He had to deal with so much absolute bullshit to get the diesel generator I mentioned in the story done, and then Hurricane Sandy destroyed it instantly a few years later. Felt bad for him.
Before Jane Street I did more humble work helping gay men hook up as fast as possible via a proto-Grindr site. We were co-located downtown when 9/11 happened. They had diesel generators but they ran out of fuel after several days because the national guard wouldn't let the diesel supply trucks through.
When we went offline customers were super understanding!
Except one customer who was outraged and we felt totally comfortable banning their account.
The real answer is probably lost in the sands of time but even at 200 people we still had different teams with overlapping responsibilities. It's possible I was the only person reachable and close enough after hours, and while I didn't know where the CRAC unit controls were I did know how to rip power cords out.
Sandy was wild. you couldn't get computers for love or money, everything was jammed up. we ended up with whatever hardware configs had been returned and sitting in a dell warehouse just to have enough machines so for a long time after you'd have a rack of the standard build and then a random machine with a fibre channel card.
shocking how much engineering you can get done when the normal process becomes impossible and waiting isn't an option.
If only we could have some kind of jobs program where the government could pay people to fix their crap. A side benefit would be a reduction in unemployment.
There are no unemployed cybersecurity professionals (who are qualified). There is likely a fraction of a percent who are "Between jobs" and that's about it. It's still very difficult to find and hire qualified candidates, even despite the recent surge in programmers making the leap.
Can't tell if Ubuntu is smart for deferring this patch until a bigger periodic release because there's no evidence it's been exploited and its exploitability is quite limited or if Ubuntu is dumb because there's a lot of publicity around this CVE and it comes off as failing to read the room.
> This technically also means we have to trust the hardware, OS, OCaml compiler that the Rocq proof checker relies on.
It just so happens Claude and I recently did an independent implementation of OCaml and ruled out malware in the compiler bootstrap via DDC (and also by achieving byte identical outputs).
So, we can at least rule out "trusting trust" malware in the OCaml part of the stack and up. (Rocq does not have trusting trust concerns since it's implemented in OCaml and C)
Couldn't this be enforced at the router? Intercept outbound TLS. If the client hello is to a new domain, hold it and start a new outbound connection and see if the server responds with a certificate on the CRL. If so, ban it. Otherwise let the original TLS connection proceed.
That doesn't stop you from asking for the certificate on a separate connection with your own session key, and terminating the original connection if you don't like the certificate.
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