
Man-made super flu could kill half of humanity - munin
http://rt.com/news/bird-flu-killer-strain-119/
======
erikstarck
Before 20th century: man can destroy man.

20th century: mankind can destroy mankind.

21st century: man can destroy mankind.

Edit: let me just add that I'm extremely positive about the future, it's just
that there are certain challenges that we as a society must deal with.

The ability for one man or a small group of men to more or less wipe out the
human race will be in our reach within perhaps just a few years.

We can deal with this by different control mechanisms in our society. I'm a
firm believer in the transparent society but the way things are going right
now we seem to be moving towards a government controlled big brother society.

Is that the way we want it? Now is the time to discuss these issues if we want
to change route.

~~~
dcx
Isn't this the same problem as nuclear knowledge regulation though? We
definitely need some controls here, but the government doesn't need to control
_everything_ big brother style. Just a few specific items within a few domains
of knowledge.

I'm not a big fan of government secrecy either but if the choice is between
that and self-extinction, well...! Our Stone Age circumstances have left us
with some pretty predatorial instincts and drives. It makes sense to put in
safeguards to protect us from our own giant technological reach. It gives us
time to let our social/cultural immune systems catch up.

And these probably don't have to be permanent - I'm not sure, but it does feel
like we're moving towards greater freedom over time. Look at the chemicals you
can buy in any hardware store or pharmacy today, and the instruction guides
freely available on the internet. Individuals can already cause asymmetrically
large harm but generally don't, because we're already fairly self-
domesticated.

(Credit to Simon of Space for this line of thought -
<http://cheeseburgerbrown.com/stories/Simon_of_Space/>)

------
prophetjohn
I think there's more to gain than lose by publishing these results. First of
all, the research states that ~50% of people _infected_ with the virus would
die, not that humanity would be reduced by 50%, necessarily. It's unclear if
this is an implication and I think, as a result, it's a bit of a misleading
title.

Also, say the title is not misleading and they publish the results and some
crazy dictator gets his hands on it. First, he has to be crazy enough to want
to develop a virus that has a 50% chance of killing him. Then he has to find
scientists that are willing to develop the virus that has a 50% chance of
killing them and their family and friends, etc. The likelihood of all these
things transpiring seems relatively low.

On the other hand, this research seems to indicate that it's not wholly
unlikely that this kind of virus mutation could transpire organically, in
which case this "recipe" being public knowledge would be instrumental in
fighting the disease. Even if it doesn't arise organically (crazy terrorist
convinces crazy scientists) the public knowledge of it would still reduce the
50% death rate.

And I also feel that the kind of sentiments that lead people to claim that
this research should never have been performed in the first place are
misguided. This kind of tinkering and hacking around is likely what would lead
to the next big cure, etc. Never stop scientists from learning new things.

~~~
tsotha
>Also, say the title is not misleading and they publish the results and some
crazy dictator gets his hands on it.

The difference between bioweapons and nuclear weapons is the former don't
require the resources of a state. It could just as easily be done by a few
grad students. Maybe even a single grad student.

~~~
saulrh
There was an article that went over exactly this in Discover magazine a month
or two ago. Summary is that it's harder than you might think. To quote:

    
    
      "You would need more than a garage; you would need a great
      garage and a lot of money. And it's not trivial. You need
      the oligonucleotides to stitch genes together, and as far
      as I know, most companies will check the order if the
      sequence represents that of a dangerous virus."
    

[http://discovermagazine.com/2011/oct/21-dawn-of-the-
biohacke...](http://discovermagazine.com/2011/oct/21-dawn-of-the-biohackers)

~~~
skrebbel
Soo if a university group can do it, then it's too difficult for North Korea
to do?

~~~
saulrh
The university group can do it because it can pay $500k to our biotech
industry for pre-researched and in-production batches of chemicals, equipment,
and other supplies. North Korea doesn't have that biotechnology industry to
start with and would be starting over from a cottage industry.

