
The President and the Bomb, Part IV - Fej
http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2020/01/08/president-and-the-bomb-part-iv/
======
lb1lf
<cough> Who's Next (Tom Lehrer)

First we got the bomb and that was good, 'Cause we love peace and motherhood.
Then Russia got the bomb, but that's O.K., 'Cause the balance of power's
maintained that way! Who's next?

France got the bomb, but don't you grieve, 'Cause they're on our side (I
believe). China got the bomb, but have no fears; They can't wipe us out for at
least five years! Who's next?

Then Indonesia claimed that they Were gonna get one any day. South Africa
wants two, that's right: One for the black and one for the white! Who's next?

Egypt's gonna get one, too, Just to use on you know who. So Israel's getting
tense, Wants one in self defense. "The Lord's our shepherd, " says the psalm,
But just in case, we better get a bomb! Who's next?

Luxembourg is next to go And, who knows, maybe Monaco. We'll try to stay
serene and calm When Alabama gets the bomb! Who's next, who's next, who's
next? Who's next?

~~~
dredmorbius
[https://www.invidio.us/watch?v=oRLON3ddZIw](https://www.invidio.us/watch?v=oRLON3ddZIw)

------
Animats
There's something to be said for the USSR's old "Dead Hand" system.[1] This is
often misunderstood. It's not a "doomsday machine". The idea was that the
Premier of the USSR did _not_ have the authority to launch a nuclear first
strike. That authority belonged to the Politburo. (They'd survived Stalin;
they didn't want a dictator again.) So the USSR built a system to enforce that
policy.

The Premier could only activate the "Dead Hand" system, which allowed a launch
only after 1) nuclear explosions had been detected near Moscow, and 2)
communications had been lost with the General Staff bunkers. Even then, all it
did was give the codes and authority to regional commanders to launch. So the
Premier could effectively order a retaliation strike, but not a first strike.

This is tighter control than the US had, or has. Not only does the US
president have launch authority without congressional approval, there was a
period during which SAC had their bombs set to an arming code of all zeros, so
that they could drop them without authority from higher.

[1]
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead_Hand](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead_Hand)

~~~
solveit
> there was a period during which SAC had their bombs set to an arming code of
> all zeros, so that they could drop them without authority from higher.

Did they _know_ that the codes were all zero? I mean, terrible security either
way, but...

~~~
beerandt
Yes, it was on purpose, but it wasn't necessarily all about launch authority.
It was military disagreement with civilian government over how to implement
contradicting policy and law, regarding security, safety, and readiness.

The government (executive + civilian agencies) saw it as an authority
(command/control) issue, but the military saw it as readiness and ability to
always respond to an attack.

In the context of flying bombers around the clock to ensure a first-strike
survival, you don't want to have your counter-strike hindered by a misplaced
code. This was also before the survivable comm systems were fully deployed, so
some autonomy was required to ensure MAD as a deterrent.

Anyway, there was a government mandate for the bombs to be secured with a
code. The military commanders didn't want this, saw it as impeding their
mission, and instead of fighting the rule, they "complied" by implementing the
systems, then loophole-ing it by setting all zeros.

To elaborate some on the military thought process: The previous methods of
arming were more about safety than security (ensuring the bomb wouldn't be
armed during takeoff/ landing, a crash, in the event of a bail-out, etc). One
design was pulling a pin to drain ball bearings, but was mechanical and failed
too often. Also, I believe it usually failed safe (or uncertain), which the
military also saw as a problem.

Before that, the package actually had to be installed (or at least opened and
activated) in flight. Which had it's own problems.

Point being, the military had spent years trying to streamline the arming
process while making it more reliable, and now they had to comply with a rule
that they viewed as unnecessary and in contradiction to their stated mission
of readiness.

There was also a political struggle of bomb custody, as initially the bombs
were to be (and were) in the possession/control of a civilian agency, and only
a fraction in possession of the military at any given time (during peace). So
there was some ongoing tension from that also playing into things.

To borrow from Dan Carlin, there was some logic to the insanity.

The whole history of it is fascinating, and this is only one tiny aspect of
one of many many topics.

------
AmericanChopper
This whole narrative just seems like fear mongering to me. For starters,
there’s no evidence that military personnel would follow even a lawful order
to launch nuclear weapons, especially if there was no evidence of an
existential crisis taking place. The only example I can think of in history is
the Soviet submarine that was given orders to launch nukes, if it was engaged
by the US, during the Cuban middle crisis. Well it was engaged by the US, and
the officers onboard refused to use them. The president doesn’t have a button
that launches nukes, and I can’t see anybody following an order to, in absence
of the US being overrun or hit with a nuke first.

Secondly, I can’t see it ever being a good tactical decision. The highest
yield conventional bombs are on-par with the lowest yield nukes. If you want
to launch a single massively destructive device, there’s already better
options. If you want to target an underground facility, then weapons designed
to target underground facilities are going to do a better job than just
scaling up the yield anyhow. If you’re just looking for a massive effect on
target, then a barrage of smaller weapons is going to do a better jobs of that
anyway, and do so more reliably.

Finally, even if you find the perfect tactical use case, it could never make
sense strategically. Using a nuke of any size will provoke the maximum
response from any potential adversary, regardless of whether they have any
stake in the conflict to begin with, and will deter any hope of support from
our allies. This is plainly obvious to anybody.

All of this is nothing more than an implausible and baseless “what if”.

