Theress a bug. That happens. Reporting it should take way less time than writing a sarcastic blog post ("I haven't filed a bug because we aren't Canonical's free debugging resource"). It's open source, so I think reporting bugs or submitting a PR is just good citizenship.
It's not a bug, it's a deliberate incompatibility, as noted by the article's author:
>> Wildcards in command line arguments are not supported—using these in original versions of sudo was usually a sign of mis-configuration and consequently sudo-rs simply forbids using them. The only supported use is ‘’ as the final argument to indicate “zero or more subsequent arguments as noted above.*
> I do not really have words for this. The Rust sudo has apparently opted to keep the single most dangerous wildcard while disallowing all of the wildcards that allow one to be narrow and specific about what you're allowing, and it buries this at the end of a section that devotes a bunch of words to describing functionality it doesn't have and doesn't support, with absolutely nothing else in that section to say this (either up front or in the descriptions of how all the wildcards would work if sudo-rs supported them, which it doesn't).
If someone tries to do an in-place upgrade to Ubuntu 26.04, sudo-rs could potentially be installed instead of 'regular' sudo, and now you have a potentially system with borked functionality.
> It's open source, so I think reporting bugs or submitting a PR is just good citizenship.
LOL, the author's very next weblog post:
> One reaction to my entry on how the Rust Sudo is not fully compatible with proper Sudo is that I should have filed a bug report about this behavior. One of the reasons I have not done this comes down why I was using the Rust Sudo, and in my view it's a wider issue with bug reporting in general. To put it simply, I am (or was) an involuntary user of the Rust Sudo, not a voluntary one.
[…]
> In a project centered view, all people using Rust Sudo 'should' report issues to the project because that's how FOSS projects improve (this is not really true, the project unquestionably only wants what it considers 'good' bug reports and will be unhappy about ones that, for example, revisit decisions it has no intentions of changing). In the people centered view, many people have not chosen to use the new Rust Sudo or the Rust Coreutils, they've been stuck with them by Canonical's decisions. These people are under no obligation to help out with Canonical's apparent project of improving these projects (or help out the projects themselves); the Ubuntu project does not get to make everyone using Ubuntu into obligatory bug reporters through its own choices.
I really hate such clickbait titles. When I read it, the assumption was that the Fable model would hide some information in watermarked images by default. This would be very concerning from a privacy point of view.
What the article is actually about is how the authors instructed Fable to do so.
I bet the same is happening with writing, at least with technical and academic. Automated grammar checkers and AI correctors bland the language by enforcing strict grammar. Whereas a slight departure from standard grammar and punctuation is something that could give writing character and personality.
You kind of just need to follow the drone news like this article and you can see over the course of the last few years the kind of wild stuff they figure out.
Thanks. The fault is mine though. Thought you were
talking about "hackers" in the breaching networks sense, not in the sense of engineering innovative mechanical solutions. Either way, impressive what Ukraine is capable of coming up with.
it was very slow, and I had to re-authenticate often.
I want something like dropbox daemon, which mounts drive and syncs it. Set up once and forget. Since I have not found anything like this for Proton I am still using Dropbox for some synced data.
"Languages: German and English" – this is odd. That means their dataset is limited. In my understanding, frontier models are trained on multilingual datasets and can combine knowledge no matter what language it was written in.
Have you read the non-English output of those mutlilingual models? They say they put extra effort in to improve nuances and tone in this one. That alone is worth having in many settings.
In my experience, ArXiv has become too slow to publish. My previous paper took weeks to be approved. It was a recommended path for journal submission (posting to a public repository and submitting a link), and after waiting a long time, I just posted it on hal.science instead, and it was up in a day.
Another one of mine has been on hold for 18 days and counting.
I think it is a great service to the community, but clearly they are having a scalability problem.
Have you contributed volunteer moderator time? Ultimately, that is the most important resource being strained on ArXiv by large numbers of submissions.
I expect in the near future all digital cameras to digitally sign the images they take. Even before AI slop, it was useful to avoid manual alterations. AI makes it all too easy, so it makes sense.
However, this will certify only the original image. I think the missing part of this is additional layers of certification which allow some image editing (e.g., rotating, contrast, etc.) yet clearly document that the image was modified and link to the original image ID. Kind of like a signed git log.
Hi, I'm the author of the above. I also got a Sony A7 IV camera a few days ago. I already have a root shell on it. Although that wasn't even required to break Sony's C2PA implementation...
Signing the raw image data wouldn't require also signing the EXIF metadata. For privacy, you could later strip out everything except the raw image and the camera's signature and still prove that the image is unaltered.
What are you signing it with, though? A unique key that only exists on your device... so it will perfectly tie a photo to a specific camera.
Even if you didn't know who owned the camera, you could identify other pictures taken by that same camera, and information in those photos might let you figure out who owns the camera.
That just means no one else can pretend they are you, but it also means they can know it HAS to be you.
If you sign two images with that private key, people will know for certain that you created both of them. This is the whole point of signing something. No one else can fake it because they don't have the private key, but EVERYONE can verify it because they DO have the public key. In fact, they don't even need the public key because they can extract it from the signature and the signed image.
Ontop of this, including a photo edit history in a photo including the original photo would increase the size of a photo to be completely unusable or unshareable.
I understood the GP so that only some unique ID or hash of the original image would be included, not the image itself. Basically like the commit chain of Git but without the actual content blobs.
You could use this data to prove that image B is an edit of image A if you already have both A and B.
