Similarly, like spaghetti shops, small software companies do not primarily make money because of "features." The notion that software is bought because of features is something that running a software company will quickly disabuse you of.
There's an old & cheesy (maybe true, maybe not) cliche: "Features TELL, benefits SELL"
"All current and former Army National Guard members since 2004 could be affected by this breach because files containing personal information was inadvertently transferred to a non-DoD-accredited data center by a contract employee [...]"
The irony that the data had been uploaded to a physically secured, encrypted datacenter network from 27 DVDs in the possession of someone who could do whatever they wanted to with the contents of those DVDs without audit was not lost on me.
I don't reference this to imply it was good and proper use of the data; merely to note the difference between policy security and actual security.
> the reason for the "are you 13 years or older" checkbox question
I thought all the age-of-13 stuff, specifically, was because you can't legally enter yourself into a contract when you're younger than 13. Which is to say, you can't accept EULAs or Terms of Service (or you can, but they'll have no legal force.)
Some people even consider COPPA to be a form of censorship. It creates such a huge legal burden on websites if they allow < 13 year olds, that most websites have to ban them, thus limiting their right to speech.
That's all true. If that was the only factor I might stick with consoles -- however, PCs have something else: A much more diverse collection of games. I'm interested in Steam machines largely because I would like to play PC games in a more Xbox-like way.
The fact that it will result in more games running on Linux is also a plus (for me).
I wouldn't want to trust 3/4 of the TSA folks I've encountered to run a cat house let alone exercise their independent judgement when it came to my safety or the safety of my friends and family getting on an airplane. While this isn't very polite, this screwup pretty clearly indicates that the TSA isn't exactly made up of "A-players."
Like most people pontificating/bitching about the TSA I of course have zero legit expertise in airport security, but I do have a bit of first hand experience at Ben Gurion airport in Israel where the threat level is generally pretty high.
The first thing you notice is that the security people always look like they are playing on game day. Unlike joe-blow TSA agent, these folks are alert, speak multiple languages, and likely get some specialized training to detect if someone is lying or was tricked/coerced into carrying a bomb.
It's weird-- the vibe is at times both more tense and also more relaxed than an American airport. The security people at Ben Gurion seem less like bureaucrats following procedures and more like smart people empowered to exercise their judgement (ex grandma isn't getting yanked out of line.)
Once you're in, you get asked some almost chit-chatty questions about what you're up to while they review your travel documents but the whole time it also feels like you're talking to an observant doctor or physician examining you for symptoms of an illness. If you "pass" their filter you're done & on your way in quite literally a minute or two (and it being Israel there's naturally some controversy about who gets selected for "extra" scrutiny and why.)
I've read that the problem in the US is that it's too big to cost-effectively implement a system like this everywhere and that's probably true. But maybe at least at the big/major airports there ought to be some equivalent specially-trained "hunters" who know their stuff.
It's a good thing that the agency head resigned because the TSA flunked a practice test instead of the real thing.
From the Sony pictures incident to the attack on that satirical magazine in Paris to this, it's getting pretty tiresome having to deal with authoritarian types who believe they should dictate what other people can say or access.
It's excessive if your goal is _solely_ to execute a repeating AJAX request. But, if I'm understanding the attack correctly, this script is injected _in place of_ jQuery requested from Baidu's CDN. If you want the affected sites to appear normal, so the users whose browsers you are highjacking will contribute to the DDOS for the longest possible period, then you want to ensure that jQuery does indeed load.
The OP further clarifies why jQuery is injected _twice_: seems the injection is occurring only for 1% of requests. So it appears the code is looking to see if it has triggered the injection itself, and fires another request if needed.
We knew the world would not be the same. A few people laughed, a few people cried, most people were silent. I remembered the line from the Hindu scripture, the Bhagavad-Gita... "Now, I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds."
Any engineer worth his salt absolutely understands the consequences of their actions on the world. Sometimes they understand a bit too late.