~~~
vkou
> For starters, there’s no evidence that military personnel would follow even
> a lawful order to launch nuclear weapons, especially if there was no
> evidence of an existential crisis taking place.

The whole point of the military is that you have no idea whether or not the
order you are given is a good, or just idea, and it's not your job to make
that decision. You carry the order out.

People who get into ethical quagmires while holding their finger on the
trigger of an end-of-the-world weapon don't get posted in Minutemen nuclear
bunkers.

Also, the beauty of MAD is that even if 90% of your silos refuse to carry out
the order, 10% will - and then the other side will retaliate, and because most
of your silos did not launch, their retaliatory strike will be far more
destructive.

So if you're the guy who didn't launch the missiles, when given the order,
_you 're_ the bad guy, who let millions of his countrymen die - because your
missiles, which you refused to launch could have destroyed enemy launch sites.
Since _someone_ on your team will launch (Thus starting a war), upon receiving
on order, if you want to minimize casualties on your side, you have to launch
as well.

All in all, it's complete lunacy to give two men the power to end the world.

~~~
AmericanChopper
> The whole point of the military is that you have no idea whether or not the
> order you are given is a good, or just idea, and it's not your job to make
> that decision. You carry the order out.

This simply isn’t true. Silo staff will know if the US is suffering a massive
ground invasion or ICBM bombardment, and will have a very clear idea of
whether launching nukes is reasonable. Even given your maximum implausibility
example of all silos ordered to launch all nukes, to get even one launched a
number of people in the chain of command need to be convinced that risking the
destruction of human civilization is justified, knowing full well that no
order will protect them from war crimes or crimes against humanity charges.
The only post WWII example in history (I’m pretty sure it’s only happened
once) of an order being given to launch a nuke was refused by the officer in
charge. You haven’t added any basis to support this “what if” speculation.

Your scenario also ignores the fact that there are other better (and better
readied) tactical options. There is no scenario where the US will be
tactically dependant on using a nuke to destroy a site, so your “if I don’t
launch the nuke Americans will die” scenario is perhaps the least plausible
part of your comment.

~~~
vkou
> This simply isn’t true. Silo staff will know if the US is suffering a
> massive ground invasion or ICBM bombardment, and will have a very clear idea
> of whether launching nukes is reasonable.

If they are being ordered to carry out a first strike, they have no idea of
whether or not that first strike is reasonable, or not. And it's not their job
to second-guess.

> There is no scenario where the US will be tactically dependant on using a
> nuke to destroy a site, so your “if I don’t launch the nuke Americans will
> die” scenario is perhaps the least plausible part of your comment.