I still think this is a bad idea, because this all requires the images to have some sort of ID - and that seems like a prime target for tracking.
In the contexts where you need to prove an image is a real unaltered photograph (court cases, news media, science, etc) privacy is usually not a concern.
Nobody cares if your social media photos are edited, they probably are, it's fine.
I'm pretty sure if signing images becomes the norm, because cameras will do it automatically then social media sites etc will start to care - or at least be thankful for the additional metadata.
EXIF already includes extensive metadata, including phone model and GPS location. For professional cameras, there is often camera and lens serial numbers too.
This has been the case for many years, and so far social media sites never care - they strip that info instead. Why would this change with one more extra piece of metadata?
>EXIF data is stripped for a good reason - because it can be a privacy hazard. Suddenly this plays no role anymore?
Can you clarify what your actual complaint is here? Putting aside for a second obvious implementation options, it's pretty standard that there can be a tradeoff between privacy and trust. Any of us are still perfectly free to upload images for fun to forums or social media or whatever that are private, or edited or whatever we like. But if there's something we [i]want[/i] to prove, this gives an extra option to do so. And in particular the set of cases where one cares the most about enhancing authenticity appears at first thought to be pretty much a union set with the cases where one will put their name (or at least the location and time of the picture in question) behind the image? Like, can you give examples of specific cases you are imagining where simultaneously the photo itself reveals no information about time and location [i]and[/i] it's something local/national/international-newsworthy where people would fear AI-alteration? Like, say you're photographing at a protest to document it including any violations of law. By definition, the images you take reveal the location and the time. That's the whole point of them. Having the location and timestamp signed wouldn't reveal anything extra as long as the photo was unaltered.
And actual legit journalism always has name(s) standing behind the reporting. Or for that matter, even if we're merely talking something like a review of a product, is it actually wrong to put a name or pseudonym behind that review if you expect readers to give you much credence? I mean, you'd be free in terms of law and tech to not bother. But even long before the current growing AI-slop age a lot of us have been starting to treat anonymous reviews with a lot of skepticism, or discounting them entirely for some product classes, for good reason.
Even in terms of maintaining privacy, remember we already have "tools" for that which this in turn could further help. You could privately report a tip to a reporter at a media organization, and then they could report on that without revealing you but be able to say "we verified the signature of the raw image and sensor data" alongside normal follow up. Then it's their name, but having a stronger chain behind it could still be helpful in places.
Finally getting back to "implementation options", there's no technical reason the image and multiple sets of metadata can't all be signed separately by the sensor stack such that you can pick & choose what to include and still have it all be signed, with readers giving greater or lesser weight to the trust based on your choices.
I think what got me worried is the GPs take that "I expect in the near future all digital cameras to digitally sign the images they take". Sure, if you have your special, verification-enhanced camera, go for it. But if this goes like with smartphones and we have all cameras embedding such a signature - and therefore all cameras are made locked-down and tamper-resistent - then we have another category of devices removed from control of their users.
> Any of us are still perfectly free to upload images for fun to forums or social media or whatever that are private, or edited or whatever we like.
First, the paper proposed a method of embedding the metadata inside the actual image pixels in a way that makes it difficult to remove. I think it's still possible, but you're will need a specialized tool to do so and it will alter the image.
Second, that's assuming forums or social media would still be allowing uploading unsigned images. If AI images really become as much of a problem as anticipated here, then sites might decide to block any image they can't verify completely.
> Like, can you give examples of specific cases you are imagining where simultaneously the photo itself reveals no information about time and location [i]and[/i] it's something local/national/international-newsworthy where people would fear AI-alteration?
All kinds of photos from warzones have this property. We wouldn't have an entire science of geolocating photos from landmarks that were accidentally captured if everyone was so easy with putting their GPS coordinates in the file.
There will always be a way around it. There are even open-source alternative/hacked firmwares for professional DSLR cameras where tampering with the signing may be possible.
And this still doesn't help any other kind of image e.g. screenshots, photo of a screen etc. that can make the camera signatures largely pointless depending on the context.
The idea is to be able to prove that a photo you took was captured by a camera, not generated. That would be helpful in the context of a disputed news story, a court case, etc.
It's not massively helpful for a court case, IMO. This has been handled the same way since the invention of photography: ask the photographer to swear under oath they took the photo. (technically, laying a foundation for the evidence)
Yes in multiple ways, and there's probably more than this:
It's relevant that a screenshot doesn't have a signature, in the case that you want to remove any "proof" or tracking info from a real photo when uploading an image. Maybe I don't want people to know what brand/model of camera I use.
And it's relevant if a screenshot did have a signature if you want to "prove" that the screenshot itself hasn't been tampered with after the fact.
In the method proposed in the paper, the signature is stored in the pixels and ostensibly even survives some compression. So if you made a screenshot of a signed image, the image would still have its signature inside the screenshot, but the screenshot wouldn't have any (new) signature as a whole.
I would assume you could make big enough differences in color/contrast/brightness and especially 3D rotation (similar to taking a photo of a screen) would make such a signature unreadable... but I would love to be proven wrong.
> However, this will certify only the original image. I think the missing part of this is additional layers of certification which allow some image editing (e.g., rotating, contrast, etc.) yet clearly document that the image was modified and link to the original image ID. Kind of like a signed git log.
That’s not necessarily missing. For photography competitions, what matters is that people send original photos; for press photos, you don’t need a digital link between what’s published and the original, either. What matters is that papers, when questioned, can produce the original of a photo they published. Then, humans can determine whether editing changed the story.
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