It's evident that people use bicycles in Montreal -- TFA itself attests this.
But if your point is that North American cities all tend to have the same downtown/suburban contrasts, you are quite right.
People who live $Downtown usually have walkable neighbourhoods and perhaps even access to underground transit. People who live outside the centre of the city mostly end up depending on a private vehicle.
Bicycles are part of the mobility culture in Montreal. But Car Cancer has the same effect everywhere.
They do. Also people who use bicycles in Montreal are disproportionately males and mostly of the certain age group. That's very apparent if you stay for ~10 minutes near Grande Bibliothèque for example or any other relatively busy piste cyclable.
If you call it a 'mobility culture' it a very niche one. Bicycling is a thing for very specific demographics in Montreal in comparison with Amsterdam and even with Eastern European cities.
Interestingly that high schoolers are not biking that much in Montreal, again in comparison. Biking to school was/is an exception where I live(d) in Montreal, i.e. Le Sud-Ouest, NDG.
> If you call it a 'mobility culture' it a very niche one.
And yet it is relatively successful in Montreal (as TFA says). If we are completely honest, bicycling could be called a niche activity in most of North America.
> Bicycling is a thing for very specific demographics in Montreal in comparison with Amsterdam and even with Eastern European cities.
For students, for example.
I did say, "Bicycling is part of the mobility culture of Montreal". I did not claim more, and I also said that it's a controversial topic. On the positive side, Bixi has been a relative success compared to other Canadian cities.[1]
(You know Bixi, so I'll add a link for others to read.)
FTA: “Under the new proposal, some “non-risk” cookies won’t trigger pop-ups at all, and users would be able to control others from central browser controls that apply to websites broadly.”
Implied consent is valid for most functionality, just not selling peoples tracking data or giving it to a third party who could.
Its entirely possible to have no pop-up.
Someone once told me they wanted one anyway because it made the site seem more legitimate than if I removed it (the only thing I would have needed to change was the embedded video from youtube and I could have dropped the popup. Oh well).
Look at what YT loads in terms of tracking, when opening a page with an embedded YT video - even if you do not play that.
Or install something like pi-hole and watch how many analytics calls to Adobe Analytics the Adible app is sending out. Even if just idle in the background. Given the fact that you pay Adobe by the server call, Audible clearly must earn a shitload of money, if they can burn tracking calls like this.
If you are on a Mac, try Little Snitch and see where your data is going while surfing the net. No wonder in the US there are companies, that can sell you a clear image of all relevant data on nearly any person to enable algorithmic wage discrimination [1].
I know, that industry is trying to push EU further and further towards less consumer protections. But we have a great example of what that means for workers, consumers and all of us in the US.
So anywhere there is a YouTube embed we instead display a static thumbnail with 2 inline buttons underneath. 1 button to accept cookies and then load the embed and 1 button to view the video directly on YouTube in a new tab.
It works nicely and also pushed us to switch most of our videos to being first party hosted instead of YouTube.
arguably if there was a browser setting for this the current GDPR would require you to respect that setting. But that's arguably, it would still need to adjudicated.
My conclusion would be that under the current GDPR that if someone had the browser setting on, if a company did not respect that setting and kept private data, that they could be reported for GDPR violations and then the issue could be adjudicated, i.e that the courts would then decide if in fact GDPR violations occur by not following that browser setting.
Secondary conclusion - it might be more beneficial if one just contacted the EDPB and said since this browser setting exists and nobody is using it please issue a ruling if the browser setting must be followed, set it to go into effect by this date giving people time to implement it, and if they agreed the browser setting would be adequate to represent your GDPR wishes they might also conclude that it would be an onerous process to make you go through a GDPR acceptance if it were turned on, howe ver as this article is saying that they are "scaling back" the GDPR that would seem to be dead in the water, which is why I said under "the current GDPR".
In the absence of any explicit consent, no-consent is always assumed by the GDPR. The absence of a DNT header definitely doesn't count as consent, so that header is kind of useless, since the GDPR basically requires every request to be handled as if it has a DNT header.
A pre-existing statement of non-consent doesn't stop anyone from asking whether the user might want to consent now. So it is not legally required to not show a cookie dialog when the DNT header is set, which would be the only real purpose of the DNT header, but legislating such a thing, would be incompatible with the other laws. It would basically forbid anyone from asking for any consent, that's kind of stupid.
The GDPR requires the consent to be given fully informed and without any repercussions on non-consent. So you can't restrict any functionality when non-consenting users, and you can also not say "consent or pay a fee". Also non-consenting must be as easy as consenting and must be revocable at every time. So a lot of "cookie-dialogs" are simply non-compliant with the GDPR.
What would be useful is a "Track me" header, but the consent must be given with an understanding to the exact details of what data is stored, so this header would need to tell what exactly it consents to. But no one would turn it on, so why would anyone waste the effort to implement such a thing in the browser and web applications?
I have never denied helm is a mistake that people refuse to stop using. I quite think of Helm as the same as Ansible. Helm is only nice when you consume packages written by others.
Quite possible that's just some bureaucrats kids running that site in exchange for EU grants. In fact in couple of countries that's precisely the case.
> Side note, would anybody know how "easily" do political elites get off the hook in France?
The actual ex-president got sentenced to jail time last month (and even served some of it) so you're at least not guaranteed to escape the law as a political elite.
