This seems to be an internet meme, because it's repeated in every discussion on this topic but I never see any citation for it.
It also doesn't seem to hold up to scrutiny - even if the initial packing of the vehicle holds everything in place, what happens once a few packages are removed?
The biggest risk from space garbage is that the small stuff is not trackable, so at any point it could slam into satellites or, god forbid, people or space stations. It's going fast enough that despite being small this would have dreadful consequences.
Larger items can be tracked, and therefore can be avoided, so they don't pose a risk any more than non-junk large items like other satellites and so on. There's quite a lot of room so if you know where things are it's not hard to avoid them.
Some amount of garbage is sadly unavoidable at this point in our development of space travel. For example many rockets are multi stage and jettison those stages, farings to protect satellites are jettisoned, and so on. That all falls into the "large and trackable" category so it's not a terrible problem, at least not yet. So the main current strategy for avoiding creating problems is to avoid creating small garbage, and people work very hard at that - being careful not to lose tools or even a single nut or bolt.
And yes, before you mention it, "lots of room" is a relative statement and this is not an infinitely sustainable strategy. But people are working on methods to capture and clean up garbage, and as those get more feasible we'll be able to go and clean up all this large garbage that we are tracking. So even with a long-term perspective, the large stuff is less of a problem.
Also, to prove a rocket you need to have a dummy payload of some kind. Whatever you think about the stunt of using a Tesla as that dummy payload, there was going to be a payload of some kind however that decision went. The fact it was a car doesn't change the collision risk or debris amount compared to using a mass simulator.
Windows doesn't have fine-grained permissions for adding to or changing certificate stores, though. When you run "mkcert -install" you'll get a generic prompt for mkcert requiring admin permissions, not a prompt for it changing certificate stores.
I believe the point is that any software asking for admin could fiddle with your certificate stores, so there's no sense in asking for a higher standard of integrity from software that tells you it will do so.
> Windows doesn't have fine-grained permissions for adding to or changing certificate stores, though.
From quick testing, in a non-elevated prompt, I can edit my local users trust store, but not the machine wide one. In an elevated prompt, I'm allowed to edit both. Seems like there are different permissions for different stores to me. (I haven't tested if any browser considers the user store, if they don't it's not very relevant for this specific use case. If I remember right, which browser wants certificates presented how was kind of a hassle)
Counter-point, I haven't had a single Apple keyboard fail on me yet (although I do not own the new Macbook, so I don't have the dreadful one) and my Matias broke after just 1 year.
Matias talks a good game, but we bought 30 of their keyboards and they didn’t last very long. We had much better luck with Logitech. Also, we are batting a 1000 on broken butterfly keyboards. It is really disappointing and frankly the feel of the things is awful.
Matias? Keys just stopped working. We cleaned them (we have people who are trained techs) and they still just stopped working. Two of the keyboards just stopped working for everything. It was weird. Plus they were really cheapish build quality.
It's a tradeoff between usability and security, and each site should make their own decision about what is right for them.
It obviously makes attacks like the one in the article easier, but there are other ways to mitigate that.
An example often given for when revealing an email is registered would definitely be bad is dating website and pornography websites - where identifying someone is a member alone could be embarrassing or compromising.
Outside of such scenarios, websites may decide the increased conversion from a more streamlined registration process and lower numbers of support requests for login issues outweigh the marginal security gains from hiding that information.
If people are using it, not paying attention, with the expectation that it will beep to tell you to take over that's a big problem. In situations like this divider issue it won't beep, it thinks everything is fine right up until it rams you into a stationary object. I think people may not be fully aware of all the potential failure modes of this tech?
The difference is (according to the article) that there is an abundance of objects at 0mph - signs, litter, barriers - so the system filters all of these out to avoid constantly braking. There is no such abundance of ignorable items going at 20mph.
I don't think any item is "ignorable" if you are about to run directly into it. I get that the computer might not be able to track every road sign or object to the left or right of the car.
Still do you want your car to directly hit a sign, litter or barrier? Why not have a second smaller system like the backup warning sensors most cars have to avoid hitting non-movable objects taller than 6 inches?
But in curves (or directly before them) you have plenty of stationary items that you appear to happily drive into in a few seconds. They're right ahead, after all.
Also note that despite all the hype surrounding those features you're still supposed to pay attention as a driver. Marketing and manuals tell very different stories here and the liability question is purely answered by the latter.
It also doesn't seem to hold up to scrutiny - even if the initial packing of the vehicle holds everything in place, what happens once a few packages are removed?