The International Atomic Energey Committee who is tasked with investigating
this kind of accident has many reports on accidents including irradiators. It
seems that these are not uncommon (as radiation accidents go), probably
because the radioactive sources in irradiators are made to be moved about and
occasionally transported, much more so than, e.g. the radioactive fuel in
reactors, or even weapons.
Lax standards or just changing circumstances such as an owner moving or going
out of business (or collapsing entirely, like in the case of the USSR) has
caused accidents, in the past.
A famous example is the accident in Goiânia, in Brazil, in 1985. In short, a
private radiotherapy institute moved house leaving behind a working caesium
137 teletherapy unit with the source still in it. Two people took parts of the
unit, broke them apart and sold them to a scrap yard. The owner noticed the
blue glow of the strange salt-like substance in the unit and took it home and
showed it to his friends and family. People became fascinated with the sight
and took fragments of it to their homes where their kids and family played
with it. Eventually, someone connected the fact that people were getting sick
with the strange glowing stuff and took a sample to the public health
department. This led to the accident being discovered.
Some 250 people were contaminated and four died while others suffered
radiation sickness, but fortunately recovered. Lest this be taken as evidence
of the low risk from such accidents let it just be said: you don't want your
kids playing with sparkly blue radioactive stardust.
I'm a radiology resident at UW and we haven't really heard much about this event. Harborview is a phenomenal hospital, and (in my opinion) the best one in the UW system. The University has a pretty good track record of admitting fault, even when it costs the system millions. See: https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/health/uw-medicine...
Harborview was the only profitable hospital in the system. Seattle is the second-largest tech city in the nation and housing prices have grown astronomically, just like in SF. The difference between UW and, say, Stanford or UCSF, is that UW's patient population comes from the WWAMI states. They don't typically treat the young tech works, although I have had a couple older Boeing/Microsoft patients. UW/Harborview patients continue to be mostly low-income Seattlites and tertiary care/trauma patients from the WWAMI states. The UW takes care of poor/rural patients while existing in a wealthy city. It's a unique place to work.
EDIT: I asked my fellow radiology residents about this event
"We had a nuc med lecture on the event! It's super interesting how they managed it."
"We had a separate nuclear medicine lecture on a Tuesday by the woman who helped managed the incident and is responsible for nuclear accidents."
"Was on HMC call that night. Physics lecture on that was useful. Radiation --> reflex call radiologist is a real thing."
"Cool. Honestly they should just reflex call them. I just paged them anyway."
“3.6 roentgens per hour. Not great, not terrible.”
Thank you, Capitol Hill Seattle (and Margo Vansynghel in particular!), for real investigative journalism that the major Seattle papers and news outlets haven't done on this story.
I have minor quibbles on the facts, and with some of the tone of the story, but I'm glad to see that a journalist was able to put in the time to research and write a long-form story about which the Seattle community will care.
For the commenters lining up to throw stones -- we all find in time that our own homes are made, at least in part, of glass. It is intrinsic to any accident that at least one mistake was made, but discerning how and why the mistake came to pass almost always takes longer than anyone would like. Throwing stones too early often means that they will miss their mark, becoming mistakes of their own.
Edit: crediting Margo Vansynghel, the article's author
Criticizing people with the use of hindsight is one thing, but if "this is unacceptably risky" would have been the right response to the planned procedure beforehand, then it is still valid afterwards.
> The Goiânia accident [ɡojˈjɐniɐ] was a radioactive contamination accident that occurred on September 13, 1987, in Goiânia, in the Brazilian state of Goiás, after a forgotten radiotherapy source was taken from an abandoned hospital site in the city. It was subsequently handled by many people, resulting in four deaths. About 112,000 people were examined for radioactive contamination and 249 were found to have significant levels of radioactive material in or on their bodies.
> In the cleanup operation, topsoil had to be removed from several sites, and several hundred houses were demolished. All the objects from within those houses, including personal possessions, were seized and incinerated. Time magazine has identified the accident as one of the world's "worst nuclear disasters" and the International Atomic Energy Agency called it "one of the world's worst radiological incidents".
