This isn't a paradox. It's simply a proof that all natural numbers are interesting, if we accept the premises. We shouldn't accept the premises, because there really is a real paradox lurking around the corner, but this isn't it.
The paradox occurs when we replace "natural number" by "ordinal". Then the same line of reasoning demonstrates that all ordinals must be interesting. But surely there can only be countably many interesting ordinals! (Because "interesting" is really code for "definable".) Which shows what the real problem in the premises were -- we failed to distinguish between definable in some particular theory and definability in the meta-theory.
While interesting, that is property of decimal notation rather than the integer number itself. In hexadecimal notation, 2013 is the first (since 2007 -> 0x7d7) with duplicate digits ;-)
Perhaps this is the point of the original article, but couldn't one say that the actual "smallest uninteresting number" is actually the second smallest uninteresting number? The first smallest uninteresting number is only interesting by virtue of being otherwise uninteresting, but once we have a second number that is only interesting by virtue of being uninteresting, it's no longer a novelty to be uninteresting. So it's legitimately uninteresting.
Some of those are a bit of a reach. "57 is 111 in base 7"? 111 in base 10 isn't interesting because it's a sequence of the same digit. "22 is the number of partitions of 8" is an interesting thing about 8, not 22, I would argue, since it's not a property inherent to 22.
Mind you, 22 is a sequence of the same digit, so I guess that counts as interesting for some reason...
The paradox occurs when we replace "natural number" by "ordinal". Then the same line of reasoning demonstrates that all ordinals must be interesting. But surely there can only be countably many interesting ordinals! (Because "interesting" is really code for "definable".) Which shows what the real problem in the premises were -- we failed to distinguish between definable in some particular theory and definability in the meta-theory.
See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berry_paradox