

Warren Buffett’s Fall From Grace - vamsee
http://www.openthemagazine.com/article/business/warren-buffett-s-fall-from-grace

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secretasiandan
The article criticizes Buffett because he

1) criticized derivatives and now holds "$63B" of them

2) is lobbying congress to "rid the bill of its ‘retrospective effect’ clause"
that might effect his financials

3) backs GS/Blankfein and says they did nothing wrong

While at first blush they should raise questions I don't think the author
makes any substantive claims against Buffett's reputation.

1) He criticized derivatives because the way their reporting effects earnings
and because their profits are partially based on the other side's credit
worthyness. I believe a large portion of the derivatives he owns are put
options he has sold on equity indices. So he's not exposed to credit
worthyness of counterparties because he's already been paid. I'm not sure but
probably the derivatives he criticized as too complex and potentially
destructive were things like CDOs/CLOs and other financial engineering
products. I think Buffett understands put options very well, so that statement
doesn't apply here.

2) He's not opposed to having derivatives accounted for differently, only
differently in retrospect as well. I think its reasonable to say "I like the
new set of rules, but please don't penalize me for acting in accordance with
the rules in the past."

3) He does have investments in GS and this probably does effect his judgement,
but the author doesn't really try to prove GS did anything wrong, so his
backing of them can't really be said to be wrong (yet, though I don't think it
will prove to be wrong).

~~~
mattmaroon
Right, there are derivatives and then there are derivatives. They're not by
any stretch of the imagination all equally risky.

I think he is taking some of Buffet's words out of context. It seems
impossible that Buffet would say he doesn't understand derivatives. I
understand them, and unlike him, I don't own companies that pretty much have
to use them.

For instance he owns Burlington Northern, a railroad (which he's had a stake
in for a long time). Companies whose profits are reliant on fuel costs
(railroads, trucking, airlines, retailers with their own distribution system,
etc.) almost always use derivatives to hedge against rising oil prices.

I'm guessing Buffet was speaking only about derivatives based on asset-backed
securities in the consumer credit sector, which were relatively new and poorly
understood and, as he pointed out, incredibly dangerous.

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philk
This is a downright shoddy article.

a) An explanation of the derivatives Buffett holds, and the reasons for
holding them is provided in his 2008 shareholders letter:

<http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2008ltr.pdf>

It should also be noted that he exited a large number of derivatives contracts
that he inherited with General Re prior to the GFC as he felt unable to manage
or understand them.

b) Buffett is arguing against retrospective changes WRT derivatives
accounting. There's nothing wrong with objecting when people are discussing a
retrospective change to the rules that you were operating within.

c) As far as I can tell, the author would pillory anyone who doesn't attack
Goldman Sachs. Buffett is entitled to his opinion.

~~~
andywood
The article read to me like thinly veiled mudslinging and innuendo.

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ewanmcteagle
Buffet falls from grace every few years. But this is not a good article. The
problem with derivatives and retrospective changes is that this messes with
agreements that have already been made. Not only is that not right but it may
have consequences that are unforseen. Berkshire and others are correct to
insist that they have rights here that should be protected.

I understand that the US Constitution is truly on the way out but it did have
this bit : "No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law,
or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts..."

I'm pretty sure that used to be taken to mean the federal government wouldn't
do it either, but then that can't be reconciled with minimum wage laws either.

Maybe that's all uncertain but I'm confident the article is relatively
thoughtless.

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mattmaroon
"But the fact remains that if clients knew that the portfolio had been largely
designed by Paulson, they would not have bought. Because Paulson had, months
before the Goldman deal, created two funds specifically aimed at shorting the
subprime market."

Sadly that is probably not true. Every person buying a synthetic CDO knew that
on the other end of the wager was someone (usually a hedge fund manager)
holding the opposite bet (a credit default swap). Every synthetic CDO was a
zero sum wager, and the people buying it knew that.