With dilution, for ~rapidly decaying isotopes, nobody arguably gets more than a de minimis dose. Comparable to a chest X-ray, transcontinental flight, etc.
But that doesn't work for isotopes that bioaccumulate, and get concentrated up the food chain. Especially if that happens faster than radioactive decay.
A good example is plutonium production. Back in the 40s-60s, they'd dissolve irradiated uranium in nitric acid. With remote manipulators, behind massive steel/lead/concrete shielding. But two of the major fission fragments are gases at processing temperatures: Xe-131 and I-131. So they just blew that up the stacks.
Xe-131 stable, but inert, so dilution is arguably OK. Although the I-131 half-life is only ~8 days, animals bioaccumulate it very effectively. Also, it's concentrated in milk.
In designing Hanford, scientists did a risk assessment for I-131 releases. They got that releasing I-131 was risky when the wind was blowing westward, toward coastal cities. But when the wind was blowing eastward, no problem. Especially because, for commercial milk production, delay from deposition on fodder to milk sales is (as I recall) on the order of weeks.
However, they didn't consider subsistence farmers living around Hanford, raising cattle and goats for milk. For them, delay from deposition on fodder to milk consumption is on the order of days. Oops. So a bunch of people (mainly children) developed thyroid disorders and cancer.
I could tell a similar story about radioisotope releases from above-ground testing. Which increased incidence of thyroid disorders and cancer throughout the US. But I'll just share the false assumption.
Nuclear explosions inject crap into the lower stratosphere. Where it floats, just above the stratopause, driven by the jet stream. So there's not much dilution, just movement. And then, somewhere, there's an intense thunderstorm, which punches convection into the lower stratosphere. If that happens to intersect a mass of radioactive crap, it comes down right there. Almost as if the explosion had occurred right overhead.
Who would have thought? If you're interested, you can find maps online that show deposition patterns for all of the above-ground test series.
Well, imagine you have 500 wooden chairs, lightly contaminated.
If you incinerate them carefully (running all waste gases through filters before being released to the atmosphere), you can convert 500 wooden chairs into a couple pounds of contaminated ashes and filters. Which are much easier and cheaper to dispose of.
TFA is about Cs-137, which melts at 28.5 °C, and boils at 671 °C. So filters should capture it, as long as the flue gas is cooled first. I-125 boils at 184.3 °C, so more will go through particle filters. But activated charcoal will absorb it.
It sounds like the removal of the vial was done on-site for somewhat reasonable reasons, but in the future they ought to have a temporary structure erected during removal so that if something happens, the dust doesn't get blown and tracked everywhere. Doing this in a shipping container would have avoided all of these problems and most of the exposure to people as well.
"International Isotopes contractors had set up a secure steel “chamber” wherein they would perform a crucial, most perilous part of the operation: removing the capsule with cesium-137 from the irradiator."
The problem is they didn't realise it had happened straight away. They only discovered the leak later, when performing a routine wipe-down check of the area. There are still details missing though, like how come they didn't perform the wipe-down check before opening the chamber? Or did they? As the article says, it's not clear exactly what happened.
I’m curious how you don’t know that you cut into the capsule. It’s supposedly a white powder, wouldn’t it make a cloud?
Also if this is possible wouldn’t you put sone contingencies in place, like mount the grinder on limited travel arm or something? Sound’s like they just went at it with a $30 DeWalt.
When you're grinding there's significant metal and abrasive dust thrown into the air. Given the airflow they generate and how fine the radioactive powder is even a small nick in the capsule could end up with a lot of material in the air without you noticing it.
A jig to limit grinder motion sounds like really cheap insurance to prevent this failure mode.
I'm curious if the capsules like this are standardized or one-off. The description of the tungsten plug makes it sound like the latter.
In which case a more sane procedure would probably mandate some examination of the capsule, formulation of a plan off-site, then implementation of said plan.
