
Are Submarines About to Become Obsolete? - Sami_Lehtinen
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/are-submarines-about-become-obsolete-12253
======
exabrial
Here's the thing about submarines you may not realize: they are the trump card
when it comes to nuclear warfare and keeping MAD in place. If one country
"struck first" and tried to wipe out our nuclear silos, nuclear armed subs
would retaliate. Given the surface are of the world covered by water, there
are quite a few hiding places too.

What happens to MAD after we have a reliable way to detect subs? :/ Don't
really know.

~~~
hga
They aren't the sole trump card, that role is also played by manned bombers
that can launch on warning from the middle of the without committing to bomb
that targets, without even having the ability to arm their warheads
([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permissive_Action_Link](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permissive_Action_Link)
); SLBMs are trump cards against undetectable attacks, or at least ones that
can be detected in time, see for example
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fractional_Orbital_Bombardment...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fractional_Orbital_Bombardment_System)

You'd also have to be _very_ confident in your ability to carry out a first
strike. Ah, and there's a quick fix, a limited ABM deployment (we've got them
and are pretty confident they work). Since you can't pick which warheads get
taken out by the ABM systems, the difficultly becomes _massively_ greater.

Note also that historically only the US believed in MAD, the Soviets correctly
thought it was unmitigated evil. Then again, they had to accept it....

~~~
pm90
Yep. MIRV's also make it incredibly hard for any kind of "Missile Defense".

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiple_independently_targeta...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiple_independently_targetable_reentry_vehicle)

~~~
hga
I didn't clearly state my case.

A first strike requires reliably hitting a bunch of targets, often on a
schedule. If your intended target has a possibility of randomly (from your
viewpoint) taking out some fraction of these incoming warheads, how much more
complicated does that make your plan?

If you're talking about protecting a target (nation) from an attack, then
"Missile Defense" shouldn't even be your first line of defense. Civil Defense
is to protect the people's lives, anti-missile defenses to protect their
possessions and those who don't make it to a shelter in time.

~~~
cocoablazing
No ABM system has demonstrated success against either MIRVs or deployed
PENAIDS (much less 53T6), but more to the point BM's of any sort are not a
first strike weapon (given US and RF radar nets, 24/7 US launch detection
capability, and part-of-the-day RF launch detection capability).

If the US has a first strike weapon, it's a fleet of nuclear-capable stealth
bombers employing GPS-guided laydown-capable munitions, coupled with a pretty
nasty set of eyes in the sky to find mobile launchers. F-35 is also stealth
and MAY get a B61 interface to replace NATO Tornados and F-16s, etc.

------
mabbo
I forget where I heard it, but in a discussion about stealth fighters and
stealth capabilities, the conclusion of one person was that it was a game of
material scientists vs computer scientists, and that in the end, computer
scientists seem to be able to outpace material scientists.

~~~
mightybyte
Yeah, I saw a slightly different take saying that in the battle between
stealth and detection, physics gives the advantage to the detection side. I
have no idea what the justification was or even if it's remotely true, but it
seemed like a plausible idea.

~~~
ethbro
_> Yeah, I saw a slightly different take saying that in the battle between
stealth and detection, physics gives the advantage to the detection side._

You could boil this down to saying that moving things fast and stealth are
fundamental tradeoffs.

The energy for the former has to come from somewhere, and at anything less
than ideal conversion there are only so many places to hide the waste without
compromising the latter.

------
rbc
Obsolete sounds a little strong. The denied areas for submarine operations
will get larger, but the ocean is really big. Running the fixed and mobile
sensor arrays to detect submarines is not cheap.

Regardless of the foreseeable improvements in submarine detection, they'll
still be harder to find than surface ships.

~~~
fnordfnordfnord
Right, but if they have to launch from the middle of the ocean, their
advantage over ICBM's becomes much smaller, maybe none if they can't strike &
destroy hostile C&C and launch sites. It is already a very small window of
time that boomers are most useful for in a hot war. SLBM's utility in
peacetime/pre-war is contingent upon people not knowing where they are.

OTOH, relying on ICMB's is contingent on enough people at SAC being sober,
which may not be a safe bet.