Tactical nuclear strikes aren't launched out of silos. If a silo gets an order
to fire, it's not a tactical launch, it's a strategic 'the world is ending
(Possibly because we decided to end it)' launch order. Most silo operators
will carry that order out.

~~~
AmericanChopper
> If they are being ordered to carry out a first strike, they have no idea of
> whether or not that first strike is reasonable, or not.

A first strike of nuclear ICBMs is never going to be reasonably justified.
Even if we ignore the fact that there is absolutely no basis for speculation
that the POTUS would ever order such a strike, there is no basis to speculate
that silo personnel will comply with an order that is clearly unlawful, a
crime against humanity, a war crime, and risks the complete destruction of
human civilization. Out of all speculative scenarios, this has to be the least
plausible.

~~~
vkou
This is just wishful thinking.

The facts are:

1\. The United States has a first-strike policy, and has invested billions of
dollars in making sure that it can actually carry it out.

2\. It adheres to it on the basis that its command staff believe that there is
some moral calculus under which a first-strike is not genocidal or unlawful.

3\. A first strike is not even abhorrent to average Americans. Around half of
American citizens support a nuclear first strike if it results in saving
American lives.

4\. There are morons that believe that a nuclear war is winnable. Some of
those morons become politicians, while others become generals. As far as I'm
aware, there is no anti-moron filter on either occupation, that keeps those
people away from positions of power.

You may observe that your moral hangups, and the international-court legality
of a first strike has zero bearing on any of those four points. And those four
points are what will drive people to act the way they will act.

Let's recap:

* A first strike is not illegal under American law. It is a heavily studied topic, on which hundreds of thinkers, paid by the Pentagon, have produced thousands of documents that argue about when it can be used, and how it can be best used.

* A first strike is not ever going to be an out-of-the-blue-POTUS-woke-up-on-the-wrong-side-of-the-bed event.

* It is going to be a decision that is made in the middle of a geopolitical crisis, after weeks, or months of threats, escalations, and counter-escalations, and the occasional shot, or shell, or conventional missile being fired. It is going to be a dramatic, but possible decision to make in that context.

* Because it is permitted by law, and because it has been argued for so exhaustively, and because the military has deliberately implemented procedures for carrying it out, the people who will be arguing for it will not have the same moral revulsion that you and I hold against it.

* Those people also happen to be convinced that there is such a thing as a winnable nuclear war.

In this context - when a silo operator receives the order to fire, when they
know that there's a military and political crisis going on, and people are
dying, many of them are going to follow their orders. After, they will have
plenty of time to ponder whether or not the International Crimes Court at the
Hague is going to hold their decision against them.

What we need is a modern "Day After" moment. It's been a generation and a half
since that film. The new crop of armchair generals, politicians, and office
holders, who grew up with no memory of war, need to be reminded of its
horrors.

If a media mogul who owns a national television station is reading, I emplore
you to consider broadcasting that film on the next Fourth of July. Or,
alternatively, after the next State of the Union address.

~~~
AmericanChopper
> The United States has a first-strike policy, and has invested billions of
> dollars in making sure that it can actually carry it out.

This is simply an outright fabrication. The US has a qualified No First Use
policy, stating:

> The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
> non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with
> their nuclear non-proliferation obligations

And

> It is in the U.S. interest and that of all other nations that the nearly
> 65-year record of nuclear non-use be extended forever

The policy specifying when nukes can be used lists:

> significant non-nuclear strategic attacks

> attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or
> warning and attack assessment capabilities

> in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States,
> its allies and partners

And regarding low yield nukes, that their purpose is to:

> help ensure that potential adversaries perceive no possible advantage in
> limited nuclear escalation, making nuclear employment less likely

[https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4365530-2018-Nuclear...](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4365530-2018-Nuclear-
Posture-Review-Final-Report.html)

Your claim that “The United States has a first-strike policy” is so
demonstrably made-up, that you should honestly be ashamed of yourself.

