
FSF recommendations for free OS distributions considering Secure Boot - ibotty
https://www.fsf.org/campaigns/secure-boot-vs-restricted-boot/whitepaper-web
======
tzs
> Their stated concern is that someone might ship an Ubuntu Certified machine
> with Restricted Boot (where the user cannot disable it). In order to comply
> with GPLv3, Ubuntu thinks it would then have to divulge its private key so
> that users could sign and install modified software on the restricted
> system.

> This fear is unfounded and based on a misunderstanding of GPLv3. We have not
> been able to come up with any scenario where Ubuntu would be forced to
> divulge a private signing key because a third-party computer manufacturer or
> distributor shipped Ubuntu on a Restricted Boot machine.

That's because like pretty much everyone who is not the FSF, Ubuntu has not
actually carefully read the part of GPLv3 that deals with software that
requires signing in order to install. Almost everyone just seems to skim
through that section, sees something about having to provide keys, and then
moves on. They don't read the definitions that define the terminology used in
that section, and so have no clue whatsoever about what they have just read
means.

I can kind of excuse it when it is just random end users or individual
software developers who don't understand the license they are using...but one
of the leading Linux companies!?

Another place you see this problem is in discussion of the incompatibility
between Apple's App Store and GPLv3. There are people who still think the
signing requirements have something to do with it. They do not. The problem is
Apple's terms and conditions, which Apple requires end users to agree to
before being allowed to use the store, count as additional terms under GPL
(both v2 and v3) that are incompatible with GPL. The GPLv3 restrictions on
distributing signed code without the signing keys would only apply to GPLv3
code that Apple ships bundled with iOS devices.

~~~
rlpb
> That's because like pretty much everyone who is not the FSF, Ubuntu has not
> actually carefully read the part of GPLv3 that deals with software that
> requires signing in order to install [...] I can kind of excuse it when it
> is just random end users or individual software developers who don't
> understand the license they are using...but one of the leading Linux
> companies!?

Please give them more credit. Apparently, they have even discussed it with the
FSF. From [https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-
devel/2012-June/035...](https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-
devel/2012-June/035448.html):

Edit: failing to quote this sensibly.

In response to: "Have you talked to the FSF about their position on this?
They're the sole copyright holder of grub 2, so any position they'd publicly
take would be pretty relevant in terms of potential legal action."

The reply: "I haven't been privy to all the mails on this, but in the ones I
saw, the responses were distinctly equivocal at best. They certainly didn't
say that we were safe, rather the reverse."

------
rdl
I would prefer not to be "protected by a GPL licensed bootloader" from having
a machine actually boot successfully under default conditions.

Pretty much ok with Fedora and Ubuntu making the best of a somewhat bad
situation. I wish they'd just fix the standard to allow multiple signatures on
code and extensions, though. With that, Secure Boot would be basically all
positive.

~~~
icebraining
_I would prefer not to be "protected by a GPL licensed bootloader" from having
a machine actually boot successfully under default conditions._

But Fedora's solution achieves both, so there's no need to leave GRUB2 for
UEFI.

------
jtsagata
Do we really need UEFI? I believe that there is simpler ways to achieve this.
For example:

a. User turn ON a switch to enter "OS Install mode"

b. User install the OS of his choice. During installation the installer read a
motherboard specific key from the BIOS and sign his bootloader/kernel/drivers
using that key.

c. User turn OFF the "OS installation switch". System is save (at least as
long as the OS in choice is not a Redmnond one)

Is there any fundamental problems with this approach?

~~~
wtracy
It seems that UEFI is supposed to protect against malicious actors who have
physical access to your machine.

Of course, you're also assuming that securing the end-user is the _actual_
goal of UEFI. ;-) I can see legitimate situations where a corporation would
want to ensure that their employees aren't tampering with their hardware.

Of course, I think it's fairly obvious by now that one of the main reasons
that MS is pushing UEFI at this point is to prevent Android from being
installed on "Windows" hardware.