~~~
skrebbel
i dont know where you're from, but your universities are RICH!

~~~
DanBC
([http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2011/may/16/cambridge-
to...](http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2011/may/16/cambridge-tops-
guardian-league-table))

> _Professor David Tidmarsh, vice-chancellor of Birmingham City University,
> says [. . .] the university is investing £180m in new buildings, facilities
> and equipment.

> _At Oxford, average spend per student fell to £11,232 in 2009-10 from
> £11,410 the year before. The university spends substantially more than other
> institutions. Cambridge spent £8,612 in 2009-10, a rise from £8,118 the year
> before.*

Rough guide to student numbers (pdf)
([http://www.ox.ac.uk/media/global/wwwoxacuk/localsites/gazett...](http://www.ox.ac.uk/media/global/wwwoxacuk/localsites/gazette/documents/supplements2010-11/Student_Numbers_2010-2011.pdf))

------
jballanc
Reading some of the comments, I am reminded of the Greek concept of
_hubris_...

In particular, it is funny how programmers, who make their living by
controlling complicated systems, jump to the conclusion that every complicated
system is trivially subject to human control. I had a professor once put it
this way: disease is just that -- a dis-ease.

The first thing you have to understand is that no organism lives in a
biological vacuum. Every organisms interacts with other organisms. When first
two organisms meet, the interaction is usually rather messy. One or the other
or both die in great numbers. Gradually, they make adjustments and the deaths
decrease. One becomes a disease or parasite of the other. Eventually, the two
organisms will reach a détente and begin living as symbionts. Given enough
time, the distinction between the two may even vanish (see: endosymbiont
hypothesis).

The flu virus is, in particular, a rather striking study of this process.
Consider the vast majority of fowl who carry the virus asymptomatically. For
them, flu is not a disease, but rather a simple hitch-hiker. For humans, you
can predict the severity of a flu outbreak based on how well adjusted the
virus is to humans. The more avian characteristics it has, the worse the
symptoms and mortality are likely to be. At the same time, an ill adjusted
virus is much less likely to spread.

One other thing to consider is that the flu virus itself does not exist in
isolation from itself. The Spanish flu of 1918 is an interesting case in this
respect. It was, as I alluded to before, ill adjusted to human hosts. At the
same time, it was particularly communicable; something of an oddity for a flu
with so many avian characteristics. It did kill a large number of people, but
within a year or two the major damage had been done and the pandemic was over.

Why? Well, certainly a large portion of the human population that had become
exposed but had not died were now immune. More importantly, though, the strain
mutated and became better adjusted to human hosts. This strain, H1N1, then
became the predominant form of the "seasonal flu". It is likely that you have
become infected by a descendent of this very strain, probably many times over.

I would not fear this virus for the same reason that I do not fear Ebola or
Marburg virus. Viruses that kill quickly and efficiently do not spread as well
as those that cause some disease but allow their host to continue functioning
more or less normally (all the while exposing many more to the virus). Of
course, this is little comfort to the dead, and there will always be those who
die from any outbreak (just go look at the annual death toll from "seasonal
flu"). It is far, far from a reason to start predicting the end of humanity.

One final note on the bioweapon/bioterror angle: if you follow the thinking of
the people that actually contemplate the use of bioweapons, you'll find that
bioweapons are only ever considered as denial-of-area or knock-down agents.
That is, you can use a bioweapon to prevent your enemy from gaining or holding
a strategic position. What you don't find is anyone proposing to use a
bioweapon as a coup de grace. Those that study these things understand that
any biological agent has an in-built time limit on its effectiveness.

 _Edit_ : I just realized I should mention that while I don't appreciate the
sensationalism espoused by the scientific press, H5N1 is a very real, very
troubling threat. It won't wipe out the human race, but it does have a good
chance of setting humanity back a decade or two (not from disease, but
primarily from the knock-on effects of people reacting to the disease, halting
productive work and worldwide travel). In my mind, though, this is all the
more reason to publish this research and, while we're at it, pour some more
money into the worldwide flu monitoring network.

~~~
rdtsc
> Every organisms interacts with other organisms. When first two organisms
> meet, the interaction is usually rather messy.

But you also seem to assume that all such interaction are taking place under
natural conditions (humans are just a passive agent, one of the mammalian
species, like a cow perhaps). In reality though humans are actively
manipulating this virus in a laboratory environment and are able to select
strains that are deadly enough, but not too deadly, also transmittable enough.
That is the real danger I think.

> Why? Well, certainly a large portion of the human population that had become
> exposed but had not died were now immune.

What if you or your family isn't. Are you willing to brave on a new hardened
strain of avian flu just to find out. Would you soldier on with a stoic face?
Nobody would right? Therefore the panic. So this is another side of the issue.
Humans are going to react to the disease not just in a sort of automatic
biological way but in a proactive way. Close borders if they can, quarantine
and so on.

