Also relevant is the Battle of the Crater during the civil war, in which Union forces dug a giant hole underneath the Confederates defenses and packed it with gunpowder. The resulting explosion was so impressive that none of the soldiers were able to capitalize on the sudden opportunity.
General Burnside had trained special black troops to head this assault because of just how complicated this mission was compared to anything else in contemporary existence. They were pulled at the last minute by General Meade for a combination of PR reasons (can't have black people winning the war), personal glory reasons, and skepticism.
Tunneled bombs were used in a major way in WWI too.
In January, 1917, General Sir Herbert Plumer, gave orders
for 20 mines to be placed under German lines at Messines.
Over the next five months more than 8,000 metres of
tunnel were dug and 600 tons of explosive were placed in
position. Simultaneous explosion of the mines took place
at 3.10 on 7th June. The blast killed an estimated 10,000
soldiers and was so loud it was heard in London.
Cillian Murphy plays a character in a show called Peaky Blinders (Netflix) who was a tunneler in WWI. The way the tunneling is portrayed is unbelievable.
My understanding wasn't that the men were stunned by the impressive explosion, but rather that Ledlie had so badly botched the whole thing that they literally had no idea what to expect or where to go or what to do. Hell the guy was drunk for most of the battle, which is a fascinating detail in the whole thing.
>My understanding wasn't that the men were stunned by the impressive explosion, but rather that Ledlie had so badly botched the whole thing that they literally had no idea what to expect or where to go or what to do.
Both, really. They didn't know what they were meant to be doing and the massive explosion did not exactly promote their higher faculties in figuring it out.
Another early advanced weapons technology is Greek Fire (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_fire), the exact composition of which is still being debated. Water intensified the flames when it was used in naval battles.
Although that misses the main facet of the nuclear weapon analogy. The Hellburner was a hugely destructive weapon that was only used once and wasn't particularly strategically effective. However the fear of that weapon was enough to intimidate and alter the opposing sides strategy in order to avoid it being used against them.
Greek Fire was a weapon that was both used more frequently and used to greater effect.
Vitrified forts are another puzzling one - ancient fortresses where the stones in the walls have been subjected to enough heat to make them melt together - whether this was done on purpose or by accident or by enemy action is unknown:
Eh, anything related directly to humans has been done before. Computers, internal combustion, electricity and medicine are the only major advances we've got over those living 1000 years ago...
I suppose if I go with the spirit of your statement, it is possible to argue that both computers and medicine were done in some form or another for the last 5 thousand years (think abacus, folk herbalism, etc). It is just that we have figured out how to leverage greater resources (including information) to do those in a much more effective way.
On the other hand, the combination of embodied knowledge and chemical energy to create machines, i.e. the internal combustion engine, is a truly novel achievement of our civilization.
Although it seems that it may never have been used for any practical purpose, it is often considered to be the first steam engine and was documented in the 1st century AD.
These aren't exactly small things, these are the things of eon defining boundaries. Human beings may be fundamentally made of the same things, our physical and emotional machinery may be largely unchanged. But how we live is hugely different.
They invented/adopted a bunch of agricultural things in the agricultural revolution. That was between the 1000 years ago mentioned and the invention of the internal combustion engine, electricity etc.
Like a better plow, using legumes to replenish nutrients, etc.
To oversimplify greatly, "tactical" means it's supposed to win a battle and "strategic" means its supposed to win (or prevent) a war. That has implications for size, delivery system, and a whole bunch of other factors, but that's the nub of it.
I'm familiar with the distinction in the abstract, but didn't really understand how it applied to nuclear weapons. I guess I had a sort of "all or nothing" mentality where if a nuclear weapon gets used, there is necessarily some strategic aspect to its deployment because its impact would be so devastating. But that is not necessarily the case.
It's a valid concern. Even a "tactical" nuke is likely to have strategic repercussions. I guess what matters is that somebody thinks/hopes the scope will be limited to the tactical, even if that turns out not to be the case. It's like using "Peacekeeper" as the name for an ICBM.
Perhaps you're not aware that there are "small" nuclear weapons? These are only a few kilotons in yield but can be very portable for battlefield use. Think of a nuclear mortar that shoots a few miles out with a half mile blast radius. This is the kind of thing that would keep people up at night if they went missing. It probably keeps someone up just making sure they don't go missing.
