

Fast Iterations: How Napoleon Managed the French Army - mikey_p
http://managingmetrics.com/how-napoleon-managed-the-french-army

======
nl
This article sounds really good at a high level, but it misses an important
point.

Prior to the invention of the radio, lower level commanders _always_ had to
use their initiative when commanding their troops, because there was no
reliable way to quickly communicate with their commanders during a battle.

It's disappointing this was missed, because it's an important point: Control
needs to be proportional to communication.

Also:

 _They also were taught to live off the land by hunting and foraging. This
decoupled the soldiers from the slow supply caravans and allowed them to
remain independent for long periods of time._

The author probably should have pointed out that this tactic led to his armies
in the Iberian peninsular being bled by attacks form the local population sick
of having the crops stolen by "foraging" soldiers. It also led to the Russian
disaster - the Russians left nothing for the French armies to forage, and so
when winter came they ~all died.

~~~
hacker-gene
> Control needs to be proportional to communication.

First time I've heard of this, and I'm pretty sure there's good insight here
somewhere (I don't think I've heard it mentioned anywhere), would be great if
you can expand on it.

~~~
nl
Thanks. I just made it up.. but I don't think it's anything complicated.

Control should only be exerted over things where you have sufficient
knowledge. In a rapidly changing environment - be it business or battle -
knowledge can only come via communication.

Strong centralized control can only work well in environments where
communication is strong too. Otherwise decisions must be made with less
knowledge than other parts of the organisation closer to the action the
decision affects.

~~~
davidw
> Thanks. I just made it up.. but I don't think it's anything complicated.

It's a nice phrase and concept. If you could fluff it up a few hundred pages,
you could get a business book of your own out of it...

------
nradov
Military analogies and examples are almost universally terrible when applied
to software development (and business in general). That blog post cherry picks
a few anecdotes from Napoleon's history and ignores his failure to learn from
his mistakes. As his famed opponent Arthur Wellesley (Wellington) said after
defeating Napoleon the final time: "They came on in the same old way and we
defeated them in the same old way."
[https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Column_%28for...](https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Column_%28formation%29#Napoleonic_Wars)

Business is not war.

~~~
anonymo
"As his famed opponent Arthur Wellesley (Wellington) said after defeating
Napoleon the final time: "They came on in the same old way and we defeated
them in the same old way.""

Cute, except that Waterloo was Wellington's one and only victory over
Bonaparte. It was the only time they met on the battle field, and even then,
Michel Ney made most of the tactical decisions (and mistakes) on that day.

Remembering Napoleon for Waterloo rather than Austerlitz, Ulm and Jena would
be like remembering Hannibal for Zama. The fact that his name has become
synonymous with his unremarkable defeat on that day, and that Wellington, a
reactionary, anti-democratic, ennobled aristocrat, is somehow looked upon with
favor in this country (America), even more so than his adversary who was an
ally of America, who doubled the size of our country with the Louisiana
Purchase and who actually planned on settling here after his second
abdication, is a testament to the lasting power of the British anti-
Bonapartist propaganda industry. More books were written about Napoleon in the
19th century than about any other man, living or dead, and most English
languages books on him were written by Brits, and most of those books vilified
him as the Corsican Ogre, the Great Usurper and so on. Were it not for this
cottage industry that sprang up during the Napoleonic Era and lingered long
after, most Americans would probably still have a favorable view of Napoleon
as they did during his lifetime.

~~~
nl
_Cute, except that Waterloo was Wellington's one and only victory over
Bonaparte. It was the only time they met on the battle field, and even then,
Michel Ney made most of the tactical decisions (and mistakes) on that day._

That's true, but Wellington defeated French armies numerous times. Indeed, I
think this is why the quote is famous - instead of Napoleon being some magical
fairy dust that made the French army invulnerable, Wellington was making the
point that he'd defeated them before and the actual fighting at Waterloo
unfolded much like it had in all of the other battles Wellington fought (eg,
in the Peninsular campaign).

It also ignore just how close the battle was - indeed, most commentators think
it is likely the French would have won if Napoleon had attacked Wellington
earlier in the morning, instead of parading his army in an attempt to
intimidate the British. (The argument is that he could have beaten the British
before the Prussians arrived instead of having to split his forces). True or
not, it does seem likely this was a mistake by Napoleon.

Wellington was _a reactionary, anti-democratic, ennobled aristocrat_ , but in
many ways he was a better _manager_ of his army than Napoleon was. For
example, he always made sure his armies were supplied with food without having
to steal from the local population. It was Wellington's logistical innovations
in India that allowed the British to subdue the sub-continent - despite French
attempts to stop them.