> Viruses that kill quickly and efficiently do not spread as well as those
> that cause some disease but allow their host to continue functioning more or
> less normally

I think again, you are assuming a naturally evolving environment outside of
human activity. With plane travel for example, and ever larger densities of
population centers, the same assumptions about the rate of spreading of a
virus cannot be made as they would have been 100 years ago. (On the other side
there is the pro-active element of having access to quicker and better
information, so which one will win -- quick information that could be used to
establish quarantine zones for example or the disease carried by fast
traveling passengers? But that is a whole other discussion).

> bioweapons are only ever considered as denial-of-area or knock-down agents.

I don't think that angle was assumed as much as some ideological angle of
depopulating the planet, by a lone extremist, for example. Here is an example
profile: a virologist at some research facility who has strong beliefs about
the world reaching a tipping point as far as natural resources are concerned
vis-a-vis he accelerating increase in population, becomes obsessed with the
idea, that de-population has to take place and they are willing to actively
encourage it. They start the process of cultivating a strain of flu. When
finished they travel to another continent and try to find ways to spread it.

~~~
munin
> Here is an example profile: a virologist at some research facility who has
> strong beliefs about the world reaching a tipping point as far as natural
> resources are concerned vis-a-vis he accelerating increase in population,
> becomes obsessed with the idea, that de-population has to take place and
> they are willing to actively encourage it.

tom clancy's lawyers called, he said to stop using the plot of "seal team six"
in internet-forum posts ;)

~~~
rdtsc
Oops. Sorry Tom ;-) I was actually thinking of someone like Bruce Ivins. He
wasn't a de-population fanatic and wasn't even proved to have sent the Anthrax
letters. He ended up killing himself (or "killing himself" if you are more
conspiracy theory inclined ;-), but anyway, I had someone like him in mind.
Was surprised that all these movies and books already have the same plot.

------
oasisbob
I found this article on the same topic more informative and less sensational:
[http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn21195-bioterror-
fears-...](http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn21195-bioterror-fears-could-
block-crucial-flu-research.html)

~~~
cr4zy
This has more info also, with moderate sensationalism:
[http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2011/11/scientists...](http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2011/11/scientists-
brace-for-media-storm.html)

------
mootothemax
_After 10 generations, the virus had mutated to become airborne_

Can someone more qualified than me comment on this? I was under the impression
that this is as ridiculous as saying that you started out with dogs and ended
up with cats 10 generations later. That viruses belong to specific families,
and those families include how they're transmitted.

My knowledge of this field is extremely limited; can someone please clear up
my confusion? :)

~~~
jballanc
In fact you are more or less correct. It is as if they put in dogs and got out
cats. That's just how Influenza works. It mutates, adapts, and evolves
extremely rapidly. This is why it never has been, and likely never will be,
eradicated (notice that those "in the know" don't even talk about Influenza
eradication in passing).

------
Apocryphon
This story is from RT, or Russia Today. It's a news network that's been known
to run sensationalist stories.

------
tokenadult
Thanks to the commenters who pointed to more balanced news stories about this
line of research. Some of the other comments here mention the difficulty in
developing strain-specific flu vaccines. That difficulty is why research on
universal flu vaccines

<http://www.nih.gov/news/health/jul2010/niaid-15.htm>

[http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2011/feb/06/flu-
universal-...](http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2011/feb/06/flu-universal-
vaccine-test-success)

is going on in multiple countries, with some major funding support. Antiviral
medicines that treat cases of the flu tend to be in short supply in every flu
season, but some governments have taken care to stockpile those in ways that
ensure that essential services would go on in those countries even during a
severe flu pandemic. Further research on broad-spectrum flu vaccines,
including a possible universal vaccine, is warranted to prevent natural
strains of the flu and is ongoing. Further research, development, and
production of antiviral medicines to treat people who catch the flu is also
warranted and ongoing.

A new pandemic, from whatever source, would be extremely disruptive, but as an
astute previous comment pointed out, people can do things like self-
quarantine, and such simple forms of self-protection were very effective in
stopping the SARS epidemic in 2003. Predicting the death of half of humankind
based the preliminary finding reported in the rather sensational story
submitted here is not a prediction I believe or worry about.