While that test was successful, as far as I know, the project was stopped before it was ever a "production" device. I suspect his was because of the risk to the operator, as small mortar and similar nuclear devices could jam or otherwise fail to move away form the launch site.
The whole concept of a nuclear mortar seems like an idea that sounds good on paper, but probably has all kinds of problem and subtle risks in implementation.
They produced 2,100 warheads for it and it was actively deployed from 1961 to 1971 (I believe it was deployed to the Korean peninsula among other places).
Tactical nukes are used in tactical situations (See Tactics vs Strategy), meaning during active combat against individual fighting units (tank battalions)
The old, grim joke was "a tactical nuke is one that explodes in Germany."
But yeah, small and designed to be delivered against enemy troop concentrations, as opposed to the larger strategic weapons that are designed to be used against enemy population centers and strategic weapons.
> While there are several ways to distinguish between
strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, most analysts consider nonstrategic weapons to be
shorter-range delivery systems with lower yield warheads that might be used to attack troops or
facilities on the battlefield. They have included nuclear mines; artillery; short-, medium-, and
long-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs. [1]
I don't think this is a good definition. The US military to my knowledge hasn't used a tactical nuke in live battle conditions ever, and has used 2 "strategic" class nukes in live battle conditions.
In my opinion, all nukes today are strategic nukes in that they intend to make your enemy think twice before launching their own nukes.
Even tactical sized nukes, if used today, will ignite a severe counter-reaction that is highly likely to escalate to full blown intercontinental nuclear war.
At the time they were first developed, tactical nuclear weapons were intended to be used in a full-scale war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. There was an opinion in the military establishment that chemical and low-yield nuclear weapons would be used to a limited degree on the battlefields of an otherwise conventional war.
I don't think this view is as crazy at it sounds on the surface. I don't think the US and UK would launch a general nuclear strike if, say, Soviet Frontal Aviation put a nuclear-tipped cruise missile into the USS Eisenhower or Seventh Army engineers blew strategic bridges with nuclear demolition charges. It's a dangerous line to flirt, though.
I believe it describes shorter range nukes used on battlefields, for example against opposing ground forces.
The opposite would be strategic nukes. These are long range, high-yield weapons used to knock-out cities and bring about nuclear apocalypse type scenarios.
More specifically strategy has an overall large plan and tactics take care of one specific goal.
So a strategic plan to prevent the use of a harbor might be a single strategic sized nuke. You could say the tactic and strategic levels merged into one. There's only one tactical move as part of that strategic plan. One call does it all.
A nuclear tactical plan to prevent the use of a harbor might involve as a small part of the overall mission a nuclear torpedo to put a pesky submarine out of commission so a naval invasion can happen without being sunk by the sub. Or a nuclear artillery shell to clear a tank battalion guarding an approach to the harbor from your forces that'll take control of the harbor.
Typically dropping a bridge with a nuke while retreating is rarely/never strategic, it's tactical as a tiny component of an overall retreat involving numerous tasks.
Another characteristic is strategic "button pushing" rarely is authorized on the front line, but tactical "button pushing" is usually authorized at the front line. So M16s tend not to be strategic.
That's right, the primary distinction is to the types of targets each is intended for, though generally speaking tactical nukes are lower-yield than strategic ones. (Because if you're aiming a nuke at enemy forces on a battlefield, the odds are pretty good that there are friendly forces a short distance away on the same field that you'd rather not kill at the same time.)
Not necessarily. It's more about range and use, but generally the yields are smaller. Some tactical nuclear weapons had yields larger than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs. Tactical nuclear weapons were generally on shorter range (rather than intercontinental) delivery systems and generally were tasked with taking out an objective, which may or may not be mobile, than fixed infrastructure or a population/industry/control center.
In short, and very simply - it means the nuke is smaller and more focused.
From my time in combat zones - we always thought of tactical as the level at which a battalion or lower might operate. Strategic would be entire regiments or larger, potentially involving entire countries.
A nuke that clears the path for a battalion (political implications of using a nuclear weapon aside) is tactical. A nuke that eliminates a capital or engulfs many battalions in flames is strategic.
I would imagine, though, that a "tactical-sized", or smaller, nuke could have strategic implications if you detonated it somewhere of great import (eliminating the leadership while all in one building, for example). This would be a strategic use of a nuke.
