
The strange postulated link between the human mind and quantum physics (2017) - elorant
http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20170215-the-strange-link-between-the-human-mind-and-quantum-physics
======
kevinpet
My internal understanding of Penrose's "hypothesis" is that there are
structures in the brain that relate individual quantum events to macroscopic
neurological processes, in a way not explained by the usual aggregation of
quantum events into chemical behavior.

I'm very skeptical of this because nothing I've read has proposed any
mechanism whereby it could evolve, nor any reason why these events should
related to "consciousness" as opposed to any other mental process.

Admittedly, I haven't spent a whole lot of time looking into it, because time
is limited and the history of science is littered with enough great scientists
who latch on to mysticism (Newton being a prominent example) that I don't
assume that everything coming from a recognizable name is worth exploring.

~~~
sdenton4
My guess would be 'easily available random number generator.' Whether access
to an rng is a prerequisite for consciousness is another question...

~~~
exoesquitur
Since adding noise is a critical part in many neural network training models,
it is entirely possible that an at-hand source of randomness is highly useful.

Drugs that reduce the accessibility of this randomness by biasing the signal
pathways (or something) might be an interesting research vector.

~~~
maze-le
>> Since adding noise is a critical part in many neural network training
models

Our brains do _not_ work _exactly_ like neural network models. Neural Networks
are a model, on how nervous systems _could_ work. It doesn't follow, that
nature has implemented them the same way.

There is no need for the human brain to produce noise with some arbitrary
process. There is more than enough noise in the human brain... Every single
neuron is a powerful noise-filter[0], that seemingly can generate signals when
the "correct" noise-signal is filtered.

>> Drugs that reduce the accessibility of this randomness by biasing the
signal pathways

The randomness you are talking about _is_ way the brain operates under normal
circumstances[1]... so no, it wouldn't be beneficial, since we cannot discern
signal from noise in any meaningful way [2].

[0]:
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuronal_noise](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuronal_noise)

[1]:
[https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/486289](https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/486289)

[2]: not even on the level of the single neuron -- except for very few types
of neurons [pyramid neurons] in a rat model --
[https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1456039/](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1456039/)

------
bascule
This article covered more than I was expecting, but still manages to squeeze a
small amount of substance into a relatively large article. Here's a tl;dr:

\- Penrose and Hameroff postulate microtubules might have quantum mechanical
behavior in their Orch-OR hypothesis. This hypothesis was refuted by Max
Tegmark in the 90s. Penrose doesn't care and keeps preaching his hypothesis,
and has not put forth any new scientifically compelling arguments in the past
2 decades.

\- Photosynthesis is shown to be quantum mechanical. I'm not sure quantum
mechanical behavior in plants is the best argument that quantum mechanics are
responsible for consciousness.

\- Fischer hypothesizes that phosphate ions in biological cells might exhibit
distinctly quantum mechanical behavior, but is wary about any link to "quantum
consciousness".

This is pretty much all of the substance of the article.

Even if there were a conclusively demonstrated link between quantum mechanical
behavior in human cells (there isn't), using that to argue that our brains are
quantum computers and that consciousness is a fundamentally quantum phenomenon
would be a huge non sequitur.

~~~
mannykannot
Furthermore: "Photosynthesis is shown to be quantum mechanical" \- well, yes,
just like everything else in physics, with the possible exception of those
issues, like black holes, where gravity is dominant. The quantum-mechanical
basis of chemistry has been included in high-school chemistry curricula for at
least half a century, so it would be quite remarkable if photosynthesis were a
exception.

