Isn't the fact that you are guaranteed to pay legal fees, which the poor will always find expensive, to be the greater obstacle to suing? I think the 'English rule' would encourage many poor people to litigate if they believed their case was strong.
> Isn't the fact that you are guaranteed to pay legal fees, which the poor will always find expensive, to be the greater obstacle to suing?
With correct insurance/lawyer-agreements, the poor can set it up so that they have no chance of paying anything. In effect, they sell part of the expected value of their suit to decrease their variance to the point that they do not pay money in any circumstance.
>I think the 'English rule' would encourage many poor people to litigate if they believed their case was strong.
Well, to be precise, it would encourage many poor people to litigate if their lawyer (or their insurance company) believed their case was strong. And isn't this exactly what we want? That justice is pursued?
I have friend who cases against the police and others on a contingency basis.
Believe me, they do not have any capital to invest to indemnifying their client against a judgment. None.
The possibilities of losing a fair amount of money in case of this sort would essentially write the police a blank check to engage in whatever without threat of lawsuit.
I don't think the commenter I replied had these types of cases in mind. I think he meant "We don't get paid unless we get money for you" ambulance chaser type of lawyers.
Suppose your lawyer thinks you have a 90% chance of winning - against a neighbour who might run up a $1000 bill for legal fees, the same as you. Then it's worth the risk.
Now suppose you are up against a bank that can run up $10M in fees (or claim their in-house lawyers cost that) - now to be $1000 at risk you need a case that is 99.999% sure before the lawyer's insurance company will let them take it.
