
“The Rise of China vs. The Logic of Strategy” by Edward Luttwak - gwern
https://handleshaus.wordpress.com/2013/12/17/review-of-the-rise-of-china-vs-the-logic-of-strategy-by-edward-luttwak/
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eob
When I read the paragraph that began with this sentence:

> Likewise, Luttwak contends that at the higher levels of Grand Strategy the
> logic of ‘get big or get stomped‘ reverses paradoxically.

I thought, "so many lessons of geo-politics I have learned by wasting time
playing strategy board games". My comment is largely petty, but it does make
one wonder about gaming in education: it's one thing to read about political
strategy, and another thing to actually feel and remember its effects because
of a game you've played. Perhaps carefully designed games would teach certain
abstract concepts as well or better than simply describing those concepts.

~~~
afterburner
Too true, and I find economic expansion games can also teach the runaway
leader effect, ie. the rich getting richer.

~~~
afterburner
Downvote... apparently people don't like being reminded of income inequality.

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austinz
Since fields like this have so much speculation and so little hard data to go
off of, they have to resort to historical analogies for much of their
analysis. Who _really_ knows if China's South Sea strategy is the result of a
concerted turn towards militarism, inflamed nationalistic sentiments forcing
the government in a particular direction, a geopolitical priority based on
projected energy needs, emergent behavior from different factions struggling
for power, or a combination of these things? Especially when it comes to a
political system and government as opaque to outsiders as that of China? And
so we reach for the tired, ill-fitting Bismarck analogies and maybe dredge up
some three thousand year old historical event that we imagine might provide
some sort of insight.

Also, the guns to butter argument doesn't really make sense. You can't just
spend lots of money to quickly buy up a fully-trained military. It takes
years, even decades of operational experience to develop a competent fighting
force, experience that simply cannot be purchased.

~~~
eob
I believe the key is to be a bit more loose with the "guns to butter" analogy.
The strategy isn't really to "buy up a fully-trained military" but rather to
direct a large proportion of the GDP to building one at whatever time-scale is
required.

If you were to do this as an up-and-coming nation (i.e., you've got just a
little butter), you'll meet strong resistance from your peers: they know they
can counter you by putting your butter pile at risk.

But if you first pursue a strategy that gives you a mountain of butter
reserves, your peers lose much of the leverage they can exact upon you, and
you are free to devote massive resources toward military with minimal "worst-
case" economic risk.

EDIT: I made another comment about how interesting it is to relate this stuff
to strategy board games, and this is an example that converts pretty well:
"don't start bludgeoning your neighbors into submission until you're pretty
sure that you no longer depend upon them for basic resources." is the
strategy. (The alternative strategy would be to constantly be frienemies: take
a little, give a little, injure a little the whole game, rather than to have a
phase of friendship followed by a phase of foeship).

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patman81
A few months ago The Economist run a review of the book:
[http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2012/12/chinas-
globa...](http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2012/12/chinas-global-role)

The dilemma facing China was nicely summarized with: "China’s drive towards
military aggrandisement will push other countries towards anti-China
coalitions that reduce rather than enhance China’s diplomatic clout. And
because China can effectively deter direct military action, nations seeking to
counter its rise will be bound to choose “eco-strategic containment”
strategies that slow, rather than enhance, the growth China needs so
desperately to maintain."

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TrainedMonkey
Here is contrasting view of the book:
[http://www.amazon.com/review/RCGISEFI8JYUF/ref=cm_cr_rdp_per...](http://www.amazon.com/review/RCGISEFI8JYUF/ref=cm_cr_rdp_perm?ie=UTF8&ASIN=0674066421&linkCode=&nodeID=&tag=)

Reviewing guy is Russian, so there may be some patriotism at play.