~~~
Nick_C
Allow me to point out that anti-democratic in the context of the times (and
especially Wellington) really means pro-monarchy. In other words, not for the
oppression of the people that anti-democracy perhaps implies to the modern
reader, but instead that monarchy is a better, more beneficial system for the
people.

~~~
nl
This is true.

But prior to his European campaigns, Wellington served as _Chief Secretary for
Ireland_ and in that position was responsible for policies that would be
considered very oppressive these days.

There is some evidence that he didn't agree with at least some of these
policies (in particular I believe he tried to moderate the treatment on Irish
tenants by English landholders).

But yeah.. attitudes really were different then, and you can't just interpret
things the same way.

------
lmkg
Interesting... he became the most renowned military commander in European
history by relinquishing his command to his subordinates. In effect, he
pioneered not micromanaging.

Of course, there's more to it than just saying "do what you think is best" and
calling it a day. Napoleon still needed to make high-level strategic
decisions, he needed ensure his subordinates' individual initiative was in
line with those strategic objectives (even harder if the officers are French
aristocrats), and as usual he needed to completely re-invent logistics for his
army to be able to take advantage of their flexibility (see also: Kanban). In
a very real sense, he wasn't just a great general but invented an entirely new
way of waging war.

------
ojbyrne
Napoleon was innovative, but only covering his career to 1805 sort of ignores
the final punchline. Over the next ten years he was repeatedly defeated by a
coalition that could field larger armies, and slowly but surely stole (or
improved on) all of his innovations. Thus demonstrating the "innovator's
dilemma."

~~~
nl
That's not true.

Napoleon repeatedly defeated larger coalitions.

Battle of Austerlitz (1805): defeated the combined armies of the Austrian and
Russian empire, which led to the collapse of the Third Coalition
(<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Coalition>)

Battle of Jena-Auerstedt (1806): defeated the Prussians, which led to the
collapse of the Fourth Coalition
(<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_of_the_Fourth_Coalition>)

Battle of Wagram (1809): defeated the Austrian army, which collapsed the Fifth
Coalition (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_of_the_Fifth_Coalition>)

In conclusion, it wasn't larger coalitions improving on Napoleon's tactics
that beat him. It was firstly the Russian winter, and secondly the superbly
trained and professional British army (which used very _different_
tactics)which first defeated his Marshals in the Peninsular campaign and then
joined with the Prussians to beat him at Waterloo.

~~~
varjag
I like how whoever gets defeated in Russia always blames it on bad weather.

~~~
nl
Except for the Mongols [1][2].

[1] I guess they didn't get defeated, and the "bad Russian weather" was much
better than the Mongolian weather they were used to

[2] And to some extent, the Rus tribe which founded Russia. Being Vikings,
they probably found the "bad Russian weather" quite reasonable, too.

------
spitfire
Napoleon practiced what is now known as Maneuver Warfare. John Boyd - the guy
who originated maneuver warfare formally studied spent his life learning this
stuff. Patterns of conflict was a study of 2500 years of conflict and includes
Napoleons campaigns.

The current startup culture of fast iteration is a very weak version of what
Boyd produced. I'd advise anyone starting or running a business to read up on
the subject Boyds' work will tell you what you can and cannot achieve and how
to go about doing it.

[http://radio-
weblogs.com/0107127/stories/2003/02/08/oodaAndB...](http://radio-
weblogs.com/0107127/stories/2003/02/08/oodaAndBusinesschesterRichardsOnBoyd.html)

~~~
celoyd
“Crew resource management” (there’s a good Wikipedia article on it) is another
interesting application of Boyd’s ideas. In a nutshell, it’s the training that
cockpit crews use to make decisions in quickly-changing environments like
emergencies. It has the advantage of lots and lots of testing, which not all
Boyd’s ideas do.

------
akharris
Fairly interesting, but a bit surprised that he missed one of the most
surprising elements of Napolean's innovations: canned food. Modern war is
largely a question of logistics, and canned goods (over foraging) gave them
the ability to keep food edible longer over greater distance. Of course, not
even canned food could give them victory over the russian winter.

------
jmatt
This is only peripherally related. But since we are on the topic of
Napoleon...

Charles Joseph Minard created and published a flow map of "Napoleon's
disastrous Russian campaign of 1812"[1]. This graphic is way ahead of it's
time. It provides so much information in such a concise and clear form that
it's hard to imagine that it was published in 1869.

Also see more information on Tufte's website[2][3]. That is how I originally
found out about it.

[1] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Joseph_Minard> and
[http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/29/Minard.pn...](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/29/Minard.png)

[2] <http://www.edwardtufte.com/tufte/minard>

[3] <http://www.edwardtufte.com/tufte/minard-obit>

------
cafard
Utter and complete crock. Armies had always requisitioned food. Hunting could
never supply a substantial part of an army's needs. Napoleon drew in part from
lessons learned by the French while assisting the Americans during the
American Revolution. Etc. etc. etc.

But as business publications go, it's above average.

------
kiba
Didn't the Roman general Gaius Marius also introduced the idea of backpack?
His soldiers were called Marius' Mules.

------
HistoryInAction
Also shows the problem of first followers in action.

All of Europe got smacked around for a while by this great disrupter, but
eventually, they learned from Napoleon, found some weaknesses, and then broke
him in the two key battles ending the Napoleonic Wars. He couldn't maintain
his 'first mover' advantage.

~~~
mousa
I would have to think some of his defeat was because France was just depleted.
It had undergone what was probably the most violent couple decades in history
to that point, starting with the revolution, and during his second run, there
wasn't much room for error.

------
krakensden
There are only two posts on that blog, and they're both great. I hope he keeps
it up.

