
Markets are efficient if and only if P = NP - ryoshu
http://arxiv.org/abs/1002.2284
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jmount
The paper linked to is a low quality imitation of the current literature.
Among its flaws it has the common fallacy that if a problem has a large number
of states than inspecting all the states is always hard.

I strongly recommend instead some of the interesting actual work on Nash
Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria:

"Nash equilibria: Complexity, symmetries, and approximation" Contantinos
Daskalakis, Computer Science Review (2009) vol. 3 (2) pp. 87-100

"Computing Correlated Equilibria in Multi-Player Games" Christos H
Papadimitriou, (2009).

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jackfoxy
I felt compelled to download this paper just to see who wrote it.

Phil Maymin <http://philmaymin.com/>

Assistant Professor of Finance and Risk Engineering at the Polytechnic
Institute of New York University Ph.D. in Finance from the University of
Chicago Booth School of Business Hedge fund portfolio manager Policy scholar
for a free market think tank Award-winning journalist Columnist for the
Fairfield County Weekly Columnist for LewRockwell.com Author of Yankee Wake Up
and Free Your Inner Yankee