It depends how heavily it was disturbed. They describe it as like talcum powder. If it's that fine, tiny particles could disperse in the air invisibly.
> They didn't realise it had happened. They only discovered the leak later
"Trained experts in radiation equiped with geiger counters and all the stuff, were unable to see it coming" Chapter 35.
They had one job. One small area to check for radiation leak in a controlled environment. How this could happen?
A) Maybe geiger counters can't detect Caesium radiation? I'm not expert in the area but would appreciate the point of view of some experts.
B) Geiger counters failed. How? didn't have batteries?
C) The leak was detected in time, but the culprit keeped his/her mouth firmly closed because... human nature. Not my fault. I didn't cut it.
D) There was not leak to detect (Leak was in a different area, Hidden second point of radiation like waste containers accumulated in the broom closet, ect)
Choose your option. In any case it feels like a lie again. This is not how you build trust on nuclear safety procedures.
In films at least, Geiger counters do a peep constantly when turned on. Could a geiger counter fall silently and be mistaken for absence of radiation? Aren't equiped with visual clues also? (lights blinking... etc)
A) If it can not see beta and gamma radiation it is completely broken. You should test that before you use the Geiger counter. It is neutrons and to some extend alpha radiation that you might be blind to.
B) Of course there is batteries in there. But if they are dead, the Geiger counter would be completely dead and not even detect the natural background. You should notice that before you actually use the device.
C) You had one job...
D) that's the problem with invisible dangers and why we have fixed procedures to follow.
A simple Geiger counter give a current pulse when a bit of ionizing radiation makes the tube conductive and then has an external circuit switch of the supply voltage to extinguish the current in the tube. During that dead time it is unable to detect radiation. After a set time the tube is powered up again. Some models would detect if there is too much current flowing and would switch of the voltage again. This current flow could happen for two reasons: it is _STILL_ flowing from the first event or it is _AGAIN_ flowing because there is too much radiation. So depending on models it might simply stay completely silent when there is a lot of radiation (failing silently when it should really warn you) or it could detect that simulation and raise an alarm (possibly giving a false positive if the tube ages and the current takes a long time to shut down after an ionization even in the tube). It is important to know which of the two the model in your hand does.
Source: Radiation Safety training more than a decade ago when studying physics.
Everything I’ve read so far points at C. Gross negligence on the part of the UW nuclear safety officer, then attempted cover up of what happened. The points made in this article support that theory, so no further reading necessary unless you care.
Perhaps the main focus is making it extremely difficult to access the radioactive material. So, no locks or anything that easy, you weld the thing shut. Makes it harder to decommission, but also makes it harder to steal.
>This could destroy the careers of people who have been working their entire lives on research meant to save lives and improve public health and hospital outcomes
Happened on my campus. Freezers even had temperature alarms monitored by the university police, but no one reacted to the alerts. Among other things, an 80 year longitudinal study was lost.
My university lost power for about 9 hours a few years ago. Several labs did not have their -80s hooked into emergency backup power (due to limits of the building, very understandable reasons). I remember a professor sitting in the dark hallway outside his lab, in tears. He could only watch as temperatures rose, and he lost almost everything. It was heartbreaking.
In looking for the construction of the capsule I found this article about a similar contamination issue with Cesium. Reading through the Events section that discovers theft and attempts at recovering the Cesium because of its blue glow are mind blowing.
Thanks for sharing. Makes one think about all those efforts to come up with a way to make nuclear waste sites look scary for millenia. Of course, you could just bury it somewhere and not leave a mark, but that's no fun.
Why is the cleanup crew not wearing safety gear? Given how easily the cesium powder disperses in the air, at the very least, I would want a mask to prevent the cesium from entering my lungs.
Even more bizarre, the gallery page for that picture has a slug of "on-the-list-before-stonewall-film-ginsberg-poetry-festival-at-volunteer-park-seattle-poetry-slam": http://www.capitolhillseattle.com/2019/06/on-the-list-before... (and the image is titled "Leak 2"). There are other interesting images in that gallery that aren't on the article (or perhaps are visible only if you have javascript enabled).