But in actuality - it is very complicated. Something like a nuclear weapon is a multifaceted action and cannot be distilled to a single word.
Tactical nuclear weapons are designed for uses like destroying enemy forces on the battlefield -- like short-range missiles, small bombs, artillery shells, and emplaced area-denial weapons (sometimes called "nuclear land mines").
As opposed to strategic nuclear weapons, which are designed for uses like destroying enemy industrial capacity, key resource infrastructure, military command and control facilities, and population centers.
Well the US military (from whom the term comes) doesn't seem to understand the difference between tactics and strategy (it defines the difference in terms of the number of people involved). I understand tactics to be about execution, strategy about setting and changing goals, but if you search for discussions on the subject you'll find a wide and confusing range of opinions.
Given that the first use of a "tactical" nuclear weapon would change the nature of any war, they're a rather strange idea (and in practice, tactical nuclear weapons were phased out because of this). Strategic nuclear weapons changed the rules of warfare, redefining the goals that could realistically be chosen -- one of the few unambiguously correct uses of the word "strategy" IMO.
I'd say it was too expensive to be used, otherwise they'd be used more often. Also one of them did not explode as intended due to the primitive detonation mechanism, so there was some technical difficulties involved (at a time when they barely started using matchlocks, not even the more advanced and successful flintlocks).
It was basically the equivalent of a boat filled with TNT as I understand, not that powerful.
Could've been very useful at wiping out ports, cities and fleets, at the time, I doubt they had any qualms about it :-).
Also, not that much of a war deterrent, as history can attest, lol...
Something similar was tried during WWII. See [1]. This was an explosive ship used to attack an important drydock. The explosive ship part worked fine. But there was a complicated commando raid on other nearby objectives attached to the operation, which didn't go as well.
Hellburners are is no way equivalent to any nuclear weapon. The renaissance had no such equivalents. The description of any ancient weapon in terms of weapons of mass destruction is disingenuous. It lessens the term and suggests that such weapons are nothing new in history. That leads to arguments for their regulation and use in historical terms: Elizabeth used hellburners then, so we should be able to use tactical nukes today.
As in another thread, it seems like the word "Tactical" is key here. The new weapon that was recently released to the US is particularly objectionable to many because it allows its' yield to be 'dialed down'.
There are also air-to-air nuclear weapons designed for planes to shoot at each other, which might not have a yield much larger than a Hellburner.
I share your concern about an interpretation of history that lends arguments to dangerous attitudes in present-day politics, just having recently read a great deal about nuclear yields, the humongous detonations we imagine are not the only type possible, they're just the only type of weapons which have ever been deployed, with many weapons simply not even having been ever tested.
Nuclear weapons are not unique only in terms of blast size. The radiation they create is a wholly new danger with no historical president. The creation, handling storage and eventual disposal of nuclear material is also new.
The hellburners had, perhaps, a few tons worth of explosive. And it was blackpowder rather than TNT. A relatively tiny nuke, such as the AIM-26 air-to-air missile, explodes with the equivalent of 250 metric tonnes of TNT. The smallest ever nukes are in the 10-50 tonnes range, still well beyond the blackpowder in any hellburner. The proportion of energy released as radiation and/or fallout is generally inversely related to yield (less confinement of the critial mass > less efficient burning). So Be afraid of tiny nukes.
The the future they will likely use antimatter, not as explosive but as a neutron source. That would allow for much smaller nukes once they figure out how to keep the antimatter suspended within the uranium shell. Such weapons could burn uranium very efficiently, resulting in much reduced fallout.
Are you implying that the ancients never had access to weapons capable of killing thousands/millions of people when unleashed?
What about chemical/biological weapons? I faintly recall some stories of the Bible where rats were used as weapons (not a plague from the Lord, but actual humans collecting lots of rats and releasing them near the enemy city), and the ancient Jews were not particularly advanced compared with other civilizations of the time.
The turtle ship is another interesting tactical weapon that comes from these era but in other parts of the world. It would ram deep inside enemy formations and fire cannons on all sides which resulted in some astounding victories given Chosun Navy had only a dozen ships vs. thousands of japanese ships. You couldn't land on the ship because it had spikes and would spew smoke for evasion.
It's really surprising that turtle ships and detonating fire ships weren't more commonly used.
Maybe most thought it was just a myth, stories told by travelers, or maybe it was ungentlemanly?