~~~
jeswin
> Your claim that “The United States has a first-strike policy” is so
> demonstrably made-up, that you should honestly be ashamed of yourself.

We should be more civil in contentious matters. The US and almost everyone
(except China) have a qualified First Use Policy.

------
DanielBMarkham
50 years ago, NATO doctrine was the use of tactical nuclear weapons, but only
in response to being overrun. The idea being that a Soviet invasion of Europe
was an existential threat. We either do this or all die.

But these guidelines were documented and well-known.

There's a good case to be made for the use of tactical nuclear weapons at some
extreme case, the nature of that case might vary. But it is very important to
make sure everybody knows what conditions have to be met for this to happen.

We have many more weapons that are much more dangerous than tactical nukes. If
we want to isolate them because of the fear of escalation, that's fine. If we
want to include them in the mix of options that's fine too. But what we can't
do is keep potential adversaries in the dark and then spring them on them.
That's because the problem with nuclear weapons is their unlimited ability to
quickly escalate destruction. That's the much more severe problem to deal with
than what kind of guts make up a particular delivery system.

~~~
nordsieck
> But what we can't do is keep potential adversaries in the dark and then
> spring them on them.

That seems like a very good strategy if you want to use nukes as a deterrent.
I don't think this follows if you are planning on actually using them.

> That's because the problem with nuclear weapons is their unlimited ability
> to quickly escalate destruction.

This is tempered quite a bit by the target's economic ability. South Africa
doesn't have an "unlimited ability to quickly escalate". Neither does Pakistan
or North Korea. Those countries do have nukes, but they are so poor, it's just
not plausible they have many, or particularly high yield ones at that.

Your point does hold for the US, Russia and China, though.

~~~
bracobama
Last time I checked South Africa got rid of their nukes in 1989 and has yet to
deviate from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty it acceded to in 1991. It
also recently ratified the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Do
you know something we don't?

~~~
nordsieck
> Last time I checked South Africa got rid of their nukes in 1989

You probably know better than I do.

I tend to believe that once countries get nukes, they don't tend to give them
up, but I could certainly believe that South Africa doesn't have any anymore.

~~~
TeMPOraL
Fortunately (in this case), knowledge and technology isn't permanent - it
takes a lot of work to maintain. Unless they have secretly trained scientists
and engineers, and maintain secret facilities for most of the supply chain,
they've probably lost the ability to make a nuclear weapon by now.

------
Gunax
> This is why, in my ideal world, I’d like there to be some kind of additional
> checks in place on the use of nuclear weapons.

I am quite curious what he thinks. I just don't see how there is time.

15 minutes. That's the time you get to respond before the nukes hit you and
you potentially lose any ability to strike at all.

~~~
pps43
15 minutes is the US thing. Everyone else is ok with retaliating later. Maybe
weeks later. UK and France rely on submarines. China even stores warheads and
missiles separately.

It's unnecessary and dangerous to try to decide the fate of the world in 15
minutes.

~~~
beerandt
The calculus on this is also changing as fuzes are replaced with variable
upgrades and as targeting systems are updated. Which completely changes how
the nuclear inventory might be allotted in an all out (or really any) attack.
For example:

With higher accuracy from ICBMs, the US ends up needing fewer bombs to hit the
same number of targets. Meaning we might be able to assume that enough silos
(plus subs) would survive a first strike to delay a response decision.

A flip side is that the new fuzes allow lower dial-a-yields, and combined with
more precision, strategic weapons can technically take on a more tactical
role, potentially increasing the justification for their use. (Which might
also play into the whole mid range missle treaty collapse.)

There are obviously many other angles to consider, but the US response window
is likely to at least shift, if not completely change.

