
Modern yacht hacking - el_duderino
https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/yachts-vulnerabilities/21576/
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throwawayjava
_> One such option would be a device powered by our Kaspersky OS, which we are
developing for car manufacturers. Thanks to our microkernel operating system,
such protection can control all interactions between the hardware components
inside an information system and prevent any deviations caused by internal
errors or unauthorized access attempts. You can learn more about our operating
system and its capabilities on the Kaspersky OS Web page._

I get that the whole blog post is an advertisement, but infotainment systems
should be _physically isolated_ from control systems.

Furthermore, just using a microkernel doesn't actually provide any guarantees.
It's a sound architecture choice, but that's all.

There are advanced control techniques that prevent replay, sensor spoofing,
and other attacks specifically for control systems. But it doesn't look like
this particular product implements those.

Correctly using a security-oriented microkernel only mitigates certain (really
stupid) classes of attacks. These sorts of application domains deserve
serious, in-house engineering effort aimed at very well understood
risk/attacker models that are specific to the particular control problem.

Control systems need traditional pentesting/security types so that you're not
broadcasting root credentials in plain text (... _jesus_ ). But a hardened
system also needs input from controls/sensing people who understand security
problems associated with particular application domains.

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avs733
>I get that the whole blog post is an advertisement, but infotainment systems
should be physically isolated from control systems.

But that costs money. It also would be a harder boundary to draw than you
might think.

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fyfy18
> It also would be a harder boundary to draw than you might think

As an example my 2010 Toyota has an automatic parking system[0], which
connects the backup camera, infotainment system (for display and input),
steering control and parking sensors.

[0] Which to be honest is basically pointless. It works, but takes a lot
longer to setup and use than just parking yourself.

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avs733
exactly.

or remote start, remote diagnostics, tire pressure monitoring systems,
maintenance reminders, electronically controlled suspensions, many traction
control systems, etc.

Not arguing those features should/need to exist but they are heavily dependent
on UI/control system data exchange.

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contingencies
There are way more vectors than discussed here. In this environment you have
limited drinking water, limited power, limited fuel, limited communications
bandwidth, limited hardware replacements, limited crew skills, limited food,
etc. It seems like DoS against critical resources in this environment could
easily lead to death.

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wkearney99
By the time you get to a vessel large enough to have any of these systems
integrated they'll very likely have means at their disposal to seek immediate
aid. That and systems such as this are often redundant and almost always have
means to be operated manually. So, please, spare us the 'easily lead to death'
fear mongering. That's just plain wrong.

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jdietrich
Two is one and one is none. You'd be utterly foolish to go to sea without
redundant navigation and communication equipment. A hacker might take out your
navigation instruments, but so could a simple short circuit. Saltwater is
brutal on electrical systems, so only a fool operates on the assumption that
their primary nav system is absolutely reliable.

Even on a tiny inshore yacht, you'd want a handheld GPS, a handheld VHF radio
and a stash of AA batteries in case your main electrical system fails. On a
small coastal yacht, that stuff would be in your survival bag next to the
liferaft. A large offshore yacht should have two fully independent nav
stations on completely separate electrical systems. If all that fails, you
should still have an EPIRB and a canister of flares; good bluewater sailors
can happily complete a passage on sextant and compass.

Contingency planning is at the heart of seamanship. If you're placing total
faith in your instruments, then you have bigger problems than the insecurity
of the NMEA protocol.

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secfirstmd
Guess this is well targeted at wealthy oligarchs.

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dang
Url changed from [https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/16/17130602/modern-yacht-
rou...](https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/16/17130602/modern-yacht-routers-root-
access-vulnerable-hackers), which points to this.

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JonasJSchreiber
Anyone else think it's odd that a Moscow based cyber security company which
has been associated with oligarchs is now investigating yacht vulnerabilities?
I mean who investigated the vulnerabilities of yachts??

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excitom
Kaspersky? The people accused of espionage with their anti-virus software?

[http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-42202191](http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-42202191)

[https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/technology/kaspersky-
lab-...](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/technology/kaspersky-lab-israel-
russia-hacking.html)

[https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-11/kaspersky...](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-11/kaspersky-
lab-has-been-working-with-russian-intelligence)

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recherche
While watching my website code, seeing kaspersky is very scary. How the heck
it managed to come inside, at first though it is virus and did long research.