The Civil War and even WW1 saw a lot of losses because of this inability to adapt, by WW2 (and forward) everybody used the latest advances they could get their hands on...
> It's really surprising that turtle ships and detonating fire ships weren't more commonly used.
I can't speak for the turtle ships, but the cost of the gunpowder used in a hellburner can't be overstated. I know that in the 18th century British navy, accurate gunners were at a premium because the government would not supply powder and shot for target practice, and only a wealthy captain could afford to purchase enough for really good training. The military cost of widespread incompetence at gunnery was deemed less than the financial cost of those training supplies--and that was more than two centuries of development after the Antwerp hellburner.
interesting point that we rarely see tactical weapons of mass destruction being frequently such as nuclear weapon. It's interesting that Japan lost both wars to sudden technological advancements from opposing side and they aren't ever used again.
The turtle ships weren't alone but it was a gifted korean naval commander who ironically never commanded a navy before and figured shit out as the war was unfolding. The Korean general would even be hailed as a mythical figure and admired by WW2 Japanese naval generals.
The turtle ship wasn't sudden (the Koreans built the first examples over a century earlier) and didn't alter the war. Toyotomi Hideyoshi had the entire peninsula under his control until the Ming Emperor intervened.
For some definition of "control." Admiral Yi fought twenty-something battles (seems like the exact number is hard to say because it's difficult to define what constitutes a "battle"), and never lost a single one.
(That's not to say the Korean navy didn't suffer devastating losses... but that was when Yi was in prison thanks to the idiot king who bought the disinformation supplied by Japanese spies.)
Anyway, that raises a philosophical question: if your troops and their supplies need to be delivered across the water, and if your enemy is controlling that water, how much are you controlling the land behind?
> Anyway, that raises a philosophical question: if your troops and their supplies need to be delivered across the water, and if your enemy is controlling that water, how much are you controlling the land behind?
Depends on how much that is true. Replacements are definitely a problem, but medieval armies had significant ability to supply locally. On top of this, the Toyotomi army was never blockaded on the peninsula; Yi's actions significantly disrupted the sea lines of communication but never truly cut or controlled them.
Without the Ming army to fight Toyotomi would not have been under significant strain. Even with a Ming army on the field and Yi disrupting his SLOC Toyotomi was still able to extract a truce while he held the southern half of the peninsula.
Regardless, what the Joseon navy was able to accomplish it did because Yi was a badass admiral, not because of turtle ships or other special weapons. That was the original point.
Well, I have no problem with your last paragraph, but I think you overestimate the mobility of medieval armies. "Finding local supply" basically means sacking towns, which is not always a viable option (ask Napoleon), especially in a war that lasted seven years.
The Japanese army did succeed in initially overwhelming Korean forces with supreme military tactics, so much so that they entered Seoul basically unscathed, only to find that the king and his courtiers have fled north.
From what little I know, it seems that the Japanese forces didn't quite understand the situation. In traditional Japan (from what I've heard), if your force wins the battle and enters the enemy castle, you have won. The enemy's people are now under your rule and their food and supply is yours.
Instead, Japanese forces found itself surrounded in a sea of hostile troops and militia bands, who will (incredibly) fight to the bitter end. Not unlike what the US found in Iraq, but without the ridiculous military advantage. Korean army's major military victories included the battle of Haengju (near Seoul) and Jinju (southeastern Korea, near present-day Busan), which all happened within one year since the war broke.
A major reason why Toyotomi could parley for truce that involved Japan securing the southern part of Korea, was that Chinese forces had no reason to stake their lives for someone else's country, yet they still had enough political power to force Korea to the talking table.
not to leave out that Admiral Yi was arrested and tortured for saving the country and becoming more popular than the King himself. Dissent was very high and there are some records of Korean civilians who chose to side with the Japanese in hope they could be liberated from the oppressive pre-North Korea Chosun dynasty, that ultimately failed it's people.
You won't find many sympathizers for the Chosun Kings apart from the one hit wonders like Sejong who invented the Korean alphabet.
General Burnside had trained special black troops to head this assault because of just how complicated this mission was compared to anything else in contemporary existence. They were pulled at the last minute by General Meade for a combination of PR reasons (can't have black people winning the war), personal glory reasons, and skepticism.
The entire thing is a very sad story.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Crater