
Flight 1080 (1978) [pdf] - ColinWright
https://www.tristar500.net/library/flight1080.pdf
======
AliAdams
For those wondering what this is about before jumping into the PDF. It is an
article from the captain's perspective of a flight in 1977, where a Lockheed
L-1011's left elevator jammed (corrosion) during take-off forcing the plane to
pitch up.

The captain, Capt. Jack McMahan, was awarded the FAA's Distinguished Service
Award for successfully landing the plane by using a thrust differential
between the wing engines and tail engine to counteract the upward pitch,
preventing a stall.

The (short) Wikipedia article can be found here:
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delta_Air_Lines_Flight_1080](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delta_Air_Lines_Flight_1080)

------
ColinWright
Video:
[https://invidio.us/watch?v=x0cnGeYEGmk](https://invidio.us/watch?v=x0cnGeYEGmk)

------
Tomte
I think this is the incident that Captain VanderBurgh describes somewhere in
[https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21535214](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21535214)

~~~
Tomte
I was wrong. Take a look at "Control Malfunctions & Flight Instrument
Anomalies":
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WfNBmZy1Yuc&feature=youtu.be...](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WfNBmZy1Yuc&feature=youtu.be&t=33m53s)

[edited]

~~~
Tomte
"You see, right here, few of us, certainly not I, are clever enough, 'cause
there isn't time to be clever. A critical flight attitude recovery requires
training and rote response, 'cause there isn't time to think. You must respond
to the training. And it's that response to their training, that initial move
that saves the initial crisis, that buys the time to do all the clever things
that we all think of, given time."

------
dredmorbius
_Spoilers for those who 've not yet read/viewed._

I'd run across this incident yesterday. Studying various technical disasters
is something of a hobby/professional interest, and in particular, the
responses of the humans involved.

I first watched the video @ColinWright lists in a comment
([https://invidio.us/watch?v=x0cnGeYEGmk](https://invidio.us/watch?v=x0cnGeYEGmk)),
then read McMahan's own account (the PDF here). The _Washington Post_ ) also
has an excelent article
([https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1978/10/08/t...](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1978/10/08/the-
saving-of-flight-1080/bc18f021-691d-4b19-8041-dc03a089bf6d/)). Wikipedia has a
brief article
([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delta_Air_Lines_Flight_1080](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delta_Air_Lines_Flight_1080)).

My first thouht on seeing the pilot's bio at the start of the video was "man,
what a way to end that career". Reading about nose-up on takeoff and the
failures of trim-control attempts brought to mind the 737 MAX story of the
past year.

One concept I've been working on is the notion of a hierarchy of failure (or
conversely, a success-chain) in problem solving:
[https://old.reddit.com/r/dredmorbius/comments/2fsr0g/hierarc...](https://old.reddit.com/r/dredmorbius/comments/2fsr0g/hierarchy_of_failures_in_problem_resolution/)

Two elements of that I've been revisiting is the diagnosis / root-cause steps.
I'm thinking now that a minimal working diagnosis/root are helpful in crisis,
but that rabbitholing into a precise diagnosis _when the immediate situation
is critical_ can be a dangerous distraction. If you're flying an aircraft with
souls aboard (or even just yourself and cargo), a sufficient grasp to regain
minimal control and effect a safe landing is _usually_ enough. And the
situation can evolve quite rapidly.... It's a tricky balance to strike.

As the video account continued, I was struck by each of McMahan's responses,
and how each was clearly prudent, effective, and/or demonstrated exceptionally
high situational awareness. The counterintuitive down-throttling during a
pitch-up / stall situation. Throttle control over pitch and roll (a case where
a three-engine design proves particularly useful), and moving the passengers
forward (a thought I'd had before it was mentioned in the video). The choice
of landing sites (and the surprising lack of alternatives in California --
things are really spread out -- though Bakersfield might have been one to
consider). Electing for a water rather than land approach to LAX.

The only possible fault I could find was in not testing gear-down performance
before final. In another, later incident, NWA 85, October 9, 2002, also with
partial loss of control, the crew elected to drop gear early in order to
assess aircraft performance. That flight also landed successfully.
([https://invidio.us/watch?v=RcAiu2FXeEk](https://invidio.us/watch?v=RcAiu2FXeEk))

UA232 also comes to mind as an impossible situation saved by excellent
piloting, situational awareness, and crew resource management.