While it is possible that the human mind has no classical-approximation
explanation, the equating-of-ignorance argument, stated in the article's
subtitle, is no reason to think it is so (and quantum mechanics is much better
understood than the human mind, anyway.)

~~~
thraway180306
All chemistry is ultimately quantum, same with rocks and everything up to
celestial bodies (meaningfully, the moon Hyperion decoheres). For most of
calculations though classical models are good enough, vast majority of
chemical reactions behave as if molecules were newtonian springs. When people
talk of quantum effects in chemistry they really mean it. In case of
photosynthesis the basic molecule's efficiency was found hinging on stuff that
is very quantum. This was described by Gregory Engel et al. Alan Aspuru-Guzik
interprets some of what's happening as a realization of quantum computation
running a tree-walking algorithm.

The wider conclusion is that living organisms do evolve around quantum effects
(if the molecule existed a priori somehow) or maybe even evolve to the point
of reaching and then harnessing them (making the molecule).

Now to what's Penrose about. Seldom anybody actually reads the guy or know the
context. He was after the computational theory of mind. Not necessarily
looking for a theory, but sneering at one big non-theory. This is in context
of the 80's with unhinged stuff coming from the AI community (same as today).
He was wondering if brain could really be this reducible and a known model of
computation (he hasn't done a good review) from the physical point of view.
For him a full logical reductionism necessiated excissing the measurement
problem (the basic point goes back to Niels Bohr who thought biology cannot be
entirely physics because of this). So he proposed a crude version that fleshes
out measurement as a real physical process. His idea has the main upside of
removing both quantum and AI mysticism.

This received angry and mostly off-topic response based on caricature
summaries like elsewhere in this thread. Of course lending themselves to such
caricatures says a lot about writing if not the ideas, but it's an honest try
that ain't entirely silly and without upsides. The microtubules guy is someone
else who Penrose was just happy to see come and collaborate with later. He'd
be happy with any kind of other stuff, such as from the original article. BTW
the author is Philip Ball, a long time editor of the Nature journals, and he's
got a new book out about interpretations of quantum mechanics that is really
superb to anything else on the market by far (that is could be better but
isn't worthless).

~~~
adrianN
My problem with his theory is not that consciousness in the brain might be
dependent on quantum effects, but that he seems to conclude that this makes it
impossible for computers to have consciousness. Quantum computers can be
simulated by classical computers.

~~~
thraway180306
That's a significant goalpost move. From debating particular mechanisms and
postulated inevitability of AI, to assuming full blown strong Church-Turing-
Deutsch principle and moving from there. Along with moving whole discussion
from practical concerns into philosophy and really arguing from the thesis, at
which point most people lose interest.

------
damip
Couldn't it be that the measurement device (or any other interacting object)
"falls" into all of the possible states of the measured system, therefore we
see the measurement device itself as a quantum object when we don't interact
with it, but every possible "outcome" of the measurement device sees the
system as classical. At a higher scale, a human being itself is an object
interacting with the measurement device, and every possible "outcome" of the
human being sees the device as a classical system, showing a classical system.
At least this explanation does not involve "quantum brains" nor
enthropocentrism.

~~~
krastanov
What you describe is really close to the "multiverse interpretation" of
quantum mechanics. It is an interesting thought exercise, but it is really
important to acknowledge that it is only an interpretation, mathematically
equivalent to the other ones, and experimentally unconfirmable.

As to Penrose's ideas on consciousness, they are many other problems with them
(see Wikipedia for a quick list of sources; or Scott Aaronson's lecture
notes).

------
buboard
All that one can deduce from this line of (mostly philosophical)
investigations is that "consciousness is randomness in our behavior".

If that definition of consciousness fits you, then fine, but the whole
discussion is not very productive for neuroscience. For all i know,
consciousness is an undefined term.

The article doesn't mention Francis Crick, who was even more qualified to
tackle the subject.

