
I understand what the concept of computronium means. It makes a certain kind
of sense. The problem I have is that both a slide rule and an iPhone are
computronium, yet there is little about their organisation or physical
function that is similar. I'm not sure what saying that they are
'computronium' does for us.

Furthermore computronium would presumably need a power source, facilities for
maintenance or repair, heat dissipation, protection from external disruption,
etc. I don't think it's a given that an optimal design would be in any way
homogenous. Ultimately I think it's very naive and simplistic way of thinking
about things, but if it's just intended as a shorthand for the purposes of
thought experiments that's fine. I'm just concerned that some people might
take the idea too literally.

~~~
henryaj
If computronium is a substance 'optimized for maximum computing power', then
neither an iPhone or a slide rule are computronium.

Computronium by that definition would be more like an entire planet
terraformed to be a massive supercomputer - something with maximum possible
computation density.

------
fmax30
Sounds more philosophical rather than being quantum physics. With lots and
lots of big words.

Maybe at one point quantum physics becomes philosophy.

Also, Apart from explaining the quantum states Schrödinger's cat has always
felt to be more of a philosophical thought experiment rather than being
mathematical or quantum one.

------
hosh
Huxley was a mystic. He knew his stuff :-)

Headlessness is a synonym for mindlessness.

Only way out is practice mindfulness.

~~~
hosh
Downvoted, haha, I guess most people didn't know about Huxley's psychedelic
experiments.

------
bananacurve
When does a perceptual schematic become the bitter mote of a soul...

------
thenerdfiles
What they're trying to do is address Copenhagen indeterminacy by assuming that
the collapse of the wavefunction involves the ontologically similar definition
of mental states. How does a mental state cause a collapse of the wavefunction
at all? — This is the Quantum Measurement problem. [EDIT:] A better question,
then, is _when_ does a mental state cause a collapse, assuming that it _can_ ,
or _should be able to_ ontologically speaking. Does a materialist framework
answer this question?

Statistically speaking collapse of the wavefunction and quantum decoherence
have the same signature, such that we never know when observation (mental
states) causes collapse. To investigate consciousness as matter is to assert
the ontological underpinnings of mental states as part of the internal causal
nexus of the quantum system.

I'm still collecting my thoughts on this subject here:
[https://gomockingbird.com/mockingbird/#xl6a68x/NLd6c9](https://gomockingbird.com/mockingbird/#xl6a68x/NLd6c9)

The gist is that observation (including our tools used for observation, along
with indexical subjective states) itself has to be treated as a quantum
system, _not as a classical system_ [0]. And matter can be described by
quantum mechanics.

[0]: [http://quantum-ethics.org/](http://quantum-ethics.org/)

~~~
AnimalMuppet
A mental state doesn't _cause_ the collapse of the wavefunction. (For example,
in the Schroedinger's Cat setup, not only is the cat a perfectly good
observer, but so is the detector.) Rather, the collapse of the wavefunction
_may_ cause a change in someone's mental state - or it may cause a change in
nobody's mental state, if it is unobserved by any human.

A quantum mechanical "observer" does not need to be a human, or even an
animal.

~~~
pknight
While we can have mechanical detectors in experiment setups that are part of
these experiments, the fact is that there is no way to conclusively say that
the presence of consciousness does not play a role in the collapse of the wave
function. All experiments we do are done by conscious humans, there is always
a conscious observer part of the experiment. That is kind of the conundrum for
which after 100+ years there still is no definitive answer brought forward by
science.

You should also realize that you are positing something equally crazy by
implying causation the other way around, meaning that the collapse of the wave
function somehow can cause changes to the mental state of a conscious person
at breathtakingly large distances.

------
peter303
Bong physics!