~~~
singularityyy
That reads like a highly un-objective view of the book, not trying to dissuade
people from reading it though - I think it's a nice perspective

~~~
alexeisadeski3
It's not really a review of the book; it's a display of disapproval of
America's recent foreign policy.

Basically some guy used the dubious "platform" of an Amazon book review to
announce that he doesn't like the way the US government acts.

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hangonhn
This article is so full of overly board generalizations and quite pretentious.
To draw conclusions about all of China is silly. To describe China as a nation
surrounded by minor gangs of barbarian is absurd. One of those "gangs" was the
Mongolian.

That he so easily dismisses the idea of Kissinger as "flattery" is dishonest.
Let's not forget Kissinger is among the greatest statesmen in history and has
had an enormous role in US and Chinese history. His strategy of using China to
counter the USSR is what eventually lead to the disarmament agreements with
the USSR. Kissinger also remade the face of Middle Eastern politics by moving
Egypt into the US camp following the Yom Kippur War.

Edit: My problem with this article is that while long it is not nearly long
enough to encompass the topic he's talking about. He gets around this by
drawing conclusions for us. I wish he had taken a much smaller bite and talked
in much more detail about the supporting ideas. For example, why does he
dismiss Kissinger's idea on China? I would like to see what he thinks and see
if I agree with those ideas. Painting Kissinger in broad strokes and in
negative light seem to play a crucial role in this article.

~~~
walshemj
Kissinger was a drama queen prone to petulant and unprofessional behavior. I
bet there are senior FO Staff who where burned by him back in the 70's - and I
bet there's a few now senior members of the state department who feel the
same.

~~~
hangonhn
I can't speak of his personal behavior. I've never been in a room with him nor
read any accounts of that. However, dismissing his expertise as simple
"flattery" without really breaking it down is dishonest. Kissinger has a track
record of being quite successful. I know some countries came out worse because
of him but it doesn't diminish his insights.

~~~
alexeisadeski3
>dismissing his expertise as simple "flattery"

>Kissinger has a track record of being quite successful

Luttwak's view is precisely that Kissinger engages in flattery to expand his
own personal influence.

~~~
hangonhn
I haven't read Luttwak's book but he seems like a smart guy. I hope in the
book he does more than just call it "flattery" and talk about Kissinger's
wife, which is what the linked article does. My guess is that Luttwak breaks
down Kissinger's ideas. My problem isn't with Luttwak or his book. I haven't
read it to be able to judge. I just don't like this article and I think it
doesn't do a good job of advancing Luttwak's idea. Why would he even deviate
into personal things about Kissinger like his wife?

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lionhearted
Luttwak's writing is often brilliant. Check out as many of his essays and
summaries as you can. "Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire" drags and is
difficult at times, but quite insightful.

One important point, re: this article --

> If you pursue military agrandizement so monomaniacally and consistently with
> realpolitick that you start to seriously threaten your neighbors and
> competitors then, if they are smart enough and act in time, you will provoke
> them into forming an alliance of resistance dedicated to doing whatever is
> necessary short of nuclear war, but including crushing your economy, to
> prevent you from getting big enough to dominate.

That was a followed by a criticism of the realism perspective to international
relations, but there's variants of realism --

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Realism_(international_relation...](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Realism_\(international_relations\))

In particular, defensive realism seems the most sane and consistent with what
actually happens in the world --

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defensive_realism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defensive_realism)

Which wouldn't advocate unlimited buildup of military resources. Compare
offenseive realism, from Wikipedia --

"The emphasis offensive realism puts on hegemony as states’ end aim stands in
sharp contrast to defensive realism’s belief that state survival can be
guaranteed at some point well short of hegemony. In a defensive realist
mindset, security increments by power accumulation end up experiencing
diminishing marginal returns where costs eventually outweigh benefits."

So... that particular criticism of realism should perhaps be of offensive
realism? As a sidenote, reading about realism on Wikipedia is certainly an
interesting use of time.

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xophe
"How did the late-Victorian-era British do it? Foresight, humility, compromise
for the sake of alliance, and expert diplomacy and statesmanship. [Excuse me
for a moment as I wipe the tears off my keyboard in my woe at contemplating
what greatness has been lost and despite the fact that loss was not mine,
though it was the world's.]"

The unfettered and self-unaware bias towards Western values of statesmanship
by this so-called -- do they actually call themselves this? -- political
_scientist_ is cringeworthy.