~~~
jtsagata
If someone have physical access to my machine he/she can install keys if the
BIOS supports that anyway. And even if it doesn't i have many more things to
worry anyway. UEFI don't protect me from stealing the machine or the HD data
or installing mallicius software.

Of course, i totally agree with you on that the reall reasons is for MS and
hardware manufactures is trying to control MY hardware.

------
cs702
One possible solution to this problem is for the FSF itself -- or perhaps
another non-profit organization with similar goals but a more flexible stance
-- to get in the business of issuing Secure-Boot keys, backed by a public
written policy of non-discriminatory key issuance. Such an organization could
work with non-mainstream operating systems to get hardware vendors to adopt
its keys. For example, Ubuntu and Red Hat could use keys issued by it.

All non-mainstream operating system projects would be able to request keys
from this organization and boot without having to resort to tinkering in UEFI
hardware from multiple vendors.

One can dream.

~~~
sounds
Just assuming that the current UEFI working group agreed to this, the first
problem arises when one of the key holders is compromised.

As a possible scenario: what if the Windows 8 private signing key leaked
because it was used in Terminal Server somehow - do you want the FSF revoking
the Microsoft signing key, thus invalidating UEFI signed drivers (necessary
for boot) from hundreds of OEM's?

We can shortcut all this by supporting www.coreboot.org

~~~
cs702
sounds: coreboot.org is a worthwhile cause but unfortunately, for better or
worse, whether we like it or not, most hardware vendors have decided to adopt
UEFI.

~~~
rbanffy
I wonder how many shady deals were involved in convincing vendors of UEFI's
superiority.

~~~
wmf
Shady deals aren't needed. Intel can just make UEFI cheaper than BIOS by
providing sample code for one and not for the other. Coreboot was never even
on the OEMs' radar.

------
tapoxi
I have a CR-48 and it already solves this problem. Joe User get a secure,
verified boot path by default. If you want to bypass this and use your another
operating system, load your own keys, or generally prove that you know what
you're doing, you:

1\. Flip the machine over. 2\. Remove battery. 3\. Flip the "developer's mode"
switch.

~~~
cooldeal
How is that much different from flipping this switch in the bios settings?

[http://www.windowsfordevices.com/images/stories/samsung_secu...](http://www.windowsfordevices.com/images/stories/samsung_secureboot.jpg)

Also, anyone having physical access to your Chromebook can flip that switch
and compromise your machine. While you can set a bios setup password to guard
against someone flipping the secure boot switch.

~~~
stcredzero
_> Also, anyone having physical access to your Chromebook can flip that switch
and compromise your machine._

Gain physical access to _Any_ machine, and all security bets are off.

 _> While you can set a bios setup password to guard against someone flipping
the secure boot switch._

Actually, that's a good point. But what if the attackers has physical access
and simply reflashes the BIOS?

~~~
cooldeal
>Gain physical access to Any machine, and all security bets are off.

That's not guaranteed. For example, see Droid Milestone's locked bootloader
and XBox 360 (recently broken with a cpu bug).

>But what if the attackers has physical access and simply reflashes the BIOS?

Security is all about raising the bar, reflashing takes a lot more time and
effort than flipping a hardware switch and inserting a USB key.

Also, a physical switch is harder to implement in a consistent manner for low
margin OEMs(who all buy the firmware from the same source), thus a software
setting is better. For example, including such a switch on a tablet like the
Microsoft Surface Pro will increase the costs and restrict design.

~~~
stcredzero
_> That's not guaranteed. For example, see Droid Milestone's locked bootloader
and XBox 360 (recently broken with a cpu bug)._

I was originally going to say, "Well, that's a different matter entirely."

It's not really, though. It's taking longer and longer for people to hack
"secured" hardware.

The lesson of the PS3 still stands, though. If you let the hacker community
install what they want, then they may not even bother to hack your hardware,
unless you piss them off. The economics of hacking and security works like the
economics of guerrilla warfare. You don't set up a highly visible and
attractive high value target for an enemy that greatly outnumbers you. Doing
that is just stupidity.

Guerrilla warfare is just as much about knowing what to cede as it is knowing
what to attack.