About half of this machine's radioactive material leaked into the immediate vicinity after the radioactive source was removed from a larger machine as part of routine decommissioning.
Basically equivalent to a dirty nuclear bomb going off with an under-powered dispersing mechanism. That building is not easy to clean up if at that is at all possible.
Cesium-137 cleanup isn’t especially difficult compared to some other radioactive agents. A rather painful vigorous scrubbing (speaking from experience) is effective for external exposure and Prussian Blue is a moderately effective antidote for internal exposure that will likely prevent loss of life. No radiation contamination is “safe” and Cesium-137 is particularly nasty, but cleanup is definitely possible without long term effects (like at the Chernobyl site) generally.
Reading this I realise that the idea of "Health and Safety" is a good one. Make a plan for the bad things that could happen and you just follow the plan - "Action On" it is called in the mklitary I believe
The bit where someone asks "did you turn off the HVAC in the building once the radioactive particles went airborne?" is a classic example.
This is a well researched article. Although mistakes can be made it's a bit puzzling that there was so much miscommunication. Maybe too many orgs involved. That Seattle fire department wasn't even informed beforehand seems clumsy.
> Things were far from being back to normal, however. That the HVAC system was shut off to prohibit the cesium from spreading through the building was a good thing. But as it stayed off, in the days after the leak, the building started to heat up. Which meant the freezers in the building, which keep research specimen at -80°C, had to work harder to stay cool. Some were failing. Important research samples were in danger.
> “Hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of equipment, labor, and samples are being lost on a daily basis. This could destroy the careers of people who have been working their entire lives on research meant to save lives and improve public health and hospital outcomes,” an anonymous source told KIRO.
> UW/Harborview personnel moved the contents of some units to other freezers nearby about a week after the spill, said Susan Gregg of the UW Medicine.
> “If they were showing signs of failure, the materials were moved to other freezers,” Gregg said. “We were very diligent that none of those research specimens were damaged.” No specimens were found to have any contamination, she added. The animals, mostly rodents, held in the building’s vivarium, have all been moved to another location as well. It took about two weeks for the HVAC system to be turned back on.
I love how they use a FUD quote from an "anonymous" source while following it up with an actual source which claims the complete opposite...
People love to be dramatic.
Also an interesting fact from Wikipedia:
>> Accidental ingestion of caesium-137 can be treated with Prussian blue, which binds to it chemically and reduces the biological half-life to 30 days.
Having worked in a lab, I do not think this is FUD.
Cryogenic freezers commonly cost > $10,000. Needless to say, space is very much at a premium.
Worse, moving samples between freezers is incredibly time consuming because allowing them to thaw even slightly will often damage them. In a biomedical lab such as you might reasonably expect to find at Harborview, many of the samples will invariable be living cells that have been frozen in order to preserve them (ie they can be thawed later and will still be alive... some percentage of them, at least). These samples are incredibly sensitive to how they are handled.
Regarding the accidental ingestion of Cs-137. The radioactive source in this case, according to the article, was in the form of talkum powder. The danger with this kind of material is not that it will be accidentally ingested, but that it will find its way into the respiratory system, where it can't be easily bound by Prussian blue.
Accidents with irradiation sources of Caesium 137 have previously happened. See my other comment in this thread on the radiological accident in Goiania, Brazil, in the 1980's, where the source of the radiation was a radiotherapy unit with a Cs-137 source, that was sold for scrap and taken to peoples' homes for the strange blue glow it emited.
With radiation risks, the idea is to find a balance: don't go mad with fear, but don't treat it like it's trivial, either. I mean, it's not like because you can neutralise Cs-137 with Prussian blue, you can go ahead and solve some in your afternoon tea and imbibe it, and no worries.
That's interesting but I wasn't making any sort of statement that Prussian Blue is some sort of solution to these problems. I just found it to be an interesting fact.