------
markazevedo
Any reason why we can't cripple the virus and start testing vaccines now?
Publish it and immunize against it.

~~~
jballanc
The trouble is not making the vaccine. As soon as you have the virus you can
make the vaccine. The trouble is that we currently lack the capacity to
rapidly produce large quantities of the vaccine.

Why do we lack the capacity? Because there's no profit in making flu vaccines!
Gotta love capitalism, eh?

~~~
shin_lao
no profit in making flu vaccines? please do some research.

~~~
jballanc
Here is some of the evidence I'm going off of:
[http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2004-10-19-flu-
leinwand-...](http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2004-10-19-flu-leinwand-
questions_x.htm)

 _Edit_ : I did find this article which mentions new vaccines being more
profitable
([http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/apr2009/tc200...](http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/apr2009/tc20090427_386206.htm)),
so perhaps the market is not as bleak as I had thought. Still, I worry about
things as vital as vaccine and antibiotic manufacture being left to the whims
of the market (new antibiotics are, last I checked, still not profitable).

~~~
billswift
As opposed to the whims of a government bureaucracy? Large amounts of the
"antibiotics" and other drugs available in the Soviet Union were saline
solution, sterile saline if you were lucky. Do you really think any other
dictatorial (ie, government run) system wouldn't sink to that state
eventually?

~~~
jballanc
I don't recall saying anything about government run... On the contrary, I find
it equally sad that given all the creativity that people exercise in designing
ways for me to talk about what I had for lunch, all we can think of for
motivating production is market economics or government bureaucracy. There is
obvious demand but it is too volatile for the market to capture efficiently
and often those with greatest demand are also those with the least means.
Perhaps there needs to be some sort of population amortized vaccine/antibiotic
futures market?

------
jarin
To me, the scariest thing (which seems to be overlooked) is that this
particular strain of Avian Flu is only 5 mutations away from the Avian Flu in
the wild.

While we're fretting about whether this will get out of a lab, it's not
entirely unlikely that a similar strain will evolve in the wild (now you know
why they burned all those chickens in China).

Edit: "A genetic study showed that the new, dangerous strain had only five
mutations compared to the original one, and all of them were earlier seen in
the natural environment – just not all at once."

------
frisco
According to Wikipedia, Erasmus Medical Center (or, for that matter, all of
Rotterdam) only has labs rated up to Biosafety Level 3. This sounds like it
should be the _definition_ of BSL4. I wonder whether the research was
conducted elsewhere, Wikipedia is wrong, or if they're really doing this in a
BSL2 or BSL3 lab.

------
kunle
Just seems like playing with fire. I get the whole idea of helping humanity
cope with an epidemic, but not clear why they didnt just do THAT research
instead.

~~~
laughinghan
It's hard to figure out how to put out fires based on news reports of what
fires are like. At some point you just have to set fire to something in a
laboratory and see if you can actually put it out.

It helps that just like it's not actually possible to start a fire that would
actually incinerate half the globe, it's not actually possible to create a
virus that would wipe out half of humanity. The article is wrong and
sensationalist.

------
dools
The ethical dilemma is interesting and, I think, parallels the "security
through obscurity" approach to software security. If the findings are
published, the scientific community at large can work to fight a pandemic
which may happen anyway, but at the same time may decrease the time until a
pandemic occurs by giving information to those who would willingly produce it
for their personal gain.

------
vl
Is it time to stockpile Tamiflu again?

But, seriously, isn't it obvious that publication of the fact that this
research is blocked is already enough for terrorists? From the preliminary
report they already have an outline of what needs to be done, they know where
to go and who to ask or what to steal if they can't do it themselves.

------
OoTheNigerian
Unfortunately, if the virus has already been created, the antidote has to be
found ASAP. For this to happen, a large number of scientists have to know how
to make it first before knowing how to destroy it.

How you decide who should have access to this information is now the problem.
If they are not careful, the censoring could piss of some crazy scientist who
would now announce such discoveries with a blogpost and allow anyone have
access to it than through a sort of regulated process that would at least give
the 'right people' a lead on the info; so they can start working on an anti-
dote before is gets to the mass market.