(I'm pretty sure that all of the CDOs at issue in this case were synthetics,
though it doesn't matter too much to the person buying them. There's
effectively no difference between a synthetic and a non-synthetic.)

At the time Paulson wasn't any different than any other hedge fund manager,
insofar as any synthetic CDO purchaser knew. The people taking they long end
of the subprime market at that point were still under the impression that the
ratings agencies were at least reasonably close to accurate.

Effectively what the wager came down to was Paulson saying "the rating
agencies are wildly incorrect" and his counterparties saying "no they're not".

~~~
secretasiandan
I think the other side can claim that what they should have been sold was a
diversified portfolio to insure whereas what they were given was a
concentrated portfolio. If you ordered a box of bananas from a grocer and what
they delivered was a box of all their rotten bananas that they hand selected,
I think you would have a claim that they acted improperly.

That GS brought in an outside agent, ACA, to me suggests that the portfolio
construction was supposed to have some oversight to prevent the box of bad
bananas scenario. If not, then why was there a third party agent? GS becomes
culpable since they made the representation to the sellers of the insurance
that there was an independent third party monitoring the construction, when in
fact they knew it was really Paulson driving the portfolio construction.

~~~
yummyfajitas
The short side of a banana sale is a guy with a comparative advantage in the
production of bananas. The short side of a bet is a guy who thinks you are
going to lose. A synthetic CDO is a package of bets, not a package of bananas.

If you bet that the Yankees would win, you can be sure that someone else
believed the Yankees would lose. Similarly, if you received a synthetic sports
bet, with a payoff of 100 x Yankee win + 100 x Red Sox win + 100 x Blue Jays
win, you can be sure that someone else thinks that at least 2 of the 3 teams
will lose. If you lose this bet, you've got no cause for complaint since you
were trying to do the same thing to the other guy.

Paulson picked (in their opinion) the worst securities out there. ACA picked
(in their opinion) the best of the worst. Everyone on the long side of this
bet (which includes Goldman) believed Paulson was wrong and were fully
prepared to take their money.

~~~
mattmaroon
Humorously even Paulson and most of the other people who made a fortune had no
idea just how right they were. They were all buying the mezzanine tranches
(confusing lingo for next to worst) of the CDOs, when in reality even the best
tranches (called senior) hit 0. They could have made many times more money
(and a few people did, though not more than you could count on your fingers)
since the credit default swaps were much cheaper on the highly-rated tranches
but the risk was effectively the same since the correlation between subprime
defaults considered to be about .3 was actually 1.

Hindsight is 20/20 though.

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failquicker
I think this article is a little propagandaish for hn. It really feels like a
giant misrepresentation of the truth.

Berkshire was not hiding the fact they owned these derivatives. Buffett has
talked about thm many times and defends purchasing this specific set of
derivatives as having been "mispriced at inception" which I think is the most
basic plan of all investing, right. Buy low, sell high.

As to the lobbying of congress, I would do the same thing, and you would too.
When the derivitives contracts were drawn up Berkshire offered both a
collatoralized and uncollatoralized option for the contract. The other parties
would have paid a higher premium to Berkshire for the collatoralized contract,
so they selected to forgo collatoral. Now, after the fact congress is going to
step in and demand the contract have collatoral?

If I borrow money unsecured, I'm going to pay a higher interest rate. It would
be extremely crappy to come in half way through the loan and demand that I put
my house up ad collatoral. Now I have all the risk, and didn't even get to
benefit from the lower I intrest rate at inception.

THAT'S what he's lobbying against.

And ontop of all of that, Buffett has said that if congress does include
retroactive collatoralization, he will just pay it and his business will still
be fine. So where's the fall from grace?

[http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=aZcI...](http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=aZcI_iSCOUWM)

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px
In fact, Buffett thrives with investments in companies that have "fallen from
grace." I don't think he is afraid of that stigma.

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jackfoxy
One of the best lines in the AMC series Mad Men is when the senior partner,
Bert Cooper, says to Don Draper "Philanthropy is the gateway to power".