I love how you automatically take what is obviously PR speak at face value. Of course they're going to say that. That's what they have to say. It's now 2019. When are people going to learn that just because somebody says something doesn't mean it means what you want it to mean.
Accidents like this don’t happen in the West/civilized world, this type of events only happens to people who are less scrupulous and (dare I say) not as intelligent as our scientists are.
On a more serious note, the “Chernobyl” tv series needs to be commended for showing that institutional lying and hiding things under the rug is indeed a global phenomenon, its viewers’ reaction shows that.
I don't see this as much different than what's going on in the US where most of the nuclear plants are running past their design life and have cracks in the concrete that they hand wave and increase the allowable tolerance for. Nuclear plants are very expensive to build. This incentivizes bending the rules and taking chances to continue running them past the point where they should be shut down.
Or the UK, where the reactor graphite has lots of cracks, but people need power and jobs, so now they're trying to relax the safety limit, you couldn't make this stuff up:
> EDF plans to ask the regulator for permission to restart with a new operational limit of up to 700 cracks.
When you have a zoo with big predators able to climb and jump there is a risk of your animals escaping somehow and starting to maul people. To avoid it, zookeepers are required to build a bigger enclosure surrounding the tiger's area and put a few aged herbivores munching grass there. If the tigers manage to escape one night, will be tempted to remain in the area some hours more, chasing, chomping and sleeping (making much easier to recapture it)
We know that caesium can be treated with prussian blue? Okay, I have an idea: What if we require, by law, to put any radioactive caesium's container floating in a bigger recipient filled with Prussian blue?
Caesium leaking would dip in Prussian blue inmediately. Any leak in the external enclosure would make also a noticeable blue stain. Impossible to miss, not tempting to eat, and would clearly delimitate the real boundaries of contaminated area that need to be cleaned.
If this is how involved removing the thing is, how exactly was it built? And if you can't transport it inside the irradiator, how did the irradiator get there?
On a flatbed or inside a semi, down the freeway, then installed with a combination of cranes and forklifts.
The irradiator goes out on the truck, but in modern times they don't want the cesium in it because of less perceived risk of truck accidents and terrorist hijackings. The small radioactive capsule can be sent more discretely via a smaller vehicle, and a security escort.
What surprises me the most is that they did the cutting in an open room (door open) without taping over the HVAC vents. They literally could have made a makeshift tent out of plastic tarps to do the cutting inside. Such bad safety precautions...
Edit: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20250627 is a fine example of how to do this, by someone who has expertise and is close to the current situation. If you post like that instead, you satisfy readers' curiosity, which is the purpose of this site. Admittedly it's more work, but it sounds like you have something a lot to offer here.
I dunno dang, in the era of "fake news" I don't think the sentiment is inappropriate.
What else but a shallow dismissal for people who are ignorant but hold forth on some technical issue? The Internet is right there, they could just as easily do their own homework as post something uninformed.
The guidelines ask HN users not to post shallow dismissals because of the effect they have on discussion: they make it even more shallow and dismissive. Look at what an offtopic subthread we got below.
People always hold forth on things they're not expert in. That's humans being human. We can't change that.
What is possible is for those who know more to share some of what they know with those who want to learn. Doing that leads to much better discussion.
> As a former Rad worker who has even cleaned up a radioactive spill I'm just shacking my head at the all the "experts" in the comments.
Well do an AMA. I have questions for you. What do you think of the Safety Officer not having any idea what was going on when the Hazmat team showed up? His not having a plan of what to do. The crew not wearing safety equipment. The Hazmat guy having to be the one to suggest shutting down the HVAC. Do you think this company handled this well at any point in the removal operation or subsequent events? What should happen to them? Should they be liable for the clean up costs? Should they be decertified? What sort of training did anyone on their crew have to allow this all to go down this way? If even one person at the company knew what they were doing, wouldn't they have raised some objections or sent a memo at some point? If everyone at this company has no idea what they are doing, should the DoE be paying them millions to deal with radioactive waste removal and transport?