------
merpnderp
His primary example of justification of low yield nukes is bunker busting. But
the US already has conventional bunker busting weapons that can either breach
or effectively bury forever any bunker the US would want to bust. Without that
example, his question becomes a whole lot more hypothetical and less important
for modern policy decisions.

~~~
AcerbicZero
The more recent nuclear accidents with power production, such as at Fukushima
highlighted how reactionary (perhaps correctly) a large portion of people are
in regards to radiation/nuclear events. I have serious doubts there are many
plausible situations in which a US president would authorize even an extremely
low yield nuclear strike, considering the domestic and international backlash,
and the optics of it in general.

If you want to be extra cynical about it, it would seem that the military
industrial complex stands to make much more money off of continuous low
intensity conflict, where they can develop advanced conventional weapons, bill
the US government for the R&D, and then sell watered down versions to ~1/4th
of the world. Nuclear weapons are just a little too good at their job, making
them bad for business.

------
thrillgore
I must be the only one here who thinks a ban on all nuclear weapons is the
only option, right?

~~~
landryraccoon
Is something an "option" if it can never be implemented? The incentives for a
nation to have a nuclear arsenal seem extremely high.

------
beamatronic
Realistically we aren’t going to use any of these things, it would be the end
of humanity.

~~~
jacquesm
They've already been used.

------
ezzzzz
in reference to the 'Crazy President' Problem:

>that isn’t how mental illness works (it tends not to flare up in a totally
unexpected way among otherwise “sane” people)

This might not be how Mental Illness works, but it _could_ present itself in
the case of Alzheimer's/dementia. I don't have a study to link to, but plenty
of anecdotes having worked as a caregiver. I've worked with patients in early
stages of dementia that could go from being completely lucid and rational, to
being completely unaware of their surroundings, and back to baseline within
the span of a few minutes.

I'll leave any speculation on Trump's cognitive facilities to somebody else.

~~~
solveit
Do they become mostly useless, or do they act erratically but effectively, as
some sleepwalkers are known to do? For instance, some people are capable of
driving while asleep. I imagine it's not outside the realm of possibility that
a sleepwalking president could operate mechanisms that will start a war.

~~~
ezzzzz
Apparently my comment upset some people, I want to reiterate I was not
insinuating anything about the President's current cognitive state, just
stating it's something to look at. Both Sanders and Biden are tiptoeing on
octogenarian status, making this concern as much of a consideration for them,
or any other future president of an advanced age.

Anyway, to answer your question, I'm just a layperson, so I can't speak to
exactly what is happening 'under the covers' when someone in the early stages
of dementia experiences an acute episode. Trying specifically to recall my
experiences as a caregiver, I'd say there is just a general confusion. They
would seemingly not be aware of things like time (i.e. what year), no idea
where they were or why (my experience was working in homes and in a hospital
as a pca), no idea who I was, no idea who family members were, etc. Asking for
deceased loved-ones was pretty common, they might even try to call them on the
phone. It's all pretty variable. The point is, it's not hard to reason that
having anybody in such a state being in charge of military power is a bad
idea.

------
FpUser
All I see is a slow conditioning of people that using nukes is ok. This is
just insane and all it does is telling to nuke free nations that they were the
ultimate fools when signing NPT. One big fat lie. Guess what may eventually
come out of this.

~~~
bracobama
My prediction is a mass exodus from the NPT by the non-nuclear weapon states
if the 2020 Review Conference goes to hell. Which I think is likely when
considering the disintegrating state of modern nuclear arms control agreements
and the nuclear modernization programmes being conducted by practically all
nuclear powers in contravention of NPT Article VI.

------
cerealbad
in a multipolar world you might see precise attacks during periods of tension
targeting military facilities - base trade conflict. this minimizes loss of
life and it creates a real sellers market for turnkey anti-missile solutions.
the regional hegemon (china, russia, usa) can build their anti-antimissile
hypersonic weapons to keep their edge while smaller countries in those regions
develop accurate missile guidance and missile defence. this is a type of
lukewarm war which is good for everyone, doesn't disrupt trade and can be used
to justify military spending in a time of relative peace. after all the point
of war is to win your opponents resources, nuclear weapons make nuclear war
pointless. small tactical nukes might still be useful to have as a final
deterrent against all out ground invasion, but the superpowers are unlikely to
allow any new nuclear development.

