
A rescue plan that might have saved space shuttle Columbia (2014) - bootload
http://arstechnica.com/science/2016/02/the-audacious-rescue-plan-that-might-have-saved-space-shuttle-columbia/
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s_q_b
What should have saved the space shuttle Columbia was establishing protocols
to deal with foam debris.

It was known well in advance of the Columbia disaster that the foam pieces
dislodged during launch. It was known that they caused damage to the heat
shield ceramic tiles. It was known that displacement of even a few tiles could
lead to catastrophic failure on reentry.

There were no steps taken to minimize or eliminate foam impacts. There was no
protocol or infrastructure in place for in orbit imaging of the heat shield to
check for structural damage, hence the decision not to perform visual
inspection. There was no rescue plan.

These factors combined to create an impossible scenario.

Do you rush through a refurbishment of a second vehicle of the same design for
rescue? That's an extremely risky call that could cost the lives of more
astronauts.

The point I am making is that in all complex systems, failure should be an
_expected_ result, and mitigation strategies should already be in place.

The best time to rescue Columbia was before it ever launched.

~~~
tamana
If you assume say a 10% mission failure rate, which is high for shuttle
missions, its a good bet to use a shuttle missions to rescue a shuttle mission
that has already failed but not killed everyone yet.

~~~
s_q_b
There are too many unknown unknowns when refurbishing the craft that quickly.
The failure rate could be 50%. Who knows?

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avmich
I always thought an interesting idea would be to launch an unmanned Soyuz to
dock with Columbia.

In 1960's Soyuzes were launched sometimes without orbital module - project
Zond; that's saving of about 15% of mass. Even if that wouldn't be sufficient,
Zonds were launched on Protons with DM kicker - and that combination flew as
far as over the Moon, so I'm sure it could match Columbia orbit inclination
and height.

Russians launch on average more often than anybody else, so they could pull
that attempt. Problems are that Soyuz spacecraft takes 2 years to manufacture
- but money could have helped there, especially in 2003, before oil prices
made incomes larger in Russia. Protons were manufactured in larger quantities
- may be more that 10 per year. Even with one Soyuz - for 3 crew - some
Progress spacecrafts, which are built in larger numbers, could be added rather
soon, maintaining the remaining Columbia crew until further options would
become available.

So, to sum this up - Russian spacecrafts could technically reach Columbia in
2003.

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jewel
Would it have been possible to launch supplies and a repair kit to the shuttle
using a more traditional unmanned rocket launch?

I imagine the preparation time for those rockets is less than the shuttle and
that it'd require a much smaller payload, which could make it even more
flexible.

~~~
rtkwe
For that to work would have needed to have on hand something like a Cygnus or
Dragon commercial supply vehicle and the first unmanned supply to the ISS that
wasn't a Progress was 5 years later in 2008. [1] There was Progress M-47 which
launched Feb 2, 2003. I'm not sure where that would have put it in their
launch preparations. It doesn't look like Progress would have had the ability
to match the inclination of Columbia though. See Mvandenbergh's comment on
[https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7305224](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7305224)

TL;DR Probably not. The only existing vehicle that could autonomously
rendezvous with the Shuttle was Progress and it couldn't make it to the
Columbia's inclination. [2]

[1] I used unmanned flights to the ISS here since anything else is unlikely to
be in production to be re-purposed by NASA. (Also I don't know where to start
looking for an easy list of alternatives).

[2] It might have been possible but it would have required cooperation from
Russia and China and then there's no docking adapter on Columbia's mission so
Progress would have had to keep station while Columbia's crew did an EVA to
get the supplies.

~~~
mikeash
If you were extremely desperate, it seems like it ought to be possible to
basically put this stuff in a fancy box/bag, launch it, and have the Shuttle
do all the maneuvering to rendezvous.

The time it would take to build, prepare, and launch the rocket that would
carry it would, of course, sink the whole idea anyway.

~~~
rtkwe
You'd still need a strong enough structure to hold up to the launch, telemetry
system to track it and a vacuum stage with enough precision to place it in a
phased orbit with the shuttle so Columbia would have a chance to come get it.
But at that point you're eating into the fuel the Columbia needs to maintain
orbit. It's been a while since I read the article (Ars has done a piece on
this before) and I haven't read the report but I don't think there's a number
for how long the orbit could be maintained.

~~~
mikeash
I don't think _Columbia_ needed any significant amount of fuel to maintain
orbit. At these altitudes, orbital decay is a matter of months or years. The
report says that it "would have been placed in a tail-down gravity gradient
attitude that would require very little propellant."