~~~
dimitar
Nuclear ballistic missile-armed submarines are considered second strike
weapons, even though there are first strike scenarios for their use.

Their missiles don't have the range to hit launch sites that are far inland in
North America or Eurasia. Even if they did the missiles would be vulnerable to
anti defence. Additionally they are slow moving, which is very undesirable in
first strikes.

However they can get really close to major population centers near the oceans
and kill millions. Thus second-strike forces are supposed to act as
deterrence. Area denial can make them much less effective if combined with
proper air defence to take down the missiles.

~~~
cocoablazing
What is your reference for this range assertion? OS intelligence says that US
SLBM's can strike any target in Eurasia from either ocean. What is your
reference for the assertion that Trident is vulnerable to ABM? RF has no
operational ABM system capable of striking RB's entering at 8 km/s. Why do
submarines have to move quickly to enable a first strike? Can't they just
stealthily move into the exact position necessary days prior to launch? You
should review what public data is available on Trident testing, because it
contradicts every one of your assertions. The Trident equipment section has
been observed conducting 14 distinct warhead release maneuvers in space. The
largest warhead Trident can carry is estimated to have a 500kt yield. Trident
is estimated to carry a max loadout to >7e3 km, and a reduced (treaty) loadout
to >11e3km. It is also estimated to exhibit the precision necessary to
guarantee kills against the latest Russian silos (envelop the silo structure
within the earthen blast cavity). This means that the Trident fleet can strike
and neutralize every counter-force target in Eurasia from defended waters.
There is no "proper air defence to take down the missiles" in existence, and
there is no indication that current ABM programs have any hope of defeating a
MIRV'd fleet of solid fuel launchers.

------
Someone1234
I'd suggest reading this article in full. I almost stopped when I read "big
data" but it was a worthwhile article with some interesting thoughts on one
potential future.

I agree that UUVs could play a big part in underwater warfare/intelligence
gathering 10-20 years from now.

~~~
tjradcliffe
The model of "subs as aircraft carriers" for UUVs seems less likely, though.
UUVs are arguably better deployed like satellites than aircraft. This is the
way underwater mines are deployed today: seed an area well in advance of
hostilities with mines that dig themselves into the bottom, and activate them
remotely at need.

If you posit that submarines are going to be highly detectable (which is
reasonable, and has been a risk since the '80's, when thermal signature
tracking looked like it might become viable) then there's no particularly
compelling reason why you would deploy UUVs from subs rather than from planes
or surface ships.

~~~
ethbro
I believe the "subs as aircraft carriers" idea came from the fact that you
generally want to interact with a target location on land. Nation states don't
tend to have too many strategic targets underwater off their coasts.

Options for interacting with a target land location (dates extremely rough, in
rough historical order): \- Subsonic aircraft: outpaced by projectile-based
anti-aircraft since ~1935 \- Supersonic aircraft: outpaced and obsoleted by
missile and satellite technology since ~1970 \- Satellite: excellent for
reconnaissance and elint, limited interactive capabilities due to treaty
obligations \- Subsonic cruise missiles (aka light missiles): limited range
(relative to coastal approach), limited survivability against active anti-
aircraft defenses \- ICBM (aka heavy missiles): expensive, high risk of
escalation due to detection, risk of nuclear payload, and ability to apply
last minute target corrections \- Carrier launched aircraft: limited range,
limited survivability against active anti-aircraft defenses \- Supersonic
cruise missiles: limited range, limited survivability against active anti-
aircraft defenses \- Drones: limited range, limited survivability against
active anti-aircraft defenses

You ideally want an aerial platform (freedom of movement, ability to interact
with land targets), survivable in a hostile environment, as cheaply as
possible.

This _was_ solved by a carrier air wing.

However, the idea of A2/AD is to push the survivability line out far enough
that the carrier can no longer approach close enough to let its air wing
operate efficiently.

The obvious go to is to take a platform that can penetrate that A2/AD coverage
to a greater depth with acceptable survivability. (It's a lot easier to hide a
submarine than an aircraft carrier / it's a lot more expensive to build a
submarine detection net across large ocean regions)

Then have that platform launch the equivalent of an air wing.

E.g. stealth submarines serving as carriers for limited-range (because that
buys you design to make them stealthier / more survivable / faster) aerial
drones

