
Boeing’s Own Test Pilots Lacked Key Details of 737 Max Flight-Control System - bookofjoe
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/boeings-own-pilots-lacked-key-details-of-737-max-flight-control-system-in-tests-2019-05-03
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gotenyama
Someone should compile all of the current 737 related issues that Boeing has
been found or alleged to have been doing this whole time.

~~~
uxhack
It looks like there is something very rotten recently about the culture of
Boeing. I wonder if any of it is due to the HQ been moved away from the
engineering base in Seattle to Chicago?

~~~
atoav
Indeed, this podcast by the Daily podcast (New York Times) is very
enlightening about the cultural shift that came with the move:
[https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/podcasts/the-
daily/boeing...](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/podcasts/the-daily/boeing-
dreamliner-charleston.html)

If people working in your quality managment quit because they have issues
squaring current behaviour with their conscience, you have a real cultural
problem.

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Glawen
This makes no sense, we know that they increase the MCAS action range from
0.6° to 2.5° and they didn't inform FAA of the change. So, they must have told
tests pilots about the feature, otherwise why did they change the parameters ?

~~~
heisenbit
It may be that they kept this information in a small circle. MCAS was supposed
to keep the plane flying similar so discussions of where this idealized model
was breaking were kept quiet.

It is still incredible. There was one big change in a high volume plane and
that one big change should have been tested and tested again. Somehow Boeing
started to believe their own cool aid.

The more I think about the MAX the scarier it gets. What if one engine fails
during start? The forward mounted other engine goes full throttle pulling up
more than pilots are trained to handle.

~~~
Glawen
You mean that the engineers quietly analyzed the test flight data and decided
to increase the parameters on their own, so that the flight data show
similarity between a MAX and a NG ?

I find it so huge that it is hard to believe. Unless they took SW guys with no
clue about how to do their jobs, like fresh graduate with no mentoring, or
even outsourced to a SW shop ? I would never take responsability of such a
change without even talking to the pilots about it.

It is hundred timed worse than the VW engineers who cheated the homologation
test.

~~~
Anarch157a
"Never attribute to malice what can be explained by incompetence".

In VW's case, it's clear as day that it was malice and greed. In Boeings case,
I was willing to write it down as incompetence at first, but as time goes by,
I'm becoming more inclined to put it on the malice bin.

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CaptainZapp
Can we stop now blaming and smearing the pilots, who propably tried just about
everything to try to control a plane that was completely out of control?

This, to me, is the most galling part in Boeing's current pr blitz.

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notatoad
if the point of MCAS was the make the new 737 behave like the old 737, why
would it be necessary to make the test pilots aware of the details of it?

~~~
mveety
You need to be familiar with all of the aircrafts systems in case one fails.

~~~
notatoad
It makes sense that a regular pilot flying actual passengers should be
familiar with all systems.

But this article is specifically about test pilots, and keeping a tester in
the dark about specific implementation details of the system they are testing
is a perfectly normal and good way to preserve the integrity of the testing,
especially for a system that's meant to be transparent.

~~~
jacquesm
At a guess you are not a test pilot. Test pilots are - or at least are
supposed to be - briefed on all of the details of the systems they are
testing, including what should happen when they take the plane outside of
normal operating parameters. There is no such thing as 'destructive aircraft
testing', that's called a crash and is considered an anomaly.

It always amazes me how software and IT people in general assume that other
industries are just as crappy in their processes.

That said, I do actually believe that this speaks in favor of Boeing to the
extent that that is still possible after all that came out so far: the fact
that they did not alert their own test pilots proves to a certain degree that
they did not believe the change was a major one or worth mentioning. It would
have been a worse signal if they had alerted their test pilots to the change
but then failed to notify their customers, this is at least consistent with
their narrative that they did not see the change as a major one.

~~~
bambax
> _... proves to a certain degree that they did not believe the change was a
> major one or worth mentioning_

Yes, what Boeing is saying is that MCAS, being designed to force the new plane
follow the flight envelope of the old plane

1/ wasn't an anti-stall system

2/ and therefore wasn't a "security" feature (and therefore, it was completely
ok to sell upgrades to that system as expensive options)

During a recent interview, Boeing CEO repeatedly said that no _specific_
training was necessary on MCAS because MCAS is part of the whole plane, and
when you're flying the MAX you're using MCAS.

This is indeed the problem: they couldn't even consider MCAS failing -- even
as a thought experiment, because if MCAS fails, the MAX isn't a 737 anymore!

It looks like they locked themselves up into an alternative reality that they
couldn't escape, until planes started crashing into the ground.

~~~
rbanffy
> if MCAS fails, the MAX isn't a 737 anymore!

A bit tongue in cheek, but it's been shown that, when MCAS fails, the 737 MAX
can't really be called a plane.

