
Schneier on Security: Post-Underwear-Bomber Airport Security - stakent
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/01/airport_securit_12.html
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ilamont
_"It's magical thinking: If we defend against what the terrorists did last
time, we'll somehow defend against what they do one time. Of course this
doesn't work. We take away guns and bombs, so the terrorists use box cutters.
We take away box cutters and corkscrews, and the terrorists hide explosives in
their shoes. We screen shoes, they use liquids. We limit liquids, they sew
PETN into their underwear. We implement full-body scanners, and they're going
to do something else. This is a stupid game; we should stop playing it."_

And do away with the restrictions? As much as I dislike dealing with the TSA,
some of these rules have made it far more difficult for terrorists to bring
down or hijack an airplane. I'm sure I am not the only one who remembers the
bad old days when criminals, mentally ill people, non-suicidal terrorists, and
political extremists would regularly hijack flights here and abroad. I can't
remember the last time it's happened, because now it's nearly impossible for
anyone to bring on weapons or get into the cockpit.

I also disagree with his conclusion that people reacted with "fear" to the
Christmas day attempt. Most of the reaction I saw was relief and anger.

~~~
karzeem
We certainly have to be safe from past attacks, but Schneier's point is that
with the government's strategy, that's _all_ we're safe from. It would be a
lot better to use a strategy that defends against all attacks we know to be
possible, and not just the ones that have already been tried.

~~~
ErrantX
_It would be a lot better to use a strategy that defends against all attacks
we know to be possible, and not just the ones that have already been tried._

I dont think that's what he's saying either.

 _Effective_ security comes way before the departure gate. If that is our main
line of defence no amount of security will foil the inevitable.

I think what he is saying is we should look on these as successes; ok a guy
got onto a plane with explosives. But it was a desperate move, with little
chance of working - and it failed.

Yet actually it succeeded because now the TSA (and others) are running scared
again.

It would take a brave politician to turn round and say that this time the
system worked. The heightened security meant a desperate mechanism was
employed and the "last line of defence" (passengers) were utterly effective.

~~~
karzeem
I phrased my point a little clumsily. What I was trying to say (and what I
think we agree Schneier is saying) is that if you know about a type of attack
and think that it's a type worth defending against, you shouldn't wait for it
to actually happen before you take action.

Abdul Mutallab could have used his butt (or other things, like a prosthesis or
a wheelchair) to stash the parts necessary to assemble a relatively reliable
bomb. That's a known attack type, but we're not defending against it at the
security checkpoints. Now that could be a wise decision based on the fact that
checking for it is hard and, as you said, "effective security comes way before
the departure gate".

But if some future terrorist carries out this quite-plausible attack and the
government _then_ decides that the TSA should start screening for it, it'll
mean they learned nothing from the underwear bomber.