With your expertise, could you at least provide insight into the situation instead of simply saying how much you know compared to everyone else in the comments?
This is probably pretty typical. The more you know, the more you read and just shake your head.
I made medical imaging software for treatment and diagnosis for a living. I suspect I have the same reaction to posts on oncology issues, or FDA issues that you are having to posts on this issue.
It's important to realize though, that some of the people commenting with obvious gaps in their knowledge are making a sincere attempt at learning more. Especially if the subject is technical rather than political in nature. Just jump in and correct them. If any of your corrections are received poorly by the user, well, just let them alone. But the curious, 'seeker' types will probably thank you and ask for more information.
I think "some" is very few (if any at all) in my experience. If you are generally looking for knowledge or not sure, you preface with "I may be wrong", "I am not an expert" or other such phrases, but most often people state wrong information as facts with no caveats. It's probably some combination of over confidence and ignorance.
HackerNews tech bros, chasing that upvote validation. When you've been rewarded all your life for being smart and right, you tend to think your guesses are right and announce them loudly.
HN users, much similar to many places on the internet, fall into the trap of believing that because they hold an opinion on a topic, they are therefore right.
Is your comment making things better? It doesn't point any particular misconceptions or even trends of misconceptions, and doesn't provide any "conceptions" of its own. Disdain towards unidentified posts based on your self-proclaimed credentials is all there is for us to read.
> Please respond to the strongest plausible interpretation of what someone says, not a weaker one that's easier to criticize. Assume good faith.
Maybe we are blathering about something we know nothing about to the point where we just sound ridiculous to someone who does know, eh? Rather than shaking his head in exasperation and moving on, OP takes a moment to try to let us know that we're wasting our time.
If we really care, I'm sure it wouldn't be too hard to find and perhaps read some authoritative document describing best practices for radioactive waste management, eh?
Sure. As someone in show business I have to roll my eyes at the stupidity spouted here whenever Netflix, Disney, Warner Bros, HBO, Hulu or any other film/tv topic comes up.
I understand the sentiment, but I wish you would. Despite all the weeds that grow in the threads, many of us are here to learn. That's the purpose of this site. If users won't comment in their areas of expertise, that purpose is stymied.
It doesn't mean you have to get into tedious arguments with ignorant, indignant comments. (It's interesting how often those two go together.) It's enough to post a substantive top-level comment explaining what you know from the point of view of someone in the business. In the end, those tend to get upvoted; there's one at the top of this thread right now. And as moderator/gardeners we do what we can to give those more interesting plants a fighting chance vis-à-vis the weeds.
As a physicist I have a similar reaction to a bunch of topics. Sometimes people are very happy with the insider info I can bring to a thread (e.g. how does the EHT create it's picture), but sometimes you get so much opposition from people who obviously don't have a clue and simply assume that everything is simple to solve with machine learning and that all professional scientists are bumbling idiot who can be save by the comments of a silicon valley kid that it stops being fun.
I wonder if a "badge" system could help HN. Validate professional work experience with a moderation team ("astrophysicist" because I have published papers there, or "radiation control tech" or "worked in the movie industrie" or "work at google" or whatever). You could even have more than one badge (say "work at google" and "race sailboats for sport"). And when you post a comment there is a list of all your badges below the text field an you can select one to be displayed noticeable above your comment to indicate "I have professional knowledge of this". Of course you can still post a comment without selecting any of your badges because "radiation controll tech" says nothing when discussing cookie recipes, but is an important thing to not when discussing a radioactive spill.
It took me a while to realize this. It wasn't until there was a post about something I was an expert on. I finally realized people respond here often with little knowledge or even no knowledge at all. It made me question everything I read before on this site.
It's also generally a problem especially of the entrepreneurial world. In the academic world, some of the most knowledgeable people get listened to, even if all they do is quietly churn out results and publish them. In the entrepreneurial world, it's often the people who speak loudly, confidently, and able to answer questions before you've even finished your question who get funded, even if they don't know what they're talking about.
