To be honest, the freedom to fail alone would make a huge difference. On one hand there's a lot of freedom for intellectual growth in academia - in the last few months I've used deep learning, assembled hardware under a microscope, performed neurosurgery and genetic engineering (this is somewhat standard for my field). On the other hand, I make less than I did as a new cable guy, won't make more for 10 years, and every postdoc and phd student in my lab works 7 days / week standard. And if I fail, I will probably be done career-wise. LOTS of talented people leave because they see startups as the 'safer' bet - at least if your startup fails you're not doomed.
The fact that the negotiations were done in secret probably means that most of the TTP content is being given to journalists by those officially authorized to speak about it. This isn't unexpected, but it does affect how the TTP is framed (even if you don't buy the Greenwald puff-piece-for-access argument).
Journalists will be interested in publishing articles about TPP today, rather than a month from now. That interest might lead one to lend a friendly ear to the only people who have actually read the current draft, who just so happen to strongly support the passage of the current draft.
That's an extreme interpretation. KAB started the thread with thoughts about "how the TTP is framed". I mentioned "lend[ing] a friendly ear". How did we move from that to "bought off"?
It's not as though NYT are infallible, however, and it is well known that journalists often become sympathetic to the opinions of those government officials, company executives, etc. to whom they require access in order to obtain information they need.
Fwiw, the increased scrutiny that goes with death penalty cases raises uncomfortable questions about the justice system in general.
Would this case be acceptable if Glossip had only received a life sentence? I'm not sure either way. But it does seem that the justice system should have more accommodation for uncertainty than a complicated appeals process that seems to focus on procedural issues.
What form would an uncertainty-conscious justice system take? Economists might suggest that you can account for uncertainty merely by lowering punishment accordingly to account for "risk," (e.g. we will lower punishment by X percent because we're only Y percent sure you are guilty) but that doesn't seem to work here. On the other hand we clearly can't have a justice system that never acts for fear of wrongful incarceration.
Anesthesia practically eliminates consciousness yet the brain states are probably more similar than brains and the United States. I'm not sure I agree that apparent similarity is good enough to conclude that the US is probably conscious under a materialist framework.
Definitely possible, however. And fun to consider whole galaxies exhibiting consciousness.
> fun to consider whole galaxies exhibiting consciousness.
Yeah, but a slow consciousness that would be, unless information can travel at speeds faster than light. If not, then there is a limit to how large a computer can be on account of the speed of light and a few other physical limitations.
I like parts of the darpa model, like sufficient funding to accomodate failure, and fast timescales.
But it can be distracting for some people, where lab members will be pulled from more basic science questions to more engineering 'how can I make this closed-loop stimulator hit these white matter tracts?' questions.
I enjoy the planetary motion analogy immensely. However, a curious complexity is evident in biological systems - it's physics imbued with 'meaning'. A cell that behaves one way instead of another will die. This is true from e. coli up to skin cells. I suspect this adds a lot of complexity to the ultimate 'algorithm' of intelligence.
In fact, it's probably prudent to stipulate whether the goal is to specify the developmental algorithm that gives rise to intelligence, or intelligence itself. The generating process might be a lot more simple than the finished product, in the same way that the output of a pseudorandom number generator is very complex in terms of entropy (but not kolmogorov complexity, I guess), but the generating algorithm is very simple. Or the Rado graph, which is sorta maximally complex in the sense that it contains all finite and countably infinite graphs as induced subgraphs, yet it has a simple generating scheme. As a last example, consider No Man's Sky - relatively simple algorithm compared to the astonishing complexity of the worlds.
I do believe there is a relatively simple high-level description of neural development. But it's curious how it's relatively robust to genetic manipulations. I remember early in graduate school listening to a lecture about a particular mouse model for autism, caused by just one gene. The lecturer excitedly told us that it had a very high rate of behavioral manipulation - 75% or so. Not coming from a mouse-model background I was astonished that it was 'only' 75%. What happens in the other 25% - the gene doesn't just magically reappear, there are other compensatory mechanisms. What drives those? I suspect that's the more abstract level of description that a simple algorithm might describe.
Yes but how much does this explain? Even being convinced of the significance of the effect, I'd like to know the magnitude, as well as how much the magnitude changes conditioned on success. E.g. do the very successful (however defined) have a higher likelihood of being the oldest in their class?
"Why do we do this to ourselves?" She asked me. "We train forever and ever, live in near poverty, work insane hours—all of it to get jobs that don’t exist, as tenure track faculty. Why do we suffer this way?"
Because it's fun and fulfilling. My lab has had people who left banking and consulting gigs, at extraordinary financial cost, measured in dollars. Neither seemed to regret the switch much, but many who go the other way feel the same.
Planning on a tenure track job isn't very reasonable, it's like planning for a successful startup, I suppose. But right now I get to do exactly what I want to be doing. The 'premium' economists would say I pay is worth it to me, for now.
It's not that fun though. It's a fun _dream_, and a dream that is worth chasing in theory, but most of us never come close to living it. Instead you just say "well, I'm sure things will work out after the hard part is over."
There is no reliable point where the hardship ends. It's just sacrifice or career change for most.
I respectfully disagree, and think "because it's fun" is a dangerous precedent to set.
When I was in grad school there was an informational poster in the lobby that said something to this effect: "Why are you in lab at 12am on a Friday night? Because science is your passion, and you are awesome. Good job."
I should have graffiti-ed "THIS IS PROMOTING AN UNHEALTHY LIFESTYLE" next to it. Why should we encourage this behavior -- especially in graduate students, lowest on the totem pole? How many PIs burn the midnight oil, versus living their life with their families? It felt so degrading.
One of the most valuable things I learned from career development in grad school was that, in the real world, you can demand to be paid what you're worth. (And, ironically, you are respected more for it.) I think it is this, more than the actual salary, that is responsible for the depression seen in the article.