

Don’t Mention the Cables, Future Diplomats - schan
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/04/dont-mention-the-cables-future-diplomats/?hp

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tptacek
This isn't some paranoid crazytalk from a government driven mad by Cablegate.
It is a fact that classified data isn't declassified by nature of having been
published. Apparently, contractors who are cleared for handling classified
data (here you learn that Matasano doesn't do government work) are quizzed on
this routinely.

It's apparently a basic rule of information hygiene that you can't ignore
classification just because something becomes public, so, ignoring the fact
that data is classified may demonstrate to a prospective employer that you
don't understand how to take classification seriously.

~~~
CodeMage
While it's not paranoid crazytalk, it certainly looks like typical
bureaucratic foolishness to me. Maybe I'm missing something here, of course.

I can sort of see the logic: if you are working for an organization whose
classified data got leaked, but the organization has not declassified that
data, you must still treat it as classified to avoid leaking any other related
data by accident (for example).

But these students don't work for the government yet. Discussing leaked cables
does not necessarily imply they don't understand classification.

~~~
rdtsc
> you must still treat it as classified to avoid leaking any other related
> data by accident (for example).

That is not quite the reason. The real reason is that those who have clearance
can be prosecuted for a willful security violation if they:

* store, process, or view classified data on an un unauthorized machine (home laptop)

* grant others access to the classified data

* discuss classified information where others who are not authorized would overhear or see it.

* prying into or accessing classified info for which they don't have a need-to-know

* creating unauthorized copies of classified info

The warning not to access this info is basically a helpful tip or reminder so
those who hold or will hold clearance could be subject to harsh penalties.

This is just as much about protecting the classified info as it is the protect
those who have a clearance.

These rules and laws have been deliberately written to be broad and wide so
that a potential spy can be easily prosecuted as they are usually found in
possession of classified info in their house or on their laptop for which they
have no authorization to have.

There is simply no exception for the case when thousands and thousands of
classified docs have been spread over the internet and are just as easily
accessed as driving directions to a restaurant.

EDIT:

This is actually a great example of how a broad and overreaching law (by
virtue of not being updated to specifically exclude leaked info) can be used
to selectively prosecute certain individuals at will. Chances are some of
those who have a clearance have read excerpts from Cablegate on the web just
by reading the news. An overzealous prosecutor can turn that into a "willful
security violation" if they really want to. This is in the same category as
"obstruction of business", "obstruction of justice", "disruptive behavior"
charges.

~~~
jdp23
excellent point in the edit!

------
bigmac
When it comes down to it, these cables were leaked most likely due to Bradley
Manning handing them over to Wikileaks. Thus, it was fundamentally a failure
of the security clearance screening process that made this leak possible; a
bad apple got through.

From that point of view, it only makes sense to assume that the screening
process will be more strict moving forward. No surprise, then, that one metric
that may be taken into account will be a person's feelings toward Wikileaks. I
imagine the people conducting clearance reviews will look at everything a
candidate has posted online, and ask them directly how they feel about
Wikileaks.

Sympathetic feelings toward Wikileaks is simply a chance the US Government
will not be willing to take.

~~~
ams6110
That a "bad apple" got through was one problem. The other problem was that he
appears to have had access to far to much information, and that adequate
systems to prevent the download and removal of the information also failed.

------
blahedo
Pursued to its logical conclusion, this means that the 800,000 or so US
citizens with some level of security clearance have been forbidden from
reading newspapers, watching the Daily Show, or discussing politics for the
last week or so. _Really?_ I mean, I know that _reductio ad absurdum_ isn't a
successful defence against dumb law, but this seems a bit excessive.

Especially considering that a big part of what's been released so far has been
ho-hum stuff that just reinforces what a lot of people have speculated was
true---"Eh, they don't really think that'll work."---and now making a comment
like that means you're propagating classified information and thus ineligible
for a State Department job?

I mean, it has shades of the old Khrushchev line ("3 years for insulting the
premier, 20 years for _revealing state secrets_.") It's one thing to say that
a leak that one person saw does not automatically declassify something (trade
secret law works the same way), but when the leak is on this kind of scale and
has been commented on so publicly, it seems hard to justify.

------
tibbon
Do government employees have an assumption that their work communications are
kept private and there is no/little recourse as to what they say in them?

I always figure that at work 100% of what I write can be read by the entire
company, and that I will be held accountable for anything I say/do even if I
have the best intentions in mind. If I say in an email something unfavorable
or slanderous about another company's CEO, and it gets out, then I must face
the consequences.

It seems that American government employees and diplomats have another
expectation of privacy and consequence to what they say/do.

~~~
GHFigs
_If I say in an email something unfavorable or slanderous about another
company's CEO, and it gets out, then I must face the consequences._

The key difference here is that making honest assessments about the character
of foreign government officials is part of the job description for diplomats.

~~~
tibbon
Agreed- If the assessments are honest and unbiased, then I think few will mind
them- although world leaders are known to have overinflated egos and not
tolerate any critique well.

Some jobs have risks associated with them. This is one of them. Time and time
again our government has told us that _we_ are made safer by having less
privacy, but now when it comes to the government having less privacy, they
don't like that feeling.

In either case- why wouldn't what is said and done by diplomats carry
consequence? Politicians always talk about responsibility and accountability.
This seems to be a ripe time for it.

------
yinmoneyhuang
The State Department seems to have mistargeted its restrictions concerning the
documents disclosed by WikiLeaks. In particular, prohibiting members of the
public (such as the SIPA students) from discussing the documents serves no
purpose. Insofar as the documents have become generally available, the State
Department is now powerless to prevent the spread of any damaging information
contained in those materials.

By contrast, restrictions would make sense for current government employees.
Because a significant fraction of those employees have access to materials
whose secrecy is still intact, it is conceivable that discussion of the
already-leaked materials could lead an employee to let slip additional
classified information.