------
giZm0
Is secure boot really gone stop any malware? It will surly make it harder for
anyone else to use a different OS. I mean malware is really a huge problem but
isn't the majority of it, not related to bootloader.

~~~
cooldeal
>It will surly make it harder for anyone else to use a different OS.

Is it really that hard to go into the bios settings to change a setting?
Already most people who want to boot a different OS have to do that to change
the boot order to boot from DVD first.

[http://www.windowsfordevices.com/images/stories/samsung_secu...](http://www.windowsfordevices.com/images/stories/samsung_secureboot.jpg)

~~~
lunarscape
Except MS specified that's not allowed on certified ARM devices.

------
stcredzero
For security purposes, wouldn't it be enough for the mechanism to simply
display a change in the signing status, and not restrict boot? This would
allow for the detection of malware without restricting how people use their
hardware.

Displaying or dismissing such a notification needs to be built into the
hardware in such a way that the OS wouldn't be able to interfere. There should
also be a read-only channel for applications running on the OS to access the
signing status to enable security programs.

~~~
MichaelGG
It's pretty well agreed that notifying the user and allowing them to dismiss
the notification is a useless security model.

~~~
stcredzero
Which is why you also have the ability for security programs to access the
same information.

------
sseveran
If this is such a huge deal and users don't like it then there should be a
market for machines that are not Windows Logo certified and run Linux. Given
that there does not seem to be such a large market maybe those people that
want to install linux on their desktop would be willing to pay more for the
opportunity to do so.

Sandboxing has become increasingly popular and Microsoft is really the last
one to the party. Most users (myself included) are happy with sandboxing.
Apple has implemented this with great effect across its ecosystem.

All the actors are private organizations. No one is forcing anyone to buy a
computer that enforces any of these restrictions. The FSF should try to
understand why if this is such an important issue there does not seem to be a
large market for Linux desktops. If there is a private actor can step in and
provide the machines. If not, then you can always build your own.

One thing that will be interesting to see is if GPLv3 software slowly withers
given that many embedded device makers will be unable to use it. I guess
another cause may be Apple's continued rise as a platform of choice for both
tablets and desktops/laptops.

~~~
wmf
_maybe those people that want to install linux on their desktop would be
willing to pay more for the opportunity to do so._

But they're not. Desktop Linux can't win in the market, so they're trying to
change the rules by whining.

------
CJefferson
_sigh_

While the FSF seems happy with the root Fedora is taken, it is interesting
that every suggestion they make will make user's life harder.

I realise that they want to make software more free, and that this is broadly
all Microsoft's fault, but I'll be honest as the years go by, I just get...
tired. I just want to be able to install Linux as easily as Windows, and have
it just work. I don't want to have to install extra keys.

~~~
ben0x539
That's kinda backwards. It's not the FSF that is pushing Secure Boot to begin
with, but it _is_ the FSF that is pushing for everybody to be able to install
their Linux as easily as Windows and not only Fedora or Ubuntu users.

------
AmazingBytecode
Wait, users can install new keys on their machines? What's the issue then?

~~~
gpvos
Please read more thoroughly.

1) If the user can, but is scared away by a disingenuous message saying "Do
you want to make your computer less secure by installing a non-Microsoft key
(y/n)?", that would still be bad.

2) They can't on ARM-based machines that have a Windows certification.

~~~
recoiledsnake
>They can't on ARM-based machines that have a Windows certification.

You cannot install an alternative OS on an iPad either which comes with a
locked bootloader. Why is this such a big deal on Windows RT tablets only?

~~~
jtsagata
I don't own or plan to own an iPad. So the locking of the iPad is not
affecting me directly. It is sad and silly imho that people is buying locked
machines, but that's their right to do.

Now ARM boot restrictions from Microsoft directly affects me, as soon i can't
buy any ARM based machine, given the way the markets work. And in the future
it is a big possibility that i can't buy any other PC and put any OS that i
like without pay directly or indirectly money to Microsoft. And i can see some
foreign governments to use this technology to control the OS that her citizens
runs, and install backdoors.

So yes UEFI secure boot is a treat to my freedom and not only my freedom to
run the OS of my choice.