According to the accident report, the time in orbit was limited by breathing
consumables, specifically the lithium hydroxide used to remove CO2, and the
onboard oxygen. Both were probably good for about 30 days.

~~~
rtkwe
Yeah I knew the other human consumables were the main issue that's right there
in the article. I didn't know and didn't want to assume how long the orbit
would last though since it didn't seem to be covered with a specific time.
Also even if it was a small amount how much would be eaten up rendezvousing
with a hypothetical dumb supply bag?

~~~
mikeash
I think the major propellant need is for deorbiting, which would dwarf all
other needs. Attitude control is probably close enough to zero to be
ignorable. The big question is how much would be required to rendezvous, and I
don't have even the slightest idea there. They clearly thought there was
enough to rendezvous with _Atlantis_ , but it's a whole different game when
the other craft is under active control and can also maneuver.

The report says _Columbia_ had 448fps of propellant available. The deorbit
burn was at least 200fps, so that leaves at most 248fps for other uses. The
rendezvous burn plans listed in the report for the hypothetical _Atlantis_
rescue list propellant use of over 300fps which is clearly too much if
rendezvousing with the dumb supply bag is even comparable, let alone worse.

The report does mention this briefly, discussing an Ariane 4 that was almost
ready to go at the time. It says, "The challenge with developing a supply kit,
building an appropriate housing and separation system, and reprogramming the
Ariane seems very difficult in three weeks..." but doesn't mention the
feasibility of rendezvousing with that housing. Whether that's because it can
be done or because it's not even worth looking at that sort of detail I don't
know, but I'd bet on the latter.

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jld89
What about the Russians? Could they have helped?

~~~
hga
See the prior discussion dang linked to, with their stock hardware it's
impossible to get from where they launch to the shuttle's orbit.

~~~
mikeash
For anyone looking for a quick summary, the problem is orbital inclination
(i.e. how tilted the orbit is relative to the equator). Columbia was in a 39
degree inclination, and for reasons related to physics (their launch site is
at a high latitude) and politics (China lies to the east) the Russians can't
launch into inclinations less than 51 degrees. It's possible to change
inclinations after launch, but requires a metric buttload (technical term) of
fuel.

This is all leaving aside the fact that the Russians (or, indeed, anybody)
don't just have rockets sitting around ready to go at a moment's notice.

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ufmace
Read it originally. Seems like the sort of crazy dramatic plan that plays well
in movies and tugs at the part of us that wants to think we did everything we
possibly could to save the crews' lives. But in reality, with such poorly
planned rush efforts, it's appallingly likely to fail catastrophically and
cause even more death.

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wanderfowl
One thing I'm still not clear about is how much the ground crew knew about the
damage. Did they have any idea there was a serious problem? Did the crew know
that the ship was compromised? Was this ever seriously considered? Or is this
all just hindsight?

~~~
gizmo686
From the official investigation [0, page 38]:

    
    
       "Without on-orbit pictures of Columbia, the Debris Assessment Team was restricted to using a mathematical modeling tool called Crater to assess damage, although it had not been designed with this type of impact in mind. Team members concluded over the next six days that some localized heating damage would most likely occur during re-entry, but they could not definitively state that structural damage would result. On January 24, the Debris Assessment Team made a presentation of these results to the Mission Evaluation Room, whose manager gave a verbal summary (with no data) of that presentation to the Mission Management Team the same day. The Mission Management Team declared the debris strike a “turnaround” issue and did not pursue a request for imagery.
    
        Even after the Debris Assessment Teamʼs conclusion had been reported to the Mission Management Team, engineers throughout NASA and Mission Control continued to ex- change e-mails and discuss possible damage. These messages and discussions were generally sent only to people within the sendersʼ area of expertise and level of seniority.
    
       At 2:30 a.m. EST on February 1, 2003, the Entry Flight Control Team began duty in the Mission Control Center. The Flight Control Team was not working any issues or problems related to the planned de-orbit and re-entry of Columbia. In particular, the team indicated no concerns about the debris impact to the left wing during ascent, and treated the re-entry like any other."
    

TLDR. "They" knew that their was a potential problem, but the bureaucracy
didn't.

The decision making process was described in far more detail in the linked
report.

[0]
[http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/CAIB_Vol1.html](http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/CAIB_Vol1.html)

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dang
Discussed at the time:
[https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7305224](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7305224).