[http://blog.wellcomelibrary.org/2016/09/crick-on-
consciousne...](http://blog.wellcomelibrary.org/2016/09/crick-on-
consciousness/)

~~~
adrianN
Yes, there is no proper definition of consciousness. All the "definitions"
I've heard so far either don't allow you to distinguish what a rock does from
what a human brain does, or they're not compatible with our understanding of
physics, or both.

I found this highly entertaining [https://www.smbc-
comics.com/comic/compatibilism](https://www.smbc-
comics.com/comic/compatibilism)

------
deepnotderp
Hmm, I remember thinking about this several years ago, the big issue is that
it's almost unfalsifiable. I remember thinking that an experiment looking at
whether anesthetics (that caused loss of consciousness in neurons) also
stopped quantum phenomena in said neurons. But alas, that was a hard
experiment to do back then :)

~~~
zamalek
Any experiment concerning consciousness is likely unfalsifiable. It's a
subjective phenomenon, by definition. Even if you could get approval to futz
with someone's consciousness, you have to ask them what they are experiencing.

~~~
crazygringo
Subjective doesn't mean unfalsifiable.

If the experiment is double-blind and a statistically significant proportion
of participants report subjective differences according to a survey, and the
results can be replicated... then you're good to go.

Obviously there's the question of what it would mean which could be argued
over... but if the effect is there, it means _something_.

~~~
adrianN
The fundamental problem is that you can test whether the drug causes people to
report that they're not conscious, but you can't test whether they're actually
conscious or not.

------
eternalny1
"Solipsism may be logically consistent with present quantum mechanics" \-
Eugene Wigner

~~~
kakarot
That's a shorter version of a quote meant to dismantle materialism.

------
titzer
Like most people here, I have been thinking this quantum consciousness stuff
is a lot of woo. However something new I saw in this article is the
mysteriousness around the different effects of different Lithium isotopes on
treating mania. That's pretty weird, as isotopes should be chemically
identical.

~~~
kgwgk
> isotopes should be chemically identical.

Not really. I don't know about lithium isotopes, but there are drugs
"improved" by replacing some hydrogen atoms with deuterium (an isotope of
hydrogen):
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deuterated_drug](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deuterated_drug)

Apparently isotopic food is also a thing:
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ifood_(isotopic_food)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ifood_\(isotopic_food\))

Edit: I found this 1986 reference about lithium
[https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/3530801](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/3530801)

Stable isotopes of lithium: dissimilar biochemical and behavioral effects.

Lithium, which is used routinely in the treatment of mania, is composed of two
stable isotopes, lithium-7 (92.58%) and lithium-6 (7.42%). Usually there is
minimal physiological or biochemical differentiation between isotopes of an
element, but lithium is an exception. Data derived from a variety of
biochemical and behavioral experiments are reviewed to support this idea.
Additionally, the clinical implications of this work are presented.

------
crazygringo
This is one of those ideas that (rightly) won't go away.

I've recently been quite inspired by Christopher Alexander's "The Luminous
Ground" (2003). For those who don't know, he's an architect and mathematician
[2] whose work greatly influenced object-oriented programming (he's best-known
for "A Pattern Language"), and in this most recent work of his, he addresses
the concept of "wholeness" head-on -- investigating what can be done to
integrate the completely separate worlds of art/spirit and physics, under the
belief that they can't stay separated forever... and following in the steps of
thinkers like Bohm, Penrose and Mandelbrot. (I.e. he's serious, not some new-
age QM crackpot.)

The print copy is sadly ridiculously expensive, but whether online or in
libraries there are definitely ways to read it if you're determined...

[1] [https://www.amazon.com/Nature-Order-Building-
Environmental-S...](https://www.amazon.com/Nature-Order-Building-
Environmental-Structure/dp/0972652949)

[2]
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christopher_Alexander](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christopher_Alexander)

------
acetoxy
Stanislav Grof talks about this in a recent interview he did with Tim Ferriss.
Very interesting. [https://tim.blog/2018/11/20/stan-
grof/](https://tim.blog/2018/11/20/stan-grof/)