As to what kind of research should be allowed, I have no comment.

~~~
lukifer
There is an interesting short story called "Talking To God" [1], which
postulates that sentient species only survive if every individual has the
ability to destroy the entire world, but chooses not to.

Our capacity for mass destruction is only going to get worse. I think it's far
more efficacious to look toward managing that reality than to try to postpone
or prevent it.

[1] <http://www.fullmoon.nu/articles/art.php?id=tal>

~~~
richardw
If so, we may be doomed. Assume there is a percentage of people who would use
that ability. We need to either destroy them, or transform them. Assume they
were 'fixed', our next problem would be fixing those who might temporarily be
inclined to destroy the world, for example a jilted lover or anyone who is
depressed and angry enough due to temporary circumstance. We then have to
either ensure those circumstances never occur, or 'fix' those people. That
likely covers most people, given an infinite amount of possible situations.
Can't kill everybody, and 'fixing' them likely means we lose too much of what
makes us human to be worth it.

I vote for taking it out of the hands of people and debugging Skynet for
longer than they did in the movie. Then stop competing and enjoy the flowers.

~~~
sneak
> I vote for taking it out of the hands of people and debugging Skynet for
> longer than they did in the movie. Then stop competing and enjoy the
> flowers.

Watch "Colossus: The Forbin Project".

------
papa_bear
Maybe a requisite for researching and developing dangerous diseases should be
that you make the vaccine immediately after (or before, if possible).

------
skrebbel
I don't get how a US body has to decide whether Dutch and Japanese research
papers are allowed to be published.

~~~
jballanc
Science is an American publication. If this were submitted to Nature, I
suspect we'd be hearing about some British committee fretting over this...or
perhaps not since Americans seem particularly prone to sensationalism.

~~~
skrebbel
Ahh right. That makes sense.

That said, I can't see Science (the magazine) being mentioned in the article
anywhere - unless the "Science" in "Science Insider" and "US National Science
Advisory Board for Biosecurity" refers to the magazine.

~~~
jballanc
Yes, "Science Insider" is Science's online, rapid publication site for science
policy: <http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/> .

------
httpitis
Why would anyone even begin to think about developing this sort of thing?

------
marze
How stupid.

------
billpatrianakos
First off, way to sensationalize. Due to the writing style and title I don't
think this should be e number one story right now.

But anyway, published or not "bio terrorists" are not the kind of people the
article wants you to picture. The only likely way such an attack could be
carried out would be with massive support of some unfriendly government.

There's no bio-weapon Al Quaeda working group or anything like that and if
there were the worst they could do is try to infect us by releasing some
infected animal loose somewhere in the hopes it would infect someone.

I wish this post didn't have "fluff piece" written all over it and focused in
a far more detailed way about the merits of publishing scientific studies that
could be used for nefarious purposes. Unfortunately, the post gives us so
little facts on that subject that none of us could really build a good
argument for or against it without doing a fair amount of research first or
resorting to uneducated guesses and opinions. It's too bad, really.

~~~
DanBC
> _There's no bio-weapon Al Quaeda working group or anything like that_

You're aware that Aum Shinrikyo released aerosolised anthrax spores for a week
in Japan before they stopped, and that it's only because they used the wrong
anthrax that there wasn't widespread infection?

That was in 1993; I imagine it's technologically much easier and cheaper to do
it now, but that there are tighter controls over chemicals etc.

The article is sensationalist. Bio-terrorists don't need to kill anyone, they
just need to cause economic harm. They can do this by releasing blue-tongue or
foot&mouth or whatever in a few farms. That costs billions and long lasting
damage.

(<http://www.fmd.brass.cf.ac.uk/>)

~~~
learc83
Yeah, they released the wrong Anthrax spores. An amateur move, they weren't a
hard core group of bioengineers--just some guys who happened to get hold of
some anthrax spores.

The issue here is creating this strain, sure some crazy death cult would _use_
a weaponized flu, but the OP is arguing they wouldn't be able to _create_ it
in the first place.

~~~
DanBC
> _they weren't a hard core group of bioengineers--just some guys who happened
> to get hold of some anthrax spores._

They aerosolised the spores, and released them for over a week. That's not as
simple as putting powder in an envelope and putting it in the mail.

(<http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/281/18/1735.full>)

> _Most experts concur that the manufacture of a lethal anthrax aerosol is
> beyond the capacity of individuals or groups without access to advanced
> biotechnology. However, autonomous groups with substantial funding and
> contacts may be able to acquire the required materials for a successful
> attack. One terrorist group, Aum Shinrikyo, responsible for the release of
> sarin in a Tokyo, Japan, subway station in 1995,6 dispersed aerosols of
> anthrax and botulism throughout Tokyo on at least 8 occasions. For unclear
> reasons, the attacks failed to produce illness._

> * the OP is arguing they wouldn't be able to _create_ it in the first
> place.*

The point I'm responding to is this:-

> _The only likely way such an attack could be carried out would be with
> massive support of some unfriendly government._

I disagree that "massive support of some unfriendly government" is needed; the
example I give is Aum Shinrikyo weaponising anthrax spores (albeit the wrong
anthrax spores.) AS successfully recruited undergraduates and graduates;
getting access to suitably stocked labs wouldn't be that hard for them.