~~~
ww520
There're plenty of 20/20 hingsight "flatteries" thrown from the author.

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roberjo
Wow, that is a really deep read.

I now have some new ancient insults to add to my repertoire.
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reply_of_the_Zaporozhian_Cossac...](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reply_of_the_Zaporozhian_Cossacks)

------
vorg
> "Until 2009 the credibility of the Peaceful Rise grant strategy was
> reaffirmed by actual Chinese conduct ... actual Chinese conduct kept faith
> with these promises in the years 2005-2008 ... But that is no longer true of
> course."

> Future Historians will certainly try and look back and discover the sequence
> of events and decisions that led to China’s shift in behavior. Perhaps it
> was the financial crisis and the feeling that the moment of leapfrogging
> over a peaked and declining West was finally on the horizon. Perhaps it was
> an internal squabble amongst political elites or wealthy families. Perhaps
> leftist-nationalist popular fervor took over and the temptation towards
> aggressiveness could not be resisted, or that having been compelled by
> circumstance to issue guarantees now seemed more ‘humiliating’ than crafty.
> It will be interesting to read what those Historians uncover.

The Chinese were very concerned until 2008 that no-one boycotted the Beijing
Olympics, which was a very symbolic event for its population regarding China's
status in the world. Heck, they even practically dismantled the Great Firewall
for a year to make sure there were no excuses for a boycott.

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hangonhn
He sort of made me cringe when he cited Steve Sailer:

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steve_Sailer#Views_and_criticis...](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steve_Sailer#Views_and_criticism)

When I read things like this:

"Luttwak is considered to be brutally honest, whereas Kissinger is recognized
as a successful and charming but mendacious manipulator. Both are brilliant,
and both are flawed in their own ways, but, in my view, Luttwak’s writing is
more often reliable as giving you actually correct information (though
selectively, with a slant towards his broader agenda of policy influence),
whereas Kissinger is better at obtaining access and favor. They are kind of a
real life Jewish immigrants versions of the ‘Once an Eagle‘ duo where
Kissinger is Massengale and Luttwak is Damon."

I'm done with the article. Telling me pre-digested conclusions is not entirely
honest. There is a lot of fudging going on there which he hides under a veneer
of references.

The article really treats the reader like a complete novice to the area of
grand strategy, foreign policy, and history.

~~~
alexeisadeski3
1\. Just because an individual has personal flaws doesn't make the entirety of
their work worthless. (re: Steve Sailer)

2\. You oppose pre-digested conclusions in articles? You don't want an author
to have thought about an issue - and reached a conclusion - before writing
about it? Sounds silly to me.

~~~
hangonhn
Totally agree. It just makes me cringe a bit.

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stcredzero
_the ideal thing to do for an emerging great power (China, in this case) would
be to artificially suppress your military aggrandizement and try to influence
perceptions about your country in the direction of ‘friendly’, ‘trustworthy’,
‘peaceful’, ‘non-confrontational’, ‘cooperative’ and especially ‘non-
threatening’ growing out of ‘objectively not interested in domination because
not interested in military power’._

This seems to be precisely what the US succeeded in doing, with the unwitting
help of Nazi Germany taking the fall as the heavy, giving the US the perfect
"Good War" justification for a massive military buildup and establishment of a
huge military-industrial complex. Then the Soviet Union succeeds in taking
Germany's place, continuing the justification.

China's unspoken strategy may be to paint the US as current hegemon and
current "heavy." If so, they do seem to be doing it wrong.

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gaoshan
A very solid example of someone that doesn't actually understand China very
well at all and so analyzes it from a somewhat extreme and self-focused
perspective that is particular to conservatives from the West.

tl;rd: pseudo-intellectually tone deaf nonsense

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cwp
Without commenting on the geo-political insights he's discussing... wow, what
a pleasant read. He had me laughing out loud at several points.

It could use some copy editing, though.

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alexeisadeski3
Pretty great article.

Luttwak is nothing short of genius.

