
AWS Launches CloudHSM, Hardware Security Module For Managing Cryptographic Keys - ippisl
http://techcrunch.com/2013/03/26/amazon-web-services-launches-cloudhsm-a-dedicated-hardware-security-appliance-for-managing-cryptographic-keys/
======
SoftwareMaven
That is really expensive. You can start provisioning your own HSM for well
under $5000 (of course, you can spend as much as you want :).

I'm guessing Amazon is counting on people who have large AWS deployments and
want a closer HSM. You are paying a _lot_ to reduce latency.

~~~
jcase
The Luna SA they are using doesn't come cheap. For an H/A setup with all the
extras (backup tools, service contract) I was quoted ~$80k.

~~~
SoftwareMaven
But the majority of people don't need that much HSM. And that's the
interesting problem I see with this: the enterprise can afford it, but is
going to be wary of using a cloud provider for this sensitive of data; and
it's outside the budget of most startups. There is probably a tier in the
middle, though, that Amazon expects will happily use the product.

~~~
count
If you're using an HSM for full DAR of your servers, you need all the H/A you
can get. IF that HSM is down, you can't boot your systems, period. If that HSM
crashes or is destroyed, you potentially lose everything.

------
ceejayoz
This is about a month old, now.

~~~
ippisl
It's relevant to the discussion regarding living social's recent hack.

------
howeyc
Disclaimer: I've never been a fan of storing my data on someone else's hard
drives, but many others seem to think it's a good idea.

At any rate, how is this more secure? Amazon has physical access to S3
servers, and physical access to these new HSM things. So what exactly is the
benefit? Is this just so companies can meet some security compliance
regulations while keeping all their data Amazon's hard drives?

~~~
petcat
Yeah it's just compliance. But Amazon having physical access doesn't matter
because this level of CIA (confidentiality, integrity, availability) is
enforced by Amazon also, by contract.

~~~
edwintorok
How can you know that your instance is talking to the real CloudHSM and not a
software emulation that can reveal the keys? At some point Amazon might be
forced (by some wiretapping lawys, or subpoena) to fake the HSM presented to
your instances and give others access to your keys.

Of course the attack window is considerably reduced, if they want to perform
this attack they have to do it when you initially set up the CloudHSM, they
can't replace it later with a fake HSM, but still...

~~~
rdl
Generally HSMs have manufacturer keys, too, so you'd need to compromise both
Amazon and SafeNet (admittedly, both US companies which could be subject to
court order...). The weak point is initial provisioning, as you point out.

~~~
rdl
Fuck, sadly I just talked to safenet at their booth at aws and they don't do
this, so you are totally vulnerable to giving keys to a fake hsm, essentially
making cloud hsm useless. Unless their booth dudes were misinformed.

------
mike-cardwell
How do these devices differ from a £50 Cryptostick <https://www.crypto-
stick.com/> or a £10 OpenPGP SmartCard? <http://g10code.com/p-card.html>

~~~
rdl
Security, performance, and functionality/features.

They're generally FIPS 140-2 level 3 (and a couple are 4), so protected
against physical and logical attacks.

Generally they have modexp accelerators and have performance equivalent to a
main CPU (they used to be way faster than CPUs...).

Mainly, they have tools for multi-party key management, crypto fill, reset,
etc. Some of which can work remotely/over the network, which is the main
weakness of the low end smartcard in this environment.

------
fixxer
Should be entertaining when this gets hacked.

~~~
ghshephard
The entire idea behind HSMs is to reduce the potential for them being hacked.
These are FIPS 140-2 Tamper Proof devices. You rarely hear about these being
hacked, if ever.

