The methodology appears to be as naive as a brute force attack against the Pre-Shared Key (PSK):
"At the beginning, the area was scanned-sniffed with ‘Airodump’ and then a deauthentication attack was made with ‘Aireplay’," according to the paper. "Through that, an instance of the PSK was caught. Finally, ‘Aircrack’ was attempting to reveal the secret password by using the instance of the PSK and matching it with every record of the dictionary. For these experiments we used a very big dictionary that consisted of 666,696 standard printable ASCII character records of various lengths. ‘Airodump’ and ‘Aireplay’ are commands of the ‘Aircrack’ suite, responsible for sniffing and deauthentication respectively."
Not that alone. They show that that is "practical", which may be semi-new, but the main trick:
" it is the de-authentication step in the wireless setup that represents a much more accessible entry point for an intruder with the appropriate hacking tools. As part of their purported security protocols routers using WPA2 must reconnect and re-authenticate devices periodically and share a new key each time. The team points out that the de-authentication step essentially leaves a backdoor unlocked albeit temporarily."
I take offence to their statement "leaves a backdoor unlocked". It's no such thing. The de-auth step merely saves you the time of having to wait for the client/ap to renegotiate on their own. Even if your de-auth step is successful, you still have to conduct a brute force against the handshake you captured. Nothing, at any time, is unlocked.
Exactly. We've known that WPA2-PSK was vulnerable to dictionary attacks since before it was even popular. Also, a ~700k password dictionary is not what I would describe as "very big". This still won't crack my wireless, nor many of the wireless networks I've used that have relatively easily predictable passwords.
The Anderson Report into scientology stated that the E-meter is used:
"...to assume, intensify and retain control over the minds and wills of preclears. Fears of its abilities keep them in constant subjection. Its use can be so manipulated by cunningly phrased questions that almost any desired result can be obtained, and it is used unscrupulously to dominate students and staff alike. All the evil features of scientology are intensified where the E-meter is involved. When used in conjunction with hypnotic techniques, its evil impact is greatly increased. This simple electrical device is not, of course, the sole basis for the condemnation of scientology, but without the E-meter scientology would be partly disarmed."
The use of psychological manipulation tools works well for scientology. Polygraphy works better because it is backed by a larger community of supporters that are just as deceived as the subjects. Polygraphy has also benefited from decades of use in movies--ensuring much of the world's population now believes in the deception.
It should be noted that both Scientology and the variety of government intelligence agencies (CIA, NSA, etc) have an obsession with berating examinees accusatory and spurious questions and claims, the goal being to get the examinees to incriminate themselves.
Famously (or infamously), a Scientologist examiner's opening question is usually "What are your lies? Everybody has lies, tell me about yours."
There was significant discussion and concern in the academic community during the early 90's in response to NIST's draft standard for digital signatures (DSS). The academic community was concerned that field parameters could have been carefully selected such that they contained hidden properties (weak primes, etc). This is why "nothing up my sleeve numbers" must be used in cryptography. The same issue impacts the selection of prime field parameters for use in ECDSA/ECDH (TLS, S/MIME, etc). Worth noting is that NIST P-256 and NIST P-384 elliptic curves were selected from "verifiable random numbers" generated in accordance with ANSI X9.62. This standard is not freely available so I am not sure which PRNG was used to generate the curve parameters and why the PRNG seed is considered a "nothing up my sleeve number".
Popular libraries such as OpenSSL and GnuTLS support TLSv1.2 (NSA Suite B Crypto). Typically this means preferring or forcing TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 with elliptic curve CURVE-SECP521R1 for maximum security. Refer to  for more information on the elliptic curve key sizes recommended to be used with various symmetric key sizes.
The notable problem for many users (particularly client-side) is libraries such as NSS not yet supporting TLSv1.2 and therefore not supporting NSA Suite B Crypto.
The "world's most private search engine" pops up the following error message when searching:
"You may be using a privacy-oriented browser extension that conflicts with Startpage. Please disable this extension and try your search again. If this does not help, please contact us at (212) 447-1100 (USA) or autoquery @ ixquick.com."
Around minute 25 there appears to be a very awkward waiting-for-the-Steve-Jobs-applause moment after Elon explains the updated navigation system. A few more announcements are made without applause and then finally, just before the 31 minute mark, applause is finally handed out when the launch date of the Model X is announced. I hope Elon didn't feel disappointed with himself or the audience. Applause is cheap. The questions that followed demonstrated audience buy-in more than any amount of applause could ever achieve.
Also interesting with this update is the suggestion to use open source multimedia DirectShow filters including LAV Filters and ffdshow. LAV Filters appears to ship with DeCSS code -- something which appears to be legally usable within Australia, for most purposes at least, as per §132APC(1) of the Copyright Act 1968.
Further to the above, widespread adoption of open source multimedia libraries on government computer networks would appear to further lock in a future for Australia where software patents are not recognised.
Automatic Identification System (AIS) is used for tracking ships and is also unprotected/unencrypted. This is not particularly an issue because ships inform government port and coastguard authorities of their source and destination ports long before entering sovereign waters. Those authorities can then use a system not too dissimilar to  to verify that a ship detected with radar:
a) is transmitting an AIS identifier that matches the paperwork already received
b) has been transmitting AIS track data that aligns with the paperwork already received since leaving the source port
Furthermore, ships have to allow a pilot on their vessel for pilotage into a port berth. Once they have pulled aside, the area surrounding the berth is, at least for most developed countries, a maritime security zone with barbed wire fences, security patrols and surveillance cameras.
The aviation sector has all of the above controls in place with even greater rigour. Encryption of track data, when factoring in the complexity of key exchange mechanisms and the expense of swapping out old hardware, would therefore have limited effect on either maritime or aviation security.