There are any number of sharp contrasts with exceedingly poor pilot/crew
response. Two that stand out are Saudi Air Flight 163, with a fire on board.
Despite a successful landing, all perished.
([https://invidio.us/watch?v=mYX5pBihw3c](https://invidio.us/watch?v=mYX5pBihw3c)).
Or Air Florida Flight 90, which crashed into the Patomac, following a series
of poor pilot judgements regarding anti-icing practices
([https://invidio.us/watch?v=gUOMZnFaMos](https://invidio.us/watch?v=gUOMZnFaMos)).
Air France Flight 447 or the Tenerife incident (latter mentioned in McMahan's
account) are other exemplars of poor response, situational awareness, or
flagrant violations of procedure.

Good piloting is not always enough -- sometimes an aircraft is simply too
crippled to fly, see Alaska Air 261. But in that grey zone between a well-
behaving ship and one that won't stay in the sky no matter what, pilot skills
matter. And McMahan was absolutely the hero of this story, with excellent
assists from his cockpit crew. Speaking of which, it's notable that this short
flight had a regular cockpit roster of three -- captain, copilot, and
engineer.

The flight attendant response at the end caps the story. The WashPo article
proves that not everyone is appreciative.

And, finally: the after-incident root cause analysis shows just how critical
the smallest elements in a tightly-constrained system can be. Water intrusion
into a bearing disabling control surfaces and leading to near complete loss of
aircraft. The specifics of the fault making it extraordinarily hard to
anticipate in advance, though I suspect that's now part of some design spec
somewhere.

In all an excellent case study.

~~~
xamuel
>Studying various technical disasters is something of a hobby/professional
interest

What would be some recommended reading in this area? Not limited to airplanes

------
yutyut
To armchair-quarterback a decades-old incident: I think it was definitely the
wrong choice to continue to LAX knowing that field (and the entire coastal
region) was IFR. They were essentially controlling the aircraft pitch (and
airspeed/altitude) solely with thrust and configuration changes.

It's a miracle (and it speaks to the superb piloting abilities of the
Captain/crew) that they were able to maintain a prescribed glideslope while in
IMC.

Having flown in the area for several years, I know that the marine layer never
(almost) extends east of the 'Peninsular Ranges' of San Diego / South OC.
There are a number of clear-air diverts to the East (March/Ontario _Maybe_ ,
NAF El Centro, probably best) that certainly would have been a better
decision(1), given the nature of their emergency.

Had the crew 'balled it up' on final approach due to vertigo or loss of SA in
the clouds, I think it's likely that the mishap board would have found pilot
error--due to poor selection of a landing site--as the final 'causal
factor'(2) in the so-called Swiss cheese model that leads to a mishap.

Note 1: The pilot's concern with runway lighting is valid but I think a ten-
minute breather above the clouds to coordinate with those fields would have
answered the question on whether a tower was staffed. Pilot controlled
lighting is also an option.

Note 2: And they would have balled up a large aircraft in one of the most
densely populated areas in the U.S.

~~~
dredmorbius
The question of landing choice highlights a number of concerns, all well-
addressed especially in McMahan's account.

The region is California. Considered landing locations were San Diego (a
notoriously short and crowded field with a difficult, over-city approach),
Palmdale and Edwards AFB, both closed, Las Vegas and Phoenix, both requiring
high-altitude flight over mountains with potential turbulence, and LAX, with a
long runway and over-water approach.

I was surprised other inland fields, say, Bakersfield, weren't mentioned,
though I'm also not a pilot and don't know the runway lengths or airfield
situation generally.

The thing about a disaster is that you're operating under greatly increased
constraints, and limited options. The question to be addressed is "what is the
next best option?".

Given the circumstances of this incident, instrument approach to LAX still
seems like a reasonable option. The principle fault lay in controls, not
instruments, time-in-air was a risk, avoiding overland travel, and preserving
the option of a sea ditching, were both prudent considerations.

It's possible that McMahan could have inquired as to viability of a Palmdale
or Edwards landing with ATC, and it appears he didn't. Given his and crew's
workload, that's understandable.

~~~
yutyut
All good points. I suppose my bias is skewed by having a good amount of
instrument time and realizing how much higher a workload can get during an
instrument approach. I’ll run it by some colleagues at work and see what their
take is on it.

~~~
pc86
Something tells me the mainline Captain from the post also has "a good amount
of instrument time."

~~~
yutyut
Certainly, but the average HN user most definitely doesn’t.