~~~
cocoablazing
Your ICBM trade-off regarding corrections is outdated. Disarmament community
has reported USN test administrators as stating latest W76-1/Mk4A LEP has
introduced real-time GPS corrections throughout re-entry and terminal phase. A
similar effort is underway to upgrade USAF RB's. Hypersonic aerodynamics and
control research is going to pay dividends at some point, and apply to both
hypersonic in-atmospheric and sub-orbital weapon control.

The "risk of nuclear payload" is only a severe problem if overflight is
necessary. The RF would be able to assess that a non-overflying SLBM was not
targeting RF territory as soon as it traveled through the radar nets.
Obviously this is still probably a stupid weapon to use in a conventional
context.

------
bubbleHead
This guy's premise is that submarines are going to lose their stealthy
advantage. He is not qualified to say that, and the technology he mentions
could become a threat to subs has been talked about for 20+ years. There is
not much danger that these new technologies will be able to detect a sub in
our lifetime.

I acknowledge that technology will require subs to become even more quiet, but
new propulsion systems are now on the boats instead of propellers. They are
quieter than ever and no one could detect us before.

Subs have already become “carriers” of SEALS and rockets. So that mission can
only be expanded.

Not much new in the article.

Edit: Source: US Navy submarine nuclear reactor officer, 20+ years

~~~
fnordfnordfnord
>He is not qualified to say that,

What about Bryan Clark? Is he?
[http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/submarines/20...](http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/submarines/2015/01/23/submarines-
warfare-undersea-technology-navy-csba/22221565/)

>There is not much danger that these new technologies will be able to detect a
sub in our lifetime.

Really? Are you qualified to say that?

~~~
bubbleHead
Source: US Navy submarine nuclear reactor officer, 20+ years

~~~
fnordfnordfnord
I don't know you, nor do I know Clark, or any of the others,

>>"We need to think about a new strategy for undersea warfare," said Bryan
Clark, a former submariner and Navy strategist now with the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

This Clark guy, writing for DefenseNews claims to have been on a sub, and a
place named the CSBA hired him. The trouble here is that I can't see why I
should take either of yours or their assertions at face value. I don't know
what their angle is, nor yours.

------
leroy_masochist
Pretty ironic that the subheading of the article says, "They could simply
become the next battleship." Battleships would be an awesome asset today if we
hadn't scrapped them. Their main guns can put 2500 lbs of ordinance on targets
40 km away. Think of what that capability would look like these days with GPS
guided rounds. America's ability to project force in the littorals is worse-
off for not having maintained battleships in the arsenal.

~~~
dalke
Battleships are expensive, with little flexibility for the types of missions
they can do.

The Navy wants railguns. Eg, [http://www.wired.com/2014/04/electromagnetic-
railgun-launche...](http://www.wired.com/2014/04/electromagnetic-railgun-
launcher/) :

> The Navy likes the weapon for several reasons, not the least of which it has
> a range of 100 miles and doesn’t require explosive warheads. That makes it
> far safer for sailors, and cheaper for taxpayers. According to the Navy,
> each 18-inch projectile costs about $25,000, compared to $500,000 to $1.5
> million for conventional missiles.

[http://www.onr.navy.mil/en/Science-
Technology/Departments/Co...](http://www.onr.navy.mil/en/Science-
Technology/Departments/Code-35/All-Programs/air-warfare-352/Electromagnetic-
Railgun.aspx) says there's a goal of 10 rounds per minute.

These don't need to be on battleship. Here's one on a destroyer.
[http://news.usni.org/2015/02/05/navy-considering-railgun-
thi...](http://news.usni.org/2015/02/05/navy-considering-railgun-third-
zumwalt-destroyer)

------
Avalaxy
Detecting a sub is one thing, but destroying it is another. Do they have a
'solution' to that?

~~~
fnordfnordfnord
If they were hard to destroy, why would they care so much about being
detected?