------
tarcyanm
For me, the question of consciousness is more than a question of pure
mechanism. The mystery for me is the particularity/locality of experience.
It's one thing to say that we have encountered these thousands of clocks, and
here is exactly how they work (mechanism). It's far more mysterious to find
one's entire experience suddenly located at the epicenter at one clock in
particular - with seemingly no access to similar experience of other clocks.
The issue of particularity is the real problem for me. And I can't see how
claiming that it is imaginary helps - it's my most convincing experience.

~~~
yters
It's funny when people say science proves consciousness is an illusion, when
all that we know of science comes to us through our consciousness :D

------
jerry40
So we have several facts:

\- your attention can change an particle's experiment outcome (you choose
future)

\- we see quantum effects on tiny particles only

\- perhaps gravity makes quantum effects for "heavy" objects impossible

Which leads to an idea that actually all objects have quantum effects but
someone watches for all objects in the universe and makes choices (chooses
future) ahead of us. And apparently we can feel his attention as gravity. But
his wathcing power is restriced and he/she/it can't watch every particle in
the world.

So to see the quantum world and to say hello to the god we should overload his
attention with DDOS attack (perhaps Babylon tower experiment was about this).

~~~
devwastaken
Afaik 'observe' is not in the human context, it's in the measurement context.
Our eyes don't change the outcome, it's that we don't know the outcome of
quantum happening without measuring in some manner, and because quantum
physics is essentially nature's statistics, measuring those physics themselves
provides different outcomes.

I probably have that wrong in definition.

~~~
jerry40
As far as I understood the article, there is a possibility that our brain can
choose one of experiment's outcome. So basically we do not change the outcome,
but select one of possible options. And we continue living in that chosen
reality after the choice.

------
hackerbabz
My expectation is that as we get closer to developing an artificial mind, we
will continue to discover previously unknown processes in the human mind that
continue to separate it from the most advanced artificial one we have built.

~~~
RobertoG
>>"[..] we will continue to discover [..]"

Do you mean indefinitely? Why that would be the case?

------
spot
"and his thesis is considered erroneous by experts in the fields of
philosophy, computer science, and robotics."

from wikipedia. what clown writes about penrose without including the standard
criticism?

------
platz
There may indeed between the human mind and quantum physics, just not the one
you're thinking.

Namely, that QM doesn't represent anything physical about reality at all, and
ONLY encodes probabilities relating to observations; the wavefunction is only
a probability calculating math tool and doesn't represent reality in the
slightest.

~~~
Retra
That's not a very useful perspective, because you could say the same thing
about any part of language or science. Human knowledge is an abstraction, and
can only ever indirectly represent reality. (And surely, "not in the
slightest" is an exaggeration.)

~~~
platz
[https://youtu.be/jvZ5m3UMer4](https://youtu.be/jvZ5m3UMer4)

------
bra-ket
Quantum probability is just a generalization of classic probability. Busemeyer
in his book [1] mentions several experiments in psychology that can only be
explained by quantum probability [2] but not by classic one

[1] [https://www.amazon.com/Quantum-Models-Cognition-Decision-
Bus...](https://www.amazon.com/Quantum-Models-Cognition-Decision-
Busemeyer/dp/1107419883)

[2]
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_cognition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_cognition)

~~~
klyrs
Since the use of a quantum-theoretic framework is for modeling purposes, the
identification of quantum structures in cognitive phenomena does not
presuppose the existence of microscopic quantum processes in the human brain.
[2]

------
johnjohnsmith
Ahhh the old fallacy of "two things we don't understand must be related
because we don't understand them!"

See also: eclipses and human sacrifices; planetary orbits and the radii
regular polyhedra; even Graham crackers and masturbation.

~~~
tomhoward
I've heard this dismissal made by the likes of Sam Harris and Michael Shermer
against Deepak Chopra, which is fair enough.

But Roger Penrose is not Deepak Chopra, and he's earned the right to be
treated with far more respect than this.

Perhaps the article doesn't do his work justice, but that doesn't make it
reasonable to draw these kinds of derisive and vulgar comparisons.