~~~
learc83
> Most experts concur that the manufacture of a lethal anthrax aerosol

They didn't make a lethal anthrax aerosol, they used a completely harmless
vaccine strain of anthrax, I would say that classifies them as amateurs.

If it really required vast bioengineering expertise to make an anthrax
aerosol, one would think they wouldn't make such a ridiculous mistake.

~~~
DanBC
The hard part is aerosolising the anthrax.

As to using the wrong anthrax - Identifying anthrax is hard.

PDF: (<http://jcm.asm.org/content/39/12/4566.full.pdf>)

> _Strain identiﬁcation in Bacillus anthracis has been problematic due to a
> lack of distinguishing features, both phenotypic and molecular (1). With the
> identiﬁcation of variable-number tandem repeats (VNTRs), identiﬁcation of
> strains (unique genotypes) by multiple-locus VNTR analysis (MLVA) is now
> possible, and worldwide clone-based diversity patterns have been
> demonstrated (2). The VNTR loci are hypervariable and have multiple allelic
> states that provide high discrimination capacity for differentiating among
> strains and for identifying evolutionary relationships._

That's from 2001. Aum Shinrikyo incident was in 1993.

~~~
rbanffy
There's easy way - test it on humans. The strain that kills the host is the
deadly one.

Remember these people don't think dying is bad - they usually believe in an
afterlife.

~~~
DanBC
Maybe spraying the aerosol over a populated Japanese city for a week was the
test on a human population?

~~~
rbanffy
Bad idea because it requires a lot of effort (you need large qantities of tbe
agent) and may call unwanted attention. It would be better to test the sample
on a volunteer before. Then you weaponize the agent that best matches your
needs.

------
DaveChild
Captain Trips.

~~~
DaveChild
No fans of The Stand here? :)

------
bitwize
But can it spread to Madagascar?

------
Zash
What could possibly go wrong?

------
corroded
Let's all hope Umbrella Corporation doesn't get a hold of this...

------
nussbi
whether or not the they publish this information - if it exists indeed - will
it really matter?

I mean; why bother with a future that does not exist yet? If it gets out and
holds to be genuine information then some fascist group (sect, terrorists,
whoever) develops it and releases it into the wild... What will happen? WE
DON'T KNOW. It could kill half of humanity but also only a few people, we
can't say.

All we know for sure is that there may be hugely harmful virus data in some
lab. That's all there is to say, future will tell what's gonna happen. Why
bother with a future we can't predict?

------
cr4zy
It seems like the United States should invest in a dream team, atom bomb, go
to the moon type of operation to deal with this. It's hard to see why this
information even got out in the first place.

------
nickpinkston
I feel like this is the ultimate "money where your mouth is" question for the
"pre-publish-the-exploit" hackers. Would they release this? I'm not sure we
shouldn't, but it's pretty crazy that we've made this.

Hell, I'm not so sure that any virologist or two worth their salt might not be
able to do the same. Modified-Nature you scary!

------
ck2
Yeah let's keep spending money on the TSA groping everyone, terrorists would
never just spread a super-flu instead.

Ironically the TSA could be the ones to spread a virus from person to person
because I am sure they do not change gloves on every grope?

------
heelhook
Maybe I'm being naive, but this sounds a lot like critical software that, if
compromised, could be a danger for our society. You would definitely want that
piece of software to remain as secure as possible: open source is definitely
the way to go!

~~~
scythe
For a more apt analogy, the human immune system is like an old piece of
critical software that society depends on, and H5N1 represents a piece of
shellcode that exploits a serious flaw in the system which is currently a
0day. It allows an attacker to remotely disable a large number of machines,
err, people. There is currently no patch -- vaccine -- available to fix the
hole.

The relevant buzzword is full disclosure. Even I'm not sure if you can take
that so far, but I'm pretty sure that if this is released, nobody ever gets to
complain about someone publishing an exploit for their personal project,
because that's nothing in comparison.