But apparently there was actual CSAM there, since the article mentioned that archive.is removed it within a few hours. So the claim was real. Why did they make up such a story around it?
>They replied within a few hours. The response was straightforward: the illegal content would be removed (and we verified that it was), and they had never received any previous notifications about those URLs.
They never notified archive.today of the illegal material, instead they chose to demand blocking actions of archive.today from a DNS provider. I would be interested to know whether any other DNS service providers have received similar such demands.
I would assume (like any normal individual), that you would notify the service first (archive.today) and if they've proven to be a non-responder to CSAM material then escalate to legal action.
If archive.today is honest about never receiving a prior notification, then the way in which they've decided to go about removing the illegal material is very suspicious.
Generally if you encounter CSAM you should report to your countries appropriate organisation. Skip the police and go straight there to save everyone some time and avoid confusion. This agency will handle notifications etc to the site.
UK - https://report.iwf.org.uk/org/ (technically the NCA, but they are a catch all reporting target. As a private individual IWF will handle the onward report for you).
If you are in a country without such an agency, the above agencies are good to inform, as they will both handle international reports.
These organisations will ensure the material is taken down, and will capture and analyse it. CSAM can be compared against hash databases (https://www.thorn.org/) to determine whether there it is as yet unknown material or reshared known material. This can help lead to the identification, arrest, and conviction of material creators as well as the identification and support of victims.
If you tell the site administrator directly there is a good chance they will remove the material and not report it; this is a huge problem in this space at the moment.
In the UK and the USA (and many other places) operators are obligated to report the material; in fact the controversial Online Safety Act puts actual teeth around this very obligation in the UK.
Thorn is the same organisation which drives Chat Control in the EU and to have their secret component installed in every app to scan your messages. Working with these organisations harms consumers, is detrimental for privacy and human rights even if they somehow have good intentions.
The point is that these organisations are in contact with each other and have established channels of funneling reports to each other and relevant legal systems for action.
Making the report is a long way off court action, and it would be unusual for a court to be involved. In most cases the data is connected, documented, and site owners contacted and educated.
Very few countries see accidental/unintentional hosting as a crime (it will fail most reasonableness tests) and fewer are interested in prosecuting one off offenders who can just be asked to stop.
Most countries are very interested in prosecuting the underlying creators and finding and supporting the victims.
I would generally use the standard precautions (VPN/Tor/etc.) but I think these organizations would much rather have you report the content than go after you, unless you've been reporting a suspicious amount of content that indicates you frequent such circles (i.e. you're one of those internet vigilantes).
Both of the reporting tools I linked allow fully anonymous reports.
If you are consuming or encountering CSAM in a fashion where it is not clear that you are not seeking it out and participating in its acquisition and distribution I suggest that you seek both medical and legal help.
One might even go so far to insinuate that they were the party responsible for the CSAM being there to begin with. Wouldn't be the first time someone weaponized such content. I remember at least one case were a steamer was "digitally" swatted using a Dropbox upload link.
It's not inconceivable to suggest that the people claiming that the CSAM hadn't been removed knew it was still there not only because they'd never actually sent the request for removal, but because they themselves put up the original site and requested the CSAM be indexed in the first place.
If the world ran by conspiracy theories, the goal would be to normalize censorship at DNS level. Sony has tried (>2 years ago) by taking Quad9 to court over a copyright matter. There are too many parties involved for whom this practice would be a useful tool to have.
Since archive.is doesn’t scan the internet and only archives content on demand, those might as well have been planted exactly for this purpose - which would put another crime onto the accuser.
It’s a reasonable possibility to consider given the evidence of bad faith, the factually incorrect claims, the apparent impersonation of a lawyer, and the apparent history of targeting using similar claims but “different” claimants.
False flag attacks are a thing that wannabe censors do.
They post CSAM to some service/site, then immediately report it to every possible contact of the site's hosting provider, DNS provider, DDoS protection provider, etc. But not the site itself.
Before they do that, they spend weeks probing the site's moderation response, to work out the best time to evade detection on the site itself.
Then they do it again, and again, and again. They fight against the site's attempt to block them.
Their intent is to _deliberately_ get the site into trouble, and ultimately get the site's hosting, DNS, peering, etc. to abandon it.
The same sort of shitstains also persistently DDoS the site.
Why do they do it? Usually minor and petty internet squabbles, the instigator hates the site and wants to destroy the site, and uses these underhand tactics to do it.
They have no legal way to get what they want -- destroy someone else's site for their own pleasure -- so they use illegal ways. https://protectthestack.org/
I don’t understand this attack, are these reports anonymous or something?
In order to pull off this attack the attacker would have to have a collection of CSAM to upload. What if the site being attacked logged the uploader’s IP and went above-and-beyond complying with authorities and provided the source of the upload.
Well, I guess some people doing this sort of thing would try to hide their identity while doing the upload. Honestly, in that case… it might be reasonable for sites to not accept uploads via things like TOR, right? (Or however else these people hide their tracks).
People who have money to rent DDoS services from criminals also have money to rent VPNs that use US residential IP addresses (usually from home computers infected with malware under the control of criminals)
Probably not EU grant bureaucrat nepotistic corruption: all we have so far is A) FBI involvement B) el cheapo fake organization, claiming they are French, with a lowrent pressure campaign on behalf of commercial entities.
Smells like freedom fries to me (am American myself)
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