Theranos and its ilk were all no surprise to me. The entire venture ecosystem is perfectly designed to catch charlatans, not experts.
Having marketed analytical products to VC audiences twice, I'm just not convinced that the VC ecosystem is even designed. They seem to prefer status quo (high risk) over data-informed decisions.
I think there are a lot of comments that are just unfounded amateur speculation presented as fact, especially for topics outside IT/CS.
On the other hand, I think it's common to see threads that have a high ratio of signal to noise. Like a link to a scientific paper will have one of the authors of the paper in the comments section answering questions.
This site (or at least the community around it) does claim a degree of highbrow intellectual merit and deep technical expertise that places it in a self-determined echelon above the rest of the web, which one can readily see in the disdain that commenters here have for Reddit, other social media sites, most non-technical fields and people in general.
So it is ironic and kind of funny when you realize that, apart from a few outliers, Hacker News is just as infested with trolls, fools, posers and Dunning-Krueger as the rest of the web.
It is just a more polite /g/ without the pictures and memes. That's not an insult, just an observation of how deeply the sets of users here, there, on Reddit and elsewhere overlap.
If only, at the least, because the guidelines for HN discourage pointless and inane commentary. Reddit is very likely 95% funny one liners on the most active threads.
There are observably obvious differences, even if you don't agree with any inferences made from them.
I suspect you're confusing the quality of commentary with the quality of a commenter's expertise. Someone's comment can read as if they know what they're talking about, being well written and civil, without that commenter actually knowing what they're talking about.
Also, Reddit is not 95% funny one liners in technical or programming forums, and the guidelines for those often also discourage pointless and inane commentary. Go look at /r/askhistorians for one example. Reddit does have a higher tolerance for humor and memes than HN, but humorlessness is not necessarily an indicator of quality.
To your second point, I agree, but I was comparing specifically the common top posts ("front page") to one another. HN is obviously more niche, but the ways in which its niche is defined are what I contend do, in fact, result in a better quality of discussion.
To your first point, I also concede that this phenomenon certainly does happen, but would counter with the notion that this probably happens with every conversation ever, with it perhaps tapering off in materials science discussions amongst experts.
I'd assert that it's happening right now, given that neither of us are likely informed enough to empirically support our assertions here. We're merely sharing our rather vague impressions.
>I'd assert that it's happening right now, given that neither of us are likely informed enough to empirically support our assertions here. We're merely sharing our rather vague impressions.
That's fair. A lot of what happens here can probably be described as anecdotes sparring with other anecdotes.
Jesus that read like a big ol fuck up. The lack of preparation for a spill, despite having all these people on site, is the most glaring issue. SFD didn’t even get a heads up.
It's a quote from HBO series Chernobyl. (The dosimeter they had maxed at 3.6, so they reported up the chain of command number 3.6, to which the crisis group responded with the quote above)
Yes, and when the main character hears it for the first time he mentions it's a very significant number before being cut off by someone who thinks they know better.
Lax standards or just changing circumstances such as an owner moving or going out of business (or collapsing entirely, like in the case of the USSR) has caused accidents, in the past.
A famous example is the accident in Goiânia, in Brazil, in 1985. In short, a private radiotherapy institute moved house leaving behind a working caesium 137 teletherapy unit with the source still in it. Two people took parts of the unit, broke them apart and sold them to a scrap yard. The owner noticed the blue glow of the strange salt-like substance in the unit and took it home and showed it to his friends and family. People became fascinated with the sight and took fragments of it to their homes where their kids and family played with it. Eventually, someone connected the fact that people were getting sick with the strange glowing stuff and took a sample to the public health department. This led to the accident being discovered.
Some 250 people were contaminated and four died while others suffered radiation sickness, but fortunately recovered. Lest this be taken as evidence of the low risk from such accidents let it just be said: you don't want your kids playing with sparkly blue radioactive stardust.
IAEA accident report here:
https://www.iaea.org/publications/3684/the-radiological-acci...