~~~
recoiledsnake
>I don't own or plan to own an iPad.

Why not? Why do you plan to purchase a Windows RT tablet then?

>Now ARM boot restrictions from Microsoft directly affects me, as soon i can't
buy any ARM based machine, given the way the markets work.

So you think Windows RT tablets will be such a success that you won't be able
to buy any Android tablets at all?

------
earl
It's amazing. I read the first 3 paragraphs and the eff can't even acknowledge
how much of a problem malware is for many computer users.

For the thousandth time: I know a computer user who almost had a $300k sum
stolen because his laptop was owned. He has had to resort to having a second
laptop used exclusively for accessing his business bank accounts in order to
feel some security. He's not dumb: he makes more money than virtually anybody
reading this and has an undergrad in math.

The computer security model for most users is incredibly broken. The alternate
to secure boot is something like an ios app store for all apps. Users simply
want to be able to run their computers without having to be constantly
paranoid about spyware and malware. Microsoft is at least trying to do this,
but the eff pretty much dismisses these very real concerns.

edit: for the record, I spelled fsf as eff before having my first cup of
coffee.

~~~
keithpeter
"I know a computer user who almost had a $300k sum stolen because his laptop
was owned."

Was this unfortunate gentleman's laptop subject to unauthorised access by
means of a compromised bootloader/bios? I have heard of very few exploits of
that nature (but I'm not involved in supporting large numbers of machines).

~~~
einhverfr
I am no fan of what Microsoft is doing here, but it is an emerging threat
profile and consequently some sort of boot loader signing makes sense. The
exact design of course should be such that it is possible for users to update
keys, however, because otherwise, once a key is compromised the whole system
falls apart.

------
recoiledsnake
>We will fight Microsoft's attempt at enforcing Restricted Boot on ARM devices
like smartphones and tablets. Like any other computer, users must be able to
install free software operating systems on these devices.

Again, a multi-thousand word essay on the topic of secure boot and lambasting
Microsoft about the locked bootloader in the ARM tablets(which many of the
same people think are going to crash and burn anyway).

Meanwhile, like in the RedHat and Mozilla blog posts about secure boot, not a
peep about Apple or the iPad's locked bootloader which runs about 80% of ARM
tablets.

Is this because Apple makes their own hardware so the FSF does not care? Or is
it just their PR strategy that attacking MS is preferable due to media and
people's favorable perception of Apple?

~~~
tmzt
I see your point, the simple fact is dual-booting Linux-based operating
systems on hardware intended for use with Microsoft Windows is the norm, and
without this source of computer systems a free license is nearly a moot point.

If ARM becomes dominant the idea that Microsoft can simply restrict access
because that's how it was done in the past (even citing Apple as an example)
simply means they can restrict a majority of all hardware sold from running a
different system, extending their monopoly control through partnership
agreements to a new generation of hardware.

Generally, PC compatibles boot an OS from a sector on the hard drive and
provide a standard interface to the bootloader to hardware (BIOS, PCI
enumeration, and now UEFI). While ARM is now beginning to adopt a similar boot
system (in UEFI on RT devices) it's not carrying with it the openness we once
enjoyed with PCs. This is the problem.

~~~
recoiledsnake
>If ARM becomes dominant the idea that Microsoft can simply restrict access
because that's how it was done in the past (even citing Apple as an example)
simply means they can restrict a majority of all hardware sold from running a
different system, extending their monopoly control through partnership
agreements to a new generation of hardware.

If iPads take over computing and desktops(along with Microsoft) die, won't the
same scenario play out? Also, if ARM becomes dominant, won't a secton of the
ARM devices be iPads and Android tablets? Why do you think Windows RT tablets
will be the majority?

>While ARM is now beginning to adopt a similar boot system (in UEFI on RT
devices) it's not carrying with it the openness we once enjoyed with PCs. This
is the problem.

As an aside, ARM is different in the sense that each ARM SoC needs special
drivers and coding.

